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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with the legal theory behind environmental rights.
There are a number of different approaches that deploy rights as a
mechanism to bring about environmental protection within international
law, all of which can be termed ‘environmental rights’. These include a
human right to a healthy environment and procedural environmental rights.
But there are also theories that support a more innovative or extensive use
of legal rights for protecting the natural world. Notably, many of these
theories concern the introduction of nonhuman rights (animal rights or
rights of nature). This thesis investigates the theory behind and the
practical structure of these various approaches, as well as analysing the
very concept of ‘rights’.
The original contribution to knowledge is threefold. I present a case for a
human right to a healthy environment to be defined broadly: measured
according to human and ecosystem health, and conceived as a right of
both individuals and peoples; I rigorously apply both Interest Theory and
Hohfeld’s analysis of rights to human rights and thus construct a clear
model for the structure of the sort of rights found in human rights (termed
‘vital rights’); and I extend the philosophical theory behind human rights
(and in particular the concept of dignity) towards the growing field of rights
of nature.
Considered holistically, the thesis presents and suggests modes of thinking
that seek to soften the divide between humanity and nature. This is done
through a consideration of lived experience as always already ecologically
embedded. As a result, the subject of vital rights (human rights included)
should be understood as ecologically embedded living beings, opening the
door to both nonhuman rights and new fields for human rights.
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines how rights can be used to protect the natural world 
within international law. To this end, it surveys, analyses and critiques 
environmental human rights, nonhuman rights (of both organisms and 
ecosystems), and the structure of rights themselves. It deploys the 
concept of dignity – the foundation of contemporary international human 
rights law – to bind these three aspects together. That dignity is neither a 
solely individual nor an exclusively human trait will be demonstrated 
through an examination of the content of human rights and by developing 
a conceptualisation of dignity that sits alongside related concepts from 
both scientific and philosophical ecological thought.  
The thesis is a doctrinal analysis. The inherently multifaceted nature of 
environmental rights requires drawing from a wide range of sources.  
Existing international law, relevant legal and ecological theory, and 
emerging legal principles are used to examine and critique the pathways 
available for environmental rights. Whilst there will inevitably be facets of 
environmental rights that lie beyond its frame, the varied subject matter of 
the thesis means that it will have a wide reach. 
The thesis is based around an observation, a realisation, and a suggestion. 
It observes that rights have a particularly potent normative force; realises 
that this potency could be deployed in order to further the goals of 
environmental law; and suggests that this can best take place by 
understanding the subjects of rights (whether they be human or 
nonhuman) in an ecologically embedded way. The observation and 
2 
 
realisation generate the central question of the thesis: how can rights be 
used to protect the natural world through international law? The 
suggestion demarcates where answers to this question lie: in a broadly 
defined human right to a healthy environment, and in rights of 
ecosystems.  
This introductory chapter will explore the nature of rights in order to 
demonstrate that it is worth investigating how rights can be used to 
protect the natural world. 
RIGHTS IN LAW AND MORALITY 
Rights are the primary legal tool discussed and analysed in this thesis. In 
order to discuss and analyse how rights can be used to protect the natural 
world within international law, this introduction will clarify (i) why rights 
form a focal point of the thesis; (ii) which rights in particular will be under 
consideration; and (iii) who those rights belong to. This is necessary 
because the word ‘right’ has a number of meanings,1 and so it is important 
to be clear regarding exactly what sort of rights this thesis is concerned 
with. 
The rights under consideration in this thesis are the sort of rights found in 
international human rights law (IHRL). This introduction will demonstrate 
that rights have a particular normative force that arises through their 
connection to both legal and moral discourse, and that this force manifests 
itself most potently within the framework of IHRL. At the outset, it is worth 
                                       
1 Chapter 4.1 (§4.1). 
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being clear about what is meant by both ‘law’ and ‘morality’ within the 
confines of this thesis.  
Firstly, the domain of law under consideration is international law: the set 
of norms and principles that have been accepted by the international 
community as governing relations between states, and between states and 
other international actors. Although this thesis is ultimately concerned with 
international law, legal principles more generally will be relied on as and 
when appropriate, since international law is a subset of law as a whole.2 
For example, jurisprudential analyses of ‘rights’ will be used in this thesis 
even if they have been performed with other domains of law in mind.  
The concept of morality employed in this thesis3 also refers to a set of 
norms and principles. People and societies adhere to these because they 
believe them to be ethically correct and indicative of appropriate behaviour. 
Moral norms and principles set out a code of conduct that determine and 
guide whether certain behaviour is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, ‘desirable’ or 
‘undesirable’, according to some underpinning theory.4 Unlike international 
law, there is no single definitive set of norms and principles that ‘morality’ 
                                       
2 See David Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (7th edn, OUP 2010) 
1-9. Consider also Article 38(1)(c) ICJ Statute, which states that general principles 
of law apply to international law. 
3 For other definitions, see ‘morality’, The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy 
(Penguin 1996). 
4 Bernard Gert and Joshua Gert, ‘The Definition of Morality’ in Edward Zalta (ed), 
The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 edn) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/morality-definition/> 
(accessed 14/5/2016). 
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necessarily refers to.5 The fact that there are many different versions of 
morality does not mean that moral codes necessarily lack precision in 
themselves, but rather that there are many different such codes.  
Both law and morality thus entail the formulation of rules regarding which 
actions must, or must not, be performed.6 These two systems of norms (ie 
international law and morality) may hold principles and rules in common,7 
but they remain distinguishable codes. Furthermore, the precise nature of 
the relationship between (international) law and morality is dependent on 
the underpinning theory of morality under consideration. 
The underpinning theory of morality adopted by this thesis does not 
restrict ‘morality’ to a narrow or restrictive domain whereby only humans 
can be beneficiaries of the norms and principles it embodies. Although it 
may be only humans that can have their actions regulated by morality8 – 
and it is human duties that this thesis is concerned with – there is no a 
priori reason why morality should only be concerned with how actions 
affect humans. In short, even if only humans can be moral agents, this 
does not mean that only humans are moral patients.9 
                                       
5 ibid. cf Article 38(1) ICJ Statute. 
6 Or should, or should not, be performed. Note that international law commitments 
are sometimes phrased using the word ‘should’ rather than ‘shall’. 
7 Harris (n2) 1-2. 
8 Although this claim is, at best, only valid within human codes of morality since 
there is evidence that nonhuman moral codes exist: see Margaret Gruter, ‘The 
origins of legal behavior’ (1979) 2 J Social Biol Struct 43, 46-48; Chris Robinson, 
‘Biological Foundations of Human Rights’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Human Rights Law (OUP 2015) 60-68, 76-77. 
9 See Paola Cavalieri, The Animal Question (OUP 2001) 28-29. 
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The notion of morality employed in this thesis is based on  theories of 
environmental ethics, which frequently extend the moral community far 
beyond the human to include a wide variety of lifeforms.10 Importantly, 
such theories have already contributed to the shape and content of 
international law: the clearest example of this is the World Charter for 
Nature, in which the UN General Assembly affirmed that it was “convinced 
that … every form of life is unique, warranting respect regardless of its 
worth to man, and, to accord other organisms such recognition, man must 
be guided by a moral code of action”.11 Recognition of the moral value of 
nonhumans can also be found within binding international law, such as the 
Convention on Biological Diversity,12 whose opening recital states that it is 
                                       
10 See eg Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (OUP 1949); Arne Naess, ‘The 
Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement’ (1973) 16 Inquiry 95; 
Richard Sylvan, ‘Is There a Need for a New, An Environmental, Ethic?’ (1973) 1 
Proceedings of the XV World Congress of Philosophy, Varna, Bulgaria 205; John 
Rodman, ‘The Liberation of Nature?’ (1977) 20 Inquiry 83; Bill Devall and George 
Sessions, Deep Ecology (Gibbs Smith 1985); Paul Taylor, Respect for Nature 
(Princeton University Press 1986); Holmes Rolston III, Environmental Ethics 
(Temple University 1988); Warwick Fox, Toward A Transpersonal Ecology (SUNY 
Press 1990); Val Plumwood, ‘Nature, Self, and Gender: Environmental Philosophy, 
and the Critique of Rationalism’ (1991) 6 Hypatia 3; Bryan Norton, Toward Unity 
Among Environmentalists (OUP 1991); Freya Mathews, The Ecological Self 
(Routledge 1991); Robin Attfield and Andrew Belsey (eds), Philosophy and the 
Natural Environment (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 36, CUP 1994); 
Gary Varner, In Nature’s Interests? (OUP 1998); J Baird Callicott, Beyond the Land 
Ethic (SUNY Press 1999); Andrew Light and Holmes Rolston III (eds) 
Environmental Ethics (Blackwell 2003); Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought 
(HUP 2010); Patrick Curry, Ecological Ethics (Polity Press 2011); Alexander 
Gillespie, International Environmental Law, Policy, and Ethics (2nd edn, OUP 2014).  
11 (1982) UNGA Resolution A/RES/37/7, Preamble. The WCN is an example of ‘soft 
law’, which falls within the scope of ‘international law’ considered in this thesis, in 
particular since soft law is in widespread use and of considerable significance 
within international environmental law: Patricia Birnie et al, International Law & 
the Environment (3rd edn, OUP 2009) 34-37. 
12 (1992) 1760 UNTS 79. 
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“conscious of the intrinsic value of biodiversity”. These instruments13 
demonstrate the overlaps between law and morality. They also 
demonstrate the appropriateness of understanding the category of moral 
patients as extending beyond the human, especially as this thesis enquires 
into how international law can use rights to protect the natural world, 
which necessarily encompasses nonhumans. The first step in this process 
is to detail why rights are worth considering in the first place. 
WHY RIGHTS? 
In his thought experiment of Nowheresville, Joel Feinberg imagines a world 
without rights.14 He postulates a society that has similar legal rules and 
compatible moral attitudes to ours, but specifically lacks the legal tool of a 
right. Feinberg points out that legal duties exist in Nowheresville, but that 
they are owed to ‘the Law’ or to God.15 Yet Feinberg argues that there is 
something missing, and that the “absence [of rights] is morally 
important”.16 The implication is that rights are not simply legal tools, but 
carry moral heft too: the term ‘rights’ refers to “legal entitlements as well 
as to moral responsibilities”.17 This section will detail the important role 
that ‘rights’ play within both morality and law. 
                                       
13 As well as others, see §3.4. 
14 Joel Feinberg, ‘The Nature and Value of Rights’ (1970) 4 The Journal of Value 
Inquiry 243, reprinted in Patrick Hayden (ed), The Philosophy of Human Rights 
(Paragon 2001).  
15 ibid 176-79. 
16 ibid 179. 
17 Costas Douzinas and Conor Gearty, ‘Introduction’ in Conor Gearty and Costas 
Douzinas (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Human Rights Law (CUP 2012) 1. 
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MORAL RIGHTS 
Feinberg is not alone in arguing that there is an important moral function 
contained within the term ‘right’. For example, Neil MacCormick argues 
that there is “a significant difference between asserting that every child 
ought to be cared for, nurtured, and, if possible, loved, and asserting that 
every child has a right to care, nurture, and love”.18 MacCormick’s point is 
that using the language of ‘rights’ generates a more powerful and urgent 
moral argument than can otherwise be achieved. HLA Hart agrees with this 
assessment, believing that “the expression ‘a right’ has a specific force and 
cannot be replaced by … other moral expressions [such as wrong, proper 
or ill-treatment]”.19 The moral potency that comes alongside the language 
of ‘rights’ has resulted in a situation whereby “rights dominate modern 
understanding of what actions are permissible and which institutions are 
just”.20 
The difference between rights-language and other normative language is 
that rights invoke a particular potency through their sense of urgency and 
seriousness. Furthermore, MacCormick believes that “it is morally 
important that we should recognise the moral importance and the 
significance of moral rights”.21 The concept of ‘rights’ is thus not only 
relevant to morality, but in fact plays a key role within it: rights indicate 
                                       
18 Neil MacCormick ‘Children’s Rights’ in Legal Right and Social Democracy (OUP 
1984) 154, 158-59. 
19 HLA Hart, ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’ (1955) 64 The Philosophical Review 
175, 181. 
20 Leif Wenar, ‘Rights’ in Zalta (n4, Fall 2015 edn). 
21 MacCormick (n18) 158. 
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particularly important and significant moral norms. LW Sumner 
summarises this role of rights by noting that “rights function normatively 
as relatively insistent or peremptory moral considerations”.22 Rights have 
an elevated moral force, the use of which is reserved for particularly 
important moral matters. 
The function of rights as indicators of particularly important matters 
bestows on them a distinct rhetorical power. This rhetorical power is often 
seized on by those campaigning for social and legal change because the 
language of ‘rights’ provides a powerful way to immediately imbue the 
issue under consideration with moral urgency. For example, movements 
for ‘civil rights’ in 1960’s America, for ‘women’s rights’ in 1920’s Britain, or 
for ‘animal rights’ today have all deployed the language of rights, even 
though the very lack of legal rights forms part of their concern.  
‘Rights’ identify where an issue of moral urgency (and potentially an 
accompanying legal lacuna) lies: ‘X has, or ought to have, a right to Y’. 
Furthermore, the rhetorical power found simply in the language of the 
word ‘right’ automatically adds considerable weight to any associated 
demands.23 Rights can both describe a better world (one where ‘X does 
have a right to Y’), and capture the urgency of demands for that world. 
Given that “getting law on your side is what all activists for a particular 
point of view pine for”,24 rights provide a neat mechanism for doing this: 
                                       
22 LW Sumner, The Moral Foundation of Rights (Clarendon 1987) 12. 
23 In this regard note the difference between claim-rights and power-rights §4.3. 
24 Conor Gearty, Can Human Rights Survive? (CUP 2006) 66. 
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they both describe a desirable legal relation and call for its establishment 
or upholding. In this way, rights can reach beyond the ‘now’ of law to the 
‘not-yet’ of justice.25 The legal character of rights also merits consideration. 
LEGAL RIGHTS 
Rights are also manifestly central to the legal domain. Indeed, the word for 
‘law’ and the word for ‘right’ is the same in a number of European 
languages (German Recht, French droit, Italian diritto) attesting to the 
central importance of rights to law. It is worth examining what it is about 
‘rights’ that makes them a useful weapon in the arsenal of the modern 
lawyer. 
As well as elucidating the moral character of rights, Feinberg’s thought-
experiment also reveals something crucial about the legal role of rights. 
Feinberg’s most significant observation for the purposes of this thesis is 
that, without rights, the notion of a duty being owed (ie being due) to a 
particular entity (viz the right-holder) is lost.26 The fact that legal duties do 
not exist in abstracto (as they do in Nowheresville), but are owed to a 
particular entity is crucially captured by the notion of a right: “rights 
belong to people, they exist only with the support of a subject”.27 A right is 
vested in a right-holder. 
                                       
25 Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights (Hart 2000) 40. 
26 Feinberg (n14) 177-79. Feinberg also believes that the ‘activity of claiming’ 
(179) is crucial to rights. However, this confuses claim-rights and power-rights, 
and in particular the difference between having a (Hohfeldian) claim and making a 
claim. See §4.3. 
27 Douzinas (n25) 233, though one must interpret the word ‘people’ here broadly.  
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This important legal role of rights is drawn out in Finnis’ comparison 
between ius and rights.28 The Roman concept of ius, parsed by Finnis as 
“the what’s fair”,29 functioned without the legal tool of a right. This is 
because ‘what is fair’ need not be owed to a particular right-holder, but 
can instead be justified as being a matter of God’s will,30 of pietas,31 or of 
duties to a Volksgemeinschaft.32 Rights, on the other hand, are vested in 
specific subjects and so demonstrate that fairness (or rightness) is not 
simply a general duty, but a duty owed to that specific subject: “ordinary 
language-speakers and lawyers in all modern languages … think of ‘a right’ 
as something beneficial which a person has (a ‘moral [including legal] 
quality’)”.33  
Finnis’ analysis leads him to assert that “the modern idiom of rights is 
more supple and, by being more specific in its standpoint or perspective, is 
capable of being used with more differentiation and precision than the pre-
modern use of ‘the right’ (ius)”.34 In particular, the purpose of a modern 
                                       
28 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 205-10. See 
also Douzinas (n25) 48-50, 61-72. 
29 Finnis (n28) 206. 
30 Douzinas (n25) 54, 150; Exodus 20:1-17. 
31 “An attitude of respect towards an ancestor, institution etc” that drove Aeneas’ 
actions in the Aeneid: ‘pietas’, Shorter OED (6th edn, OUP 2007).  
32 ‘Folk community’, used to express the National Socialist concept of unification. 
Note that it is possible in each of these cases to consider ‘God’ etc as the ‘right-
holder’, though such a perspective misses an important justification for the 
existence of a duty. See §4.3; §5.3.1. 
33 Finnis (n28) 208. 
34 ibid 209, emphasis removed.  
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right can be identified through this ‘standpoint or perspective’: a right 
exists to benefit the right-holder.35  
The precision that rights afford in identifying to whom duties are owed 
makes them ideal tools for this thesis. Through an investigation of the 
function of rights, the thesis will go on to argue that rights are grounded in 
interests of right-holders. Rights do not only identify to whom duties are 
owed but can even assist in determining why those duties exist: to protect 
interests. This will allow the thesis to investigate the possibility of new 
nonhuman legal right-holders through consideration of the interests of 
nonhumans. 
Rights are vested in a right-holder to whom duties are owed. As such, 
rights have two perspectives: they can be viewed either through the eyes 
of the right-holder, or through the eyes of the duty-bearer. The first 
perspective demonstrates why a right exists: rights exist for the sake of 
the right-holder, not merely for the sake of ‘what’s fair’. The second 
perspective reveals that rights have normative force: if a right exists, then 
a duty must be performed. 
* 
Rights are crucial to the functioning of modern law thanks to their creation 
of ‘right-holders’ to whom duties are owed; and they allow the 
identification of important moral issues. As such, rights have more than 
one ‘character’: they exist within the law, as elementary components 
                                       
35 See discussion of Interest Theory in §5.4-5.5. 
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central to law’s functioning, and they exist beyond the law as signposts of 
morally important issues. Rights are thus powerful weapons in the arsenal 
of both the lawyer and the campaigner that bridge between the related 
domains of law and morality. 
WRONG RIGHTS? 
That rights are of great value within both law and morality does not mean 
that they lack drawbacks. Two critiques of rights that are particularly 
relevant to this thesis are those of legalism and individualism. As identified 
by Conor Gearty, the critique of legalism is concerned with “the dangers 
inherent in the successful entrenching of the term ‘human rights’ in law 
and legal discourse”.36 Gearty looks at what happens after the language of 
rights has been successfully deployed to demand and effect legal reform: 
what happens when the moral rhetoric of ‘rights’ becomes packaged into 
legal structures?  
The central problem that Gearty identifies of having rights enshrined in the 
law is that “custodianship of the idea [of rights] moves from the political to 
the legal sphere, from the NGOs, the MPs and so on to the judges and the 
lawyers”.37 This gives judges control over the content and the meaning of 
rights, which they may not exercise in the same emancipatory spirit that 
led to the establishment of the rights in the first place.38  
                                       
36 Gearty (n24) 61, see also 60-99. 
37 ibid 71. See also Douzinas (n25) 8, 12, 119-20, 175, 229ff. 
38 See Gearty’s historical examples of judges exercising their power in 
questionable fashions: Gearty (n24) 76-78. See also Upendra Baxi, ‘Human rights 
in an era of hyper-globalisation’ in Gearty and Douzinas (n17) 156-60. 
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In this way, the legalisation of rights can dislocate them from the political 
communities in which they were born and in which they function, thus 
potentially changing their nature from tools of rhetorical power and moral 
importance accessible to all, to the technical terminology of an unelected 
in-crowd.39 There is a risk that “the rationalism of rights discourse makes 
their formulation so abstract and general as to render them unreal and 
unrealisable”.40 Although all law is susceptible to this potentially 
problematic process, it is particularly serious for rights precisely because of 
their moral importance, which can lead to rights being (incorrectly) 
perceived as static ‘extra-political’ norms41 and so beyond the purview of 
non-legal communities.42 Almost paradoxically, the moral importance of 
rights could lead to the guardians of rights (ie the judges etc) shielding 
them from the very processes (ie societal deliberation) that give them their 
moral importance. 
However, Gearty notes that the problems of legalism can be reduced 
through careful legal design. He cites the UK Human Rights Act as a good 
example because it contains exceptions and caveats that throw the 
adjudication of rights back into the political realm.43 Furthermore, there 
                                       
39 Gearty (n24) 81-82. 
40 Douzinas (n25) 152, 150-53. 
41 Baxi (n38) 161. 
42 Gearty (n24) 72, 84. 
43 ibid 94-96. Some similar exceptions and caveats are also contained in the 
Human Rights Act’s ‘parent’ document within international law, the ECHR. 
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are judicial processes emerging in South Africa44 and South America45 that 
seek to involve and engage, rather than exclude, the political community 
from the legal processes that accompany legal rights. Such participatory 
approaches diminish the threat posed by legalism’s deflation of rights, 
since they open and return rights to society, preventing them being 
trapped within a legalistic discourse. 
Another relevant critique of rights is their perceived individualism. Because 
rights shift focus from the general ‘what’s fair’ to the particular rights of 
the right-holder, the subject of rights can come across as “an isolated 
monad, withdrawn into himself … into the confines of his private interests 
and private caprice, and separated from the community”.46 This Marxist 
critique of rights – one that is also pertinent to ecological critiques47 – 
would hold water if it were impossible for subjects other than individuals to 
be right-holders.48  
                                       
44 Sandra Liebenberg, ‘Participatory Approaches to Socio-Economic Rights 
Adjudication’ (2014) 32 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 312. 
45 César Rodríguez-Garavito, ‘Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial 
Activism on Socio-Economic Rights in Latin America’ (2011) 89 Texas Law Review 
1669. 
46 Karl Marx, ‘On the Jewish Question’ (first published 1844, reprinted in Hayden 
(n14)) 131, 132-33. 
47 See PS Elder, ‘Legal Rights for Nature - The Wrong Answer to the Right(s) 
Question’ (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 285; Prudence Taylor, ‘From 
Environmental to Ecological Human Rights: A New Dynamic in International Law?’ 
(1997-1998) 10 GIELR 309; Mariachiara Tallacchini, ‘Human Right to the 
Environment or Rights of Nature?’ (1997) 67 Archiv fur Recht und Sozial 
Philosophie 125, 125. 
48 See Jeremy Waldron, ‘Nonsense upon Stilts? – a reply’ in Jeremy Waldron (ed), 
Nonsense upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (Methuen 
1987) 183ff. 
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However, this thesis supposes no such technical restriction regarding who 
can have rights. There is nothing in the language of rights per se that 
presumes individualism; it is rather the deployment of rights according to 
an individualistic morality whereby only individuals can have rights that 
perpetuates individualism. This can be avoided by simply adopting a non-
individualistic morality that understands that there are important moral 
issues which cannot be captured through the perspective of the individual, 
and so is open to vesting rights in holders other than individuals.49 An 
additional way in which the individualism of rights can be tempered is 
through acknowledging the social context in which rights operate. This is 
already recognised within IHRL, for example in the European Convention 
on Human Right’s statements that a number of rights can be interfered 
with when this is “necessary in a democratic society”.50  
USING RIGHTS 
Though rights may have shortcomings, they are crucial tools in both the 
development and the functioning of law and morality. In order to see 
further the important position that rights have within both law and morality, 
one can consider a number of characterisations of rights within the 
literature. For example, Dworkin’s classification of “rights as trumps”;51 
Maine’s observation that a legal right “seems to us elementary”;52 Raz’s 
                                       
49 §1.4; §9.6. 
50 (1950) 213 UNTS 222, Article 8(2), Article 9(2), Article 10(2), Article 11(2); 
§2.2.1; §8.2.1.6. 
51 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth 1977) xi. 
52 Cited in HLA Hart, ‘Legal Rights’ in Essays on Bentham (Clarendon 1982) 163. 
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claim that a “special feature” of rights is their “peremptory force”;53 
Douzinas’ analysis that rights “act as if they are the underlying grammar of 
the sentences of law”;54 and Kramer’s noting that there is “political 
prestige attach[ed] to the language of ‘rights’”55 all point towards the fact 
that rights are a driving force behind both law and morality and so worthy 
of consideration as a tool to protect the natural world through international 
law. 
Not all rights exhibit these two characters to the same degree. Some rights 
are primarily legal – such as rights created under a contract; some are 
predominantly moral – such as many current invocations of animal rights. 
But many rights straddle law and morality,56 and although “there is no 
simple identification to be made between moral and legal rights[,] there is 
an intimate connection between the two”.57 A consequence of this intimate 
connection is that in many instances when a right is referred to, what is 
meant is a tool that is both moral and legal. 
 
Rights are central to law, important to morality, and valuable in connecting 
the two together. Together, these features of rights result in them having 
a distinctive and definitive normative force, the existence of which is 
                                       
53 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (OUP 1986) 192. 
54 Douzinas (n25) 246-47. 
55 Mathew Kramer, ‘Rights in Legal and Political Philosophy’ in Keith Wittington et 
al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (OUP 2008) 414, 421. 
56 There is a continuous spectrum between ‘moral rights’ and ‘legal rights’ and 
consequently many different ‘species’ of rights. See §4.1-4.6. 
57 Hart (n19) 177. 
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manifest in all the analyses referred to above. It is precisely this normative 
force that justifies a consideration of the role of rights when (new) legal 
theory is under consideration. In the quest for new, more forceful, ways for 
international law to protect the natural world, an analysis of the role rights 
can play may well turn out to be crucial.58 However, having already seen 
that rights have more than one character, there is a need to be clear about 
exactly which kind of rights are under discussion in this thesis. 
WHICH RIGHTS? VITAL RIGHTS 
The rights under consideration in this thesis are both moral and legal. They 
must be legal, since this is a legal analysis considering tools that 
international law can use to protect the natural world. But they must also 
be moral, since the analysis seeks to make use of the normative force that 
arises through rights’ moral dimension. 
It is possible to narrow the scope of the thesis further by identifying a 
subset of rights that exhibits the normative force of rights in the most 
compelling way. There is a category of rights that have a “special 
character”,59 that are “resistant to trade-offs”60 and are “of paramount 
importance”.61 These rights are “the utopian element behind legal rights”.62 
                                       
58 Focussing on the potential value of rights in this regard does not deny the value 
of other alternative ways to protect the natural world through international law. 
However, the purpose of this thesis is to assess the virtues of one particular 
approach (ie rights) that seems promising. 
59 HRC, General Comment 24, HRI/GEN/1/ (Vol I) [18].  
60 James Griffin, On Human Rights (OUP 2008) 76.   
61 Maurice Cranston, What are Human Rights? (Bodley 1973) 67-68. 
62 Douzinas (n25) 245. 
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These four quotations all refer to those rights found in international human 
rights law (IHRL).63 The rights in question are undeniably both moral and 
legal, as captured by Jürgen Habermas in his characterisation of them as 
“Janus-faced, looking simultaneously toward morality and the law”.64 
Furthermore, such rights have “law-exceeding energies and institutionally 
elevated juridical status”65 because “human rights have a particularly 
potent level of symbolic and rhetorical appeal”.66 It is this particular 
potency that the thesis will tap into as a potential source for new ways to 
protect the natural world through international law.  
It is essential to point out that the thesis is not concerned exclusively with 
IHRL per se, but rather with the particular sort of rights found in IHRL: 
legal rights that have a particularly potent normative force. This difference 
is important because such rights are not the exclusive prestige of IHRL. 
Constitutional rights, for example, also carry a potent moral force above 
and beyond that of rights simpliciter,67 whilst also having a definitive legal 
status. Hart’s analysis of legal rights led him to realise that there is an 
“important deployment of the language of rights by the constitutional 
lawyer … for whom the core of the notion of rights is … basic or 
                                       
63 See also Gearty (n24) 71. 
64 Jürgen Habermas and William Rehg, ‘Remarks on Legitimation Through Human 
Rights’ (1998) 24 Phil & Soc Criticism 157, 161; Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Concept 
of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights (2010) 41 
Metaphilosophy 464, 470. 
65 Anna Grear and Louis Kotzé, ‘An invitation to fellow epistemic travellers’ in Anna 
Grear and Louis Kotzé (eds), Research Handbook on Human Rights and the 
Environment (Elgar 2015) 2. 
66 ibid 1. 
67 Such as legal rights established under a contract. 
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fundamental individual needs”.68 Notwithstanding his unwarranted 
restriction to the needs of individuals, Hart is referring to the same 
category of rights as those found in IHRL. And his characterisation is in fact 
a useful one: these rights seek to protect issues of fundamental, rather 
than merely incidental or circumstantial, moral importance.69  
Although constitutional rights provide a useful comparison, the focus of 
this thesis on international law means that IHRL will remain the 
paradigmatic example of the rights under analysis. To be clear then, the 
rights investigated in this thesis are the sort of rights found in 
contemporary IHRL.  
These rights will be characterised in this thesis as ‘vital rights’.70 This 
terminology is suitable because the word ‘vital’ captures two important 
features of such rights. Vital rights are essential, and they are vested in 
living beings.71 The term ‘vital rights’ is thus a suitable moniker for the sort 
of rights that this thesis will investigate, and will be used with this meaning 
throughout the thesis.  
Having already noted that vital rights are not only found in IHRL, there is 
an important observation to be made for the purposes of this thesis. There 
is no a priori reason why only individual humans can have vital rights. This 
                                       
68 Hart (n52) 193. 
69 See §6.3.2. 
70 See §6.3 for more detailed explanation of this terminology. 
71 See §1.3; §6.3. 
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observation opens up the possibility of a plethora of vital right-holders: 
peoples, nonhuman organisms, ecosystems, even the Earth itself. 
The possibility of using vital rights to protect the natural world is evidenced 
by a number of burgeoning approaches to use them to such an effect.72 
This includes the growth of environmental human rights, and proposals for 
rights of nature. These two topics will form the primary areas of 
substantive discussion in the thesis: human and nonhuman rights 
approaches to environmental protection. Both will be examined in order to 
respond to the research question posed by this thesis, which can now be 
more precisely defined as ‘how can vital rights be used to protect the 
natural world through international law?’  
WHOSE RIGHTS? 
It has already been noted that an important feature of rights is that they 
are specifically vested in a right-holder. Because rights are so vested, their 
content is connected to the nature of the right-holder: as Chapter Five will 
show, rights protect an interest of the right-holder.73 It has also been 
noted that this thesis is open to the possibility of a wide inventory of right-
holders; and it is therefore necessary to make some preliminary remarks 
regarding right-holders themselves. 
There are two connected points to be made in this regard. Firstly, and 
more simply, it is worth re-iterating that although the thesis is open to a 
wide variety of (potential) right-holders, there are some in which it is 
                                       
72 See §2.2; §7.2-7.3. 
73 §5. 
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particularly interested. Currently, humans are the only holders of vital 
rights within international law, and the thesis will initially exploit this 
observation. As such, it will analyse the possibility of using and developing 
IHRL to protect the natural world. In this regard, although the majority of 
human rights belong to individual human beings, there are also a number 
of rights within IHRL that belong to peoples. The thesis acknowledges this 
significant development, as peoples’ rights may turn out to be a 
particularly useful legal construct for responding to environmental 
degradation. 
The thesis is also interested in the possibility of vital rights being vested in 
nonhumans. In the first instance, this opens up the possibility of right-
holding to organisms other than humans. But beyond this, the thesis will 
also investigate the possibility of rights being vested in subjects such as 
ecosystems. There is a useful analogy to be made here between 
individual/group human rights and organism/ecosystem rights of nature, 
which the thesis will draw out. The analogy is not a perfect one (since 
ecosystems are not sets of individuals of a particular species74), but will 
help to develop some theoretical matters regarding the interests of 
individual organisms (including humans) and how these relate to the 
composite entities of which they form a part (including peoples). The 
important observation to note is that peoples’ rights recognise the 
important social dimensions of being human, and that rights of ecosystems 
                                       
74 Though a ‘people’ is more than just a collection of individuals too: they also 
embody common histories, cultures, languages and worldviews: see §1.4; 
§9.6.1(a). 
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could be used to recognise that there are also important ecological 
dimensions of being an organism. 
The reason why the thesis is compelled to look beyond human rights is 
because of their unavoidably anthropocentric focus.75 Anthropocentrism 
means holding humans at the centre of a particular consideration.76 
Claiming that human rights are anthropocentric does not refer to the fact 
that they are created by humans (ie anthropogenic), but rather that they 
exist for the sake of humans. Since rights are vested in their holders, their 
holders are necessarily at the centre of their (moral and legal) 
consideration. It is important to note that no matter how the subject of 
human rights is conceptualised, whilst it is a human that is the holder of a 
right, it is to that human that the consequent duties are owed. Rights of 
humans are therefore unavoidably anthropocentric. 
The second point to be made concerning the subjects of rights under 
consideration in this thesis is somewhat more complex. As well as asking 
‘who is the right-holder?’, we must also ask ‘how is this right-holder 
conceptualised?’. This is necessary because of the nature of the rights 
discussed in this thesis – ie vital rights. Vital rights protect issues that are 
of essential importance to the holder (their ‘vital interests’77). Knowing 
what is of vital importance to a particular right-holder requires 
                                       
75 §3.4. 
76 ‘anthropocentric’, Shorter OED (6th edn, OUP 2007). See Peter Burdon, ‘The 
Great Jurisprudence’ in Peter Burdon (ed), Exploring Wild Law (Wakefield 2011) 
59-60. 
77 §6.2-6.3. 
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understanding the nature of said subject, and so how (potential) right-
holders are conceptualised becomes a significant theme for the thesis.  
In this regard, it will be seen that the content of human rights has enriched 
alongside developments in understanding of the nature of human nature. 
In investigating how IHRL can be used to protect the natural world, the 
underpinning theoretical question is whether IHRL has encompassed an 
enriched enough view of the human rights subject for IHRL to provide 
suitable levels of protection to the natural world.  
As just noted, IHRL will be hampered in this task by its unavoidable 
anthropocentrism. Part III of the thesis therefore responds to this 
limitation of human rights by considering nonhuman vital rights. Since the 
content of any such rights must be based on the ‘vital interests’ of 
organisms and/or ecosystems, the thesis must develop an understanding 
of what these interests are. This requires a careful consideration of the 
nature of organisms and ecosystems.  The thesis will therefore develop a 
relational-ecological ontology both as a response to the limitations seen in 
Part I, and also in response to the deeply relational nature of the natural 
world. This ontology describes living organisms as always already 
ecologically embedded, composed as much of relations as of matter. It also 
conceives of the natural world as amenable to a number of perspectived 
descriptions. For example, ecosystems and organisms are equally primary 
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manifestations of the natural world. There is no definitive answer to the 
question ‘which came first: the organism or the ecosystem?’.78  
It is worth pointing out at this juncture that even if IHRL were to 
understand its human subjects in line with the ontology developed in Part 
III (ie as ecologically embedded organisms), then it still cannot escape its 
unavoidable anthropocentrism. A re-imagining of the human rights subject 
can take place in an ecological context, but it cannot re-orientate the 
direction of the duties arising through human rights. These are inevitably 
owed to humans, and human rights are inevitably anthropocentric, even if 
understanding of the anthropos changes. 
Nonhuman rights offer a potential solution to this problem because here 
the legal duty, and the connected moral obligation, is owed to a nonhuman 
right-holder. Understanding the interactions (or indeed intra-actions79) 
between organisms and their ecosystems (and indeed ecosystems and 
their organisms) is necessary in order to develop the most fitting legal 
structure for nonhuman rights.  
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis will proceed in three Parts, each with three Chapters. Part I of 
the thesis will survey and analyse human rights approaches to 
environmental protection; Part III will survey and analyse nonhuman rights 
approaches to environmental protection. These two parts will contain the 
main responses to the research question (how can rights be used to 
                                       
78 Michel Jacob Morange, Life Explained (Yale University Press 2008) 108.  
79 §9.4.1. 
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protect the natural world through international law?). Connecting these 
two approaches, Part II will conduct an analytical exposition of rights, 
which will improve understanding of the structure and function of vital 
rights. 
Part I begins by establishing some key features of IHRL. In particular, 
Chapter One identifies IHRL as a method by which humans and peoples 
have received international legal personality, demonstrating the flexibility 
that international law exhibits in this regard. It also investigates the 
developing content of IHRL in order to demonstrate that the subject of 
IHRL is conceived of as a real-life physically embodied and socially 
embedded living being, rather than simply a legal persona. The chapter 
also introduces the concept of dignity, which serves as both metric and 
justification within IHRL. In other words, dignity both captures what 
constitutes human suffering and flourishing, and why the former should be 
prevented and the latter promoted. A significant consequence of the 
embedded nature of the human rights subject is that this flourishing 
happens in community, as acknowledged by IHRL through, inter alia, 
group rights. 
Direct analysis of how IHRL can be used to protect the natural world takes 
place in Chapter Two. In particular, the chapter will analyse a human 
right to environment. The central themes considered are the right’s 
definition, its actors, and its duties. None of the matters raised within 
these themes are trivial, but a particularly significant matter is defining the 
content of the right: even once identified as a ‘right to a healthy 
environment’, there is still room for manoeuvre regarding how this can be 
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understood. The chapter will argue that a ‘healthy environment’ should be 
understood broadly: multiple reference points should be used to determine 
what counts as a ‘healthy environment’ in terms of both human health and 
ecosystem health. 
Chapter Three investigates some theoretical concerns regarding the 
justification of a human right to environment. The three key challenges in 
this regard are its compatibility with IHRL, its potential redundancy, and 
the anthropocentric focus of human rights. Although all of these pose 
searching questions, it is anthropocentrism that most severely limits the 
value of using human rights for environmental protection. Human rights, 
as they are vested in humans, are unavoidably anthropocentric. This 
motivates the thesis’ subsequent exploration of nonhuman rights. 
Before doing so however, an enquiry must take place into the nature of 
‘rights’ themselves. Part II thus marks a change of tack: it analyses rights 
in order to determine whether rights technically can be vested in 
nonhumans, and what the function of these rights might be. Based on the 
Hohfeldian schemata of rights, Chapter Four analyses the concept of 
rights from a formal standpoint. It demonstrates the logical distinctions 
between claim-rights, duties and power-rights (inter alia), and constructs a 
model for the structure of vital rights. Vital rights are shown to be complex 
bundles of Hohfeldian positions that are specifically secured by legal rights. 
Building on the foundations of the previous chapter, Chapter Five 
considers what rights do. This entails investigating the merits of Will 
Theory and Interest Theory. It will be shown that Will Theory is too 
restrictive to explain the function of both rights and vital rights: not least 
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because autonomy (the helmsman of Will Theory) is an unsuitable 
substitute for dignity as the foundation for vital rights. Interest Theory 
must therefore be preferred in providing a description of rights’ function: 
rights protect interests of the right-holder. 
Chapter Six examines more closely the nature of vital rights. It first 
explains that vital rights are vital in two senses of the word: they are 
vested in living beings and they protect what is essential to these living 
beings. That is, vital rights are grounded in the essential interests of living 
beings (‘vital interests’). The chapter then re-visits the notion of dignity 
due to the important observation that vital rights protect both dignity 
(rhetorically) and interests (functionally). It will argue that insight can be 
gained into the nature of dignity by understanding it as being specified 
through ‘vital interests’.  
These observations are taken to their logical conclusion in Part III’s 
investigation of nonhuman rights. Chapter Seven sets the scene by 
surveying attempts to have nonhuman rights recognised. The diversity of 
nonhuman rights will become apparent: they can be attached to individual 
organisms or ecosystems as a whole; they can protect a variety of 
interests; and they can be established through the judiciary or through 
legislation. Because of this diversity of nonhuman rights approaches, the 
thesis will use the Interest Theory approach developed in Part II (whence 
vital rights are grounded in the essential interests of living beings) in order 
to stabilise the foundations of nonhuman rights and to link them to IHRL. 
This will allow for greater clarity over the justification and content of 
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nonhuman rights. The following two chapters use this chapter as a foothold 
for their theoretical consideration of nonhuman rights. 
Chapter Eight is primarily concerned with the content of rights. It 
constructs a list of eight vital interests that are protected by IHRL, and 
then demonstrates the presence of these vital interests outside the human 
genus. Having shown that (at least some) nonhumans have (at least some) 
vital interests, the chapter then returns to the concept of dignity to see 
whether it can be meaningfully applied to nonhumans. In order to do this, 
the chapter compares the concepts of vital interests, intrinsic value and 
dignity in order to show that having dignity can be parsed as having a vital 
interest additional to the one in continued biological functioning. This is 
because it is not just mere survival that matters to something with dignity, 
the kind of life matters too: those with dignity should not suffer but 
flourish. 
The thesis concludes by arguing that all living organisms have a vital 
interest in forming ecological communities in Chapter Nine. This interest 
arises because organisms (the subjects of vital rights) are ecologically 
embedded and so their flourishing happens in ecological community. This 
is a result of the deeply relational nature of living systems. The presence of 
this interest opens the door to nonhuman dignity and hence the 
establishment of nonhuman vital rights. The chapter also argues that this 
dignity is best protected through vesting rights in ecosystems in a 
comparable fashion to how the socially embedded nature of humans is 
protected through peoples’ rights in IHRL. 
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PART I 
Part I examines how international human rights law (IHRL) can be used to 
protect the natural world. The bulk of Part I is concerned with the concept 
of a human right to a healthy environment, as it is the most direct way to 
use IHRL to protect the natural world.1 However, there are other 
approaches which use the norms, institutions and rhetoric of human rights 
for environmental ends that are clustered alongside this right. These 
include the ‘greening’ of existing human rights and procedural 
environmental rights. All of these together are termed ‘environmental 
human rights’.  
That IHRL already exists entails both advantages and disadvantages for its 
use in environmental contexts. It is already operational, but it may operate 
under certain (at times implicit, unclear and/or unnecessary) standpoints, 
which make extending its reach non-trivial. Part I therefore explores some 
of these standpoints – in particular regarding how the subject of human 
rights is conceived, and the anthropocentric focus of human rights – and 
considers whether and how current IHRL can be deployed or extended to 
respond to environmental concerns. To do this, it will first detail some key 
aspects of human rights and then consider the development of 
environmental human rights within IHRL.  
                                       
1 Note that in this thesis the terms ‘the natural world’ and ‘the environment’ will 
be used interchangeably to mean the living systems found on Earth. The term 
‘environment’ should not necessarily be understood to be referring specifically to 
‘the human’s environment’. See §3.4; §9.4.2.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
HUMAN RIGHTS: AN OVERVIEW 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter situates human rights historically and conceptually, and 
analyses some key aspects of their content and their design. In particular, 
Chapter One will demonstrate that human rights can adapt in response to 
developments in understanding of humans and human nature, and so have 
the potential to address issues related to the state of the natural world. 
The Introduction detailed the potent nature of rights, and in particular of 
the sort of rights found in international human rights law (IHRL). IHRL for 
the sake of this thesis means those rights established and developed by 
the United Nations (UN) and by regional human rights bodies from 1948 
onwards. Part I investigates whether the potency of these rights can be 
used to protect the natural world. Chapter One will set the scene for this, 
and the thesis as a whole, by examining some theoretical aspects of 
human rights in order to allow a fuller understanding of the nature of these 
rights.  
Chapter One will develop understanding of IHRL through a brief historical 
overview; a consideration of the developing content and applicability of 
human rights; and an introduction to the concept of dignity. Together 
these will demonstrate that contemporary IHRL is broader, more flexible, 
and more dynamic than earlier incarnations of human rights. It is this 
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breadth, flexibility and dynamism that renders the idea of using IHRL to 
protect the natural world plausible. 
Two key points made in this chapter are relevant to the thesis as a whole. 
The chapter will demonstrate (i) that international law can create new legal 
subjects and (ii) that the content and the range of application of human 
rights is not fixed. The former result is relevant to the thesis as a whole as 
it opens up the technical possibility of international law creating new, 
nonhuman, right-holders. The latter result has both direct and indirect 
implications. Firstly, it directly demonstrates that IHRL can potentially 
expand further to include environmental matters within its remit. Secondly, 
it demonstrates a developing understanding of the subject of human 
rights, away from a political-legal persona and towards a real-life human 
being. Not only does this present a more receptive legal framework for 
environmental human rights, but it also crucially reveals the increasingly 
‘fleshy’ (ie living, embodied and socially embedded) understanding of the 
human rights subject, opening up the normative possibility of other ‘fleshy’ 
beings having rights.  
At a more general level, the ideas developed in this chapter will 
demonstrate the need for flexible approaches when understanding 
particular concepts such as ‘rights’ and ‘dignity’. It will be seen that 
continuous (rather than discrete) interpretations, and ones which allow a 
number of potentially heterogeneous viewpoints to be held at once, allow 
for deeper analysis. This is because they match more closely to the world 
we live in, which is continuous (in the sense of not being containable in 
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clearly demarcated blocks); relational (in the sense of being axiomatically 
inter-connected); and open to explanation from a number of perspectives.1 
1.2 A VERY BRIEF HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
Human rights, as understood by this thesis, are protected by international 
law. It is therefore worth considering how human rights fit into 
international law as a whole. 
1.2.1 THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Through the nineteenth and into the early twentieth century, public 
international law was primarily one-dimensional: it was concerned almost 
exclusively with the law between nations, operating in a Westphalian 
arrangement. The turn of the century can be considered “the apogee of the 
state-centred phase of international law”.2 Throughout this time, state 
sovereignty ruled supreme: 
Perhaps the most important [implication of the conception 
of a law of nations] is the idea that, because the law of 
nations governs only the relations between States, rulers 
                                       
1 §9. 
2 Robert Kolb, ‘The Protection of the Individual in Times of War and Peace’ in 
Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds), The Oxford Handbook of The History of 
International Law (OUP 2012) 318. Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights (3rd edn, 
OUP 2014) 1-2; Louis Sohn, ‘The New International Law: Protection of the Rights 
of Individuals Rather than States’ (1982) 32 The American University Law Review 
1, 1-9. 
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must therefore be at liberty to govern as they please within 
their respective domains.3 
This ‘hands-off’ approach to domestic affairs in other states meant that the 
international legal community was hardly able to intervene in the internal 
affairs of other states: “a state’s own citizens were almost completely at its 
mercy, and international law had little to say about mistreatment of 
persons by their own government”.4 Furthermore, problems of 
international (or regional) concern had only one possible route for 
resolution – state-centric approaches.5 Herein lies the one-dimensionality 
of international law qua International Law6 in its formative era: in “the 
insistence on the independent nation-State as the fundamental unit”.7 
This fundamental unit of international law was found to be insufficient 
during the twentieth century through two major wars. Under the state-
centric view of international law, “war was seen as an inevitable and 
permanent feature of the inter-state system”,8 yet this view was 
challenged by the atrocities of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945. War could no 
                                       
3 Stephen Neff, ‘A Short History of International Law’ in Malcolm Evans (ed), 
International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 35. See also Antonio Cassese, ‘States’ in 
Fassbender and Peters (n2) 50-52, 65. 
4 Sohn (n2) 9. See also David Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law 
(7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 535. 
5 Sohn (n2) 4, 9. Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights (Hart 2000) 118. 
6 That is, modern International Law as opposed to earlier forerunners of legal 
provisions beyond the domestic. These were in fact less rigid: Fassbender and 
Peters (n2) 5ff; Neff (n3, 4th edn, 2014) 4-8. 
7 Neff (n3) 39. 
8 Neff (n3) 40; cf Dominique Gaurier, ‘Cosmopolis and Utopia’ & Mary O’Connell, 
‘Peace and War’ both in Fassbender and Peters (n2) 250, 272. 
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longer be seen as a mere side-effect and sovereignty as ultimate after the 
horrors of claimed Aryan supremacy, lebensraum and holocausts.9 The 
attempts to rein in the excesses of states through the League of Nations10 
eventually proved abortive, but the developments in international law post-
WWII have prevailed. 
Three key responses arose to Hitler and his allies: the creation of the UN in 
1945; the Nuremberg Trials in 1945-46; and the adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) by the UN in 1948.11 The latter two 
responses both recognised individuals per se as actors within international 
law.12 In so doing, they cemented the international community’s realisation 
that regulating only the interactions between states was insufficient to 
respond adequately to certain matters of international concern. Although 
international law had not ignored the relevance of individuals previously,13 
it was not until the 1940s that a genuine overhaul of the system took 
place.14 The following observation can be seen as the outstanding message 
from Nuremberg: 
                                       
9 Harris (n4) 535. 
10 In particular the Minorities Regime was an important development: Tomuschat 
(n2) 23-26; Janne Nijman, ‘Minorities and Majorities’ in Fassbender and Peters 
(n2) 111-18. 
11 UNGA Resolution A/RES/3/217/A(III). See Johannes Morsink, ‘World War Two 
and the Universal Declaration’ (1993) 15 HRQ 357; Sohn (n2) 9-12. 
12 Sohn (n2) 1; Thomas Buergenthal, ‘The Normative and Institutional Evolution of 
International Human Rights’ (1997) 19 HRQ 703, 703-707, 717-18. 
13 Consider the treatment of aliens, and workers’ rights through the ILO: Kolb (n2) 
332-36; Sohn (n2) 4-7. 
14 Harris (n4) 535. 
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Crimes against International Law are committed by men, 
not by abstract entities [ie states], and only by punishing 
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of 
International Law be enforced.15 
Individuals were not only held to account for international crimes through 
international criminal law, but they were also given ‘rights’ by international 
law. In particular, these rights are found in the so-called ‘International Bill 
of Rights’: the UDHR together with the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)16 and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).17 Through these 
developments in international criminal law and IHRL, the status of 
individuals as actors within the international legal system has been 
confirmed.18 
Through these developments, it is clear that individual human beings now 
have international legal personality. This contrasts with earlier 
International Law, which saw states as the only actors, even if individuals 
where sometimes of concern to the law. Simpson notes that pre-1945 one 
could think of the place of individual humans within the international legal 
system “in much the same way one might fit animals, or trees, or the 
                                       
15 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German War 
Criminals 1946 (1947) 41 AJIL 172, 221. 
16 (1966) 993 UNTS 3. 
17 (1966) 999 UNTS 171. 
18 Buergenthal (n12). International humanitarian law (eg Fourth Geneva 
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949) 75 
UNTS 287) also contributed to this process. 
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environment, into thinking about the existence of domestic law aimed at 
protecting them”.19 This analogy is highly pertinent for this thesis, which 
will go on to explore if a similar adaptation of international law can take 
place to include nonhuman right-holders.  
The key point is that the creation of IHRL demonstrates the ability of 
international law to create new legal subjects. This shows that the idea of 
legal personality is flexible, and not fixed: “(legal) subjectivity, like 
humanity, is an elastic category that can be extended and contracted 
without great difficulty”.20 
1.3 THE DESIGN OF CONTEMPORARY HUMAN RIGHTS 
The emergence of IHRL can be characterised as a response to some of the 
inadequacies of a traditionally state-centric international law.21 However, 
the creation of individual right-holders within international law was neither 
sudden nor unexpected: the signals pointing towards the enshrinement of 
human rights within international law stretch back over centuries.22 
Furthermore, human rights have a long history of forerunners within 
national law (such as the Magna Carta (1215), the English Bill of Rights 
(1689), the US Declaration of Independence (1776), and the French 
Declaration on the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789)). The development of 
                                       
19 AWB Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire (OUP 2001) 93. 
20 Douzinas (n5) 234. 
21 In the spirit, if not the word, of Alan Dershowitz, Rights from Wrongs (Basic 
2004). 
22 Micheline Ishay, The History of Human Rights (University of California Press 
2008); Scott Davidson, Human Rights (Open University Press 1993). 
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‘human rights’ was neither spontaneous nor linear.23 Although currents of 
similarity run through this history, there are also important differences 
between IHRL and its antecedents. This section will consider two important 
distinctions that can be made: differences in the content of human rights 
and differences in the applicability of human rights pre- and post-1948. 
In this regard, Baxi distinguishes between ‘modern’ and ‘contemporary’ 
human rights,24 using the same point of division (ie 1948) as in this 
thesis.25 Baxi argues that contemporary human rights differ from their 
modern predecessors in four key ways.26 Firstly, whereas modern human 
rights were ‘exclusionary’ in their scope of right-holders, contemporary 
rights are ‘inclusionary’: they now belong to humans qua humans, rather 
than some ordained subset of humans. That is, “the modern paradigm of 
human rights … excluded ‘slaves’, ‘heathens’, ‘barbarians’, colonized 
people, indigenous populations, women, children, the impoverished, and 
the ‘insane’ … from those considered worthy of being bearers of human 
rights”.27 Contemporary human rights seek to include these ‘others’ within 
its domain:28 they are vested in all humans, rather than in some humans. 
                                       
23 Ishay (n22); Micheline Ishay (ed), The Human Rights Reader (2nd edn, 
Routledge 2007); Ed Bates, ‘History’ in Daniel Moeckli et al (eds), International 
Human Rights Law (2nd edn, OUP 2014); Tomuschat (n2) ch2; Davidson (n22) 
ch1; Simpson (n19) chs1-5; Neff (n3). 
24 Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (3rd edn, OUP 2008) 48-50. 
25 ibid 49. 
26 ibid 49ff. 
27 ibid 51. 
28 ibid 49. 
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Secondly, their use of language differs: in particular, contemporary rights 
are no longer limited to protecting matters of civil or political concern 
through being “exclusively at the service of the ends of governance”.29 In 
contrast, contemporary human rights are now “endlessly inclusive as far as 
norms and standards of human rights are concerned”.30 This means that 
IHRL can engage with a greater variety of content than modern human 
rights. As such, contemporary human rights are no longer only civil and 
political, but also economic, social, cultural, and in solidarity. 
Thirdly, the “processes of formulation of contemporary human rights are 
increasingly inclusive”.31 The development, authorship and ownership of 
human rights is no longer kept within a closed group, but is open to all. 
This results in a broader, livelier “carnivalistic”32 aspect to contemporary 
human rights whereby indigenous peoples and people with disabilities take 
part in defining their rights, as compared to their “ascetic”33 predecessors, 
whose authorship was “both statecentric and Eurocentric”.34 
Fourthly, contemporary human rights now “[take] human suffering 
seriously”35 (as with war, suffering was accepted as inevitable by modern 
human rights36). As will be seen, taking suffering seriously results in a 
                                       
29 ibid 54, emphasis removed. 
30 ibid 53. 
31 ibid 54, emphasis added. 
32 ibid. 
33 ibid. 
34 ibid, emphasis removed. 
35 ibid 57. 
36 ibid 57-58. 
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markedly different, and indeed enriched, content of contemporary human 
rights when compared to the narrower focus of modern human rights.  
Baxi’s division is useful in this section’s drawing out of some important 
features of the design of contemporary human rights (ie those found in 
IHRL). Assessment of the design of contemporary human rights is 
important as it will reveal how IHRL may be able to address environmental 
concerns, and how IHRL understands and constructs the ‘human rights 
subject’ (ie the subject in which human rights are vested). In particular, 
this section will consider what Baxi describes as the ‘two perplexities’ of 
human rights: “the nature of human nature [and] the question of who is to 
be counted as ‘human’”.37 These will be considered through an examination 
of the content and the breadth of application of IHRL. 
Before doing so however, it is important to make some preliminary 
remarks regarding the ‘human rights subject’. Like human rights 
themselves,38 the human rights subject bridges the two domains of law 
and morality, and how it is understood is ultimately dependent on the 
perspective taken.39 From one perspective, it is clear that the human rights 
subject is a legal subject, since IHRL creates legal rights. This legal subject 
is not the same as an actual human being however: it is a legal 
construction, a persona (ie mask) that a human must wear when engaging 
                                       
37 ibid 51. 
38 §Introduction; §4.2. 
39 And the question asked: §9.5. 
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with the law.40 A different, yet not mutually exclusive, perspective is that 
the human rights subject is not (only) a constructed legal persona, but the 
real-life human being. This is because human rights set out to protect the 
real-life human being: they are vested in humans qua humans and take 
actual human suffering and flourishing seriously.41  
Human rights are legal rights, but they also reach outside technical legal 
rules and principles because they deal with matters that are vital to real-
life human beings. The subject of IHRL thus faces both towards the 
abstract law and towards the fleshy organism: the interplay between these 
two will be seen throughout the following analysis. 
1.3.1 THE DEVELOPING CONTENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
Modern conceptions of human rights were typically justified by and 
focussed on the autonomy and freedom of the individual.42 Their genesis 
was in the liberation of the individual man from the tyrannical oppression 
of first the state of nature and subsequently the sovereign nation state.43 
Such rights, often referred to as ‘rights of man’, were attached to 
politicised beings and were concerned with the protection of a personal 
                                       
40 Anna Grear, ‘Law’s Entities: Complexity, Plasticity and Justice’ (2013) 4 
Jurisprudence 76, 82-83. 
41 infra. 
42 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (first published 1651, Infomotions 2001) 59; John 
Locke, Two Treatises of Government (first published 1689, Yale University Press 
2003) 136; Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (first published 1797, Mary 
Gregor tr, CUP 1991) 24ff; Patrick Hayden (ed), The Philosophy of Human Rights 
(Paragon 2001) 57-147; Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Blackwell 
1974); Jerome Shestack, ‘The Philosophic Foundations of Human Rights’ 20 HRQ 
201, 206-208, 215-17. 
43 See Conor Gearty, Can Human Rights Survive? (CUP 2006) 23, 73-74. 
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sphere of influence away from state interference.44 They issued a domain 
of ‘small-scale sovereignty’45 around the right-holder, in which he could 
govern as he saw fit.  
The content of these modern human rights was thus predominantly 
concerned with the political relationship between a (nominally male: ‘rights 
of man’) right-holder and his government: these rights were dominated by 
civil and political liberties.46 The consequent ‘asceticism’ of modern human 
rights, obsessed with the issue of governance, limited what they could 
protect. However, it has become clear that there is more to being a human 
than political demands,47 and contemporary human rights consequently 
protect a broader array of interests.48 The Second World War in particular 
functioned as a trigger for the international community to re-evaluate 
human suffering and how it must be prevented through human rights with 
“the post-Holocaust and post-Hiroshima/Nagasaki angst register[ing] a 
normative horror at human violation”.49  
Humans’ (potential for) suffering extends beyond the political and into 
other aspects of lived human lives: this became unavoidably evident 
during the Second World War.50 There has since been an enrichment in the 
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content of human rights, which has broadened their scope. Contemporary 
human rights now contain “an agenda of action to improve the lives of the 
peoples of the world, the kind of things we might come up with if we were 
designing Nirvana from scratch”.51 This enrichment of the content of 
contemporary human rights takes human suffering and human flourishing 
seriously. It is worth noting that human flourishing52 is as important to 
human rights as human suffering is. Human rights do not only prevent the 
bad, they also promote the good: 
Human flourishing has been brought by linguistic usage and 
the actions of activist civil society well within the rubric of 
the term human rights. This part of our subject speaks to 
our right to thrive, not only as individuals but also through 
those associations and connections – with family, 
community, culture, national identity and so on – by which 
our humanity is further enriched.53 
1.3.1(A) ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 
A clear example of the development in the content of human rights is the 
inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) in both the UDHR 
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and the ICESCR.54 Unlike modern human rights, which were primarily 
(though not exclusively) concerned with civil and political matters,55 IHRL 
contains rights such as freedom from hunger56 or the right to found a 
family.57 This demonstrates a clear development in the content of human 
rights. Contemporary human rights do not understand and construct 
human rights in a narrow political or legal sense,58 but rather seek to 
reflect the real lives that humans lead: ones where we eat (and so can 
suffer from hunger) and form lasting bonds with others (and so found 
families). They thus endorse the view that human flourishing is not a one-
dimensional political affair.59 This broader understanding of how humans 
flourish has not just developed, but enriched, both the content of IHRL and 
its understanding of the human rights subject. 
ESCR are indeed essential for humans to flourish.60 For example, “the right 
to education is crucial for a person’s self-fulfilment and the development of 
society as a whole”61 as “lack of access to educational opportunities 
typically limits (both absolutely and comparatively) people’s abilities to 
participate fully and effectively in the political and economic life of their 
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country”.62 Self-fulfilment and participation in society are part of what it 
means to flourish as a human.63 Note also the inclusion of rights such as 
the human right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health.64 This right is also of undeniable importance to human flourishing, 
and its recognition within IHRL is a clear indicator of the enriching content 
of human rights: IHRL does not see human suffering and human 
flourishing solely through the lens of governance, but also acknowledges 
the biological, physical and social needs of humans. 
Through the full and proper inclusion of vulnerable communities and the 
challenges they face, IHRL can reach beyond technical legal arrangements 
regarding the legal person, and reach out to prevent the suffering and 
promote the flourishing of human beings.65 The incorporation of ESCR 
demonstrates the developing content of human rights and the parallel 
enrichment in their understanding of the human rights subject as a real 
human being as well as a legal persona. That is, since “[i]t is clear on 
various accounts, including its own, that the UDHR attempts to respond to 
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the need to protect the human being understood qua human being”,66 the 
actual ways in which the UDHR (etc) seek to protect the human being are 
demonstrative of how IHRL understands the human rights subject.  
This growing content of IHRL has been painted by some as human rights 
‘inflation’ (and hence devaluation).67 However, such a reaction cannot hold 
up for every ‘new’ human right.68 This is because the growing content of 
human rights correctly acknowledges that the vital interests of human 
beings are not simply political: evidently humans do not only suffer and 
flourish in a political sense, as has become clear by evolving understanding 
of human suffering and flourishing. There is consequently a need for 
human rights to develop and enrich in order to better correlate with the 
real-life subject of human rights. 
The value of ESCR is now widely enough understood such that the 
historical tension between ‘civil and political’ and ‘economic, social and 
cultural’ rights69 is largely out-dated: “a comprehensive human rights 
approach has evolved, encompassing the broad and interlinked scale of 
civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights”.70 ESCR are now 
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properly considered a core part of the “indivisible, interdependent and 
interrelated”71 set of contemporary human rights.  
The inclusion of ESCR within IHRL thus demonstrates not only that the 
content of human rights can develop, but also the direction in which such 
developments are heading. This direction is towards protecting a wider and 
more enriched set of human interests that acknowledge the real-life lived 
experience of human beings. Overemphasis of civil and political concerns 
results in a subject of human rights that “is not just ‘thin’ but ethereal, 
while real people are always ‘fat’, full of weaknesses, inadequacies and 
uncertainties”.72 The enriching of human rights has meant realising that 
these weaknesses, inadequacies and uncertainties are part of being 
human. In turn, the understanding of the human rights subject – though 
unavoidably a legal subject – has ‘fattened’ up.  
Thus according to IHRL, ‘the nature of human nature’,73 or ‘what it means 
to be human’,74 does not simply amount to participatory political structures 
and equal treatment before the law (vital as these are). This is because 
human beings are not simply political entities or legal persons.75 Rather, 
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they live in the real, tangible, fleshy world. The existence of ESCR in IHRL 
thus demonstrates a move towards recognition of this living reality of the 
human rights subject. Contemporary human rights understand the human 
rights subject as an embodied subject whose (potential for) suffering can 
be eminently physical. This stands in contrast to the incorporeal ‘small-
scale sovereign’ of the ‘rights of man’. This is a key difference between the 
design of modern and contemporary human rights. 
This is not to say that IHRL now fully and perfectly captures, protects and 
provides an ideal life for all humans. Rather it is simply to point out that 
the content of IHRL is different from that of modern human rights; and 
that this difference signposts an enriched understanding of the human 
rights subject – from a primarily political being to one that lives and 
breathes. This increasing embodiment of the human rights subject and 
parallel enrichment in the content of IHRL opens the door for 
environmental conditions to be protected through IHRL, given the 
axiomatic physical dependence that humans have on their environment.76 
Connected to this enrichment in the content of human rights is a 
developing understanding of who exactly it is that has human rights. 
1.3.2 THE DEVELOPING APPLICABILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
The second key difference between modern and contemporary human 
rights is in their breadth of application: the range of persons bestowed with 
human rights. Contemporary human rights are inclusive. Indeed, Baxi 
writes “inclusivity is the hallmark of contemporary human rights, stamped 
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with the exponential expansion of the very notion of ‘human’”.77 
Contemporary human rights seek to include ‘others’ (such as ‘barbarians’ 
and the ‘insane’78) within their remit, whereas modern human rights 
excluded these ‘others’. A useful vantage point from which to view this 
developing applicability of human rights is provided by the concept of 
citizenship. 
1.3.2(A) CITIZENSHIP WITHIN IHRL 
A common thread running through both modern and contemporary human 
rights is that they dictate how states must and must not treat their 
citizens. This is done through giving individuals legal rights held against 
the state.79 However, there is an important difference between modern and 
contemporary human rights in this regard. Whereas the forerunners to 
IHRL limited their scope to some subset of people (eg noblemen in the 
Magna Carta or “adult propertied male citizens”80 in modern human rights), 
the UDHR seeks to bestow rights on all humans,81 not just some subset of 
them.82 This means that under contemporary human rights “every human 
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being is now to be counted as human”,83 and that “human rights are rights 
held by individuals simply because they are part of the human species”.84  
Despite IHRL’s ambition to bestow rights on all humans, it has been argued 
that IHRL still excludes certain people from its ambit. In particular, the 
continuing importance of states within international law is said to reveal an 
important limitation. This limitation is found in the plight of migrants, 
exiles and stateless persons,85 whom Baxi argues “stand condemned to 
conditions of ‘absolute’, ‘fundamental’ rightlessness”86 because human 
rights are “meaningful only within the zones of sovereignty”.87 That is, 
without citizenship and the accompanying machinery of the state, human 
rights remain meaningless.88 The role of the state and of citizenship within 
IHRL thus merits attention. 
The effectiveness of IHRL is clearly reliant on states, since they are “the 
principal duty-bearers of human rights obligations”,89 and it is through the 
machineries of states (their governance and administrative structures etc) 
that the rights of individuals are normally secured. Arguably then, the right 
to a nationality (UDHR Article 15) is of considerable importance since a 
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citizen of a particular state will normally enjoy a greater range of rights 
with respect to that state than a non-citizen.90 
States clearly are important actors within IHRL. However, there is an 
important distinction between the role of the state in modern and 
contemporary human rights. Modern human rights bestowed rights 
because of citizenship of a particular state, whereas contemporary human 
rights are granted “to all persons irrespective of their citizenship and qua 
their being human”.91 Under IHRL one has rights simply by virtue of being 
a human, even if the state is often relied on to provide the mechanisms 
through which these rights can be secured. The role of the state in IHRL is 
to be the principle guarantor of human rights, not the progenitor of them.92   
As such, human rights are not only of benefit to citizens of a state: 
“[n]umerous international human rights decisions and judgments have 
confirmed that non-nationals have human rights”.93 For example, under 
the ICCPR a state must respect and ensure the rights of “all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction”.94 Stateless individuals 
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thus do have rights under IHRL, in contrast to the pre-1948 state of affairs 
whereby “a person’s protection depended on the conduct of his state, and 
stateless persons were entitled to no protection whatsoever”.95  
The central role of states as the primary guarantors of human rights arises 
in IHRL through reliance on pre-existing state structures to secure human 
rights rather than through a deep conceptual link between citizenship and 
human rights. States’ central role in IHRL is that of a proxy: one may rely 
on a state to secure one’s rights, but this is only because states provide a 
convenient platform through which human rights can be realised.96 The 
overarching goal of IHRL is for all humans to enjoy all human rights: its 
reliance on states is simply a means to achieve this end. The right to a 
nationality is not a right to have rights. “[W]hile international law scholars 
might claim that the right to a nationality is the right to have rights, the 
principles of human rights would indicate otherwise”.97 The right to a 
nationality is directed at preventing statelessness, it is not the gatekeeper 
of all human rights. 
The proxy role of states in IHRL is further evidenced by the fact that it is 
not only states that have duties under IHRL: international organisations 
are also duty-bearers in IHRL,98 and there is some degree of 
extraterritorial application of human rights.99 Any rightlessness of the 
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stateless is therefore far from absolute, and any citizenship-based 
limitations of contemporary human rights are a downfall of the 
mechanisms of IHRL rather than its theoretical design,100 as was the case 
for modern human rights. 
That contemporary human rights belong to humans qua humans – rather 
than to humans qua citizens – is connected to the developing content of 
human rights outlined above.101 This is because the content of 
contemporary human rights is determined through consideration of the 
real-life fleshy human being, rather than the legal persona or the citizen 
(even if the persona and the citizen must be retained in order to give effect 
to the rights within law). The human rights subject cannot be parsed 
entirely through the legal subject or the citizen: ‘humans’ are necessarily 
more complex than ‘citizens’. The ‘citizen’ is one role amongst many that 
humans can play (eg we can also be parents, students, patients, activists 
and so on).102 Understanding human rights as belonging to fleshy 
multifaceted human beings rather than simply political citizens enriches 
their potential content and is a precursor to capturing the embodied nature 
of the human being within human rights. 
While IHRL must retain some notion of legal personhood, its conception of 
its subjects (ie as the human being qua human being) is different from 
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that of other forms of legal rights.103 IHRL seeks to reach beyond legal 
formalism and a technically constructed legal persona, and towards the 
real-life human being: 
Human rights, for example, (read as both ‘moral’ and ‘legal’ 
rights) are deemed inherent to this natural [human] subject 
and are understood to proceed directly… from the ‘natural 
condition of being a human’. This ‘natural’ subject forms 
the site at which the conflation between legal personhood 
and humanity is most explicit and intractable.104 
It is important that at this conflation point within contemporary IHRL, the 
human rights subject is not entirely subsumed by the legal persona.105 
Instead, “the human rights movement can be seen as the ongoing but 
failing struggle to close the gap between the abstract man of the 
Declarations and the empirical human being”.106 The human rights subject 
is constructed by seeking to understand real human suffering and 
flourishing (“the nature of human nature”107) rather than reverting to tired 
legal tropes.  
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It is the real human that IHRL seeks to protect,108 not the caricature of the 
citizen or the legal person. This has rendered it possible for IHRL to enrich 
its understanding of the human rights subject towards the real-life 
embodied human being, even if it must still use the artificial construct of 
legal personhood. Not only does IHRL seek to protect real-life humans 
rather than abstract citizens, but it also seeks to protect all humans rather 
than just some citizens. 
1.3.2(B) UNIVERSAL APPLICATION OF IHRL 
IHRL bestows rights simply as a consequence of being a human. As such, 
the rights contained within it are (purportedly) universal. However, the de 
facto universality of human rights has been challenged.109 As well as 
potential issues over citizenship discussed above, concerns have also been 
raised over the reach of a law that claims to represent everyone. This is 
distinguishable from the supposed statelessness concern, since it is an 
issue with the theoretical construction of IHRL, rather than its 
implementing structures and mechanisms.  
The issue arises because in the very act of constructing human rights to be 
universal (ie to apply to everyone), the human rights subject that IHRL 
implicitly constructs is a ‘universal human subject’. Given that no such 
universal human actually exists in reality, a ‘universal human subject’ 
                                       
108 Even if it does not manage to do so perfectly. See Baxi (n24) 88-90 and infra. 
109 Baxi (n24) 51, 58-60, 152-56, 187-233; Douzinas (n5) 94-100, 141-60, 257-
59; Anna Grear, ‘The vulnerable living order: human rights and the environment in 
a critical and philosophical perspective’ (2011) 2 JHRE 36-37; Ishay (n22) 293-
311; Rao (n80); Gayle Binion, ‘Human Rights: A Feminist Perspective’ (1995) 17 
HRQ 509, 514-15; Grear (n66) 26-34. 
55 
 
comes laden with an unavoidable abstractness. It is questionable whether 
such an abstract notion can portray an accurate picture of the 
particularities, intimacies (and even idiosyncrasies) of real human lives.110  
More acutely, a problem arises if the universality of contemporary human 
rights results in ingraining colonialism, patriarchy or other existing power 
imbalances.111 That is, if the ‘universal human subject’ is defined with the 
straight white able-bodied cis-gendered middle class European male in 
mind. This can happen if universalism allows one particular culture to 
conclusively decide what matters about being human. The risk of this 
exists if “the ‘universal’ is the form by which dominant ideology generalizes 
formations of particular interests”.112 
The ‘exclusionary’ nature of modern human rights can thus creep back into 
contemporary human rights, since their project of universality necessarily 
excludes the particularities, intimacies and idiosyncrasies of people’s lives. 
Thus some people, notably those historically excluded and disenfranchised 
– women, children, people with disabilities, indigenous peoples, the LGBT+ 
community – may be excluded from contemporary human rights if their 
lived realities do not conform closely enough to IHRL’s universal human 
subject. Consider MacKinnon’s critique of contemporary human rights: 
Rights that humans have by virtue of being human have 
not been rights to which women have had access, nor have 
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violations of women as such been part of the definition of 
the violation of the human as such.113 
The universal human rights subject, MacKinnon argues, excludes the 
possibility of actually being a woman114 because the constructed universal 
human rights subject (‘being a human’) does not take the suffering of 
women seriously.115 The purported universality of contemporary human 
rights is thus under threat if IHRL is unable to respond to such critiques. 
1.3.2(C) DIALOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MULTIFACETED HUMAN 
RIGHTS SUBJECT 
There are two interlinked ways in which the universality of IHRL can be 
maintained. Firstly, the universal human rights subject must be understood 
as multiplex rather than singular. The human rights subject is not an 
arithmetical average of all human beings (who has approximately one 
ovary and 2.4 children). Nor is it one-dimensional: it is not simply a citizen 
or an employee, for example, although citizenship and work are 
dimensions of the human rights subject. Nor is the universal human rights 
subject a static Platonic form of a human, accompanied by a template 
human life. Instead, the human rights subject must be understood as 
diverse, pluralistic, and dynamic. 
The creation of an abstract universal human rights subject cannot be 
avoided: “abstraction is necessary of course, if the great plan of rights is to 
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cohere in the face of all the great differences of people and place and 
circumstance”.116 But this universalism must not be done restrictively. 
Moreover, the point of the universality of contemporary human rights is to 
be able to capture all the diverse and important components of every lived 
human life. As such, IHRL must endeavour to construct its subject with the 
breadth of scope necessary to be meaningful to all lived realities: this 
requires pluralism, not monism; diversity, not homogeneity. Contemporary 
human rights celebrate the many different ways of being human, with the 
result that 
[t]he bearer of universal human rights is … no individual 
human being or community with a pre-posited ‘essence’ but 
a being born with a right to invent practices of 
identification, contest identities pre-formed by tradition, 
and the power to negotiate subversive subject-positions.117  
However, suitably complex and multifaceted theoretical understandings of 
the universal human rights subject are themselves not enough. IHRL itself 
must also be flexible and dynamic, so that this complexity can be exercised 
in practice and the universal subject can be made meaningful to the many 
dimensions of being a human. This leads on to the second important 
approach through which can the universality of IHRL can be maintained. 
                                       
116 Douzinas (n5) 153. 
117 Baxi (n24) 174; Douzinas (n5) 165, 200-201. 
58 
 
Although IHRL relies on categorisations of humans, their interests and their 
rights,118 these categories are not fixed. IHRL is in fact able to respond to 
new categorisations (and new understandings of old categorisations) that 
emerge alongside accompanying realisations of what lived human 
experiences are like. The creation and embellishment of the rights of 
women,119 of children,120 of people with disabilities,121 and of indigenous 
peoples,122 in the decades following the adoption of the UDHR 
demonstrates precisely the ability of IHRL to rethink, remodel and improve 
its universality and its categorisations.123 IHRL has not imposed a ‘take-it-
or-leave-it’ construction of the subject of human rights, but rather is 
constantly open to modification. Although the very existence of treaties 
enunciating the rights of particular marginalised groups demonstrates 
IHRL’s imperfect ‘universal subject’,124 it simultaneously indicates 
willingness and capability to address this imperfection.125 
For example, Quinn and Arstein-Kerslake’s analysis of the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)126 demonstrates IHRL’s 
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developing understanding of what it means to be human.127 In particular, 
they argue that the CRPD “really does pivot on a three-dimensional view of 
the reality of life as a person with a disability”128 and that “this was made 
possible because of a much more nuanced understanding of what it means 
to be human and specifically a person with a disability”.129 Significantly, 
the CRPD (and in particular Article 12, which provides for equal recognition 
before the law) re-imagines quite directly the conflation point between 
legal personality and being a human. It forces a ‘revolution’ that 
does not work unless one abandons cognition as the 
essence of personhood. Nothing in the convention pivots on 
the ‘myth system’ of the rational and masterless man. In 
fact it depends rather on a frank acknowledgment of the 
reality and complexity of human existence. It chimes better 
with reality than the myth system, a reality that is 
increasingly being revealed in other walks of scholarship.130 
This re-imagination of the human rights subject is witnessed not only in 
the creation of new treaties, but also in the issuing of General Comments 
by the various human rights treaty bodies, which “set out … understanding 
of the treaty language”131 and are “highly influential in setting out the 
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scope of rights and standards”.132 General Comments flesh out the details 
of necessarily succinct and prosaic treaty provisions to bring them into 
lived reality. They slide from the abstract persona to the real-life human 
being. For example, “through the device of the General Comments, the 
CEDAW Committee has unevenly sought to redress the lack [of reference 
to violence in CEDAW] by erasing the distinction between discrimination 
and violence”.133 General Comments134 have allowed IHRL to take women 
seriously as subjects of human rights through responding to the reality of 
lived experiences whereby it is not just abstract discrimination but actual 
violence that matters.  
In these ways, IHRL’s construction of the human rights subject can be re-
imagined and enriched through IHRL’s very institutions, and real 
experience and suffering can be made relevant to international law.135 This 
is not a straightforward linear process, but a spiralling, dialogical one that 
requires time, space and reflection between an array of different actors.136 
                                       
132 Saul (n70) 5. 
133 Baxi (n24) 124, emphasis removed; see also Rao (n80) 522, Chinkin (n133) 
80-81. 
134 And other IHRL mechanisms such as the consideration of complaints and 
communications For example, see the case law of the ECtHR regarding the Gypsy 
way of life as discussed in Doris Farget, ‘Defining Roma Identity in the European 
Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 19 International Journal on Minority and Group 
Rights 291. 
135 National law can show such dialogical process too: consider the participatory 
approaches detailed in Sandra Liebenberg, ‘Participatory Approaches to Socio-
Economic Rights Adjudication’ (2014) 32 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 312 and 
César Rodríguez-Garavito, ‘Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism 
on Socio-Economic Rights in Latin America’ (2011) 89 Texas Law Review 1669. 
136 Baxi (n111) 162. 
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Contemporary human rights take human suffering and flourishing seriously 
and seek to reflect lived realities. Given the complexity and diversity of 
lived realities, this cannot be done in one motion. However, IHRL’s 
continual recursive practices of re-defining and re-imagining the universal 
human rights subject through ‘carnivalistic’ dialogues allows it to reach 
towards the real-life human being. Conor Gearty talks of how human rights 
are “primarily about empowering the voiceless and the marginalised”,137 
with the result that the language of human rights is “a language that 
speaks for people and that manages, by forcing people to be visible to 
everyone, first to make it possible for others to speak on their behalf, and 
then for them to speak for themselves”.138 As such, the development of 
contemporary human rights is directed towards an improved universality, 
even if ‘complete universality’ is an asymptotic limit IHRL will never quite 
reach.139  
1.3.3 SUMMARY 
The subject of contemporary human rights is the real human being. This 
has direct implications for the design of human rights: IHRL aims to be 
applicable to all humans (earlier incarnations of human rights that made 
no such specific claim). But it is also important indirectly, since it forces a 
re-imagination of the human rights subject as a real-life, living, breathing, 
                                       
137 Gearty (n43) 12. 
138 ibid 48. See also 5-6, 42-44, 67. 
139 Douzinas (n5) 23-45. 
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loving, bleeding, embodied human140 as opposed to a constructed141 
political or legal person.142 
The re-imagination of the human rights subject as an embodied being 
results in an enrichment in the content of IHRL, as witnessed in the 
adoption of ESCR; in the creation and embellishment of the rights of 
disenfranchised groups; and in the issuing of General Comments. Neither 
the content of human rights, nor IHRL’s construction of the human rights 
subject has remained static over time: both are open to renewal, 
demonstrating that IHRL may be able to enrich further to play a role within 
environmental protection measures in international law. Although IHRL 
may never fully reflect the ‘true’ human being, it is heading asymptotically 
in this direction. The following section considers another crucial aspect of 
this development. 
1.4 GROUP RIGHTS 
The majority of human rights in IHRL belong to individual humans. 
However, some are attached to groups.143 Given the palpably communal 
aspect of environmental protection (favourable environmental conditions 
are a ‘public good’), the notion of group rights is relevant to this thesis. 
This section will consider how group rights both inform the developing 
                                       
140 Note that this is one of the reasons why the label ‘vital rights’ has been chosen 
in this thesis to refer to the sort of rights found in IHRL: see §6.3.1. 
141 Notwithstanding the fact that ‘the human’ is always, to some extent, 
constructed: Baxi (n24) 152. 
142 Even if, as rights, they cannot (indeed must not) escape the law entirely. See 
Douzinas (n5) 18. 
143 infra. 
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understanding of the human rights subject and indicate the structural 
flexibility of international (human rights) law. 
Common Article 1 of the two International Covenants states that “all 
peoples have the right of self-determination”,144 and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights145 contains a number of rights attached to 
peoples,146 including that “all peoples shall have the right to a general 
satisfactory environment favourable to their development”.147 This latter 
right directly demonstrates the need to consider group rights in this thesis. 
The inclusion of peoples’ rights is a significant feature of IHRL as it 
demonstrates recognition of two important ideas. Firstly, that according to 
IHRL the ‘nature of human nature’ cannot be construed entirely in terms of 
individuals. The second important recognition is a structural one. Rights 
can be attached to groups without creating legal or logical absurdities.  
The first recognition further demonstrates the dynamic nature of IHRL. The 
second recognition re-iterates the possibility of international law creating 
new legal subjects, even if these subjects do not have clearly defined 
boundaries. Before analysing the significance of group rights in these two 
ways, it is necessary to make some preliminary remarks concerning what 
group rights actually are. 
                                       
144 Also ICESCR Article 25, ICCPR Article 47; and potentially cultural rights: Saul 
(n70) 1182-84. 
145 (1982) 1520 UNTS 217. 
146 As does UNDRIP (n122). 
147 Article 24. 
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The term ‘group rights’ can refer to one of two different concepts: a right 
held by an individual because they fulfil certain criteria and so belong to a 
particular group (here termed a ‘collective’ right148); or a right belonging 
properly to a group per se (here termed a ‘corporate’ right149). For 
example, every Welsh person may have the right to receive official 
documentation in the Welsh language (a collective right); and the Welsh 
people may have the right to decide whether they wish to continue to form 
a part of the UK (a corporate right). The term ‘minority right’ usually refers 
to a collective right, and a ‘peoples’ right’ to a corporate right,150 and this 
is how the terms shall be used in this thesis. In a sense, all human rights 
are collective rights: they are rights which individuals have because of 
their membership of the group Homo sapiens. Other collective rights are 
also readily identifiable: the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 
CRPD set out collective rights. 
                                       
148 Peter Jones, ‘Human Rights, Group Rights, and Peoples’ Rights’ (1999) 21 HRQ 
80, 83-88. 
149 Not to be confused with the phenomenon of corporations claiming to be the 
beneficiaries of individual human rights, see Marius Emberland, The Human Rights 
of Companies (OUP 2006). This development is at best tangential to the original 
intentions of the UDHR and potentially not only derails the foundations of human 
rights, but also misconstrues the subjects of human rights (ie humans as 
embodied beings): Anna Grear, Redirecting Human Rights (Palgrave Macmillan 
2010). 
150 See Roland Rich, ‘Right to Development: A Right of Peoples?’ in Crawford (n90) 
44. 
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1.4.1 FURTHER ENRICHMENT 
Corporate rights contain an implicit acknowledgment that there is a social 
dimension to the nature of human nature, which cannot be captured 
through the lens of the individual alone. In other words: 
As human rights should reflect lived realities, it is necessary 
to see them as more than about individuals. After all, most 
societies accord an importance to communities, collectives, 
and families.151 
Group rights demonstrate and endorse that mapping human suffering and 
flourishing necessitates taking seriously humans’ existence in social 
communities.152 To construct an entirely individualistic human rights 
subject would be to ignore the (potential for) suffering experienced 
through violence against and oppression of the group(s) to which one 
belongs,153 and the (potential for) flourishing found through “associations 
and connections – with family, community, culture, national identity and so 
on”.154 Human flourishing happens in community.  
It is worth noting that there is an inevitable overlap between individual 
rights and group rights.155 Rights to join trade unions156 or those attached 
                                       
151 Robert McCorquodale, ‘Group Rights’ in Moeckli (n23) 333; Marx (n102) 126; 
Sohn (n2) 48. 
152 Gearty (n43) 6, 141. Corsin Bisaz, The Concept of Group Rights in International 
Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2012) 132-49, 168. 
153 Consider the Genocide Convention, which “is considered by advocates of group 
rights as a ‘classical group right in international law’” Bisaz (n152) 20. 
154 Gearty (n43) 6. 
155 HRC, General Comment 31 [9]. 
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to the benefits of scientific progress and its applications157 are individual 
rights with a notable group-oriented outlook. This demonstrates that it is 
often impossible to precisely determine whether something is of benefit to 
an individual or a group (or both).158 In fact, the UN Human Rights 
Committee has stated that “the right to work is an individual right that 
belongs to each person and is at the same time a collective right”.159 To 
further see this overlap between group and individual benefits, consider 
that societies with a more even distribution of wealth tend to improve 
everyone’s wellbeing.160 More pertinently to the environmental context, 
protecting forests, wetlands and coral reefs is of benefit to society,161 but 
also more particularly for those who live nearby or make their living from 
such areas (eg land managers, ecologists or managers of visitor centres). 
As such, it should be expected that human rights in an environmental 
context will also operate in domains between the individual and the group 
perspective.  
This is a consequence of the fact that what it means to be human is 
neither constrainedly individual nor hyperdispersibly communal. Instead it 
                                                                                                              
156 ICCPR Article 22(1). 
157 ICESCR Article 15(1). 
158 Bisaz (n152) 107-26. 
159 CESCR, General Comment 18 [6]. 
160 Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for 
Everyone (Allen Lane 2009).  
161 TEEB, ‘The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: Mainstreaming the 
Economics of Nature: A synthesis of the approach, conclusions and 
recommendations of TEEB’ (2010) 14-17. 
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contains (at least) both these elements as equally vital,162 and there is a 
continuous spectrum between what is individual and personal and what is 
shared and communal.163 Being human is potentially best thought of as a 
contextual condition.164  
Discernible within the adoption of group rights is therefore another re-
imagining of the human rights subject: group rights give legal recognition 
to the contextual and social nature of the human rights subject. This is 
part of IHRL’s enrichment and construction of a subject that mirrors what it 
actually means to be human. The existence of group rights thus further 
demonstrates that the nature of the human rights subject is dynamic, and 
that the direction of travel is towards the lived experiences of human 
beings. In particular, group rights demonstrate that the human rights 
subject is not only embodied, but also socially embedded too.165 
1.4.2 RIGHT-HOLDERS 
Moving to the important structural lesson of group rights, the first 
preliminary issue is whether a group is the sort of entity that can hold a 
right. This is necessary to consider since the creation of group rights within 
                                       
162 §9.4. 
163 §5.5.2; §9.2-9.5. 
164 This is neatly realised in the ideas of Watsuji Tetsurō, especially as developed 
by Kumon Shumpei. See §9.4.1; Steve Odin, The Social Self in Zen and American 
Pragmatism (SUNY 1996) 75-77. 
165 This thesis will go on to argue that humans (as living organisms) are also 
ecologically embedded: see §8.4; §9.2-9.4. 
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IHRL has not been without academic controversy.166 However, corporate 
rights have received sufficient espousal to gain legitimacy within IHRL,167 
which is, after all, one important measure in gauging the acceptability of a 
construct. If the international community as a whole raises its voice loud 
enough to demand a certain legal arrangement, then legal theory ought to 
find a way to make sense of it. Political and philosophical arguments can 
still be made against the concept, but it cannot be dismissed on entirely 
technical grounds.  
The main structural challenge with regards group rights (both collective168 
and corporate) is that of membership: this is crucial in order to be able to 
understand who the right-holder actually is. Although a ‘group’ can be 
formed of any combination of individuals,169 it is usual in IHRL to talk of 
peoples’ rights. However, who exactly constitutes a ‘people’ is not 
straightforward. Broadly speaking, there are two possible approaches: (i) 
allow any set of individuals who self-nominate as a people to count as one, 
or (ii) define some characteristics that define a people for the purposes of 
a peoples’ right. The latter has been the preferred route, but an 
                                       
166 Maurice Cranston, ‘Are There Any Human Rights?’ (1983) 112 Daedalus 1; 
Alston (n67); Crawford (n90); JG Merrills, ‘Environmental Protection and Human 
Rights: Conceptual Aspects’ in Alan Boyle and Michael Anderson (eds), Human 
Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection (Clarendon 1996) 31-32; Philip 
Alston (ed), Peoples’ Rights (OUP 2001) 267; McCorquodale (n151). 
167 McCorquodale (n151); Alston (n166); Bisaz (n152) 77ff. 
168 Where the issue is slightly different: it takes the form of who counts as (eg) a 
child. 
169 See Ned Markosian, ‘Restricted Composition’ in Theodore Sider et al (eds), 
Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics (Blackwell 2008) 341-63.  
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unequivocal definition of what constitutes a people has yet to emerge 
(although it is clear that ‘people’ cannot mean the same as ‘state’170).  
A reasonable starting point is a UNESCO experts definition which, inter 
alia, notes that to be a “people for the [purposes of the] rights of peoples 
in international law”, the group “must be more than a mere association of 
individuals within a State”.171 This definition appears to have indigenous 
peoples or ethnic minorities in mind. Although there can be no doubt that 
such groups can benefit hugely from both kinds of group right, it is 
plausible too that groups other than peoples in a ethno-cultural sense 
could be worthy of the protection of corporate rights. In any case, 
uncontested and predetermined membership of a group is evidently not a 
prerequisite for said group to receive rights within international law: this 
must be the case, since peoples’ rights exist within international law 
without the law stipulating the exact constitution of all ‘peoples’. 
International law therefore can bestow rights on groups without those 
groups being clearly and precisely defined. This is relevant as this thesis 
will go on to investigate the possibility of the creation of further legal 
subjects whose boundaries are not precisely definable (ie ecosystems).172 
                                       
170 James Crawford, ‘The Rights of Peoples: ‘Peoples’ or ‘Governments’?’ in 
Crawford (n90).  
171 ‘Final Report and Recommendations of an International Meeting of Experts on 
further study of the concept of the rights of peoples’, UNESCO SHS-
89/CONF.602/7 (22 February 1990) [22(2)]. See also Robert McCorquodale 
(n151) 333, 337; Crawford (n172); Makinson (n90) 72-77; Jane Wright, ‘Minority 
Groups, Autonomy, and Self-Determination’ (1999) 19 OJLS 605, 625-28; Saul et 
al (n70) 25-27, 36-45; Gunme and Others v Cameroon (2009) ACommHPR 
Communication No 266/03 [171]. 
172 infra Part III. 
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The possibility of ecosystem rights can build on the notion of peoples’ 
rights because an ecosystem, like a people, is a corporate entity composed 
of living organisms. It is therefore worthwhile introducing another key 
aspect of corporate rights that can function as an exemplar for ecosystem 
rights.   
1.4.3 REPRESENTATION AND STANDING 
It is necessary to determine who can legally represent a group that has a 
corporate right in international law.173 This is distinct to the membership of 
a group as it concerns who has a voice that properly represents the group 
as opposed to who the potential victim of a violation is. When a right of an 
individual has been violated, the first choice for the legal person to make a 
complaint is obvious: the individual in question. Likewise, the violation of a 
collective right would normally be taken up by the relevant individual(s).174 
A group of individuals can make a joint complaint in the case when the 
same act has violated all of their rights.175 
Corporate rights do require a little more thought, but the challenges can be 
overcome. What is required is the identification of suitable legal 
representation in order to make a complaint on behalf of the group. The 
                                       
173 Legal complaints mechanisms will be used here to give useful insight into this, 
although there are other methods to complain about human rights violations (eg 
lobbying governments), and although complaints mechanisms are not necessary 
for human rights to exist (see the distinction in §4.3 between a claim and a 
power),  
174 eg Länsman et al v Finland (2005) HRC Communication No 1023/2001, 
CCPR/C/83/D/1023/2001; Lovelace v Canada (1981) HRC Communication No 
R.6/24A/36/40, A/36/40. 
175 eg Guerra v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 357. 
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principle of legal representation is not a new one: it is often the case that 
individual or collective rights will be taken up on the behalf of other people. 
Notably this will happen when the individual in question is incapable of 
making the complaint themselves: they may be imprisoned176 or a child,177 
and thus unable to initiate legal proceedings. But complaints within IHRL 
can also be made by NGOs178 or other concerned individuals.179 This form 
of representation is common and uncontroversial. 
Legal representation of a group per se is therefore technically possible. 
Although finding the most suitable representation may not always be 
immediately obvious, it is normally reasonably straightforward to 
determine a solution. Groups are able to appoint spokespersons to act on 
their behalf,180 and NGOs are also capable of bringing legal proceedings on 
                                       
176 eg Fillastre, Bizouarn v Bolivia (1991) HRC Communication No 336/1988, 
CCPR/C/43/D/336/1988. 
177 eg A v United Kingdom (1999) 27 EHRR 611. 
178 Protocol to the ACHPR on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (1998) OAU Doc OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT(III), Article 5(3); 
SERAC and CESR v Nigeria (2003) ACommHPR Communication No 155/96, 10 
IHRR 282 (‘Ogoniland’); Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin 
Câmpeanu v Romania (App no 47848/08, Judgment of 17July 2014) [64]-[73], 
[96]-[114]. 
179 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (2008) UNGA Resolution A/RES/63/117, Article 2; Yanomami v 
Brazil (1985) IACommHR Resolution 12/85, Case 7615.  
180 Lubicon Lake Band v Canada (1990) HRC Communication No 167/1984, 
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within IHRL since the HRC held that an individual cannot be the victim of a 
violation of a peoples’ right [13.3], but that currently complaints can only be made 
by or on behalf of individuals (Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1966) 999 UNTS 171, Article 1).  
See also Antonie Bissangou v Congo (2006) ACommHPR Communication No 
253/02 [82]; cf Gunme (n171) where the complainants brought the 
72 
 
behalf of a group.181 There is therefore no technical barrier to either the 
establishment or the functioning of corporate human rights: 
There is nothing to prevent international law from endowing 
‘with some element of personality entities other than 
states’. Although conceptually difficult, and existing in that 
penumbra between the individual and the state, it is 
possible to create rights in international law for minorities 
qua minorities [ie corporate rights].182 
1.4.4 SUMMARY 
Group rights, both corporate and collective, are a part of IHRL. In fact, 
they form an essential part of it, given that human flourishing happens in 
community. Their existence further demonstrates the dynamic content of 
IHRL as well as the asymptotic conflation of the political-legal persona and 
the real human being in the human rights subject. The structural 
requirements for group rights mean that the structural models used for 
individual human rights may not always suffice (in particular with regards 
complaints), but there is no technical barrier to adapting these models: 
                                                                                                              
communication “on their behalf and on behalf of the people of Southern Cameroon” 
[1]. A violation of Article 19 (a peoples’ right) was found: [162]. 
Nor can a complaint be made actio popularis: Brun v France (2006) HRC 
Communication No 1453/2006, CCPR/C/88/D/1453/2006 [6.3]; Metropolitan 
Nature Reserve v Panama (2003) IACommHR Report No 88/03, Petition 11.533; cf 
Ogoniland [49]. 
181 supra 178. 
182 Wright (n171) (citing Rodley). See also Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the 
Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1949] ICJ Rep 174. 
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international law can create new right-holders and new mechanisms to 
make their rights effective, should this be desired. 
The possibility and indeed establishment of corporate rights is not only 
demonstrative of the ability of IHRL to adapt in both its structure and its 
content. It also re-confirms that it is possible for all manner of subjects to 
be bestowed with rights within international law as a whole. Imprecision 
over precise boundaries (ie membership of peoples) and concerns over 
suitable representation are surmountable. Within the context of this thesis, 
this is a valuable observation as it affirms that pathways exist for the 
creation of other right-holders (including ecosystems).183  
1.5 DIGNITY 
This chapter has provided an overview of some key developments in 
human rights that differentiate IHRL from previous incarnations of human 
rights. Significantly, it has shown that the content of contemporary human 
rights is richer than that of modern human rights, and that this is tied to 
an enriched understanding of the subject of human rights. There is one 
final differentiation between human rights pre- and post-1948 that this 
chapter will now detail. This differentiation is found in the fact that, unlike 
its predecessors, IHRL provides a handle to understand what it protects: 
dignity. 
                                       
183 Part III. 
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1.5.1 DIGNITY AS THE FOUNDATION OF IHRL 
Dignity’s foundational role in contemporary human rights is apparent from 
its appearances within the International Bill of Rights. Firstly, according to 
the UDHR: 
[R]ecognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. 
[T]he peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter 
reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person. 
The reliance of human rights on dignity is even more explicit in the joint 
Preamble to the ICESCR and ICCPR, which not only repeats the first recital 
of the UDHR, but also sets out that: 
[T]hese rights derive from the inherent dignity of the 
human person.184 
The foundation of human rights is explicitly stated to be dignity.185 Before 
stepping any further, it is necessary to point out that the concept of 
‘dignity’ is a highly contested one. There is a lack of consensus in the 
                                       
184 Emphasis added. 
185 See also UNGA Resolution A/RES/41/120 (4 December 1986) [4(b)]; Charles 
Foster, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Law (Hart 2011) 93; Christopher 
McCrudden, ‘In Pursuit of Human Dignity: An Introduction to Current Debates’ in 
Christopher McCrudden (ed), Understanding Human Dignity (OUP 2013) 1. 
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literature as to the definition, nature or function of dignity.186 However, 
this imprecise, even vague, character of dignity actually proves 
indispensable for its utility. 
Other proposed foundations for IHRL (such as equality187 or autonomy188) 
are less suitable because they are less vague than dignity: their precision 
narrows the scope of protection that they can offer. Nickel points out that 
relying on a narrow foundation189 will make the justification for human 
rights too heavily skewed towards some particular subset of them, causing 
the justification of other rights to “appear shaky and derivative”.190 Seeing 
as human rights are neither shaky nor derivative, a wide bed for their 
justification is necessary. 
In contrast, dignity proved broad enough for the drafters of the UDHR to 
give it its justificatory role in IHRL: “the word dignity [was] considered 
                                       
186 Oscar Schachter, ‘Human Dignity as a Normative Concept’ (1983) 77 AJIL 848; 
Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 
(OUP 2001); David Kretzmer and Eckart Klein (eds), The Concept of Human 
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187 eg Samantha Besson, ‘Justifications’ in Moeckli (n23) 44-46. 
188 eg Griffin (n69). 
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carefully by the Human Rights Commission, which [included] it to 
emphasize that every human being is worthy of respect … to explain why 
human beings have rights to begin with”.191 The Commission’s 
consideration had involved discussion of the concepts of unity, reason, and 
‘two-man mindedness’,192 with the main difficulty being finding “a formula 
that did not require the Commission to take sides on the nature of man 
and society, or to become immured in metaphysical controversies, notably 
the conflict among spiritual, rationalist, and materialist doctrines on the 
origins of human rights”.193 The result was to deploy dignity in a 
foundational role.  
Dignity thus has this role because of, rather than despite, its vagueness. 
Dignity can encompass a pluralistic set of justifications, and allows diverse 
beliefs about why humans matter to be united under one banner. It can 
serve as a shorthand – or a placeholder194 – for the complex, diffuse and 
entangled nexus of reasons and beliefs as to why humans should have 
human rights. A polycentric approach to human rights is necessary, and 
this requires a polycentric conception of dignity. Thanks to its vagueness, 
dignity can in fact include many potential justifications for human rights: 
                                       
191 Glendon (n74) 146. 
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dignity can contain interlocking and interacting components,195 such as 
conscience,196 equality,197 liberty,198 or well-being.199  
This widespread relevance and amenability of the notion of dignity (its 
roots are not confined to Europe200) is necessary since “the philosophical 
foundations of human rights law cannot be confined exclusively to some 
conveniently Western natural rights theory, but are to be found in a more 
diverse, pluralistic set of justifications”.201 Given the ambitious ambit of 
IHRL (ie the entire human race), its stated foundation must be meaningful 
to every single culture and lived experience. Dignity’s vagueness renders it 
malleable enough to fulfil this requirement. 
The malleability of dignity also helps IHRL remain relevant over time. The 
conception of dignity can adopt and develop as the human rights project 
adopts and develops its content (as IHRL has done through the continued 
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adoption of treaties and development by General Comments and general 
jurisprudence).  
Although using the term ‘dignity’ specifically as the foundation for human 
rights is new in IHRL, the concept itself was not invented by the UDHR.202 
Dignity has routes back to (at least) the time of Cicero,203 and ‘human 
rights’ had long been about protecting something akin to ‘dignity’, even if 
no such word had been used to this effect; indeed, “it needs to be more 
fully recognised than is the case now that contemporary human rights 
values, norms, and standards emerged much earlier than the UDHR”.204 
However, neither of these points prevents dignity from serving a useful 
purpose as a placeholder for understanding what human rights set out to 
protect. No major IHRL treaty has sought to distance itself from the 
concept of dignity.205  
Dignity being vague and malleable does not mean that it is entirely 
meaningless. Dignity does hold some content and its meaning cannot be 
stretched indefinitely: as Schachter says, “I know it when I see it even if I 
cannot tell you what it is”.206 The remainder of this section will detail some 
key features of the concept of dignity. Given that this thesis is concerned 
specifically with the role that dignity plays within IHRL (rather than the 
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(n186) 112-13; Jochen Abr Frowein, ‘Human Dignity in International Law’ in 
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notion of dignity more broadly), it is possible to sculpt away some of 
dignity’s vagueness by analysing this particular role. Key features of 
dignity will be drawn out in two ways. Firstly, by enquiring how IHRL’s 
construction of the human rights subject informs its understanding of 
human dignity. Secondly, by analysing the role of dignity in key legal 
documents.  
1.5.2 THE DIGNITY OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SUBJECT 
Contemporary human rights (i) derive from the inherent dignity of the 
human person and (ii) are vested in and protect the human rights subject. 
The notion of ‘human dignity’ as found in IHRL is therefore connected to 
IHRL’s understanding of the human rights subject. This chapter has 
already demonstrated some ways in which IHRL constructs the human 
rights subject. These are indicative of how IHRL understands dignity. Here 
these will be outlined and their connections with dignity noted. 
The first connection lies in the inherentness of dignity and the universality 
of human rights. As demonstrated above, human rights are designed to 
belong to all and every human. Under IHRL, humans have human rights 
simply because they are human (not because of citizenship of a particular 
state, or membership of a certain club; nor because of some particular 
trait or achievement etc). The universality of human rights must be 
dependent on there being something shared amongst all humans that 
justifies the very existence of human rights. Dignity embraces this by the 
fact that it is ‘inherent’ (ie permanent and pre-existing), as referred to in 
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both the preambles above. The universality of human rights is thus 
captured by, and a consequence of, the inherentness of dignity.207 
Furthermore, since dignity inheres in the human rights subject, it is clear 
that dignity need not be awarded, and nor can it be taken away. Dignity is 
something that humans have simply by virtue of being human.208  
Dignity’s inherentness allows elimination of some interpretations of it: 
human dignity (as understood with respect to human rights and this 
thesis) is neither an aspirational status to be earned nor idealised human 
comportment. It is not concerned with gold standards or the dignified 
behaviour of ‘dignitaries’. If possession of dignity is a matter of status, 
then the only status that matters is the status of being human.209 Its 
presence in every human is therefore indubitable. Dignity exists because of 
what a human is, not what because of what a human has.210 Although 
dignity cannot be taken away, it is possible to ignore or to violate dignity. 
As such, dignity must be recognised; and this is the purpose of IHRL.211  
Rosen describes dignity as an ‘inner transcendental kernel’: “something 
intangible that all human beings carry inalienably inside them that 
                                       
207 Dicke (n202) 112. 
208 Note that this does not preclude the possibility of other entities having dignity 
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underlies the moral claims that they have just by being human”.212 This 
‘kernel’ both inheres in all humans and justifies the existence of human 
rights: for this reason contemporary human rights are universal. 
It is in fact possible to dig a little deeper about the concept of dignity 
beyond noting that it is something that all humans have by virtue of being 
human. The analysis of the contemporary human rights subject in this 
chapter has revealed that IHRL understands the nature of human nature in 
a physically embodied and socially embedded sense. This is evidenced by 
the progressive inclusion of rights that seek to shield against suffering that 
emanates from this embodied and embedded status. This demonstrates a 
commitment to real, lived realities that must also be reflected in IHRL’s 
understanding of the concept of dignity. If dignity were not related to the 
human rights subject’s embodied and embedded nature, then such 
concerns could not be ultimately justified within IHRL by appeals to human 
dignity. 
‘Human dignity’ is therefore concerned with the lived, visceral reality of 
human existence and the urgent need to protect it (the need must be 
urgent else the potency of (vital213) rights would not be deployed). Dignity 
is undeniably an abstract concept; but its abstraction should not be a 
distraction from its very real reckonings.214 To talk of ignoring or violating 
dignity often evokes concrete physical scenarios – whether found in the act 
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of violation itself (eg regarding medical treatment215); our immediate 
response to such an act (eg regarding injustices suffered under apartheid 
or other discrimination216); or both, with the result that 
many dignity claims [are] powerful and moving: the 
Peruvian mother of the disappeared; the Jamaican men 
kept indefinitely in overcrowded, small, dark, and 
unventilated police holding cells amid garbage and urine; 
the leader of the Paraguayan indigenous community whose 
children were dying from diarrhoea because they had no 
access to clean water.217  
Human dignity, like the human rights subject, cannot be locked in a 
noumenal realm; it “needs to be forged in the crucible of human 
experience”.218 Dignity is concerned with real matters of human life, as 
revealed by IHRL’s enriching commitment to the embodied and embedded 
human rights subject. 
Furthermore, it is important to note the significant implications that the 
existence of group rights have for IHRL’s understanding of dignity. That 
human rights have been assigned to groups per se (ie through corporate 
rights) necessitates a compatible outlook on dignity. The implication is that 
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dignity must have some group-oriented dimension; perhaps dignity may 
even be directly applicable to groups.219 Indeed, dignity has been 
attributed to the entire human species within the law,220 demonstrating 
that dignity is not necessarily confined solely to individuals.  
Another way to conceptualise group dignity is through considering each 
individual’s dignity (which must be congruent with the lived reality of 
human existence) to be deeply entwined with communal identity.221 Such a 
notion of dignity, as residing beyond the atomistic individual, reflects 
common lived experiences: 
The individual whose human rights and fundamental 
freedoms the United Nations seeks to proclaim and defend 
is [humankind] in [its] national, cultural, and spiritual 
environment. Stripped of [its] environmental, national, and 
cultural characteristics, spiritually adrift from [its] past and 
loosed from [its] traditional moorings, [humankind] loses 
[its] essential humanity.222 
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It is clear that IHRL does not wish to strip away something that can be 
considered essential to humanity (nor would this be desirable). There must 
therefore be something beyond the individual, something relational, to the 
concept of human dignity understood by IHRL. This relationality of dignity 
will be explored in greater detail in Part III of this thesis. 
Dignity attempts to capture in a single word the real-life complexity of the 
human rights subject and the urgent need to protect it from suffering. As 
such, dignity is multifaceted, organic and potent. It exists alongside and is 
bound up with the human in such a way that the two cannot be divorced, 
and any attempts to sever one from the other necessarily de-humanise 
and in-dignify the human. In order to explore further the precise role of 
dignity in IHRL, it is worth considering more closely its appearances within 
the legal texts. 
1.5.3 DIGNITY AS JUSTIFICATION AND METRIC 
Despite the reliance of human rights on dignity, IHRL does not define or 
clarify what dignity actually is. This lack of a definition of dignity is not too 
surprising given the lack of consensus in the literature as to the definition 
of dignity, and that the drafters of the UDHR found agreeing on its 
philosophical basis highly challenging.223  
However, the term ‘dignity’ appears in a number of places in the 
International Bill of Rights, and this assists in understanding its role. For 
example, “the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring … an 
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existence worthy of human dignity”;224 the right to education, which “shall 
be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense 
of its dignity”;225 and the right that “all persons deprived of their liberty 
shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of 
the human person”.226 However, it is not clear why these rights in 
particular require reference to dignity while others do not, given that all 
rights derive from dignity.227 
However, the references to dignity in the texts of treaties and declarations 
(as well as those in General Comments228) are in fact instances of dignity 
being used to detail the content of a right rather than to justify it.229 In 
each case, the right refers back to dignity in order to demonstrate the 
content and the scope of the right: existence must be worthy of dignity, 
treatment must be with respect for dignity. In this sense, dignity provides 
a way to somehow measure particular actions or situations. Dignity thus 
cannot be devoid of meaning, since it can be used as a measure of sorts; 
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although understanding dignity’s content is necessarily context-dependent 
and open to debate.230 
Dignity helps shape the contours of IHRL; it pushes and pulls at how 
human rights are to be defined and interpreted, thus serving a purpose 
within human rights interpretation and adjudication.231 In particular, 
Townsend identifies three ways that courts have utilised dignity when 
adjudicating human rights issues: “as decider, as a rule of interpretation, 
and by interpreting dignity to extend and create new rights”.232  The 
criticism of the legalism of human rights identified in the Introduction re-
emerges here if a court treats dignity “as a truth to be discovered and then 
imposed rather than a point of view to be argued for and deliberated 
on”.233 The value and importance of the dialogical development of IHRL is 
key to avoiding this: a plurality of relevant voices must be heard in 
defining the contours of dignity and human rights. 
Because undignified treatment (eg the overcrowded prison cells and 
diarrhoea from lack of clean water) is something to be avoided, dignity 
functions as a metric that indicates the boundaries and the intentions of 
                                       
230 For a good example of how dignity provides a debatable measure, consider the 
discussion around Wackenheim v France HRC Communication No 854/1999 
CCPR/C/75/D/854/1999 (2002): Susan Millns, ‘Dwarf-throwing and human 
dignity: A French perspective’ (1996) 18 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 
375; Rosen (n186) 63ff; McCrudden (n186) 705-706. 
231 McCrudden (n186); McCrudden (n185) 361-402. 
232 Dina Townsend, ‘Taking dignity seriously? A dignity approach to environmental 
disputes before human rights courts’ (2015) 6 JHRE 204, 213. 
233 Conor Gearty, ‘A Perspective from Law’s Front Line’ in McCrudden (n185) 162. 
87 
 
human rights (including environmental human rights234). Dignity captures 
what constitutes human suffering and flourishing, and why these should be 
respectively prevented and promoted. 
Dignity therefore has two roles in IHRL: as a metric and as an overarching 
justification.235 That is, humans have human rights because they have 
dignity (justification), and human rights seek to ensure that humans are 
not treated in an undignified way (metric). As a justification, dignity refers 
to the inherent worth or intrinsic value that humans have.236 Dignity points 
to an ineffable quality about being a human that means that they matter, 
that their suffering matters, and that their lives matter. It signposts that 
humans have a certain moral status simply through virtue of being human. 
As a metric, dignity descibes the boundaries within which humans must be 
treated: it captures what constitutes human suffering and flourishing and 
informs the content and interpretation of human rights. This is why 
Schachter knows dignity when he sees it: because its absence (ie 
treatment in an undignified manner) evokes a distinctive response, a 
response that shapes human rights by sounding an alarm when a human 
has been wronged.237 As such, dignity is not entirely vacuous (as some 
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suggest238): if it were, then it would not be able to both underpin and 
shape the prodigious body of law that is IHRL.  
As a justification, dignity explains why being a human matters. As a 
metric, it describes what matters. These two roles are clearly intertwined: 
humans matter because there are things that matter to and about them. 
There is a loop between using dignity as a justification and a metric: one 
must be treated with dignity because one has dignity.239 This two-threaded 
role of dignity helps understand the dynamic, ‘carnivalistic’,240 nature of 
contemporary human rights, with their constant spiralling reflection and 
reinterpretation of lived human realities. IHRL (founded on dignity) must 
continually refer back to the lived reality of human existence in order to 
ensure that it is achieving the aim it has set itself (providing for a life in 
dignity).   
Because dignity is both a metric and a justification, it serves as a 
shorthand for both what matters and why it matters. This still leaves open 
a broad scope for dignity: it is not clear whether dignity is spiritual, 
rationalist, or materialist (as questioned by the Human Rights 
Commission241); nor is it clear why (only) humans have dignity. These 
ideas will be revisited later in the thesis.242 
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1.6 CONCLUSION 
Human rights have transformed international law. They have transformed 
it through their incorporation of individuals (and groups of individuals) as 
right-holders within the international legal order, and they represent a 
movement of international law from technical legal rules between states to 
a law that recognises the inherent dignity of the human being. The fact 
that international law has shown its ability to develop its structure by 
incorporating new right-holders and new justifications is of particular 
significance for this thesis.243 
A second important result of this chapter is that the content of human 
rights is not static. In particular, the developments in the content of IHRL 
post-1948 have shown a transition from human rights being predominantly 
concerned with protecting the civil or political liberties of the citizen, to 
them protecting against a wide range of forms of human suffering, and 
indeed promoting human flourishing. It is therefore plausible that IHRL will 
provide suitable terrain for using the tool of ‘rights’ to protect the natural 
world within international law, given that it has increasingly been 
recognised that human flourishing (and indeed survival) is at risk from the 
progressive deterioration of the state of the natural world on this planet. 
The following chapter will investigate how IHRL has responded to this 
possibility, and determine the most fruitful paths available for IHRL in this 
regard. 
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Implicit with the developing content of human rights is a parallel 
enrichment in IHRL’s construction of the human rights subject. Given that 
a key role of rights is to indicate to whom duties are owed (viz to the right-
holder in which the right is vested),244 the understanding of the subject of 
rights is crucial. By moving towards understanding human rights as 
belonging to humans qua humans (rather than citizens or legal persons), 
IHRL has understood its subject to be the real living, ‘fleshy’ human. 
Recognition of the embodied and embedded nature of human beings has 
thus broken through into IHRL. This ability to understand the legal subject 
as an approximation of a real-life subject is relevant for considering the 
possibility of nonhuman legal subjecthood, as noted by Douzinas: 
The creative potential… allows the original rights of ‘man’ to 
break up and proliferate into the rights of various types of 
subject, eg the rights of workers, women, children, 
refugees or the rights of a people to self-determination, or 
animal and environmental rights.245 
This thesis will go on to consider the expansion of the sort of rights found 
in the original rights of ‘man’ to animals and other living, ‘fleshy’ beings. 
Another notable difference between human rights pre- and post-1948 is 
IHRL’s specific identification of ‘human dignity’ as its foundation. Because 
of its role as the justification for the existence of contemporary human 
rights, dignity has a proximity to the human rights subject: dignity 
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attempts to captures in a single word the real-life complexity of the human 
rights subject and the urgent need to protect it from suffering and promote 
flourishing. Dignity is admittedly a vague concept – but the obverse of this 
imprecision is its malleability: a true asset for a concept underpinning 
something as broad and diverse as IHRL. Dignity strikes a balance. It 
displays just the right amount of malleability to make it widely acceptable 
as the foundation of human rights without it being easily sloughed off as a 
meaningless jingle.  
This balance is in part due to the fact that dignity plays two roles within 
IHRL: as a metric and as a justification. These two roles are closely 
entwined. It is because humans have dignity that they must be treated in 
line with their dignity. Although an ultimate and unanimous definition of 
dignity is unlikely to be forthcoming (if it even exists), some statements 
can be made regarding its definition for the purposes of this thesis.  
Firstly as just noted, dignity operates as both a metric and a justification 
within IHRL. Secondly, human dignity is tightly enmeshed with and indeed 
an inherent property of the human: one has dignity simply through being 
human. Thirdly, because of its dual-role, and because of the complexity 
that dignity seeks to capture, dignity is best thought of as a shorthand for 
a vast number of potential beliefs both as to why humans matter and what 
matters about being a human.246 It is worth pointing out too that none of 
these features of dignity necessarily prevent nonhumans from having their 
own brand of dignity. Elephants of course cannot have human dignity 
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(which humans have by virtue of being human), but they could have 
elephant dignity by virtue of being elephantine.  
Leaving aside this final remark to be revisited in Part III of the thesis, it is 
now necessary to investigate how IHRL may be able to function to protect 
the environment. Although some philosophical aspects of human rights 
suffer from imprecision, the presence of human rights is ubiquitous, their 
reach is considerable and their power indubitable. The next two Chapters 
look at methods of deploying human rights for environmental protection in 
order to see if this is a viable and valuable extension of their reach.  
93 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE FORM OF A HUMAN RIGHT TO ENVIRONMENT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having analysed some key aspects of human rights in Chapter One, this 
Chapter focuses on responding to the question of how such rights can be 
used to protect the natural world through international law. It will do this 
by considering environmental applications of international human rights 
law (IHRL). The question underlying this analysis is whether IHRL can 
imagine the human rights subject and its flourishing in such a way to 
include protection of the natural world. Chapter One has shown that it is 
technically feasible for IHRL to enrich its content, and this enrichment 
could allow environmental protection to be included within IHRL’s scope. 
Furthermore, this may be desirable given that “[w]ere the Universal 
Declaration to be drafted today, it is easy to imagine that it would include 
a right recognized in so many national constitutions and regional 
agreements [ie a right to a healthy (or satisfactory, safe or sustainable) 
environment]”.1  
There are in fact a number of strategies by which human rights can be 
used to protect the environment and so some definitions are required. In 
this thesis, ‘human right to environment’ is used as shorthand for a 
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substantive human right to an environment of a certain quality, ie for any 
of the following: a human right to a healthy environment, a human right to 
a satisfactory environment, a human right to an adequate environment, 
and so on. ‘Environmental human right’ means any human right (individual, 
collective or corporate) with an environmental hue. This includes a human 
right to environment, human rights that are affected by environmental 
conditions (such as the right to life), a human right to conservation, and so 
on. 
In this chapter, both the theory and the practice of environmental human 
rights will be examined. After looking at the deployment of existing human 
rights in environmental contexts (‘greening’), it will consider how a specific 
human right to environment can take shape. The main difficulties here are 
in defining precisely what such a right is protecting; locating its actors; and 
establishing the legal duties it creates. 
Although some groundwork for a human right to environment has been 
laid, its establishment is not ubiquitous.2 The embryonic nature of a human 
right to environment is captured by the UK’s declaration when signing the 
Aarhus Convention3 that “the 'right' of every person 'to live in an 
environment adequate to his or her health and well-being' … express[es] an 
aspiration which motivated the negotiation of this Convention”.4 The 
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declaration points out that a substantive human right to environment has 
not yet fully matured, but that it represents something towards which the 
international community is heading.5 This aspirational status of a human 
right to environment directs the following analysis.  
2.2 THE ‘GREENING’ OF EX ISTING HUMAN RIGHTS 
‘Greening’ refers to the deployment of existing IHRL in environmental 
situations.6 The idea behind greening is that regulation of environmental 
quality is already implicit in extant IHRL, and this characterisation needs 
simply to be drawn out.7 Existing human rights may be able to deal with 
environmental problems adequately once they have been appropriately 
interpreted, in particular in line with the embodied and embedded nature 
of the human rights subject. 
2.2.1 EUROPE 
Greening of human rights has predominantly taken place within the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR) regime.8 The ECHR does not contain a human right to environment. 
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However, this has not deterred the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) from engaging with cases of an indubitably environmental flavour. 
The ECtHR has interpreted environmental issues to be relevant to a 
number of rights within the ECHR, in particular the rights to respect for 
private and family life, home and correspondence (Article 8)9 and to life 
(Article 2).10 The right to property in Article 1 of the First Optional Protocol 
to the ECHR protects the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions11 also 
contains potential for greening.12 However, the European Commission on 
Human Rights noted that this provision does not “guarantee a right to the 
peaceful enjoyment of possessions in a pleasant environment”.13 
The earliest European environmental cases concerned Article 8, and this 
has continued to be the most common basis for environmental claims 
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within the ECHR regime.14 Article 8 has been shown to be applicable when 
polluting activities, such as noxious fumes in López Ostra v Spain15 and 
noise pollution from an airport in Hatton v UK,16 have a negative impact on 
the lives of individuals. The Court has established a relatively low threshold 
for environmental damage to interfere with the enjoyment of Article 8 
rights: pollution can have negative impacts on an individual’s right to enjoy 
their private and family life or home without necessarily seriously 
endangering their health.17 The ECtHR has also noted that the level of 
adverse effects caused by environmental pollution necessary to 
demonstrate an interference with Article 8 is a contextual issue: suitable 
environmental conditions vary depending on the situation.18  
Article 8 does not protect against all environmental problems because the 
enjoyment of rights protected by Article 8 ECHR can be limited: an 
interference will be legitimate if it is “in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.19 The possibility of 
legitimate interference accommodates the important economic role that 
                                       
14 supra n9. 
15 López Ostra (n9). 
16 Hatton (n9). 
17 López Ostra(n9) [51]; S v France (n9) [2]. Sumudu Atapattu, ‘The Right to a 
Healthy Life or the Right to Die Polluted?: The Emergence of a Human Right to a 
Healthy Environment Under International Law’ (2002) 16 Tul Envtl LJ 65, 102-103. 
18 Fadeyeva (n9) [69]. 
19 Article 8(2) ECHR. 
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activities causing environmental hazards often perform. In assessing 
whether an interference with Article 8 is legitimate (ie whether a fair 
balance has been struck between individual interests and the societal 
interests being pursued), consideration must be given to both the 
substantive merits of the decision resulting in the interference and the 
procedure through which the decision was reached.20 
With regards to the substantive merits of a decision, the ECtHR has “held 
on a number of occasions that in cases involving environmental issues the 
State must be allowed a wide margin of appreciation”.21 This ‘margin of 
appreciation’22 is afforded to states in their compliance with the 
requirements of Article 8 because national authorities are often better 
placed to assess local needs than an international court.23 Furthermore, 
the margin of appreciation is wide in the present context because 
environmental issues are normally concerned with general policy decisions 
– such as aviation policy in Hatton24 – rather than with a highly intimate or 
                                       
20 Giacomelli (n9) [79]. 
21 Giacomelli (n9) [80]. 
22 Pedersen (n8) 85; Alastair Mowbray, European Convention on Human Rights 
(3rd edn, OUP 2012) 551; Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘Environmental Degradation’ in 
Daniel Moeckli et al (eds), International Human Rights Law (2nd edn, OUP 2014) 
597.  
The ‘margin of appreciation’ actually refers to a number of related but distinct 
situations: Robin White and Clare Ovey, The European Convention on Human 
Rights (5th edn, OUP 2010) 79. 
23 ibid. 
24 Hatton (n8 [GC]) [97]. A Grand Chamber overturned an earlier ruling from a 
Chamber in this case based primarily on consideration of the margin of 
appreciation. Mowbray (n22) 550-53. 
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private aspect of home or family life.25 There is thus an “understandable 
reluctance to allow the [ECtHR] to become a forum for appeals against the 
policy judgments of governments, provided they do not disproportionately 
affect individual rights”.26 
Because of the wide margin of appreciation, and the normally public nature 
of environmental damage and protection, a violation of Article 8 is more 
likely to be found when its procedural requirements have not been met.27 
Relevant procedural duties include giving regard to prior consultation,28 
compliance with national law,29 and taking compensatory measures.30 
However, even if the procedural requirements of Article 8 have been met, 
the ECtHR will still consider whether there has been a substantive 
breach.31 This will include consideration of pollutant levels and resulting 
rates of illnesses.32 For example, in Öçkan and Others v Turkey,33 the 
                                       
25 Hatton (n8 [GC]) [102].  
26 Boyle (n6) 508. 
27 ibid. 
28 Giacomelli (n9) [82]-[98]. 
29 López Ostra [55]-[56]; Guerra [27], [59]; Taskin [117], [123]; Fadeyeva [132] 
(n9). Dinah Shelton, ‘Resolving Conflicts between Human Rights and 
Environmental Protection: Is there a Hierarchy?’ in Erika de Wet and Jure Vidmar 
(eds), Hierarchy in International Law (OUP 2012) 206, 225. 
30 S v France (n9). 
31 Consider Hatton (n9 [GC]) [122]-[129]. 
32 CoE (n12) [43]-[45]. 
33 (2006) 42 EHRR 50. 
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ECtHR found “a violation of Article 8 because of the threat posed to the 
applicants’ health by the operations of gold mine using cyanidation”.34 
Violations of Article 2 ECHR, the right to life, have also been found as a 
result of poor environmental conditions.35 In Öneryıldız v Turkey the Court 
ruled that a violation of Article 2 had occurred on account of the poor 
conditions of a waste-collection site resulting in the deaths of nine people. 
The ECtHR noted that the positive obligation on states to safeguard the 
lives of those within their jurisdiction is relevant when there is a real and 
immediate risk to life as a result of poor environmental conditions.36 It is 
therefore necessary to ensure appropriate environmental conditions in 
order to protect the right to life. 
Violations of human rights have therefore been found based on 
environmental conditions. The extent and content of ECtHR case law 
demonstrates that its greening of the ECHR has not been a superficial 
watercolouring. Indeed, the Council of Europe’s Manual on Human Rights 
and the Environment indicates that it can be valid for states to interfere 
with certain other rights contained in the ECHR in order to pursue 
environmental protection measures.37  
                                       
34 CoE (n12) [43]. 
35 supra n10. 
36 Öneryıldız (n10) [71], [101]. 
37 CoE (n12) 8. See also Boyle (n6) 486, 492-500; Francesco Francioni, 
‘International Human Rights in an Environmental Horizon’ (2010) 21 EJIL 41, 45-
46; ECOSOC, ‘Human Rights and the Environment’ E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 
(‘Ksentini Report’) [242]; Fredin (n7). 
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However, because of its use of the ‘margin of appreciation’, the ECtHR has 
in general been unwilling to challenge states’ own definitions of suitable 
environmental conditions unless there has been a loss of life.38 The 
greening of existing human rights is therefore a limited means of 
protecting the environment in the European context. The ECtHR has 
acknowledged this, stating that “there is no explicit right in the Convention 
to a clean and quiet environment, but where an individual is directly and 
seriously affected by noise or other pollution, an issue may arise under 
Article 8”.39  
The ECHR is therefore only relevant in cases where damage to the 
environment has also resulted in an interference with the enjoyment of a 
human right already recognised. Damage to the environment alone is not 
enough for a breach of duty to be found. Kyrtatos v Greece40 provides a 
concrete example of this. Assessing whether the destruction of a wetland41 
violated Article 8, the ECtHR ruled that “neither Article 8 nor any of the 
other Articles of the Convention are specifically designed to provide 
general protection of the environment as such”.42 Thus the ECHR approach 
                                       
38 Boyle (n6) 495-96, 508; Dinah Shelton, ‘Developing substantive environmental 
rights’ (2010) 1 JHRE 89, 111-12. 
39 Leon and Kania (n9) [98]. See also X v Iceland (1976) 5 DR 86; DeMerieux 
(n8)524. 
40 Kyrtatos (n9). See also Herrmann v Germany (2013) 56 EHRR 7, Separate 
Opinion of Pinto de Albuquerque 36.  
41 Referred to as a ‘swamp’ by the ECtHR. Karen Hulme, ‘International 
environmental law and human rights’ in Scott Sheeran and Nigel Rodley (eds), 
Routledge Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Routledge 2013) 285, 
298. 
42 Kyrtatos (n9) [52]. 
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provides a point of access for environmental protection into IHRL, but does 
not protect the environment per se. 
2.2.2 ELSEWHERE 
Although no other regional human rights regime has engaged with 
greening on a par with the ECHR, the principles can be found elsewhere. 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACommHR) has stated 
that “several fundamental rights require, as a necessary precondition for 
their exercise, a minimum environmental quality”.43 Indeed, the 
IACommHR and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) have 
acknowledged that environmental damage has an impact on the right to 
life;44 communal rights to property;45 the right to residence and 
movement;46 the right to religious freedom and worship;47 the right to 
family;48 the right to preservation of health;49 and the ‘right to consultation’ 
                                       
43 IACommHR, ‘Thematic Report on Indigenous Peoples, Communities of African 
Descent and Extractive Industries’ (2015) [58]. Note that the OAS regime does 
contain a human right to environment. See infra and Dinah Shelton, ‘Remedies 
and Reparations’ in Malcolm Langford et al (eds), Global Justice, State Duties (CUP 
2013) 381-84; Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay (2005) IACtHR 
Series C No 125 [163]. 
44 Yanomami v Brazil (1985) IACommHR Resolution 12/85, Case 7615 p10; Maya 
Indigenous Community of the Toledo District v Belize (2004) IACommHR Report 
No 40/04, Case 12.053 [154]; Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador 
(2012) IACtHR Series C No 245 [341(3)]. 
45 Maya [147]; Sarayaku [341(2)]. 
46 Yanomami p10, Sarayaku [134]-[136]. 
47 Maya [154]. 
48 Maya [154]. 
49 Maya [154], Yanomami p10. 
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implicit in the right to self-determination.50 Although the IACtHR and 
IACommHR have primarily considered how environmental damage affects 
the rights of indigenous peoples, their ‘greening’ principles may have wider 
reach.51  
At the global level, UN bodies have likewise noted that the state of the 
environment is relevant to existing human rights. The Committee on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights’ (CESCR) General Comments on the 
right to health52 and the right to food53 contain references to the 
environment and environmental policy. John Knox, in his role as Special 
Rapporteur on human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, 
clean, healthy and sustainable environment,54 has emphasised the 
connection between existing human rights and environmental conditions, 
in particular the rights to life, health, food, water, housing, and self-
determination.55 Knox has noted that “all human rights are vulnerable to 
environmental degradation”,56 and that “states have obligations to protect 
                                       
50 Maya [154], Sarayaku [145]-[232]. 
51 §2.4.1(a). 
52 CESCR, General Comment 14, HR1/GEN/1/ (Vol I) [4]. 
53 CESCR, General Comment 12 [4]. 
54 See <http://srenvironment.org/> (last accessed 14/6/2016). 
55 UNHRC, ‘Mapping report’ A/HRC/25/53 (30 December 2013) [17]-[25]; 
‘Preliminary report’ (n1) [16]-[24]. See also ‘Analytical Study’ A/HRC/19/34 (16 
December 2011) [56]-[63]; ‘Climate Change Report’ A/HRC/10/61 (15 January 
2009) [18]-[41]. 
56 ‘Preliminary report’ (n1) [19]. See also Ksentini Report (n37) [188]-[248].  
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against environmental harm that interferes with the enjoyment of human 
rights”.57  
Although greening is a legitimate pathway for bringing environmental 
concerns into IHRL, its scope is limited. Greening is only relevant when an 
existing human right has been violated. Damage to the environment is not 
itself enough to demonstrate a breach of a greened human right. Greening 
acknowledges that enjoyment of human rights is affected by the state of 
the environment, but falls short of protecting the environment per se. As 
such, the greening of existing human rights is limited in its ability to 
protect the natural world through international law. An alternative strategy 
which may prove more effective at this is to establish a specific human 
right to environment. The remainder of this Chapter will focus on this 
strategy, assessing current law and potential developments.  
2.3 DEFINING A HUMAN RIGHT TO ENVIRONMENT 
The first hurdle that a human right to environment must overcome is 
determining its formulation. This will affect its content, its interpretation, 
and its resultant duties. The usual strategy to deal with this question is to 
insert an adjective to describe the environment58 that humans have a right 
to, such as ‘adequate’, ‘satisfactory’ or ‘healthy’.59 Existing treaty texts will 
                                       
57 ‘Mapping report’ (n55) [44]. See §2.5. 
58 There is also the question of determining what constitutes someone’s 
‘environment’. It is not certain that this must be in any way physically delimited or 
clearly defined.  
59 Others include: clean, healthful, ecologically balanced, decent, pure, safe and 
sustainable. See Stephen Turner, A Substantive Environmental Right (Kluwer 
2009) 46-48. 
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be surveyed to form a starting point to see how a human right to 
environment has been defined to date. 
2.3.1 A SURVEY OF CURRENT LAW 
Although there is no human right to environment within global IHRL, four 
regional treaties contain provisions directly concerned with the state of the 
environment, all of which couch it in terms of health either directly or 
indirectly. Firstly, Article 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (ACHPR)60 provides: 
All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory 
environment favourable to their development. 
Although the drafters of Article 24 opted to use the qualifier ‘general 
satisfactory’, this has been interpreted to mean healthy. In the Ogoniland61 
case, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACommHPR) 
referred to “the right to a general satisfactory environment … or the right 
to a healthy environment, as it is widely known”.62 Ogoniland concerned 
the conditions of the Ogoni people of Nigeria and the violation of a number 
of their human rights as a consequence of oil extraction activities in their 
lands. The operations caused extensive environmental degradation and 
                                       
60 (1981) 1520 UNTS 217. 
61 SERAC and the CESR v Nigeria (2003) ACommHPR Communication No 155/96, 
10 IHRR 282 (‘Ogoniland’) 
62 ibid [52]. See also Fons Coomans, ‘The Ogoni Case Before the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ 52 ICLQ 749, 754; Dinah Shelton, 
‘Decision Regarding Case 155/96’ (2002) 96 AJIL 937, 939. 
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health problems resulting from pollution and contamination.63 In assessing 
the merits of Ogoniland, the ACommHPR considered the violations of 
Article 16 (right to best attainable standard of health) together with Article 
24.64 A ‘general satisfactory environment’ should therefore be considered 
in this context to be closely related to a ‘healthy environment’.  
Secondly, Article 11(1) of the Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (San Salvador Protocol)65 provides:  
Everyone shall have the right to live in a healthy 
environment and to have access to basic public services. 
Article 11(1) provides a slightly different formulation of a human right to 
environment than the ACHPR. It refers directly to a healthy environment 
and is attached to individuals rather than peoples as in the ACHPR.66 
However, it does not define what is meant by a ‘healthy environment’.  
Article 38 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights67 also contains a human 
right to a healthy environment. The right is framed under the umbrella of 
ensuring ‘well-being and a decent life’ alongside flood, clothing, housing 
and services. 
                                       
63 Ogoniland [1]. 
64 Ogoniland [50]-[54]. 
65 (1988) OAS Treaty Series No 69. 
66 §2.4.1(a). 
67 12 IHRR 893. 
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The final relevant regional treaty is from Europe and is not normally 
considered a part of IHRL but rather of international environmental law 
(IEL). The Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation 
in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
(Aarhus) sets out a number of procedural rights. It can therefore be 
thought of as a bridge between IEL and IHRL, especially as it is the first 
environmental treaty to create legal relations between states and their 
citizens.68 Although Aarhus does not codify a substantive human right to 
environment, it does mention one in Article 1, which begins as follows: 
In order to contribute to the protection of the right of every 
person of present and future generations to live in an 
environment adequate to his or her health and well-being, 
each Party shall …  
Article 1 endorses the idea of a human right to environment. It also 
specifically provides that the state of the environment is to be measured in 
terms of human health and well-being. The Aarhus Convention’s 
embellishment of the meaning of a healthy environment (as adequate to 
human well-being) is unique in the realm of international treaties, and its 
reference to future generations69 is also innovative in this field. 
All existing instances of a human right to environment within IHRL refer to 
health in their formulation. However, simply defining the right as a human 
right to a healthy (as opposed to sustainable, adequate, etc) environment 
                                       
68 §1.2.1; Boyd (n2) 87. 
69 §2.4.1(b). 
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provides only the first step in defining a human right to environment. The 
next step is to define what is meant by a ‘healthy environment’. 
2.3.2 DEFINING A ‘HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT’  
There are two important components to unpacking the meaning of a 
‘healthy environment’: (i) whether it should be understood as one which is 
conducive to human health or interpreted to mean that the environment 
itself is healthy; and (ii) setting the actual standards for human and/or 
ecosystem health.  
As to the latter component, precise standards cannot be set out in a treaty 
text since this would be far too unwieldy, and suitable environmental 
conditions are inevitably variable.70 The supposed consequent vagueness 
of a human right to environment is often grounds for criticism.71 Although 
vagueness is a meaningful concern, it is not one unique to a human right 
to environment. For example, Article 7 ICCPR provides that “no one shall 
be subjected to torture”, but does not provide a definition of what 
constitutes torture.72 Nickel points out that “international human rights 
typically set broad normative standards that can be interpreted and 
applied by appropriate legislative, judicial, or administrative bodies at the 
                                       
70 Fadeyeva (n9) [69]. 
71 Philip Alston, ‘Conjuring up New Human Rights’ (1984) 78 AJIL 607, 613; Paula 
Pevato, ‘A Right to Environment in International Law: Current Status and Future 
Outlook’ (1999) 8 RECIEL 309, 312-13; Boyd (n2) 33-34; Rodriguez-Rivera, ‘Is 
the Human Right to Environment Recognized Under International Law? It Depends 
on the Source’ (2001) 12 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and 
Policy 1, 32-33. 
72 And the definition of torture has indeed been further defined through the more 
specific Convention Against Torture: see §8.2.1.2. 
109 
 
appropriate level”:73 a key element of the design of contemporary IHRL 
seen in Chapter One is that they are not static but dynamic (‘carnivalistic’ 
even),74 they are open to re-interpretation and renewal.  
Defining exactly what is meant by a healthy environment can therefore be 
done elsewhere through an interpretive process.75 The articulation of a 
human right in a treaty is distinct from the interpretive process, and the 
latter can solve problems that the former cannot. Such a process is well-
suited to fleshing out the meaning of a human right to a healthy 
environment, which will necessarily vary across time and space. 
Defining appropriate environmental standards is a complicated problem. 
There is no precise rate at which chopping down trees for firewood 
becomes unsustainable deforestation and no level that defines when the 
concentration of pollutants in a river becomes dangerous. Of course, 
standards can and have been set in this regard,76 even if they are 
ultimately arbitrary to some extent.77 Allocating an interpretive role to 
human rights institutions would entrust considerable responsibility to 
judges and other professionals who may not be well-versed in 
                                       
73 James Nickel, ‘The Human Right to a Safe Environment: Philosophical 
Perspectives on Its Scope and Justification’ (1993) 18 YJIL 281, 285. 
74 §1.5.3n240. 
75 Dinah Shelton, ‘Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to 
Environment’ (1991) 28 Stanford Journal of International Law 103, 135-37; 
François du Bois, ‘Social Justice and the Judicial Enforcement of Environmental 
Rights and Duties’ in Boyle and Anderson (n8); Boyle (n6) 508. 
76 Relying for instance on WHO guidelines: Shelton (n38) 97, 117-18. 
77 Decreasing the concentration of a pollutant by a tiny amount may alter its 
status from illegal to legal without necessarily providing any health benefits. 
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environmental science and ecology (and the expansive time and space 
scales required to respond to environmental problems).78 However, this 
risk can be overcome by ensuring that a range of suitable experts are 
involved in the process.79 
Vagueness can in fact be an asset of human rights – it allows them to be 
developed and deployed appropriately in differing situations. This flexibility 
of human rights is especially pertinent in the environmental context: “the 
variability of implementation demands imposed by the right to 
environment in response to different threats over time and place does not 
undermine the concept of the right, but merely takes into consideration its 
dynamic character”.80 All human rights require flexibility in how they can 
be deployed (given that no ‘universal human rights subject’ exists81), and a 
human right to a healthy environment is no different in this regard. In 
summary, “indeterminacy is thus a problem, but not necessarily an 
insurmountable one”.82 
                                       
78 Hulme (n41) 298. 
79 Consider the role of experts in Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan) ICJ 
(Judgment of 31st March 2014) and the composition of the CEDAW and CRPD 
Committees 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/Membership.aspx>; 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/Membership.aspx>(both 
accessed 22/12/2014). 
80 Dinah Shelton, ‘Human Rights and the Environment: What Specific 
Environmental Rights have been Recognized?’ (2006-2007) 35 Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy 129, 164. 
81 §1.3.2(b). 
82 Alan Boyle, ‘The Role of International Human Rights Law in the Protection of the 
Environment’ in Boyle and Anderson (n8) 51.  
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It is also necessary to determine whether a ‘healthy environment’ is 
defined in terms of human health, ecosystem health, or both (the first 
component raised earlier). The anthropocentric route to defining a ‘healthy 
environment’ may appear more obvious. Popović claims that a right to a 
healthful environment “refers to an environment conducive to human 
health”83 and Nickel refers to a safe environment “meaning an environment 
that is not destructive of human health”.84 Furthermore, the non-binding 
reference to a human right to environment in the Aarhus Convention is 
clearly formulated in anthropocentric language. However, as will be seen, 
human rights institutions have not always interpreted a healthy 
environment so narrowly. 
2.3.2(A) INTERPRETING A ‘HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT’ 
As previously identified, judicial and other supervisory institutions 
frequently draw out the definition of human rights in an interpretive 
process. This subsection looks at how this has been done in practice with 
regards to the right to a healthy environment. 
The ACommHPR has interpreted the meaning of Article 24 ACHPR to be 
concerned with human health, as demonstrated by the combined reading 
of Articles 16 and 24 ACHPR in Ogoniland.85 But the meaning of a ‘healthy 
environment’ was also developed further by the Commission’s 
endorsement of the words of Alexandre Kiss: 
                                       
83 Neil Popović, ‘In Pursuit of Environmental Human Rights’ (1996) 27 Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review 487, 524.  
84 Nickel (n73) 284. cf Atapattu (n17) 111-12. 
85 Ogoniland [2], [50]. 
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An environment degraded by pollution and defaced by the 
destruction of all beauty and variety is as contrary to 
satisfactory living conditions and the development [of 
personality] as the breakdown of the fundamental ecological 
equilibria is harmful to physical and moral health.86 
In other words, for an environment to be healthy – according to the 
ACommHPR – it must be clean (ie not degraded by pollution), beautiful, 
varied and functioning (ie in terms of fundamental ecological equilibria). 
The endorsement of the words of Kiss incorporates an important 
recognition: that the meaning of a healthy environment is pluralistic, and 
so determining whether or not an environment is healthy requires 
consideration of a number of ‘reference points’.87 The reference points 
referred to (clean, beautiful, varied, functioning) concern both the health 
of the environment itself, and the health of its human inhabitants. Indeed, 
the two approaches are shown to be closely linked: functioning ecosystems 
are necessary for good human health. 
These reference points lend themselves to quantification and qualification 
to varying degrees. A healthy environment must be clean: limits can be set 
for various pollutants. It must be varied: there are a number of different 
ways in which biodiversity can be measured,88 and the existence of 
                                       
86 Ogoniland [51]. 
87 See Melissa Thorme, ‘Establishing Environment as a Human Right’ (1991) 19 
Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 301, 310. 
88 Such as species richness or the Shannon index. 
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particular species or habitats can be safeguarded.89 It must be functioning: 
ecological equilibria, cycles and processes must not be hampered. It must 
be beautiful: people must feel connected to their environment and enjoy 
spending time in it.90  
No specific scientific measurements were used to indicate what 
demonstrated a violation of Article 24 ACHPR in Ogoniland. This is at least 
partly due to the lack of independent scientific monitoring (a fact that 
contributed to the Commission finding a violation of Article 24).91 However, 
the reference points identified by the ACommHPR may help with identifying 
breaches in the future. Given the heterogeneity of the natural world and 
the need to be context specific, universal standards can hardly be set for 
these reference points.92 Rather, their value is in giving greater definition 
to the right and assisting in its justiciability. 
Within the Inter-American regime, Article 11(1) San Salvador Protocol has 
not to date been the subject of a decision from the IACommHR or the 
IACtHR.93 This is because Article 19 San Salvador Protocol limits the 
                                       
89 eg The 1979 Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural 
Habitats 1284 UNTS 209. 
90 Since beauty is, by definition, a subjective characteristic.  
91 Ogoniland [53]-[54]. A breach of Article 24 can thus be established through 
either procedural or substantive means. 
92 IHRL is capable of responding to such heterogeneity, consider for example its 
interpretation of the right to freedom of religion: Kevin Boyle and Sangeeta Shah, 
‘Thought, expression, association, and assembly’ in Moeckli (n22) 220-25. 
93 Although there have been a number of petitions and cases before them which 
have a palpably environmental undercurrent: Yakye Axa (n43); Yanomami; Maya; 
Sarayaku (n44); Saramaka People v Suriname (2007) IACtHR Series C No 172; 
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua (2001) IACtHR Series C No 
79. 
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competence of these institutions to only receiving petitions concerning 
trade union rights and the right to education. However, in its Thematic 
Report on Indigenous Peoples, Communities of African Descent and 
Extractive Industries,94 the IACommHR has “asserted that extraction and 
development projects generate a series of consequences to the personal 
integrity, health, and right to a healthy environment of indigenous peoples 
and Afro-descendent communities”.95 In particular, the IACommHR details 
a number of environmental impacts that may affect these rights.96 These 
include impacts relating both to human health – such as toxic substances 
harmful to human health,97 exposure to oil and oil-related chemicals,98 and 
interruptions to river flows that affect water use99 - and to ecosystem 
health – such as destruction of ecosystems,100 adverse consequences to 
the hydrological system,101 loss of biodiversity,102 and habitat 
degradation.103  
Again, a ‘healthy environment’ has been interpreted to include numerous 
‘reference points’ concerned with both human and ecosystem health 
(including being clean, varied and functioning). The impacts identified by 
                                       
94 IACommHR (n43). 
95 ibid [273]. 
96 ibid [250], [273]-[286], [294]. 
97 ibid [274], [277]. 
98 ibid [280]. 
99 ibid [281]. 
100 ibid [274]. 
101 ibid. 
102 ibid [250], [281]. 
103 ibid [294]. 
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IACommHR (eg exposure to oil/functioning of hydrological systems) 
provide specific measures that can be used to determine whether or not an 
environment is healthy.  
Within other regional bodies, Article 38 of the Arab Charter has received no 
further interpretation, and the Aarhus Convention is not relevant to the 
interpretive process for a ‘healthy environment’ since it does not enlist a 
substantive right to an environment of a particular quality. 
At the global level, reports from UN human rights institutions are useful 
sources, even though no human right to environment is articulated within 
global human rights instruments. Most significantly, the Ksentini Report 
and its Draft Principles104 both go beyond a purely anthropocentric 
definition of a healthy environment. When discussing the health aspect of 
environmental protection, the Ksentini Report notes that healthy “has been 
generally interpreted [in international and domestic instruments] to mean 
that the environment must be healthy in itself – free from ‘diseases’ that 
hinder its ecological balance and sustainability – and that it must be 
healthful, that is conducive to healthy living”,105 thus defining a healthy 
environment in both an ecocentric and an anthropocentric manner.  
This twinned interpretation of a ‘healthy environment’ is reflected in the 
Ksentini Draft Principles, which contains a human right to a “secure, 
healthy and ecologically sound environment”.106 In particular, in order for 
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an environment to be ‘ecologically sound’, consideration must be had of 
the health of ecosystems themselves. Finally, although John Knox’s 
mandate is focussed on greening rather than a human right to 
environment, he has noted that the human right to environment enshrined 
in national constitutions often refer to both human health and/or “an 
ecologically balanced environment”.107  
2.3.2(B) MULTIPLE REFERENCE POINTS 
A broad and pluralistic interpretation of a ‘healthy environment’, defined 
according to multiple reference points, has been endorsed by a number of 
legal regimes.108 Defining a ‘healthy environment’ according to multiple 
reference points is not only legitimate, but also increases the scope of 
protection afforded by a human right to environment109 because of the 
limitations of a purely anthropocentric definition.110 In particular, Alan 
Boyle notes that the ECHR already “fully guarantees everything a right to a 
healthy environment would normally be thought to cover”111 if (and only if) 
it is conceived of solely in terms of human health. This is because 
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environmental problems which have an impact on human health are 
already (potentially) relevant to Article 8 ECHR.112  
Defined only in terms of human health, a human right to a healthy 
environment is better thought of as a ‘newly focussed human right’ rather 
than a ‘new human right’.113 In fact, an entirely anthropocentric definition 
of a ‘healthy environment’ actually provides less protection than the 
greening approach, which does not require any impacts on health 
specifically: according to the ECtHR “severe environmental pollution may 
affect individuals’ … private and family life adversely, without, however, 
seriously endangering their health”.114  
Defining a healthy environment according to both anthropocentric and 
ecocentric reference points thus adds substantive content to the right. 
Whilst human health should remain as a reference point for defining a 
healthy environment, it should not stand alone. The definition of a healthy 
environment should, and can, incorporate both anthropocentric and 
ecocentric reference points, such as pollution levels, nutrient cycles, 
biodiversity, and people’s ability to access nature. Whether such an 
interpretation of a ‘healthy environment’ is compatible with IHRL and its 
project to protect human dignity will be examined in Chapter Three, where 
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it will be argued that the flourishing of the ‘fleshy’ human rights subject 
does require healthy ecosystems.115 
A broad definition of a ‘healthy environment’ is able to provide better 
protection both to humans and to the natural world. However, limitations 
still remain. For example, a right to a healthy environment is not a right to 
a particular environment. Ecosystems could be destroyed and rebuilt as 
long as they meet certain criteria.116 It is therefore worth considering how 
reference points beyond the notion of ‘health’ could be included in a human 
right to environment. 
2.3.3 DEVELOPMENTS BEYOND HEALTH 
Environmental human rights are certainly connected to health, both human 
and nonhuman. However, it is plausible that ensuring appropriate 
environmental conditions for humans is not solely an issue of health. That 
environmental human rights are not restricted to issues of health is 
witnessed via alternative formulations for a human right to environment. 
In particular, proposals for a human right to an ‘ecologically balanced’ or a 
‘sustainable’ environment, or a ‘right to co-existence with nature’117 may 
potentially include matters that a human right to a healthy environment 
cannot.  
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Additionally, the interpretive process for other human rights has seen 
acknowledgment from the European, Inter-American and UN regimes that 
the state of the environment is relevant to the enjoyment of many other 
human rights (via the greening process).118 This suggests the existence of 
dimensions to a human right to environment other than health, since the 
state of the environment is also relevant to, for example, cultural life,119 
and food.120  
Further reference points may also emerge through use of dignity’s role as 
a metric121 within IHRL: “dignity can alleviate the nebulous nature of 
environmental rights by providing a benchmark against which a violation or 
a remedy should be judged”.122 Using dignity as a metric to interpret 
environmental human rights “may allow courts to consider a broader range 
of impacts, such as impacts on personality, identity and well-being”.123 
Chapter Three will identify a number of ways in which human dignity is tied 
to a healthy environment;124 and deeper analysis of dignity later in this 
thesis will demonstrate that fuller understanding of the ‘fleshy’ nature of 
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the (human) rights subject reveals that (human) dignity is in fact 
fundamentally caught up in the natural world.125  
However, it has already been seen that a ‘healthy environment’ can be 
defined very broadly. For example, the ‘beauty’ dimension referred to be 
the ACommHPR perhaps extends beyond ecosystem health since 
ecosystems that are functioning are not necessarily aesthetically pleasing 
or conducive to meaningful human interaction.126 It is thus possible for 
additional reference points to be used as methods for determining whether 
an environment is indeed ‘healthy’. For example, the Special Rapporteur 
on the right to food has found that right to be threatened by pollution and 
habitat loss.127 As such, a ‘healthy environment’ could be interpreted to 
mean one that is capable of producing adequate food. This additional 
reference point will inevitably be linked to others: an environment that can 
produce adequate food must also be clean and diverse. 
Furthermore, even reference points relating to the cultural and identity 
aspects of environmental conditions could be incorporated under the 
‘healthy environment’ umbrella. As recognised by the UNESCO Director-
General in 1976: “The deterioration of the natural environment and, even 
more, the alienation from this environment of an increasingly large number 
of people in the industrialized countries are direct and potentially very 
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serious blows to culture itself”.128 The interpretive process could determine 
that for an environment to be considered ‘healthy’, it must be capable of 
supporting positive human cultural relationships.129 The adjective ‘healthy’ 
has proved popular because it is flexible. This flexibility can be used to 
ensure that a ‘healthy environment’ is not interpreted too literally given 
the litany of other formulations of a right to environment.   
Another way in which environmental human rights extend beyond health 
can be found in the Ksentini Draft Principles. Article 6 provides: “all 
persons have the right to protection and preservation of the air, soil, water, 
sea-ice, flora and fauna, and the essential processes and areas necessary 
to maintain biological diversity and ecosystems”.130 The UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)131 also envisions environmental 
human rights as including a “right to the conservation and protection of the 
environment and the productive capacity of their lands or territories and 
resources”.132 Rights to protection, preservation or conservation are 
distinct from a right to an environment of a particular standard. They are 
not concerned with the quality of environment humans have a right to but 
rather with specific components of the existing environment. They come 
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closer to protecting the environment itself, as opposed to a human interest 
in the environment – although the two may be ultimately inseparable. 
Although such rights are distinguishable from a human right to 
environment, the two matters are closely entwined. This issue will be 
returned to when the duties that flow from a human right to environment 
are considered, where it will be seen that IHRL already recognises that 
environmental protection measures are necessary in order to secure 
environmental human rights.133 A broadly defined human right to 
environment will necessarily expand the scope of state duties in this regard 
to protect and conserve the environment. A broadly defined human right to 
a healthy environment is thus a highly promising means by which to both 
codify and extend how IHRL can be used to protect the natural world 
through international law. The remainder of this chapter will explore other 
important aspects of such a right. 
2.4 ACTORS 
2.4.1 SUBJECTS 
The subjects of a human right to a healthy environment need establishing. 
The potential candidates here are individuals and groups. The relative 
advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches merit attention, as 
does gauging the possibility of following a hybrid pathway whereby both 
individuals and groups are the subjects of the right. 
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2.4.1(A) INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS 
Whether an individual, collective or corporate right is more suitable for a 
human right to environment is not immediately clear. This is attested to by 
the fact that the ACHPR enlists a peoples’ right, whereas the San Salvador 
Protocol contains an individual right to a healthy environment.  
As noted in Chapter One, there are two different types of group rights: 
collective and corporate.134 All three types of right (individual, collective, 
corporate) are potentially meaningful within environmental human 
rights.135 For example, biodiversity loss and the ensuing deterioration of 
the health of the environment is a corporate issue at both a local and 
global level. Members of an indigenous community affected by pollution 
from mining activity may have had their collective cultural rights violated. 
Or a concerned individual may wish to exert a right to environmental 
information concerning a new development on a greenfield site. The 
difference is subtle, and also somewhat artificial. It is plausible that 
individuals who request information on the environmental aspects of a new 
development do so for reasons other than individual benefit. A community 
suffering from pollution is likely to consider this an issue to be addressed 
as a group, especially if there are suggestions of discrimination in the 
locating of the polluting activity in the first place.136 Likewise, biodiversity 
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loss can affect individuals in a direct way (for example farmers or fishers). 
It is therefore not immediately obvious which strategy (individual, 
collective or corporate) is the most suitable for a human right to 
environment. 
However, a purely individualistic account will not suffice for a human right 
to environment because the environment is a public good:137 nobody’s 
environment is exclusively their own. Environmental conditions supply a 
tangible way in which human flourishing happens in community138 and 
environmental damage will normally affect more than one person. For 
example, the aspects of environmental protection concerned with species 
loss or deforestation are not solely owed to a single individual since the 
justification for such protection is not solely based on individual interest. 
Rather, it is in the wider interest of society and humanity at large that an 
inhabitable biosphere is present: ecological collapse affects more than just 
individuals.139 
Even if a healthy environment is construed narrowly to be concerned only 
with human health, environmental issues will often arise that affect entire 
groups – the air people breathe and the water they drink are shared 
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resources. Flexibility would allow the law in this area to develop along the 
lines of common property,140 which may prove essential to defining a 
human right to environment since “to be meaningful, a right to a decent 
environment has to address the environment as a public good”.141 A right 
to environment should therefore be vested in groups. A corporate 
perspective is in part needed in order to avoid situations whereby “the 
more widespread the violations – which can occur in many contexts where 
environmental harm is the origin of the complaint – the less likely it is that 
[a] complaint will be admissible”.142 
Indeed, when emerging group rights are discussed, a right to environment 
often features.143 However, the majority of analyses of human rights in 
environmental contexts have paid relatively little attention to the concept 
of group rights,144 even though the only justiciable human right to 
environment is a corporate one (Article 24 ACHPR). This may be due to the 
controversy over, and consequent reluctance for, corporate rights 
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generally.145 Part of this reluctance is due to difficulties over establishing 
who the holder of a group right is. 
The risk noted in Chapter One of associating corporate rights in general 
with peoples’ rights in particular, and ‘peoples’ with indigenous 
communities, can be seen here. Undeniably, there is a tight connection 
between indigenous communities and environmental human rights due to 
the particular relationship such communities often have with their land.146 
This has been witnessed in cases such as Ogoniland;147 Yanomami;148 
Lubicon Lake Band;149 and Länsman.150 Together these bear witness to the 
ease with which whole communities can be affected by environmental 
damage. It may seem promising to use these cases as examples of how a 
corporate environmental human right can function. However, this risks a 
potential narrowing of environmental human rights by restricting them to 
indigenous rights. All people(s) share a dependence on natural systems. 
This dependence is unaffected by (lack of) awareness of it. The groups 
affected by environmental damage are not only indigenous ones.  
Although environmental human rights may require clear enunciation and 
specific interpretation for indigenous peoples, this is the case for all human 
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rights (hence the very existence of UNDRIP151). There are important 
lessons for IHRL to learn from indigenous communities, and those 
concerning the nonhuman environment may be particularly visible.152 
These lessons should be listened to and reflected on not only for 
indigenous communities, but for all humankind. However, since it is 
possible that legal decisions regarding indigenous communities are not 
relevant outside such a context,153 developments for environmental rights 
should not be aligned too closely with indigenous rights. All peoples 
(however defined) stand to benefit from a right to environment. 
There is also room for a human right to environment to also have an 
individual dimension. The important human health aspects of a human 
right to environment can be considered from the vantage point of the 
individual154 and it should be possible for an individual alone to have 
standing in this regard. As noted in Chapter One, it is unlikely that 
individuals would have standing under a specifically group right to 
environment.155 However, it is conceivable that the majority of a people 
experiencing a deteriorating environment may not be interested in bringing 
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a complaint due to some political or economic compromise that has been 
struck. In such a case, the legal position of an individual who wants to 
uphold their right to environment is unclear. Perhaps as an individual, they 
never had such a right in the first place, or it may be considered waived on 
their behalf by the position of their people. Neither result seems 
particularly satisfactory.  
There therefore needs to be a synthesis between individual and group 
rights in order to best reflect environmental needs. This can be done by 
simply stating that a human right to environment applies to both 
individuals and to groups.156 It is possible that a human right to 
environment will help develop understanding of the coexistence of 
individual and group rights within IHRL.  
2.4.1(B) OTHER SUBJECTS 
There are two further categories of potential right-holders worth 
mentioning here. Firstly, future generations since legal regimes within IEL 
are often concerned with the plight of future generations.157 Notice too that 
the Aarhus Convention refers to “the right of every person of present and 
future generations”.158 This could be read as simply stating that humans 
will be born in the future and they too will have human rights. However, 
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the language does raise the issue of how a legitimate environmental 
objective (ie the protection of future generations) can fit into IHRL. In this 
regard, the OHCHR has stated that: 
The human rights principles of equality and non-
discrimination generally focus on situations in the present, 
even if it is understood that the value of these core human 
rights principles would not diminish over time and be 
equally applicable to future generations.159 
On the other hand, Minors Oposa160 demonstrates the possibility of future 
generations having legal standing. The case was brought on behalf of 
children and future generations to stop deforestation in The Philippines. 
The Filipino Supreme Court ruled that future generations do have a right to 
a balanced and healthful ecology. However, Minors Oposa does not draw 
out the implications of granting future generations human rights under 
IHRL. As a starting point, it is nontrivial to ascertain exactly which rights 
future generations can hold. It seems unlikely that the entire catalogue of 
human rights can be bestowed on the unborn.161 It is worth noting that the 
issue of future persons has received most debate within IHRL through the 
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discussion on the human rights of foetuses.162 There may be parallel 
developments regarding the notion of legal standing. 
Secondly, it is not only humans that benefit from living in a healthy 
environment, but every single living organism.163 As Part I is focussed on 
IHRL and the subjects of human rights are necessarily humans, this 
observation will be considered in Part III of this thesis. 
  *   
Embracing the many dimensions of environmental human rights can 
encourage human rights in general to celebrate their multi-functionality.164 
The subjects of a human right to environment are humans in their many 
manifestations as individuals, members of collectives, and constituent 
parts of various groups. It would be challenging for IHRL to bestow human 
rights on future generations, and this is a drawback of using human rights 
to achieve environmental protection objectives given the clear 
endorsement of inter-generational justice within IEL. An equivalent 
observation is also valid for nonhumans.  
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2.4.2 DUTY BEARERS 
The primary duty bearers in IHRL are states.165 As detailed in Chapter One, 
the creation of IHRL was based on consensus among states that they owe 
responsibilities to individuals within their jurisdiction. However, IHRL is 
now somewhat more nuanced: not only do state bodies and agents have 
human rights duties,166 but IHRL also places duties on other actors (such 
as the UN167) and state duties can be dispersed to non-state actors within 
their jurisdiction.168  
The dispersed nature of duties emanating from human rights was seen in 
Ogoniland where the polluting activities were performed by the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Company, a state-owned company, in conjunction with 
the Shell Petroleum Development Corporation, a private actor. It was the 
state, Nigeria, who held the legal duty, but part of this duty was to 
regulate the activities of Shell.169 It is thus possible for the existing model 
for duties under IHRL to be transferred seamlessly to a human right to 
environment: 
The right to a safe environment can be sculpted to fit the 
general idea of human rights by conceiving it as primarily 
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imposing duties on governments and international 
organisations. It calls on them to regulate the activities of 
both governmental and nongovernmental agents to ensure 
that environmental safety is maintained.170 
However, the nature of these duties is often rather complex.171 The 
following section will examine what environmental duties already exist in 
IHRL and what might arise from a human right to environment.  
2.5 NATURE OF DUTIES 
All human rights involve a wide array of interlocking duties. Insight into 
these can be gained through the ‘respect, protect, fulfil’ typology, which 
provides a useful depiction of the range of state duties which arise through 
IHRL.172 The (prospective) duties arising from environmental human rights 
can therefore be thought of in terms of this tripartite scheme. Although 
there are meaningful differences between the three types of duty, there is 
inevitably some continuity between them.173 
The most basic element of state duties regarding human rights is to 
respect them. This entails a predominantly negative obligation on states 
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not to violate human rights, including both direct and indirect interference 
with their enjoyment.174 For environmental human rights, this means that 
states must not wantonly destroy the environment, subject their citizens to 
unacceptable levels of pollution, or pursue policies that necessitate severe 
environmental degradation.  
The duty to protect human rights requires states to “create an 
environment in which rights are enjoyed”.175 This means that states must 
ensure that private actors operating within their jurisdiction are not able to 
readily interfere with rights.176 The need to protect human rights does not 
make a state responsible for every act that infringes an individual’s rights, 
but it does place an obligation on them to safeguard their citizens against 
such acts, at least to some extent. In the present context, states must 
exercise due diligence177 in ensuring that activities of private individuals 
and companies under their jurisdiction do not illegitimately prevent their 
citizens from enjoying their environmental human rights.  
To fulfil a human right is the more complex, and perhaps more onerous, 
aspect of the state obligation. It includes “obligations to provide, facilitate 
and promote”178 and requires states to proactively engage in activities 
intended to strengthen people’s ability to realise their rights.179 Fulfilling 
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human rights includes adopting national measures180 that mirror 
international commitments, and ensuring that rights cannot be violated 
with impunity.181 Ramcharan includes some aspects of this under the duty 
to respect,182 demonstrating the continuity between the three types of 
state duties. As will be seen below, there are a number of largely 
procedural duties that arise within the context of fulfilling environmental 
human rights.  
This section will present the environmentally relevant duties that already 
exist in IHRL and consider how these duties would be altered and/or 
extended by the creation of a specific human right to environment. 
Environmental duties already exist because of the need to respect, protect 
and fulfil greened human rights. For example, within the ECHR regime, 
[c]ases such as Guerra, Lopez Ostra, Öneryildiz, Taskin and 
Fadeyeva show how the right to private life, or the right to 
life, can be used to compel governments to regulate 
environmental risks, enforce environmental laws, or 
disclose information.183 
John Knox’s rapporteurship is concentrated on analysing the environmental 
obligations that arise from existing human rights. Knox has noted that 
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there are numerous obligations in this regard,184 which will be outlined 
below.    
2.5.1 ADOPTING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
As seen above, poor environmental conditions can result in violations of 
human rights. As such, in order to respect, protect and fulfil many human 
rights, states must take steps to ensure that the environment is of a 
certain quality. For example, the IACommHR has “reiterated the widely 
held conclusion that the right to life … requires that governments take 
affirmative steps to protect life by ensuring environmental integrity”.185  
In order to ensure appropriate levels of environmental integrity, states 
must firstly ensure that their own activities do not damage the 
environment. In Ogoniland the ACommHPR considered that the particular 
duties required to respect Article 24 are “largely non-interventionist”186 – 
states must “desist from directly threatening the health and environment 
of their citizens”.187 Secondly, states must also ensure that activities of 
private actors within their jurisdiction do not damage the environment in 
ways that interfere with the enjoyment of human rights. They must not 
only respect but also protect environmental human rights.  
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As such, states have obligations to adopt and implement legal frameworks 
that prevent environmental harm by regulating both state activity 
(respecting) and business and industry (protecting). This has been 
witnessed in ECtHR case law,188 noted by the IACommHR,189 put forward in 
Ogoniland, implied by Article 11(2) San Salvador Protocol,190 and endorsed 
by John Knox.191  
The content of these laws will mirror the content and formulation of 
environmental human rights. For this reason, the definition and 
interpretation of environmental human rights is significant: the kind of 
environment that the state must respect, protect, and fulfil influences the 
laws it must adopt.192 For example, greening has placed an obligation on 
states to ensure that environmental quality does not endanger the 
enjoyment of other human rights. States must therefore put in place 
legislative frameworks that protect the environment only in so far as the 
state of the environment may affect these rights. This will likely include 
regulation of “air quality, water quality [and] toxic releases”.193 As 
demonstrated above, an anthropocentrically defined human right to a 
healthy environment will have much the same content as greened human 
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rights, and so also places an obligation on states to regulate environmental 
quality where it may affect human health.  
However, under existing IHRL, states have no obligations to protect the 
environment per se. Neither John Knox nor the ECtHR have identified an 
obligation to protect biodiversity or sites of cultural importance in order to 
respect, protect and fulfil greened human rights. Indeed, the ECtHR has 
“consistently held to the view that nature protection as such is not part of 
the ECHR’s guarantees”.194 
The increased scope of a human right to a healthy environment when 
defined according to multiple reference points can be seen in the 
ACommHPR’s development of the obligations arising from that right: 
Article 24 … imposes clear obligations upon a government. 
It requires the State to take reasonable and other 
measures to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, 
to promote conservation, and to secure an ecologically 
sustainable development and use of natural resources.195 
A broader definition of a healthy environment – including ecocentric 
reference points – would generate obligations regarding ecological 
degradation and biodiversity conservation. This is because states would 
have obligations to protect and provide an environment that is varied, 
functioning, and beautiful. The additional rights contained in the Ksentini 
                                       
194 Shelton (n142) 149.  
195 ibid [52]. 
138 
 
Report and UNDRIP regarding the protection and conservation of 
biodiversity do not flow from greened human rights, but would be integral 
components of a broadly defined human right to environment.196 This 
demonstrates the additional protection offered to both humans and the 
natural world by defining a healthy environment according to both 
anthropocentric and ecocentric reference points.  
2.5.2 PROCEDURAL DUTIES 
There are also a number of procedural environmental duties within IHRL. 
As recognised by Knox, these procedural duties – to facilitate participation, 
to provide information and access to justice, and to assess environmental 
impacts197 – have a key role to play in protecting and fulfilling all 
environmental human rights. These procedural duties are also standalone 
components of IEL: they can be found in Principles 10 and 17 of the Rio 
Declaration198 and in the Aarhus Convention, which has codified access to 
information,199 access to justice200 and public participation201 in 
environmental matters into binding international law. The procedural rights 
                                       
196 Other potential duties flowing from a human right to environment such as 
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correlative to these procedural duties are often considered the most 
widespread form of environmental human right.202 
The key principles contained in Aarhus have been adopted by the ECtHR, 
which has found violations of Article 8 ECHR based on procedural issues 
such as a failure to provide environmental information.203 It is also notable 
that the ECtHR applies the Aarhus principles to all state parties, notably in 
Taşkın204 “despite the fact that Turkey is not a party to the Aarhus 
Convention”.205 Given the desire of international human rights regimes to 
standardise their practice, the principles of Aarhus may even have global 
reach.206 The need for community involvement in decision-making 
processes concerning their immediate environments has also been 
emphasised by the IACtHR in Maya, Sarayaku and Saramaka,207 with the 
IACtHR noting that consultation is not just a treaty-based provision, but “is 
also a general principle of international law”.208 
The ECtHR has also recognised that states have a procedural duty to 
conduct environmental impact assessments (EIAs).209 As with other 
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procedural duties, EIAs are a key component of (international) 
environmental law. The Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay210 
centred on the obligation to conduct EIAs, with the ICJ concluding that “an 
environmental impact assessment must be conducted prior to the 
implementation of a project”.211  
These same procedural duties will also be necessary in order to protect and 
fulfil a specific human right to environment. Indeed, the ACommHPR 
recognised the importance of procedural duties in Ogoniland, where it 
noted that appropriate and independent scientific monitoring, active 
dissemination of information, impact assessments, and providing 
meaningful opportunities for local communities to participate in decision-
making are all necessary in order to comply with Article 24.212  
However, a specific human right to environment would also connect these 
procedural duties to more detailed substantive requirements regarding the 
state of the environment (according to its multiple reference points). This 
is important since compliance with procedural requirements does not itself 
guarantee protection and restoration of the natural world.213 Substantive 
standards are also necessary, and appropriate scientific, philosophical, 
sociological and historical expertise should also be involved in decision-
making processes. The multiple reference points of a human right to 
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environment would facilitate this, generating indicators for when the 
substantive requirements of the right have been breached. 
A broad human right to environment would also extend the scope of 
procedural obligations. That is, human rights duties regarding 
environmental information and public participation would also include 
matters relating to biodiversity conservation and ecological degradation 
per se, rather than just matters concerning pollutants and nuisances. This 
would again be incorporating principles that already exist within IEL214 into 
IHRL.  
Procedural obligations in the Aarhus Convention are in fact broader than 
those within IHRL in a number of ways. In addition, procedural duties are 
currently limited within IHRL because they are only owed to those whose 
rights have been (potentially) violated.215 This is in contrast to the Aarhus 
Convention, which provides access to environmental information and 
justice to the public in general, including NGOs.216 A similar structure could 
be constructed in IHRL if a human right to environment is recognised as a 
peoples’ right, moving towards the understanding of the environment as a 
public good.  
The provisions of the Aarhus Convention also apply “without discrimination 
as to citizenship, nationality or domicile”.217 Aarhus thus creates ‘diagonal’ 
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rights that are “held by individuals or groups against the governments of 
states other than their own”.218 There is clear value in procedural 
rights/duties219 functioning across borders given that environmental 
problems often need addressing supranationally.220 This is especially 
pertinent given the lack of guaranteed environmental protection from 
procedural rights. A potentially toxic mix may arise “if a fully informed 
society decides to sacrifice environmental quality in order to advance 
economic or cultural considerations [then] such decisions can have harmful 
consequences for other states or international commons”.221 The 
extraterritorial application of norms and duties within IHRL is an issue that 
requires tackling if IHRL is to provide effective protection to the natural 
world. 
2.5.3 SCOPE OF DUTIES 
IHRL treaties ordinarily impose duties on states to secure rights only within 
their jurisdiction.222 However, environmental damage often traverses 
political borders, and large proportions of environmental protection require 
multilateral action by a number of states. The Maldives alone cannot 
prevent climate change, nor can Ecuador solely halt deforestation of the 
Amazon. The transboundary/extraterritorial nature of much environmental 
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damage thus creates challenges for environmental human rights.223 
Fulfilling these rights cannot be done by states in isolation: assistance, co-
operation and even provision of aid may be required.224 
The issue of extraterritoriality is not new to IHRL.225 Some solutions have 
been attempted, but none have yet proved to be entirely sufficient. For 
example, the ECtHR decided in Banković v Belgium226 that obligations 
under the ECHR only arise where a state exercises jurisdiction, and that 
such jurisdiction is normally limited by national borders even if cause and 
effect can be identified.227 On the other hand, the HRC has stated that a 
“State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant 
to anyone within the power or effective control of that State party, even if 
not situated within the territory of the State party”;228 and the ECtHR 
decided in Al-Skeini v UK229 that recognition of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
can occur in “exceptional circumstances”,230 in this case that the UK was 
exercising “some of the public powers normally to be exercised by a 
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sovereign government”.231 However, transboundary environmental impacts 
do not necessarily result from one state having ‘effective control’ over 
another’s territory in a political or military sense.232 
John Knox has discussed the lack of precision over obligations relating to 
transboundary environmental harm,233 concluding that “although it is clear 
that States have an obligation of international cooperation… clarification of 
the content of extraterritorial human rights obligations pertaining to the 
environment is still needed”.234 Clarity could potentially be gained in this 
area through combining principles from IEL and IHRL. For example, the 
horizontal application (ie state to state) of IEL, combined with the vertical 
application (ie state to citizen) of IHRL can potentially aid progress towards 
the ‘diagonalisation’ (ie between one state and another’s citizens) of 
international law, as witnessed in the Aarhus Convention.235 A specific 
human right to environment could potentially assist in this process since it 
is a legal rule that is definitively reliant on principles from both bodies of 
law. 
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2.5.4 REMEDIATION 
Finally, further duties will also arise as a consequence of a breach. There is 
a duty under IHRL to provide a remedy for a violation of human rights,236 
and this likewise applies for all existing and potential environmental human 
rights.237 In Ogoniland, the ACommHPR appealed to Nigeria to “undertake 
a comprehensive cleanup of lands and rivers damaged by oil 
operations”.238 Similarly, in Yanomami, Maya, and Sarayaku, the relevant 
states were all recommended (or ordered) to perform some element of 
environmental remediation.239 
* 
A wide range of duties arises from environmental human rights. This is 
both expected and desirable since the state of the natural environment 
affects humans in a number of different (and at times unpredictable) ways, 
and since IHRL must actually safeguard human dignity rather than merely 
appear to do so (the ECHR (eg) protects “effective rights and not illusory 
ones”240). States are the primary duty-bearers under IHRL, but their duties 
extend to regulating, and thus placing duties, on other actors within their 
jurisdiction. There are both procedural and substantive duties resulting 
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from environmental human rights, although the procedural ones are more 
fully established. 
Compliance with a specific human right to environment would require 
compliance with the vast majority of existing environmental duties under 
IHRL. However, such a right would also place firmer substantive duties on 
states regarding environmental quality. Development of the multiple 
reference points could lead to certain particular environmental standards 
being required to comply with IHRL (eg air pollution levels in cities or total 
national extent of protected areas).  
A broadly defined human right to a healthy environment would generate 
additional duties to those already existing in IHRL. In particular, it would 
extend the scope of environmental legislation that states are obligated to 
create and implement. This is a result of the additional reference points 
that states must take into account in respecting, protecting and fulfilling a 
healthy environment. Codifying the right as a peoples’ right would also 
potentially extend the scope of duties under IHRL. This is because it would 
openly endorse the ‘public good’ nature of environmental protection, and 
hence the need for the public as a whole to have access to environmental 
information and judicial proceedings.  
2.6 DETERMINATION OF A BREACH 
In order for a human right to environment to function, it must be possible 
to determine when it has been violated. Determining a breach of the 
procedural obligations of a human right to environment is likely to be 
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easier than doing so for the substantive obligations.241 Procedural breaches 
were relied on in Ogoniland242 and have been the favoured approach in the 
ECtHR’s greening process.243 Even if a human right to environment were to 
set particular standards regarding environmental quality, then determining 
a breach of such obligations would still be tricky for a number of reasons. 
Alongside the problem of definition (ie the standard of environment 
demanded by the right), there are interconnected difficulties regarding 
causation and balancing the right against other legitimate aims.  
2.6.1 CAUSATION 
Causation is a constant problem in environment law as it is often difficult 
to pinpoint the exact cause of environmental harm.244 The issue of 
causation actually has multiple strands to it. The first strand is to 
determine which action caused which environmental damage (a largely 
scientific problem); the second is to determine whether such 
environmental damage falls outside the definition of a ‘healthy 
environment’ (setting the boundaries for which is a predominantly political 
issue); the third is to demonstrate that said environmental damage was a 
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result of a breach of duty (an essentially legal question).245 These are all 
difficult issues to resolve.246 However, identifying these as separate 
concerns provides a framework for dealing with them: the three issues 
should not be confused with one another. 
A corporate human right to environment could overcome some of the 
causation-related difficulties vis-à-vis human health. This is because one 
need only demonstrate that general demographic trends (such as higher 
mortality rates or lower fertility rates) can be linked to polluting activity in 
order to demonstrate a (potential) breach. The individual equivalent of 
explicitly arguing that an instance of (eg) lung cancer was specifically 
caused by activity at a particular industrial plant has obvious 
deficiencies.247 
The often cumulative nature of environmental damage (eg greenhouse gas 
emissions) creates additional difficulties in determining what action caused 
what environmental damage. Again, there is a need for increased and 
improved international co-operation and approaches to 
transboundary/extraterritorial issues in order to properly secure 
environmental human rights. 
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2.7.2 BALANCING 
It has already been seen that the ECHR recognises a need to balance 
individual rights with legitimate social aims.248 In addition, Article 24 
ACHPR is unavoidably dependent on development, stating that “all peoples 
shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to 
their development” (enshrined in Article 22 ACHPR). A human right to 
environment, and indeed any human right,249 is susceptible to a balancing 
process with other human rights and legitimate objectives. To achieve this, 
fruitful interdisciplinary dialogue is needed in responding to environmental 
(and human rights) concerns. A human right to environment can 
potentially be a useful tool in promoting such dialogue and enhancing the 
consideration given to environmental matters within IHRL:  
Lacking the status of a right means that the environment 
can be trumped by those values which have that status, 
including economic development and natural resource 
exploitation. This is an omission which needs to be 
addressed if the environment as a public good is to receive 
the weight it deserves in the balance of economic, social, 
and cultural rights.250 
Balancing of various social and individual concerns is best done on a case-
by-case basis: there is an avoidance of strict liability when it comes to 
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environmental damage, both within IEL251 and IHRL.252 Gradually, general 
principles for how to balance environmental protection with other 
legitimate aims may emerge, but this will take time.253 Determining a 
breach of duty cannot be done by blanket rules, but requires 
understanding and sensitivity regarding the particular circumstances. That 
both IEL and IHRL require balancing acts renders them familiar with the 
process. 254 Although both may have “imperial ambitions”,255 neither 
expects to reign supreme. 
The determination of a breach is not a trivial affair. However, it can be 
done provided that relevant expertise is relied on; that suitable standards 
are developed; and that the geographical scope of state duties is 
clarified.256 However, there are situations in which IHRL will likely be 
unable to identify a breach. Environmental damage often occurs over time 
and space scales that are longer and more complex than many human 
rights violations.257 The time-lag effect of some environmental harm, and 
the potentially global nature of much of it, present serious issues to the 
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use of human rights to effect environmental protection, no matter what 
strategy is adopted. 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
A number of ways to address environmental harm through IHRL have been 
developed. In Africa, a peoples’ right exists; in America, a non-justiciable 
right has been pronounced; and in Europe, a process of greening human 
rights has been undertaken. Despite the lack of a specific human right to 
environment at the global level, UN institutions have shown interest in 
environmental human rights, in particular through John Knox’s compilation 
of environmental obligations in IHRL.258 Although all environmental human 
rights can contribute towards improvement of environmental conditions, a 
broadly defined human right to environment can go furthest. In particular, 
it opens the possibility of environmental degradation itself being a violation 
of IHRL; broadens the scope of environmental laws that a state has 
obligations to create and implement; provides a clearer pathway for the 
setting of environmental quality standards in IHRL; and enhances the 
status of environmental issues in IHRL balancing processes. 
A human right to environment is normally defined as a right to a healthy 
environment. However, there is room for manoeuvre in defining what a 
‘healthy environment’ actually means. When interpreted purely in terms of 
human health, much of the right’s scope can be covered through a robust 
greening process. However, a healthy environment can also refer to the 
environment itself being healthy. A broad interpretation of ‘healthy 
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environment’ according to multiple reference points both anthropocentric 
and ecocentric (such as clean, varied, beautiful and functioning) has been 
endorsed in the Ksentini Report, by the ACommHPR in Ogoniland, by the 
IACommHR, and within national jurisdictions. The term ‘healthy 
environment’ should thus be interpreted in a broad and dynamic sense, 
potentially including additional reference points (such as cultural ones) as 
understanding of human-nature interactions develops. 
The plurality of a human right to environment can also be found in the 
most appropriate subjects of such a right. Both individuals and groups can 
suffer from environmental degradation through its effects on inter alia their 
health, culture or private life. In order to ensure that a human right to 
environment is effective in protecting against this (potential for) suffering, 
it should be vested in both individuals and peoples. This recognises the 
‘public good’ nature of environmental protection, and also helps ensure 
that restrictive rules over standing do not thwart attempts to use IHRL 
processes to ensure adequate environmental conditions.259  
A binding global right with multiple reference points regarding what 
constitutes a ‘healthy environment’ could be established via a protocol to 
an existing international human rights treaty, or a separate treaty regime, 
or even CESCR General Comments.260 Such an instrument could also set 
out those rights that can also be infringed with through environmental 
degradation, and clarify state duties in order to respect, protect and fulfil 
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environmental human rights. This would further enrich IHRL’s 
understanding of the human rights subject, providing a clear route towards 
recognising that human flourishing requires appropriate environmental 
conditions. A broadly defined human right to a healthy environment would 
contribute towards protection of both humans and the natural world and 
potentially improve understanding of how the two relate: it is the strongest 
form that environmental human rights can take. 
Because of its plurality, a human right to a healthy environment will 
inevitably be somewhat ambiguous in its initial formulation. But so it 
should be: the overlap between IHRL and IEL in which the right can be 
located spans anthropocentrism and ecocentrism; individual and group 
interests; and requires awareness of contexts and balancing acts. In 
addition, environmental problems operate on scales of time and space 
unusual to IHRL, and environmentally damaging activities will often be 
performing necessary social or economic roles. Flexibility is therefore 
essential to allow the law to engage with the many ways in which humans 
interact with and depend on the natural world. The wording ‘a human right 
to a healthy environment’ in a treaty may be vague, but its full meaning 
can be developed by courts, commissions and committees through 
interpretive, collaborative and participatory processes relying on multiple 
reference points (such as beauty, diversity and harmony).  
The substantive difficulties surrounding a human right to environment – 
issues regarding definition, appropriate rights-holders and consequent 
duties – can be overcome using norms relevant to the entire human rights 
canon and ideas more specific to the environmental context. There are 
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however a number of problems that are more difficult to overcome in using 
IHRL to protect the natural world. In particular are problems in responding 
to the time and space scales required for environmental protection. These 
rear their heads under the guises of the plight of future generations and 
extraterritorial/transboundary challenges. However, the further 
development of a human right to environment could actually benefit IHRL 
more broadly through providing context for engagement with these issues. 
In particular, difficulties associated with extraterritorial obligations and 
peoples’ rights can potentially be tackled through an environmental 
framework.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
JUSTIFYING HUMAN RIGHTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The final chapter of Part I turns to more theoretical concerns about a 
human right to environment. Chapter Two demonstrated that there is 
value in establishing a human right to environment, even if its precise 
contours are currently unknown. Chapter Three is concerned with whether 
such a right is justifiable in terms of both international human rights law 
(IHRL) and the goal of protecting the natural world. 
There are three major topics to be looked at: compatibility, redundancy, 
and focus. The first of these is concerned with whether a human right to 
environment can successfully be accommodated within IHRL. That is, 
whether it is consistent with certain foundational requirements (both moral 
and legal) that all human rights must meet. The latter two topics question 
whether a human right to a healthy environment actually serves a purpose 
that cannot be achieved through alternative channels (redundancy); and 
whether this purpose can actually meet the demands of environmental 
protection (focus). Both of these hinge on how ‘a healthy environment’ is 
defined.  
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This chapter will show that the potential redundancy of a human right to 
environment can be assuaged by ensuring that a healthy environment is 
defined using ecocentric as well as anthropocentric reference points.1 
However, even in this case, its focus is still confined since its protection 
exists for the sake of humans.2 
3.2 COMPATIBILITY 
Justification for a human right to environment does not arise simply 
because it could improve international law’s ability to protect the natural 
world. Nor can the valid observation that a legal right is emerging at 
national, regional, and international levels3 serve such a purpose. One 
cannot simply assume that ‘a human right to X’ is a valid legal construction 
for all possible X. It must also be compatible with the basis and nature of 
other human rights. There are a number of criteria that are essential to 
human rights norms, in particular: paramount importance, universality, 
justiciability, enforceability and inalienability.4 There are thus two elements 
to the compatibility of the right: its moral legitimacy (ie paramount 
                                       
1 §3.3. 
2 §3.4. 
3 James May, ‘Constituting Fundamental Environmental Rights Worldwide’ (2006) 
23 Pace Environmental Law Review 113; UNHRC, ‘Preliminary report’ A/HRC/22/43 
(24 December 2012) [12]-[14].  
4 Maurice Cranston, What are Human Rights? (Bodley 1973) 23, 66-68; Maurice 
Cranston, ‘Are There Any Human Rights?’ (1983) 112 Daedalus 1, 13-14; Philip 
Alston, ‘Conjuring up New Human Rights’ (1984) 78 AJIL 607, 615; Philip Alston, 
‘Making Space for New Human Rights’ (1988) 1 Harv Hum Rts YB 3, 24ff; James 
Nickel, ‘The Human Right to a Safe Environment’ (1993) 18 YJIL 281, 288-93; Tim 
Hayward, Constitutional Environmental Rights (OUP 2005) 47-52; James Nickel, 
Making Sense of Human Rights (Blackwell 2007) 75; Liz McKinnell, ‘Environmental 
Rights’ (Doctoral thesis, Durham University 2010) 92ff. 
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importance and universality) and its legal viability (justiciability, 
enforceability and inalienability). 
These two elements serve different purposes: the moral legitimacy 
concerns whether there should be a human right to environment, the legal 
viability whether there could be. Neither of these necessarily implies 
anything about the other and so they must be considered separately. The 
reason why the compatibility of a human right to environment is bifurcated 
like this is because human rights as a whole are dual-natured: they are 
‘Janus-faced’, with roots in both natural law and positive law.5 
Consequently, for a human right to environment to be compatible, it must 
be able to mirror both faces of human rights.  
3.2.1 MORAL LEGITIMACY 
A case to justify the use of human rights language is a prerequisite for the 
establishment of a human right to environment. As Joseph Sax contends, 
there is a situation which needs to be avoided:  
When assertions of environmental [human] rights are made, 
the assumption often seems to be that the principled basis 
for them is self-evident and need not be identified or 
explained. The result is to leave an aura of ambiguity 
around most such declarations.6 
                                       
5 See §Introduction; §4.2. 
6 Joseph Sax, ‘The Search for Environmental Rights’ (1991) 6 Journal of Land Use 
and Environmental Law 93, 96.  
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Rights language must be justified. Human rights are concerned with real 
human suffering and flourishing; and they have an urgency and a potency 
that arises from their paramount importance to the human rights subject 
(ie the human being). This is captured within contemporary IHRL by the 
concept of human dignity. As such, for a human right to environment to be 
morally legitimate, it must be connected to the notion of dignity. Chapter 
One has shown that human dignity is a shorthand for both why humans 
matter and what matters about being a human (it is a justification and a 
metric). Therefore, in order to pass the test of moral legitimacy, a human 
right to environment must protect human dignity: it must prevent suffering 
that would undermine human existence and/or promote human flourishing. 
A preliminary remark in this regard is that although there may be other 
human rights whose connection to dignity seems more apparent than that 
of a human right to environment, this does not prevent dignity being 
relevant here too. For example, one might consider freedom from torture 
to be intimately bound with respect for human dignity in a way that 
environmental conditions are not.7 However, human rights are non-
hierarchical:8 none has a monopoly on dignity. Therefore, even if the 
explicative route from dignity to a human right to environment is more 
nuanced than it is for some other rights, this does not discount the 
                                       
7 Consider that “when the [ECtHR] uses human dignity ‘positively’, in order to find 
a violation, it is clear that it applies it much more to serious violations, with Article 
3 being especially privileged … The very notion of … torture is, in the Court’s view 
manifestly contrary to human dignity”. Jean-Paul Costa, ‘Human Dignity in the 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ in Christopher McCrudden 
(ed), Understanding Human Dignity (OUP 2013) 393, 400. 
8 §1.3.1(a). 
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existence of the connection.9 Furthermore, it is important to ensure that 
the meaning of dignity is not prematurely restricted through uncritical 
adherence to certain theoretical preconceptions. One must avoid the 
situation whereby “one’s presumptions about what is ethically acceptable 
determines the nature of one’s freedom and therefore the meaning of 
one’s ‘dignity’… a dizzying circularity”.10 Instead, one must be open and 
flexible in response to lessons of lived suffering and real experience, 
engaging with the potential enrichment of the human rights subject, as 
indeed contemporary IHRL is.  
The previous chapter noted that a human right to a healthy environment 
can have a number of formulations, but that the most effective one is 
when ‘healthy environment’ is understood broadly through multiple 
reference points. It is worth considering whether both the anthropocentric 
and the ecocentric definitions of ‘healthy environment’ are legitimate 
interests that are comprised by human dignity and so to be protected by 
IHRL. In Alan Boyle’s words, the question is: “Is the environment – or the 
global environment – a sufficiently important public good to merit 
economic and social rights status”?11 
                                       
9 It is even possible to derive the right from other human rights. See Antonio 
Trindade, ‘Environmental Protection and the Absence of Restrictions’ in Kathleen 
Mahoney and Paul Mahoney, Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century (Martinus 
Nijhoff 1992) 561, 572-82; §6.2.2. 
10 Charles Foster, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Law (Hart 2011) 38. 
11 Alan Boyle, ‘Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next? (2012) 23 EJIL 
613, 629. 
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Given the overlap in content between a human health oriented right to 
environment and existing greened human rights,12 it is clear that such a 
right falls within the scope of IHRL. The central importance of 
environmental conditions to humans is well-established: it is already part 
of what IHRL protects, and so part of human dignity. Heavily polluted 
environments that threaten human health, well-being and life are not 
conducive to a life lived in dignity: “[t]oxic rivers and polluted air diminish 
dignity not just because of the threat to life or to health, but also because 
they challenge the ability of people fully to develop their personalities in 
relation to their surroundings”.13 It is therefore indubitably within the remit 
of IHRL to establish a human right to a healthy environment, when defined 
according to anthropocentric reference points. Alan Boyle responds to his 
own question that “[t]he answer endorsed repeatedly by the UN over the 
past 40 years is obviously yes”.14  
As acknowledged in Chapter Two, defining a healthy environment in terms 
of ecosystem health may seem to stretch IHRL beyond its remit of 
protecting human dignity. However, given that such an interpretation 
already exists in both international and national laws, and since a right 
defined in this way would provide greater scope in protecting the natural 
world, it merits consideration. As will be seen, there are in fact a number 
of reasons as to why the health of ecosystems is related to human dignity: 
                                       
12 §2.2-2.3; Boyle (n11) 613-21; Nickel (n4 1993) 288-92. 
13 Erin Daly and James May, ‘Bridging constitutional dignity and environmental 
rights jurisprudence’ (2016) 7 JHRE 218, 232. 
14 Boyle (n11) 629. 
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this is essentially because humans – as living organisms – are dependent 
on the state of the natural world.15 As reasoned by the ACommHPR in 
Ogoniland, a degraded and defaced environment is contrary to satisfactory 
living conditions for humans.16    
That human flourishing is dependent on healthy ecosystems is in some 
senses obvious, for example in terms of food production, pollination and 
clean air. But healthy and functioning ecosystems improve the quality of 
human lives in myriad direct and indirect ways.17 The value to humans of 
defining a ‘healthy environment’ in a broad sense is demonstrated by the 
mental health benefits of contact with nature;18 the sense of 
connectedness and solace that people feel within their local environments 
(‘biophilia’);19 the cultural significance of certain landscapes;20 the concept 
                                       
15 See §9.2-9.4. 
16 Ogoniland [51]. 
17 The at-times controversial concept of ‘ecosystem services’, and in particular 
cultural ecosystem services, can help to understand the ways in which healthy 
ecosystems are in human interest. See eg TEEB, ‘The Economics of Ecosystems 
and Biodiversity: Mainstreaming the Economics of Nature: A synthesis of the 
approach, conclusions and recommendations of TEEB’ (2010). 
18 Joe Sempik et al (eds), ‘Green Care: A Conceptual Framework’ (Loughborough 
University 2010). 
19 Edward Wilson, Biophilia (HUP 1984). Consider also the Norweigan concept of 
friluftsliv, Arne Naess, Ecology, community and lifestyle (David Rothenberg tr, CUP 
1989) 177-81; and the Japanese one of shinrin-yoku E Morita et al, ‘Psychological 
effects of forest environments on healthy adults’ (2007) 121 Public Health 54. See 
also an IUCN Resolution that endorses a right to environment that includes “the 
child’s inherent right to connect with nature in a meaningful way” IUCN, WCC-
2012-Res-101-EN [1a]. 
20 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 
(1972) 1037 UNTS 151. 
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of ‘ecohealth’;21 and the disorientation and displacement caused by 
environmental destruction (‘solastalgia’).22 Humans are happier and 
healthier (they can flourish) when they live within clean, diverse and 
beautiful ecosystems. It is to the benefit of both humans and nonhumans 
for ecosystems to be healthy.  
There is thus convergence between human dignity and ecosystem health: 
a “healthy environment is not separate from, but is an integral part of, 
human dignity. Human dignity, likewise, resides within nature”.23 This is 
ultimately because humans are ‘fleshy’ living beings, and to cut humans off 
from their ecological home ignores a fundamental aspect of what it is to be 
human. As will be seen in Chapter Nine, humans are not only socially, but 
also ecologically embedded.24 
Since human existence cannot be dislocated from the natural world, it is 
impossible to divorce the condition of both local and global environments 
from the conditions in which people live. Just as other humans and human-
constructed institutions affect humans, it is inevitable that environmental 
conditions affect human lives in diverse ways. Whether this connection is 
                                       
21 Ecohealth is concerned with “identify[ing] ecosystem management strategies 
that contribute to improving the health and living conditions of human populations 
and the sustainability of the ecosystem in which they live”: Renaud de Plaen and 
Catherine Kilelu, ‘From Multiple Voices to a Common Language: Ecosystem 
Approaches to Human Health as an Emerging Paradigm’ (2004) 1 EcoHealth 
(Suppl 2) 8, 9.  
22 See Dina Townsend, ‘Taking dignity seriously? A dignity approach to 
environmental disputes before human rights courts’ (2015) 6 JHRE 204, 218. 
23 Daly and May (n13) 240, 232, 236. 
24 §9.2-9.4. 
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enough to consider poor ecosystem health an affront to dignity is 
ultimately dependent on one’s understanding of dignity. However, such a 
claim is certainly plausible and has been recognised by the Indian Supreme 
Court which “has found that … a dignified life necessitates not only 
adequate environmental conditions, but also ecological balance”.25 As such, 
vesting in humans a right to healthy ecosystems is legitimate within IHRL. 
A fuller analysis of dignity (and its relevance to ecosystem health) will take 
place later in this thesis where “the aim will be to link the intrinsic values 
of humans with the intrinsic values of other species and the environment 
[since] human rights… need to respond to the fact that the individual not 
only operates in a social environment, but also in a natural environment”.26 
This analysis will construct an argument that human flourishing happens in 
ecological as well as social communities, demonstrating that human dignity 
does include living in and access to healthy ecosystems.27  
The second test for moral legitimacy concerns whether a human right to 
environment is a universal issue or not. Human rights must not be 
protecting the parochial interests of some subset of humanity. The 
universality criterion for a human right to environment is rather 
straightforward to establish. It is not required that a human right to 
                                       
25 Townsend (n22) 217. Townsend goes on to argue that such an interpretation 
would allow human rights counts to include the issues raised in Kyrtatos within 
their remit. 
26 Prudence Taylor, ‘From Environmental to Ecological Human Rights: A New 
Dynamic in International Law?’ (1997-1998) 10 GIELR 309, 396. §8.4; §9.2-9.4. 
27 Because humans have a ‘vital interest’ in forming ecological communities: §9.2-
9.4. 
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environment must have the exact same content for everyone: people’s 
needs vary based on geography, culture and individual differences. Rather, 
every human being must require a healthy environment in which to live. 
Since there is not one human who is not reliant on the state of their local 
and global environment, the criterion of universality, and so the moral 
legitimacy as a whole, can be met.  
3.2.2 LEGAL VIABILITY 
The key criteria for a human right to environment to fulfil in order to be 
legally viable are justiciability, enforceability and inalienability. This 
subsection will consider them in turn. 
Ogoniland demonstrates the justiciability of a human right to 
environment.28 The contextual nature of appropriate environmental 
conditions means that the right cannot set out precise and unchanging 
standards, but this is not a criterion for human rights: all human rights 
require interpretation.29 The fact that there are number of clear procedural 
obligations flowing from the right assists in its justiciability, and developing 
precise substantive standards and duties which arise from a human right to 
environment will enhance it further.30  
                                       
28 See also John Lee, ‘The Underlying Theory to Support a Well-Defined Human 
Right to a Healthy Environment as a Principle of Customary International Law’ 
(2000) 25 Colum J Envtl L 283, 298-301; Christian Courtis, Courts and the Legal 
Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (International Commission of 
Jurists 2008); Malcolm Langford (ed), Social Rights Jurisprudence (CUP 2009). 
29 §2.3. 
30 §2.5. 
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The enforceability of a human right to environment is perhaps best thought 
of in terms of implementation and supervision.31 Implementing and 
supervising a human right to environment may not be straightforward, but 
it certainly is possible, especially with regards to its procedural aspects.32 
As standards evolve, the enforceability of a human right to environment 
will become more straightforward and more powerful. 
The required inalienability of a human right to environment may initially 
seem more problematic. As evidenced by the corpus of international 
(environmental) law, protection of the environment must be balanced 
against other objectives.33 The concept of sustainable development 
encapsulates this balancing act.34 However, human rights’ inalienability 
does not mean that every right always has the widest scope imaginable: all 
human rights must be balanced against one another and other legitimate 
aims. Although the scope of each human right may vary, their inalienability 
means that the right itself can never be waived, surrendered, foregone, or 
alienated by the right-holder.35 A human right to environment can fit this 
requirement. 
                                       
31 Alston (n4 1988) 35; Trindade (n9) 582-85. 
32 Alexandre Kiss, ‘Concept and Possible Implications of the Right to Environment’ 
in Mahoney and Mahoney (n9) 551, 554-56; ‘Compilation of good practices’ 
A/HRC/28/61 (3 February 2015). 
33 Patricia Birnie et al, International Law & the Environment (3rd edn, OUP 2009) 
109-10. 
34 ‘The Future We Want’ UNGA Resolution A/RES/66/288 (11 September 2012) IV. 
35 Nickel (n4 2007) 44-45. This reveals the moral portion of inalienability: the right 
must have such a character because of its high level of moral importance. 
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The potential scope of a human right to environment also presents 
potential problems of legal viability. The transboundary nature of natural 
processes means that a human right to environment would best operate on 
an international (or at least transnational) plane.36 Handl points out that 
this “might turn into an extremely effective legal platform for 
internationalising national decision-making in areas that represent the core 
of traditional state sovereignty”.37 It is doubtful that there is much appetite 
for this, given the frequent reassurance given to states of the importance 
of sovereignty in international environmental law. Dinah Shelton believes 
that “the required broad extension of state liability may prove to be the 
biggest single hurdle to establishing a right to environment”.38 However, 
whether this is a genuine issue of legal viability or a reminder of the 
difficulty of using a state-centric international legal order to deal with 
global environmental problems is debateable.39 The latter may not solve 
any problems, but it identifies them as practical, rather than theoretical 
ones.  
                                       
36 §2.5.3. 
37 Günther Handl, ‘Human Rights and Protection of the Environment: A Mildly 
“Revisionist” View’ in Antonio Trindade (ed), Human Rights, Sustainable 
Development and the Environment (Instituto Interamericano de Derechos 1992) 
130. 
38 Dinah Shelton, ‘Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to 
Environment’ (1991) 28 Stanford Journal of International Law 103, 134. 
39 All human rights entail intrusions on state sovereignty: ‘Preliminary report’ (n3) 
[48]. 
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3.2.3 SUMMARY 
The multiple challenges to a human right to environment’s compatibility 
with IHRL can be summed up as genuine, but surmountable. A human 
right to environment is therefore both morally legitimate and legally viable. 
However, the fact that it can coalesce with existing human rights norms 
and structures does not mean that it ought to be created. It must also be 
demonstrated that it serves a purpose. 
3.3 REDUNDANCY 
Establishing a human right to environment may be a pointless exercise if 
its goals can be achieved more easily by existing means. That there is an 
overlap between human rights and environmental protection does not 
mean that bridging the two in the most lexically obvious way will produce 
ideal outcomes: the relationship between the two is more complex than 
that.40 It is thus possible that a human right to environment is a redundant 
tool.  
The redundancy argument states that the potential lies within international 
law to appropriately protect both humans and nonhumans without a 
human right to environment. Günther Handl is a keen proponent of this: 
                                       
40 See (eg) Michael Anderson, ‘Human Rights Approaches to Environmental 
Protection: An Overview’ in Alan Boyle and Michael Anderson (eds), Human Rights 
Approaches to Environmental Protection (Clarendon 1996) 3-4; Mahoney and 
Mahoney (n9) 517-614; Dinah Shelton (ed), Human Rights And The Environment 
(Edward Elgar 2011); Linda Hajjar Leib, Human Rights and Environment: 
Philosophical, Legal and Theoretical Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff 2011) ch3. 
‘Analytical Study’ A/HRC/19/34 (16 December 2011) [6]-[10]. 
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Indeed, the emphasis on such a perspective on the 
interrelationship of human rights and environmental 
protection carries significant costs; it reflects a maximalist 
position that offers little prospect of becoming reality in the 
near term while its propagation diverts attention and efforts 
from other more pressing and promising environmental and 
human rights objectives.41 
Given that there a number of legal regimes and theoretical approaches 
already existing within international law (including IHRL) concerned with 
environmental issues, it is possible that a human right to environment is 
redundant. It may achieve nothing that cannot be done through 
consolidating and developing more firmly established pathways. The most 
obvious place to look for this is international law concerning the 
environment. 
International environmental law (IEL) has expanded over recent decades 
and now represents a considerable body of law comprising a large number 
of treaty regimes. These cover a diverse range of subject matter 
(incorporating themes of transboundary pollution,42 protection of 
endangered species,43 and natural heritage44). IEL has also adopted and 
elaborated a number of key principles that accompany the formal treaty 
                                       
41 Handl (n37) 119-20. 
42 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (1979) 1302 UNTS 217. 
43 Convention on International Trade In Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (1976) 993 UNTS 243 (CITES). 
44 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 
(1972) 1037 UNTS 151 (‘Heritage Convention’). 
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regimes, such as the principles of precaution45 and common but 
differentiated responsibilities.46 These increase IEL’s flexibility and hence 
ability to deal with specific problems arising within the environmental 
realm.47 
Through diverse treaty regimes and general principles, IEL is already 
equipping itself to deal with the intricacies of regulating natural processes 
and may therefore be better suited to continue with this project than IHRL. 
The corollary is that focus should turn to improving implementation, 
compliance and enforcement of IEL, as well as further elaboration of the 
legal implications of more complex principles (such as intergenerational 
justice48) and concepts (such as the intrinsic value of living entities49), and 
improving coordination between IEL and IHRL.50  
In addition to what can be achieved by IEL is the potential for deeper 
‘greening’ of existing human rights.51 It may be the case that existing 
                                       
45 Jonathan Wiener, ‘Precaution’ in Daniel Bodansky et al (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law (OUP 2007) 597. 
46 Tom West, ‘Environmental Justice and International Climate Change Legislation: 
A Cosmopolitan Perspective’ (2012) 25 GIELR 129, 149-52. 
47 For discussion of the relevance of these principles to IHRL, see Karen Hulme, 
‘International environmental law and human rights’ in Scott Sheeran and Nigel 
Rodley (eds), Routledge Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Routledge 
2013) 285, 297-300.  
48 Edith Brown-Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations (Transnational 1989). 
49 Mattia Fosci and Tom West, ‘In Whose Interest? Instrumental and Intrinsic 
Value in Biodiversity Law’ in Michael Bowman et al (eds), Research Handbook on 
Biodiversity and Law (Edward Elgar 2016). 
50 Handl (n37); Günther Handl, ‘Human Rights and Protection of the Environment’ 
in Asbjørn Eide, Catarina Krause and Allan Rosas (eds), Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: A Textbook (2nd edn, Brill 2001). 
51 §2.2. 
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IHRL, once more fully interpreted, is able to ensure a suitable environment 
for humans. However, limitations of the greening approach have already 
been seen: in particular, it seems unlikely that environmental human 
rights will be able to accommodate the intrinsic (or even inherent52) value 
of nonhumans,53 which is a core goal of IEL.54 Not only is a human right to 
environment potentially redundant, but it may also be attempting to unite 
two incompatible value systems.  
It is therefore worthwhile enquiring what a human right to environment 
contributes beyond existing law. The need to do this is compounded by the 
fact that greened human rights can potentially provide more extensive 
environmental protection than a human right to a healthy environment 
when a ‘healthy environment’ is conceived of purely in human health 
terms, since “severe environmental pollution may affect individuals’…  
private and family life adversely, without, however, seriously endangering 
their health”.55  
When a ‘healthy environment’ is defined as an environment that is healthy 
per se, then additional protection certainly is offered by a human right to 
environment.56 As seen in Chapter Two, a right with multiple reference 
                                       
52 The difference being that inherent value is still anthropocentric: it is the value 
humans place on the pure existence of something (which could be a mountain or 
the Mona Lisa). See Michael Bowman et al, Lyster’s International Wildlife Law (2nd 
edn, CUP 2010) 68-69. 
53 §2.2.1. 
54 §3.4. 
55 López Ostra v Spain (1995) 20 EHRR 277 [51]; §2.2-2.3. 
56 Alan Boyle, ‘Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A Reassessment’ (2006-
2007) 18 Fordham Environmental Law Review 471, 507-11. 
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points opens the possibility of environmental degradation itself being a 
violation of IHRL; broadens the scope of environmental laws that a state 
has obligations to create and implement; provides a clearer pathway for 
the setting of environmental quality standards in IHRL; and enhances the 
status of environmental issues in IHRL balancing processes. Thus, when a 
human right to environment is interpreted broadly, as argued for in this 
thesis, the redundancy argument shrinks away.  
Furthermore, even when defined anthropocentrically, there are a number 
of reasons as to why a human right to environment is not redundant. A 
specific human right to environment has the potential to improve the 
balancing processes both between and within IEL and IHRL. While 
considered two distinct bodies of law, balances in the overlaps between 
them may be skewed or incomplete because of their segregation. Without 
dedicated environmental expertise, the long-term insight required for 
suitable environmental protection may be lacking within IHRL institutions 
which are accustomed to operating on shorter time-scales.57. This can be 
overcome to some extent by greened human rights and improved 
coordination between the two bodies of law. But a specific human right to 
environment would go further in terms of ensuring that environmental 
expertise features adequately within IHRL.58  
In addition, a human right to environment can help develop legal principles 
in cases when human rights and environmental protection are not mutually 
                                       
57 ‘Climate Change Report’ A/HRC/10/61 [90]; See also EHP v Canada (1984) HRC 
Communication No 67/1980, CCPR/C/OP/1 [8(a)]. 
58 Boyle (n11) 629-33. 
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supportive.59 By specifically including the state of the environment within 
IHRL, important environmental issues can be engaged with directly by 
IHRL rather than through circuitous routes. Using human rights can also 
assist in ensuring that vulnerable groups are not marginalised,60 and 
holding states to account for serious environmental damage due to the 
more advanced enforcement and complaint mechanisms within IHRL. 
Another additional benefit of a human right to environment that deflects 
the charge of redundancy is the rhetorical potency61 carried by IHRL, which 
is not currently found within IEL. Creating a specific human right to 
environment would direct this urgency towards environmental protection 
measures. There is thus something to be gained simply by using the 
language (and consequent machinery) of IHRL to bring about 
environmental protection. Furthermore, human dignity may well contain an 
essential ecological component,62 making it proper for IHRL to secure 
healthy environmental conditions. That is, a human right to environment 
                                       
59 Such as with rights to property or to found a family. See Dinah Shelton, ‘Human 
Rights and the Environment: What Specific Environmental Rights have been 
Recognized?’ (2006-2007) 35 Denv J International L & Poly 129, 170; Fredin v 
Sweden (1991) 13 EHRR 784.  
60 ECOSOC, ‘Human Rights and the Environment’ E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 (‘Ksentini 
Report’) [117]-[160]; UNHRC, ‘Mapping report’ A/HRC/25/53 (30 December 2013) 
[69]-[78]. See also Elisa Morgera, ‘No need to reinvent the wheel for a human 
rights-based approach to tackling climate change’ in Erkki Hollo et al (eds), 
Climate Change and the Law: A Global Perspective (Springer 2012); Tom Kerns, 
‘Ten practical advantages of a human rights approach to environmental advocacy’ 
(2013) 3 J Environ Stud Sci 416. 
61 See §Introduction; §4; §6.3. 
62 §8.4; §9.2-9.4. 
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makes clear that a deeper environmentalism is also in the interests of 
humans.  
There are thus a number of reasons why a human right to environment is 
not redundant. Handl is right that it should not take away from “more 
pressing and promising environmental and human rights objectives”,63 but 
it need not do so. A human right to environment may in fact be able to 
help achieve such objectives. For example, demonstrating that climate 
change violates human rights may aid climate change negotiations;64 and 
fuller understanding of environmental issues such as desertification and 
soil salination within human rights institutions may help to fulfil a human 
right to food.  
To conclude, a human right to environment is certainly not redundant if it 
is conceived of as protecting an interest in the environment itself being 
healthy. This provides new content to IHRL and new urgency to 
environmental protection. When interpreted strictly along the lines of 
human health, its potential redundancy is more visible since much of what 
it protects can be achieved through the greening of existing human rights. 
However, endorsing a specific human right to environment would still 
achieve other objectives and confirm the importance of the state of the 
environment to human dignity. Matching the value systems of 
anthropocentrism and ecocentrism may not be straightforward, but a 
                                       
63 supra n41. 
64 Boyle (n11) 633. 
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human right to environment can help “make it possible to go beyond 
reductionist concepts of ‘mankind first’ or ‘ecology first’.”65  
3.4 FOCUS 
The apparent tension between anthropocentric and ecocentric focuses to 
environmental protection presents the third theoretical problem to a 
human right to environment. The focus of protection offered by a human 
right to environment is inevitably restricted due to its status as a human 
right and consequent vesting in humans.66 This section will demonstrate 
that although IEL certainly meets anthropocentric aims,67 it also goes 
beyond protecting what is in the direct interests of humans.68 As such, a 
human right to a healthy environment is not able to cover the same 
ground as existing IEL.  
Existing IEL protects ecosystems,69 species,70 biodiversity,71 and even 
“every form of life”.72 There are also a number of legal regimes that 
                                       
65 Ksentini Report (n60) [5]. 
66 ‘Mapping report’ (n60) [53]; Catherine Redgwell, ‘Life, the Universe and 
Everything: A Critique of Anthropocentric Rights’ in Boyle and Anderson (n40). 
67 eg UNFCCC; Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for 
Nuclear Damage (1997) 2241 UNTS 302. 
68 In instruments such as: CBD (1992) 1760 UNTS 79; Heritage Convention (n25);   
Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (1979) 
1284 UNTS 209; Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 
(1991) 30 ILM 1461 (‘Antarctic Protocol’). 
69 Antarctic Protocol (n68) Article 3. 
70 CITES (n43). 
71 CBD, Preamble. 
72 ‘World Charter for Nature’ (1982), UNGA Resolution A/RES/37/7, Preamble.  
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protect the welfare of individual animals.73 Not only does existing IEL 
directly protect nonhumans, but significantly the justifications given for 
this protection are frequently non-anthropocentric. For example, the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) – one of the most important 
legally binding treaties within IEL – opens by noting that the contracting 
parties are “conscious of the intrinsic value of biodiversity”.74 This opening 
recital demonstrates a key justification for the existence of the CBD: that 
biodiversity has value in, of, and for itself.75 The CBD thus openly affirms 
and endorses the existence of a broadly ecocentric dimension within IEL.  
The CBD is by no means the only instrument in IEL to have a focus that 
expands beyond human interest. The 1979 Convention on the 
Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (Bern 
Convention),76 the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the 
Antarctic Treaty,77 and the 2004 African Convention on the Conservation of 
Nature and Natural Resources78 all refer to the intrinsic value of 
                                       
73 CITES Articles III(2)(c), IV(5)(b), IV(6)(b), V(2)(b), VII(7)(c), VIII(3); 1976 
Convention for the Protection of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes ETS 87; 1979 
European Convention for the Protection of Animals for Slaughter ETS 102; 1987 
European Convention for the Protection of Pet Animals, ETS 125.  
74 (1992) 1760 UNTS 79, Preamble. 
75 For discussion of intrinsic value, see §8.4.1. 
76 1284 UNTS 209, Preamble. See Bowman (n52) 298-300. 
77 20 ILM 1461, Article 3(1). 
78 The text can be found in IUCN, An Introduction to the African Convention on the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN, 2004); for the original, see 
the 1968 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 
1001 UNTS 3. 
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nonhumans.79 Furthermore, the (nonbinding) World Charter for Nature 
(WCN) is unambiguously ecocentric; it is “aware that [m]ankind is a part 
of nature and life depends on the uninterrupted functioning of natural 
systems which ensure the supply of energy and nutrients”,80 and is 
“convinced that [e]very form of life is unique, warranting respect 
regardless of its worth to man”.81 All of these instruments demonstrate 
that the conservation of nature does not only exist as a legal obligation 
because of human interests.  
Thus, although multilateral environmental agreements are often designed 
to benefit humans, they frequently have a more comprehensive outlook. 
“[E]ven if their focus remains human benefit this concept is drawn so 
broadly as to be indistinguishably ecocentric”.82 Whilst it may be the case 
that “anthropocentric motivations have plainly predominated”83 within IEL, 
“the need for a more expansive and pluralistic approach seems also to 
have gained clear recognition”,84 and the intrinsic value of all species “is 
now clearly recognised in multiple regimes”.85  
                                       
79 Bowman (n52) 65-67; Fosci and West (n49) 59-61. 
80 supra n72, Preamble. See also Ian Mason, ‘One In All: Principles and 
Characteristics of Earth Jurisprudence’ in Peter Burdon (ed), Exploring Wild Law 
(Wakefield 2011) 41. 
81 Preamble. 
82 Alan Boyle, ‘The Role of International Human Rights Law in the Protection of the 
Environment’ in Boyle and Anderson (n40) 52. See also Birnie (n33) 280. 
83 Bowman (n52) 66. 
84 ibid 68. 
85 Alexander Gillespie, International Environmental Law, Politics and Ethics (2nd 
edn, OUP 2014) 129. 
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IEL’s ecocentric tilt has not displaced anthropocentric rationales for 
protecting the environment, but rather exists alongside them.86 As such, 
IEL embraces a plurality of values,87 and although arguments concerned by 
the utilitarian component of environmental law, which contend that “in 
order to secure a ‘proper’ relationship between humans and nature, 
environmental law should evolve, to follow ecocentric ethics”88 may be 
valid, it should equally be recognised that this evolution is already under 
way.89 
The stated objectives of the CBD neatly bear out the simultaneous 
existence of both ecocentric and anthropocentric motivations within IEL. 
Its objectives are the conservation of biodiversity, the sustainable use of 
its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of its benefits.90 The 
first of these reflects an ecocentric rationale, whereas the latter two are 
                                       
86 See eg Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton, International Environmental Law 
(Transnational 1991) 10-11; Birnie (n33) 7-8, 597-600, 618; Christopher Stone, 
‘Ethics and International Environmental Law’ in Bodansky (n45) 296-99; Philippe 
Sands et al, Principles of International Environmental Law (3rd edn, CUP 2012) 
450; Gillespie (n85) 127-28, 133-36, 148-49; Fosci and West (n49) 57-61. 
87 For discussion of the benefits of ecological value pluralism, see Bryan Norton 
and Douglas Noonan, ‘Ecology and valuation: Big changes needed’ (2007) 63 
Ecological Economics 664. 
88 Jane Holder, ‘New Age: Rediscovering Natural Law’ (2000) 53 Current Legal 
Problems 151, 167. See also Sally Bullen, ‘Lessons from feminist epistemology: 
toward an environmental jurisprudence’ (1993) 23 Victoria U Wellington L Rev 155, 
159-164. 
89 For example, Holder claims that “in the light of the [intrinsic] value accorded by 
deep ecology to human and non-human life alike, the instrumentalism of law on 
genetically modified organisms becomes less tenable” (ibid 170). There is some 
truth in here, which is why IEL has abandoned pure instrumentalism. 
90 CBD, Article 1. 
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concerned with human interests.91 In fact, the CBD’s distinction between 
biological diversity, and biological resources (in that not only resources, 
but also diversity itself must be conserved92) provides a useful vantage 
point from which to view the value pluralism endorsed by IEL.93 Thus, 
although it is true that IEL is concerned with human wellbeing, it would be 
false to claim that this was its only focus. 
There is thus a complex interplay between anthropocentrism and 
ecocentrism found in IEL. This interplay is captured by the recognition in 
the CBD that “humans, with their cultural diversity, are an integral 
component of many ecosystems”.94 IEL cannot avoid the fact that humans 
are part of nature, but it also cannot deny an escape route for human 
exceptionalism. Human cultural diversity is used to maintain a division 
between the human and the nonhuman. 
This pluralistic approach of the CBD can also be seen in the Addis Ababa 
Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable use of Biodiversity.95 Given 
that the ambit of these is sustainable use, one could reasonably expect 
them to have an exclusively anthropocentric focus. However, Principle 10 
states that international and national policies should take into account 
                                       
91 Alan Boyle, ‘The Convention on Biological Diversity’ in L Campiglio et al (eds), 
The Environment after Rio (Kluwer 1994) 38; Bowman (n52) 596-98 
92 CBD Articles 5-7, 8(a), 8(b), 8(g), 8(i), 8(j), 11-14. 
93 Bowman (n52) 67, 598; Rosemary Rayfuse, ‘Biological Resources’ in Bodansky 
(n45) 369. 
94 Annex A [2]. 
95 Available at <https://www.cbd.int/sustainable/addis.shtml> (accessed 
13/8/2016). 
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intrinsic and other non-economic values of biological diversity. The CBD 
operates from a platform of value pluralism, whereby “the strength of the 
CBD approach lies … in the potentially all-encompassing concept of ‘value’ 
reflected in its recognition of the intrinsic value of biodiversity, which 
allows a broad and flexible approach to the definition of biological 
resources beyond mere economic value”.96 
This pluralistic approach of IEL can also be found in one of the tools it has 
at its disposal: the ‘ecosystem approach’. The ecosystem approach has 
been defined by the CBD as a “strategy for the integrated management of 
land, water and living resources that promotes conservation and 
sustainable use in an equitable way”97 and has become the “primary 
framework of action”98 under the CBD. 
The core idea underpinning the ecosystem approach is to use the 
ecosystem (defined by the CBD as “a dynamic complex of plant, animal 
and micro-organism communities and their non-living environment 
interacting as a functional unit”99) as the primary unit and guiding principle 
for regulating human interaction with the natural world. As such, the 
approach encompasses a commitment to moving away from species-based 
or other single issue approaches and towards responding to the natural 
world in accordance with the complex and interconnected ways in which it 
                                       
96 Rayfuse (n93) 362, 369 (367-370). 
97 Decision V/6, Annex A [1]. 
98 CBD COP 5 Decision V/6, Annex C [12]. 
99 Article 2. 
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functions.100 This demonstrates a realisation within environmental law that 
in order to protect the natural world, ecological principles need to be 
understood and followed.101  
The ecosystem approach therefore demonstrates a willingness within 
international law to adopt techniques and perspectives learnt from ecology 
and the natural world, rather than insisting on imposing an anthropogenic 
order on it. These techniques can of course be appropriated for 
anthropocentric as much as ecocentric ends, but their ecogenic nature 
provides a means to work with, rather than against, natural processes. 
The objectives of the ecosystem approach in fact exactly mirror the 
objectives of the CBD: the conservation of biodiversity, the sustainable use 
of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of its benefits.102 The 
focus of the ecosystem approach, like IEL as a whole, thus revolves 
between the anthropocentric and the ecocentric.103 There are “two broad 
narratives within which the ecosystem approach is finding expression, 
responding to two broadly competing logics roughly aligned with what is 
usually referred to as ecocentrism and anthropocentrism”.104 And while 
                                       
100 R Edward Grumbine, ‘What Is Ecosystem Management?’ (1994) 8 Conservation 
Biology 27, 29-31; Arie Trouwburst, ‘The Precautionary Principle and the 
Ecosystem Approach in International Law: Differences, Similarities and Linkages’ 
(2009) 18 RECEIL 26, 28-29; Bowman (n52) 603-604; Gillespie, (n85) 139-40; 
Vito De Lucia, ‘Competing Narratives and Complex Genealogies: The Ecosystem 
Approach in International Environmental Law’ (2015) 27 JEL 91, 92. 
101 See §7.1.2. 
102 CBD, Article 1. 
103 See De Lucia (n100) 
104 ibid 94, 105-108, 111-14. 
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“the prevailing deployment of the ecosystem approach in international 
law… remains aligned with the anthropocentric construction of nature as a 
service provider, ecocentric perspectives find at least some space in the 
language of the law”.105 In comparison, a human right to environment 
obscures this space by throwing the purpose of environmental protection 
into a staunchly anthropocentric domain. 
The reason for this staunch anthropocentrism is because human rights are 
necessarily vested in humans. As demonstrated in the Introduction, a key 
legal advantage of ‘rights’ is that they identify a holder to whom duties are 
owed. In the case of human rights, this holder must necessarily be a 
human.106 Thus the focus of a human right must be directed towards its 
human holder. Human rights are therefore unavoidably anthropocentric. As 
such, human rights cannot fully encompass the ecocentric rationales of 
IEL. Indeed, the existence of an ecocentric rationale for protecting the 
natural world within IEL may even make the idea of endorsing a human 
right seem cumbersome. Why use humans as a proxy for protecting nature 
if, according to the WCN, “Nature shall be respected and its essential 
processes shall not be impaired”?107 Sumudu Atapattu goes so far as to 
claim that “recognising a fundamental right to a healthy environment 
                                       
105 ibid 96. 
106 §6.3-6.4. 
107 WCN (n72), Principle 1. 
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would go against the very nature of the Charter”108 because of this clash in 
focus.   
Because the focus of IHRL is more restricted than that of IEL 
“environmental protection cannot be wholly incorporated into the human 
rights agenda without deforming the concept of human rights and 
distorting its program”.109 Furthermore, a human right to environment 
cannot encompass all the motivations for and approaches of IEL, in 
particular its recognition that “every form of life is unique, warranting 
respect regardless of its worth to man”.110  
However, this does not mean that IHRL and IEL must be locked at an 
impasse. Rather than a conflict, there is a poignant juxtaposition between 
meeting the needs of humans and the needs of nonhumans, as recognised 
in the ecosystem approach and other principles of IEL. As Christopher 
Stone put it in 1972: “these goals will often be so mutually supportive that 
one can avoid deciding whether our rationale is to advance ‘us’ or a new 
‘us’ that includes the environment”.111 One route towards reconciliation has 
already been seen in this thesis: through defining ‘a healthy environment’ 
according to the health of the ecosystem rather than of humans. This 
would temper the inherent anthropocentrism (and the potential 
                                       
108 Sumudu Atapattu, ‘The Right to a Healthy Life or the Right to Die Polluted?’ 
(2003) 16 Tul Envtl LJ 65, 75. 
109 Shelton (n38) 138. Stephen Turner, A Substantive Environmental Right (Kluwer 
2009) 49-51. 
110 WCN, Preamble.  
111 Christopher Stone, ‘Should Trees Have Standing? – Toward Legal Rights for 
Natural Objects’ (1972) 45 S Cal L Rev 450, 489; Shelton (n38) 109-10. 
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redundancy) of the right and increase the level of protection it can offer to 
aspects of the nonhuman environment.  
However, as a human right, a human right to a healthy environment would 
still be vested in humans, and so would still amount to protecting the 
environment for the sake of humans. The anthropocentrism of human 
rights is immovable: because they are directed towards humans, human 
rights have humans at the centre of their consideration.112 
How the subject of human rights is understood will affect how this 
anthropocentrism is manifested: as seen in Chapter One, the 
anthropocentrism of human rights does not mean human rights must be 
egotistical and individualistic.113 In fact, they are not. The contemporary 
human rights subject is understood as embodied and embedded. But even 
an embodied and embedded human rights subject cannot shift the 
spotlight of human rights away from the human and towards the 
nonhuman, for it is still a human that is found at the centre, as the holder 
of the right. 
Human rights’ ability to reach beyond anthropocentrism is therefore limited 
by their unavoidably restrictive focus. Daly and May claim that once an 
ecologically embedded sense of the human and its dignity has been 
established “the question of whether nature itself has (competing) rights, 
including dignity rights, becomes less pressing because nature’s rights can 
                                       
112 See ‘anthropocentric’, Shorter OED (6th edn, OUP 2007). 
113 cf Holmes Rolston III, ‘Rights and Responsibilities on the Home Planet’ (1993) 
18 YJIL 251, 253-62. 
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be enveloped within human rights”.114 But this is not entirely convincing 
because the human still remains at the centre. Whilst it is undeniable that 
there is value in understanding that human dignity “resides within 
nature”,115 this does not shift IHRL away from its anthropocentrism.  
The anthropocentricity of human rights (when unbalanced) has the 
potential for reinforcing a one-dimensional view of environmental 
protection that fails to bring out the value pluralism of IEL. The 
conceptualisation of nature as the dominion of man116 is confirmed. This 
conceptualisation sees nature’s value as being found in its exploitation – or 
perhaps more generously, management – by humanity.117 Thinking of the 
natural world exclusively as ‘resources’ that exist for the sake of humans 
constructs a false (and potentially counter-productive) discontinuity 
between humanity and nature. This discontinuity leads to a limited 
understanding of humans and nonhumans alike, resulting in limitations in 
the legal constructs designed to protect them.118 
The anthropocentricity of a human right to environment can in fact be 
found throughout its lexical phrasing. Not only does the fact that it is a 
human right render it anthropocentric, but also the term ‘environment’ is 
                                       
114 Daly and May (n13) 240 
115 ibid. 
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117 Robert Costanza et al, ‘Changes in the global value of ecosystem services’ 
(2014) 26 Global Environmental Change 152. 
118 See Gary Francione, Animals Property and the Law (Temple University Press 
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employed in an anthropocentric sense. This is because the ‘environ-ment’ 
is literally that which environs, that which encircles. To talk of an 
‘environment’ is therefore to implicitly register that there is something at 
the centre. Although it is not necessary that the word ‘environment’ must 
refer to the human’s environment (all organisms have an ‘environment’ or 
‘Umwelt’119) – and it is in fact arguable that ‘environment’ is not 
interpreted as such within IEL120 – its meaning within the phrase ‘a human 
right to a healthy environment’ is naturally interpreted this way. This is 
obviously the case when a healthy environment is defined as one 
conducive to human health; but even when the health of the ecosystem 
itself is under consideration, ‘environment’ can be so interpreted. This is 
because it is still the human’s environment that must be healthy, and the 
human thus remains at the centre.  
Implicit (as well as explicit) anthropocentrism can result in negative 
repercussions for humans as much as nonhumans. Given humans’ 
dependence on the natural world, relegating nonhumans to merely 
instrumental, or even incidental, legal protection through the lens of 
human interest is a gamble. The gamble is that human self-interest will be 
enlightened enough to protect the natural systems on which humans 
depend, despite the temporal and spatial complexities in their composition 
                                       
119 See §9.4.2. 
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and our dependence on them.121 This is a gamble that we currently appear 
to be losing.122 In this sense, we see that speciesism123 or species 
chauvinism124 is in reality short-sighted. With the interests of humanity so 
closely tied to the interests of other living beings, the selection of some 
direct human interests to be protected by the superior potency of vital 
rights is a challenge to international law’s effectiveness and consistency. 
This is especially the case given the difficulties of IHRL in suitably dealing 
with the temporal and spatial scales required for environmental 
protection.125 
The critique of anthropocentrism is not that humans do not matter, but 
that it is not only humans that matter. Recognition of issues such as the 
mutual causation between environmental degradation and human rights 
abuse126 can improve protection of humans and nonhumans alike, but is 
not itself sufficient. Conceptualisations of the natural world must go 
beyond that of humanity’s dominion. Just as humanity is a ‘strand in the 
thread of life’,127 so too should human interest in a healthy environment 
constitute a strand in the thread of protection of the natural world. 
                                       
121 See Gillespie (n85) 14-24. 
122 Will Steffen et al, ‘Planetary boundaries: Guiding human development on a 
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Chapter One demonstrated the ongoing enrichment of the human rights 
subject from an abstract legal persona to an embodied and (socially) 
embedded human being. It is crucial that this process continues in such a 
way that humans are understood as being embedded in the natural world 
too. Recognition of this would help to ensure that both humans and the 
nonhuman natural world are better understood, and better protected, by 
the law. However, the anthropocentrism of IHRL will still remain. Even if 
IHRL were to conceptualise the human rights subject as an ecologically 
embedded living organism, human rights would still exist for the sake of 
humans. There is thus a need to contemplate the possibility of vital rights 
being vested in nonhuman beings. This will be the task of Part III of this 
thesis. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
There are a number of criteria that any human right must meet in order to 
become part of IHRL. The right to environment is no different in this regard 
and many of the problems for a human right to environment are not 
specific to its subject-matter. For example, the issue of justiciability is a 
common one for many human rights; the problem of moral legitimacy is 
one which all rights must be able to meet; there is no purpose in any 
redundant human right; and the transboundary issues of environmental 
harm are similar to the extraterritorial issues that arise in securing 
numerous human rights. 
This chapter has demonstrated that a human right to a healthy 
environment can overcome the majority of these issues. Firstly, it is 
relevant to human dignity and it can function as a legal tool. Both of these 
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are at least in part dependent on a ‘contemporary’ rather than a ‘modern’ 
conception of human rights. But since IHRL is definitive of this 
contemporary conception, there is no formal barrier to a human right to 
environment forming part of the corpus of IHRL. 
Secondly, a human right to environment is not redundant. It can play a 
valuable role in balancing human and nonhuman, and short- and long-term 
interests appropriately.128 This is especially the case when ‘a healthy 
environment’ is defined in terms of ecosystem health. The redundancy 
argument suggests that the creation of a human right to environment may 
be a gamble with limited resources, but if limited resources are an issue, 
then this is surely a wider issue about the commitment given to human 
rights and environmental protection in general. It would thus be valuable 
to establish a human right to environment within IHRL. 
However, there is one problem that cannot be overcome within IHRL. That 
is the problem of their anthropocentric focus. Given the inherent 
anthropocentrism of human rights, it is impossible for a human right to 
environment to meet a great number of the concerns of environmentalism 
and existing IEL. Restricted focus is thus a problem of a different ilk to the 
rest. It cannot be solved through alterations within IHRL. This does not 
render such a right worthless, but it does mean that it cannot alone be the 
solution to the question of how rights can be used to protect the natural 
world within international law. 
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A human right to environment can make a considerable contribution 
towards improving both human wellbeing and the state of nature, but it 
also perpetuates a dubious belief that separates humanity from the rest of 
the natural world. Even though a human right to environment will benefit 
nonhumans, the primary focus of a human right is the individual or group 
who holds it. The aim of protecting nonhumans for their own sake cannot 
be done through human rights machinery.  
An alternative approach is to see (environmental) human rights as 
functioning within a wider body of legislation designed to protect the 
interlocking needs of humans and nonhumans.129 A key question for this 
thesis is how (or whether) nonhuman rights could also be used within such 
a framework. IHRL defends human dignity but does not explain what is so 
specifically human about dignity itself. Dignity, more deeply considered, 
may be something held in common by more than just humans, and so may 
make demands to protect other forms of life. 
Nonhuman rights may be able to respond to these demands. At the start of 
Chapter One, it was noted how individual human beings were incorporated 
into the international legal system through, inter alia, the establishment of 
IHRL.130 It may therefore be possible for international law to adapt again to 
include other living beings as legal subjects. This idea recalls AWB 
Simpson’s characterisation of the position of humans of international law 
before the adoption of human rights as being similar to the “way one might 
                                       
129 See Nickel’s ‘accommodationist stance’ in Nickel (n4 1993) 283; Atapattu 
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130 §1.2.1. 
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fit animals, or trees, or the environment, into thinking about the existence 
of domestic law aimed at protecting them”.131 Perhaps a parallel 
adjustment can be made. 
The prospect of nonhuman rights will dominate the rest of this thesis. The 
conceptual shift required for such rights (in Stone’s words: “thinking the 
unthinkable”132) is creaking into gear. The development of nonhuman 
rights is currently diffuse, reflecting the diverse values and focus found in 
IEL. This thesis will provide a little more rigour to the concept of nonhuman 
rights, in particular regarding how rights of this ilk can be justified through 
the concept of dignity. 
The most visible solution to the question ‘how can rights be used to protect 
the natural world through international law?’ has proved valuable but 
inadequate, and so examination of other possibilities is required. However, 
before travelling any further down this pathway, this thesis will first 
analyse further what ‘rights’ actually are. 
                                       
131 AWB Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire (OUP 2001) 93. 
132 Stone (n111) 453-56. See Steven Bartlett, ‘Roots of Human Resistance to 
Animal Rights: Psychological and Conceptual Blocks’ (2002) 8 Animal Law 143. 
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PART II 
Part I’s investigation of human rights approaches to environmental 
protection ended with a proposition: that the potency associated with 
human rights could be harnessed for environmental protection through 
vesting comparable rights in nonhumans. It is worth re-iterating that in 
answering the question ‘how can rights be used to protect the natural 
world through international law?’, the meaning of the word ‘rights’ is 
understood as the sort of rights found in international human rights law 
(IHRL). These ‘vital rights’ have both moral and legal characters and they 
form a subset of rights as a whole.  
The Introduction demonstrated that rights are powerful normative tools 
that are central to the functioning of modern law and morality. This is 
exhibited in two main ways. Firstly, rights are a valuable legal tool because 
they are vested in a right-holder (cf the Roman concept of ius – the ‘what’s 
fair’1). As such, rights are owed to a specific right-holder rather than 
existing for the sake of an overarching ‘fairness’. Secondly, rights identify 
important moral2 issues. They conduct this identification because of the 
rhetorical and normative force attached to the language of the term 
‘rights’: that is, stating that one has a right to something will often evoke a 
strong moral demand because “the expression ‘a right’ has a specific force 
                                       
1 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 205-10 
2 Morality in this thesis is understood in a broad sense that does not limit the 
subjects of moral behaviour to humans.  
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and cannot be replaced by … other moral expressions”.3 The normative 
force of rights is particularly elevated within the category of ‘vital rights’, 
since these have “law-exceeding energies and institutionally elevated 
juridical status”,4 which is why they are the primary tool for enquiry in this 
thesis. 
Because of their normative potency, vital rights may offer a particularly 
effective way to protect the natural world, and their current entrenchment 
within IHRL makes their continued and expanded usage tempting. In order 
to assess whether vital rights can be vested in nonhumans there is a need 
to be clear over the nature of both rights in general and vital rights in 
particular. These matters will be scrutinised in Part II, the aim of which is 
to demonstrate that rights can be vested in nonhumans, and to construct a 
theoretical framework for the function of vital rights that allows Part III to 
analyse whether they should be. 
Part II develops understanding of both the moral and the legal characters 
of vital rights through a rigorous technical analysis. It will provide clarity 
and precision as to what rights are and what rights do, for both rights in 
general and specifically with regards vital rights. Chapter Four conducts a 
Hohfeldian analysis of rights in order to gain clarity over what rights are; 
Chapter Five gauges the various merits of Will Theory and Interest Theory 
                                       
3 HLA Hart, ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’ (1955) 64 The Philosophical Review 
175, 181. 
4 Anna Grear and Louis Kotzé, ‘An invitation to fellow epistemic travellers’ in Anna 
Grear and Louis Kotzé (eds), Research Handbook on Human Rights and the 
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in order to describe what rights do. Chapter Six then focuses more 
specifically on the concept of vital rights, explaining why this terminology 
has been chosen, and constructs a framework that permits Part III’s 
enquiry into whether vital rights should be vested in nonhumans. 
There is a need to be clear and precise about what exactly it is that rights 
are and what they do because the word ‘right’ can be used in many 
different senses. For example, there are ‘human rights’, ‘rights of way’, 
‘women’s rights’, ‘constitutional rights’ etc. LW Sumner compares the 
many varieties of rights to many species of the same genus, arguing that 
despite their differences, “all species of rights must share some common 
concept of a right”.5 This comparison with taxonomical classification’s 
ability to provide meaningful distinctions within a continuum6 is a highly 
pertinent one for this thesis. Although there must be some shared 
characteristics of rights regardless of the context in which they are found 
(they are of the same genus), their differences may be so marked as to 
make distinct species of rights neither comparable nor interchangeable. 
However, just as there is often no clear dividing line between species, 
rights also exist along continuous gradients, the different species flowing 
into one another. A task of Part II is to discover both the shared 
                                       
5 LW Sumner, The Moral Foundation of Rights (Clarendon 1987) 17-18, 92-93. 
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‘Speciation by Distance in a Ring Species’ (2005) 307 Science 414). There are in 
fact a number of different definitions of ‘species’ (see Ernst Mayr, Systematics and 
the Origin of Species (Columbia University Press 1942); Kevin de Queiroz, ‘Ernst 
Mayr and the modern concept of species’ (2005) 102 PNAS 6600). 
194 
 
characteristics of rights as a whole, and the defining features that 
distinguish vital rights from other rights.  
.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
WHAT RIGHTS ARE 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The word ‘right’ can be deployed in numerous and diverse ways and in 
numerous and diverse settings. As a consequence, ‘rights’ suffer from 
problems of varied meaning and nebulous usage.1 Because of this, it can 
be unclear precisely what someone means when they declare that they 
have a right to something. This is not a new observation: it is one that has 
attracted attention for decades with the result that many adjectives can 
now be prefaced to the word ‘right’ to give it a more precise meaning.2 Yet 
in both everyday and academic usage rights are often left unqualified. This 
ambiguity can create confusion, imprecision and inaccuracy.  
The goal of Chapter Four is to prevent confusion, imprecision and 
inaccuracy by establishing clearly what is meant by ‘rights’ within this 
thesis. In order to do this, ‘rights’ will be analysed through the Hohfeldian 
                                       
1 Wesley Hohfeld, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning’ (1913) 23 The Yale Law Journal 16, 28-29. 
2 eg positive, negative, natural, legal, moral, active, passive, in personam, in rem, 
human, animal, natural, inalienable, inviolable, subjective, objective. Joseph Raz, 
Morality of Freedom (OUP 1986) 167; LW Sumner, The Moral Foundation of Rights 
(Clarendon 1987) 1-14; Hillel Steiner, ‘Working Rights’ in Mathew Kramer, N 
Simmonds and Hillel Steiner, Debate Over Rights (OUP 1998) 248. 
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framework, thereby constructing a model that describes the sort of rights 
under consideration.  
This thesis is concerned with the sort of rights found in international 
human rights law (IHRL). This is because this category of rights exhibits 
rights’ normative force in a particularly potent way,3 and so they are worth 
investigating as potential tools for protecting the natural world within 
international law. This category of rights will be referred to as ‘vital rights’, 
a choice of terminology that will be explained in Chapter Six. Chapter Four 
will first describe some overarching features of vital rights in order to 
situate them within the continuum of rights as a whole. It will then set out 
some properties of rights in general, and show how these manifest 
themselves within the subset of vital rights. 
4.2 WHAT KIND OF RIGHTS? 
A key feature of human rights is that they are both moral rights and legal 
rights.4 They are reliant on an overt moral justification, but are also firmly 
grounded in law.5 Human rights are “Janus-faced, looking simultaneously 
toward morality and the law”.6 This ‘Janus-faced’ nature of human rights 
                                       
3 §Introduction. 
4 Samantha Besson, ‘Justifications’ in Daniel Moeckli et al (eds), International 
Human Rights Law (2nd edn, OUP 2014) 34-41; Conor Gearty, Can Human Rights 
Survive? (CUP 2006) 40; Upendra Baxi, ‘Reinventing human rights in an era of 
hyper-globalisation: a few wayside remarks’ 150 and Florian Hoffmann, 
‘Foundations beyond law’ 89, both in Conor Gearty and Costas Douzinas (eds), 
The Cambridge Companion to Human Rights Law (CUP 2012). 
5 §Introduction; §3.2. 
6 Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of 
Human Rights (2010) 41 Metaphilosophy 464, 470.  
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must be carried over to the more general category of vital rights in order 
to ensure that the potency of human rights resides in all vital rights. 
Although there are numerous other perspectives from which to view 
‘human rights’7 (and also ‘vital rights’), it is their particularly strong dual 
manifestation of both moral and legal characters that renders them of 
interest to this thesis. 
A second important feature of vital rights is that they are a subset of all 
rights, yet potentially broader than IHRL.8 Importantly, there is no a priori 
reason why only humans can have vital rights. This is represented in the 
figure below. In the figure, the rectangle represents the entire domain of 
‘rights’. There is both a blur between law and morality and a dividing line 
between them since both these interpretations of their relationship are 
defensible: it is possible to consider law as an attempt to codify morality,9 
                                       
7 Human rights are also historical, political, institutional and so on. There are a 
great number of ways to interpret and analyse them, none of which are ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’. Human rights are like the elephant being touched by a group of blind 
people. Depending on which bit you touch, you will see a different picture. 
Consider a Wittgensteinian analysis of the word ‘right’; Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, 
Who Believes in Human Rights? (CUP 2006) 233ff; James Griffin, On Human 
Rights (OUP 2008) 210. See also Scott Davidson, Human Rights (Open University 
Press 1993); Alan Gewirth, The Community of Rights (University of Chicago Press 
1996); Jerome Shestack, ‘The Philosophic Foundations of Human Rights’ (1998) 
20 HRQ 201, 225-26; James Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights (2nd edn, 
Blackwell 2007); Horacio Spector, ‘Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights’ 
(2009) 46 San Diego L Rev 819, 829-38; Allen Buchanan, The Heart of Human 
Rights (OUP 2014) chs1-2; Moeckli (n2) Part I; Christian Tomuschat, Human 
Rights (3rd edn, OUP 2014) 1-7. 
8 Although international human rights are here used as the paradigmatic example 
of vital rights, there may be others in existence. Constitutional rights are a good 
candidate, although these are not international and so less relevant to this thesis.  
9 eg Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (YUP 1964); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously (Duckworth 1977). 
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but it is also possible to set them apart by identifying particular criteria 
which tools must have to count as law (or morality).10 Whichever 
interpretation is preferred, it is clear that ‘Janus-faced’ human rights sit 
with a foot planted firmly in each camp. This important feature of human 
rights also applies to the broader domain of vital rights.  
 
Vital rights have a clear, direct and indispensable link to important moral 
issues. Human rights achieve this through being justified by the concept of 
dignity.11 Although it is not necessarily the case that all vital rights must be 
based on dignity, this thesis will rely on the fact that dignity clearly can 
serve as a foundation for vital rights when it comes to investigate 
nonhuman vital rights in Part III. This will necessarily require an 
investigation of the concept of (nonhuman) dignity. In any case, vital 
                                       
10 eg via Hart’s ‘rule of recognition’ in HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, 
OUP 1994) 100ff. 
11 §1.5. 
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rights must certainly be protecting issues of fundamental moral importance 
rather than relatively inconsequential issues.12 
Vital rights must also have legal effect, since they are legal rights. Human 
rights are not simply exhortative statements of what should be done; 
rather they indicate what must be done and so create legal duties directly 
binding states and with secondary consequences for non-state actors.13 All 
vital rights must have legal force, and potentially must operate in the same 
way as human rights: binding states directly and other non-state actors 
indirectly.  
Not only are vital rights ‘Janus-faced’, but it is also possible to think of 
them as ‘Colossal’. Like the Colossus of Rhodes, they stand astride two 
separated, but connected domains (law and morality), and they play a 
commanding role in both. As seen in the Introduction, vital rights indicate 
urgent and essential moral issues, and provide a necessary engine for the 
functioning of law. Like the Colossus, vital rights dominate the moral-legal 
landscape. 
Focussing on vital rights (rather than on rights in general) delimits the 
scope of this thesis and focuses its intent. Doing so moves the thesis away 
from a discussion over whether the fact that nonhuman entities do receive 
a measure of legal protection amounts to furnishing them with rights more 
generally. Vital rights require ‘rights-language’ to be deployed – they must 
                                       
12 §3.2.1; §6.3. 
13 §2.4-2.5. 
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be specifically and intentionally designated as ‘rights’ in order to receive 
the normative potency associated with ‘rights’. This thesis is concerned 
with the rhetorical force that arises through the very language of rights, 
and the legal effect that comes from the clear status of rights vested in 
particular right-holders.  
4.3 UNDERSTANDING RIGHTS 
Before building a model for vital rights, it is necessary to understand the 
structure of rights more broadly. Since most analytical expositions of rights 
have focussed on legal rights, the approach here will be indebted to, and 
reliant on, a primarily legal understanding of rights.  
Wesley Hohfeld’s investigation into rights is the road most travelled in 
analyses of rights.14 Hohfeld’s insight was to notice that the word ‘right’ is 
used to denote a number of related but separate legal relations.15 From 
there he constructed the Hohfeldian schema of ‘fundamental legal 
conceptions’.16 Hohfeld’s aim in defining his ‘fundamental conceptions’ was 
to shore up legal thinking by categorising and characterising legal 
relationships, removing “chameleon-hued words [which] are a peril both to 
                                       
14 Hohfeld (n1). See Kramer et al (n2); HLA Hart, ‘Legal Rights’ in Essays on 
Bentham (Clarendon 1982) 162; Sumner (n2); Joseph Singer, ‘The Legal Rights 
Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld’ (1982) Wis L Rev 
975; Carl Wellman, An Approach to Rights (Kluwer 1997); Gopal Sreenivasan, ‘A 
Hybrid Theory of Claim-Rights’ (2005) 25 OJLS 257; Leif Wenar, ‘Rights’ in Edward 
Zalta (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 edn) 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/rights/> (accessed 
14/1/2015). 
15 Hohfeld (n1) 28-30. 
16 ibid 30. 
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clear thought and to lucid expression”.17 In so doing, he distinguished a 
number of distinct situations that are often referred to as ‘rights’. 
Although there are alternatives,18 Hohfeld’s schema remains singular in its 
ability to provide an understanding of numerous meanings of legal right 
and to act as a springboard for consideration of rights in further domains. 
As Matthew Kramer has pointed out, it can be used to understand the 
structure of rights at the broadest level, since “virtually every aspect of 
Hohfeld’s analytical scheme applies as well, mutatis mutandis, to the 
structure of moral relationships”.19 
Hohfeld’s analysis identifies a number of relations that can exist between 
actors. Hohfeld describes these relations, their relationships with one 
another and their crucial differences. These will here be referred to as 
Hohfeldian ‘positions’ and categorised into two groups of four. The first 
group is ‘static’ and describes a state of affairs between actors, whereas 
the second group is ‘dynamic’ and allows for alterations to relations to take 
place. The two groups are as follows:20 
                                       
17 ibid 29. 
18 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (first published 1797, Mary Gregor tr, 
CUP1991); Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies (1843); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, 
State and Utopia (Blackwell 1974); Dworkin (n9); Neil MacCormick, ‘Rights in 
Legislation’ in PMS Hacker and Joseph Raz (eds), Law, Morality and Society (OUP 
1977); Raz (n2). 
19 Matthew Kramer, ‘Rights Without Trimmings’ in Kramer et al (n2) 8. See also 
Jeremy Waldron (ed), Theories of Rights (OUP 1984) 8. 
20 See Hohfeld (n1) 30. Two changes have been made to Hohfeld’s terminology: 
claim for right and liberty for privilege.  
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Static Group 
Duty    Claim 
Liberty  No-claim 
Dynamic Group 
Power    Liability 
Immunity    Disability 
It is imperative to realise that although the Hohfeldian schema uses 
terminology that overlaps to a large extent with everyday usage, the 
words are used here with precise, technical meanings. Hohfeld defines 
rather than describes. The words used to label the Hohfeldian positions 
(duty, claim, etc) come encumbered with associated meaning from their 
variegated usage in day-to-day life since they are fairly common English 
words. However, within the Hohfeldian schema, they have a clearly 
delimited sense: they are technical labels.21 For example, a Hohfeldian 
liberty does not carry every feature that one can think of that a liberty 
might be thought to have. Instead, the analytical schema defines exactly 
what features the Hohfeldian liberty has and does not have. The fact that 
they tend to converge broadly with everyday meaning has both 
advantages and disadvantages: it encourages intuitive understanding of 
                                       
21 That is, they function as symbols, and symbols are ultimately arbitrary: the 
solutions to x2 = x + 1 are the same as ⧊2 = ⧊ + 1. Kramer points out that 
Hohfeld could have used ‘spaghetti’ and ‘rice’ to denote the positions: Kramer 
(n19) 23. 
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complicated arguments, but it also risks inaccuracy when slippage from the 
precise to the colloquial occurs. 
4.3.1 THE STATIC GROUP 
It is sensible to begin by looking at the static group and, in particular, at 
the Hohfeldian ‘duty’. In everyday language, to have a duty means that 
you are compelled, required, obligated, or forced to act in a certain way.22 
This parallels what the Hohfeldian ‘duty’ represents: that a particular 
action (or omission) is required of a particular entity.23 We can express this 
as ‘Y has a duty-to-φ’, where φ represents a verb.  
Note that although we can create sensible sentences such as ‘you have a 
duty to your family’ where φ appears to have been replaced by a noun, 
this is not actually the case as the verb is implicit. What is really meant by 
the second sentence is ‘you have a duty-to-φ and this duty is owed to your 
family’. Two facts of significance are uncovered here: (i) the word ‘to’ can 
function as the dative indicator or as part of the infinitive of a verb; and 
(ii) that Hohfeldian duties are owed to another entity.  
The first fact is a reminder that language will at times occlude 
understanding within this analysis; it is a double-edged sword where the 
consideration of meaning is concerned. The latter fact reveals that 
Hohfeldian duties are directional.24 This provides for a key feature of the 
                                       
22 cf Raz (n2) 195. 
23 Hohfeld (n1) 32. 
24 cf Siegfried van Duffel, ‘The Nature of Rights Debate Rests on a Mistake’ (2012) 
93 Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104, 107-14. 
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Hohfeldian schema: each and every Hohfeldian position can be expressed 
from the perspective of a second entity. This second entity can vary – it 
could be your neighbour, your family, a country, humankind, yourself, the 
Earth, or God.25 But in any case, there is always another side to the coin, 
and this other point of view to the duty is represented by the Hohfeldian 
‘claim’.  
In Hohfeldian terminology claims and duties are ‘correlatives’.26 They 
represent the same situation, viewed from different sides. That is, ‘Y has a 
duty-to-φ-held-to-X’ is identical to ‘X has a claim-on-Y-that-Y-φ’. This can 
be written in shorthand:  
Y dφ X ≡ X cφ Y  A correlative relationship 
Although not technically necessary, the fit with our ordinary conception of 
what claims and duties are is a good, though not perfect, one: if you 
promise to lend your brother your bike, then he has a claim on you that 
you loan him the bike and you a duty to provide it. A claim is something 
that a claim-holder has (and likewise for duties): claims and duties do not 
exist untethered, but are attached to actors. The Hohfeldian schema 
provides clarity over to whom duties (and claims) are directed by clearly 
identifying two parties and a legal (or moral) relation that connects them.  
                                       
25 Note that it is logically coherent for all sorts of entities to hold Hohfeldian 
positions. Whether this is desirable is a value judgement: Matthew Kramer, 
‘Getting Rights Right’ in Matthew Kramer (ed), Rights, Wrongs and Responsibilities 
(Palgrave 2001) 28. 
26 Hohfeld (n1) 30. 
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However, it is important to notice that in everyday language ‘claim’ has an 
alternative, but similar, meaning. A claim can also be a statement 
asserting that a certain proposition is true, no matter how spurious it 
might be. I can claim to be Spartacus, or that Marvin Gaye’s ‘What’s Going 
On’ is the greatest album of all time. Neither of these needs to be true to 
be a valid claim.27 The Hohfeldian claim, on the other hand, is a statement 
about what one entity is owed by another.28 Importantly, having a 
Hohfeldian claim has nothing to do with the act of ‘claim-making’. By 
definition, one cannot have a Hohfeldian claim to do something, but only 
that another do something.29 A Hohfeldian claim is not an appeal that 
another should do something, but simply the state of affairs that they must. 
The room for confusion expands if the looser sorts of claims are made 
about other Hohfeldian positions (ie if X claims that they have a right). 
These potential pitfalls must be avoided by clear thinking about the 
meaning and usage of words with regards to the Hohfeldian positions.  
The two other static positions arise where duties and claims end. This is 
represented by another relationship between Hohfeldian positions: the 
antithesis.30 The antithesis is used to describe the situations when duties 
                                       
27 cf the difference between ‘sound’ and ‘valid’ in formal logic. 
28 Which could be critiqued from outside the system, but within the system it is 
simply a fact. 
29 Glanville Williams, ‘The Concept of Legal Liberty’ in Robert Summers (ed), 
Essays in Legal Philosophy (2nd edn, Blackwell 1972) 139. 
30 Hohfeld used the term ‘opposite’ to describe this relationship. However, as 
Halpin points out, this term is open to misinterpretation. AKW Halpin, ‘Hohfeld’s 
Conceptions: From Eight to Two’ (1985) 44 CLJ 435, 440ff. 
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and claims are not found and gives rise to the final two static Hohfeldian 
positions: the ‘liberty’ and the ‘no-claim’. 
Firstly, the antithesis of duty is liberty.31 Hohfeld made the subtle definition 
that the antithesis of Y having a duty-to-φ is not Y having a liberty-to-φ. 
Rather, it is Y having a liberty-to-not-φ.32 If one has a duty-to-φ, then not-
φ-ing is impermissible, whereas the antithetical case is when not-φ-ing is 
permissible: ie Y having a liberty-to-not-φ. In other words, one has a 
liberty to do anything (and everything) which one has no duty not to do. 
In shorthand: 
Y lφ X  ≡ Y ¬d¬φ X  An antithetical relationship33 
Again, the match with everyday meaning is close though not perfect. 
Having a Hohfeldian liberty to perform some action says nothing about the 
practical feasibility of said action. I have a Hohfeldian liberty to run the 
hundred metres in 9.58 seconds (since I have no duty not to), but this is a 
rather useless liberty to possess given its unfeasibility. 
Two key observations must be made, both of which demonstrate the 
Hohfeldian liberty to be weaker than the everyday conception of liberty. 
Firstly, Hohfeldian liberties are specifically directed to a particular person:34 
                                       
31 Hohfeld (n1) 30. 
32 ibid 32. 
33 ¬ represents negation. Alternatively: Z dφ W ≡ Z ¬l¬φ W. 
34 We could say they have an indirect object. cf in rem and in personam rights; Liz 
McKinnell, ‘Environmental Rights’ (Doctoral thesis, Durham University 2010) 17, 
70-71. 
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Y has a liberty-to-φ with respect to X. A consequence of liberties being 
specifically directed at a particular person is that conflicting positions may 
be held with respect to different people. For example, if Laura has signed a 
contract with her employer that she will be in the office on Mondays, then 
Laura has a duty-to-go-to-the-office owed to her employer and, as such, 
does not have a liberty-to-not-go-to-the-office with respect to her 
employer. That is: 
Laura dgo to office Employer ≡ Laura ¬l ¬go to office Employer 
However, Laura has signed no such contract with her sister. She therefore 
has no duty-to-go-to-the-office owed to her sister, and therefore does 
have a liberty-to-not-go-to-the-office with respect to her sister: 
Laura ¬dgo to office Sister ≡ Laura l ¬go to office Sister 
Laura’s situation is such that she both has a liberty-to-not-go-to-the-office 
and does not have a liberty-to-not-go-to-the-office simultaneously. It is 
therefore possible for someone to both have and not have a Hohfeldian 
liberty to do something at the same time as these opposing liberties can be 
held with respect to different entities. Speaking universally then, one is 
only really at35 liberty-to-φ if one has a Hohfeldian liberty-to-φ with 
respect to everyone since otherwise one is under at least one duty-to-not-
φ.  
                                       
35 For clarity ‘being at’ liberty is used to refer to the intuitive conception, whereas 
the Hohfeldian position is referred to as ‘having’ a liberty. 
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Just as with claims and duties, Hohfeldian liberties do not exist untethered 
but rather are a specific relation between two specified actors. This is a 
property of the Hohfeldian schema as a whole, since all Hohfeldian 
positions have specified holders, and all can be viewed from two different 
perspectives. The Hohfeldian schema provides clarity over who exactly it is 
that has a liberty (eg), and who that liberty is held against. The directed 
nature of Hohfeldian positions explains what it means to say that rights are 
vested in a right-holder, as detailed in the Introduction. Hohfeldian 
positions (of which rights are composed36) are something that someone in 
particular has. Duties are not owed to God, or to ‘the Law’ in general as in 
Roman Law37 or Nowheresville,38 but are specifically directed and owed to 
a right-holder.39  
The vestedness of Hohfeldian positions further emphasises why human 
rights are unavoidably anthropocentric. Human rights are (by definition) 
vested in humans. Their duties are owed to humans, and so have humans 
at the centre of their concern, which is what it means to be 
anthropocentric. Additionally, it is crucial to realise that the Hohfeldian 
schema removes ambiguity over who (or what) has a Hohfeldian position, 
but not over who (or what) actually constitutes that position-holder. For 
                                       
36 infra.  
37 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 205-210. 
38 Joel Feinberg, ‘The Nature and Value of Rights’ (1970) 4 The Journal of Value 
Inquiry 243. 
39 Unless of course God or ‘the Law’ is the claim-holder. 
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example, a ‘people’ can hold a Hohfeldian position even if it is not entirely 
clear who (or what) constitutes a people.40  
The second key observation over the Hohfeldian liberty concerns another 
important divergence between Hohfeldian and everyday language, 
reinforcing the need to be precise in the use of language when analysing 
what rights are. To have a Hohfeldian liberty-to-φ does not logically entail 
having a Hohfeldian liberty-to-not-φ. It is therefore possible within the 
Hohfeldian schema for Y to have a liberty-to-φ but not have a liberty-to-
not-φ, ie:  
Y lφ X AND Y ¬l¬φ X 
But the second of these is equivalent to Y dφ X. This implies that it is 
possible for an entity to have both a Hohfeldian duty and a Hohfeldian 
liberty to do something.41 As such, in order for the Hohfeldian liberty-to-φ 
to connote actual freedom, it must be combined with the Hohfeldian 
liberty-to-not-φ to ensure that there is no duty-to-φ. Although there is 
considerable discussion on the existence and the nature of the so-called 
‘half-liberty’,42 the key observation here is that Hohfeldian positions do not 
exist in isolation but often require combination to be meaningful.43  
                                       
40 See Kramer (n19) 56-57. 
41 Hohfeld (n1) 32-33. Hart (n14) 173. 
42 Hart (n14) 166–67, 173-74; Feinberg (n38) postscript; Joel Feinberg, ‘Voluntary 
Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life’ (1978) 7 Philosophy & Public Affairs 
93, 109n16; Kramer (n19) 17-20; Judith Jarvis Thomson, Realm of Rights (HUP 
1990) 46; Sumner (n2) 26-27; Daniel O’Reilly, ‘Using the Square of Opposition to 
Illustrate the Deontic and Alethic Relations Constituting Rights’ (1995) 45 
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The final static Hohfeldian position is the antithesis of claim and the 
correlative of liberty. The best label for this position is the neo-Hohfeldian 
term ‘no-claim’.44 The lack of a more imaginative or intuitive name for this 
position is perhaps due to (or results in) the fact that it is much more 
naturally and smoothly expressed via its antithesis or correlative. If Paul 
has a liberty to water his garden (with respect to all other entities), then 
no other entity has a claim against Paul that he does not water his garden. 
To put it another way: every entity has a ‘no-claim’ on Paul that he water 
his garden. In shorthand: 
Y lφ X ≡ X nφ Y  Correlative 
X nφ Y ≡ X ¬c¬φ Y  Antithesis 
An important implication is that the Hohfeldian liberty is not a particularly 
forceful position. The entity on the other side of the coin to a liberty (ie X) 
is not compelled to act in a certain manner because of the existence of the 
liberty. It may seem that X cannot prevent Y from φ-ing, but this is only 
true in a rather weak sense. For example, Paul being at liberty to water his 
garden (with respect to Jane) does not of itself mean that Jane cannot 
prevent Paul from doing so by, for example, stealing his watering can or 
inviting him round for lunch. Jane is simply lacking a specific claim that 
Paul not water his garden.  
                                                                                                              
University of Toronto Law Journal 279, 290ff; Leif Wenar, ‘The Nature of Rights’ 
(2005) 33 Philosophy and Public Affairs 223, 228, 231n9. 
43 §4.4. 
44 Hohfeld preferred ‘no-right’. 
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The four static Hohfeldian positions can now be grouped as follows: 
 
It is apparent that, generally speaking, claims and liberties are 
advantageous for the holder (ie the entity on the left hand side of the 
shorthand expression), whereas duties and no-claims are generally 
disadvantageous. Although creative thinking can create exceptions to this 
state of affairs,45 it both makes sense and is useful to group liberties and 
claims as Hohfeldian ‘entitlements’, and duties and no-claims as 
‘disadvantages’. This is a crucial step for the encapsulation of the structure 
of rights.  
4.3.2 THE DYNAMIC GROUP 
Hohfeldian positions must arise from somewhere: they are not discovered, 
but constructed. Furthermore, legal (and moral) systems are susceptible to 
                                       
45 Sumner (n2) 32. 
Duty
Claim
No-claim
Liberty
Correlative: 
Two Hohfeldian  
positions which 
describe the 
same situation 
from alternative 
perspectives. 
 
Antithesis: 
Two Hohfeldian 
positions which 
are in contrast 
to each other 
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modifications on both the macro and micro scales. This ability for legal 
relations to be created, manipulated and terminated is central to many 
rule-systems (eg contract law). As will be seen, the dynamic group of 
Hohfeldian positions allows such processes to take place through the 
modification of static positions (and indeed of dynamic positions 
themselves).46 
There are parallels in structure between the two groups. Recalling the four-
way arrangement of the static group, a comparable structure can be used 
to model the dynamic group. 
 
The intuitive place to begin is the Hohfeldian ‘power’. To have a Hohfeldian 
power is to have the ability to create, alter or destroy a Hohfeldian 
                                       
46 The function of some elements within the dynamic group is akin to Hart’s 
secondary rules for a rule-system, see Hart (n10) 79-99. 
Liability
Power
Disability
Immunity
213 
 
position.47 In any given rule-system, there may be one unique power-
holder (eg God for The Ten Commandments) or huge numbers of them (eg 
any potential contracting party in contract law). Where there are multiple 
power-holders, there is no reason why each must hold identical powers.48 
Such a situation is in fact highly unlikely: it is probable that a power-holder 
will have the ability to modify some of their own positions in a way that 
nobody else can.  
The directionality of the power is slightly more complex than with the static 
group, since if A has a power to create the position Y dφ X, then A has a 
power over both Y and X. In practice, this difficulty will seldom be 
significant since the imposition (or removal) of a Hohfeldian position will 
usually be to the benefit of at least one entity and, although technically a 
power exists over them both, it will be more meaningful to talk of the 
power over the disadvantaged entity.49 Note that it remains entirely 
unambiguous who the power is vested in (ie who the power-holder is).  
As before, the remaining positions can be conceived through considering 
correlatives and antitheses. Firstly, the correlative: if A has a power to 
impose a duty upon B, then from B’s viewpoint, B has a ‘liability’ with 
respect to A.50 Care must be taken not to slip into confusing the Hohfeldian 
                                       
47 Hohfeld (n1) 44-45. 
48 The same is true for other Hohfeldian positions. 
49 See Nigel Simmonds, ‘Rights at the Cutting Edge’ in Kramer et al (n2) 152n53. 
There is also a nuanced difference between the cases when the power-holder is a 
party to the claim-duty position (eg a contractor) or independent to it (eg a 
legislator). 
50 Hohfeld (n1) 30. 
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liability with any other (legal or non-legal) meaning of the word. Here, it 
simply means that another actor has the potential to alter one of your 
existing legal relations or to create a new one.  
A powφ B ≡ B liabφ A  Correlative 
The antithesis of power is where the power runs out: the Hohfeldian 
‘disability’. If you lack the power to alter some arrangement, then you are 
disabled from doing so.  
A ¬powφ B ≡ A disφ B  Antithesis 
The antithesis of liability, (and hence the correlative of disability), is the 
Hohfeldian ‘immunity’. If you are not liable to an alteration of your position 
by a certain entity, then you have an immunity with respect to them.51  
A disφ B ≡ B immφ A  Correlative 
B liabφ A ≡ B ¬immφ A  Antithesis 
Note that the antithesis within the dynamic group does not function in the 
same way as within the static group. Moving between duties and liberties 
(antitheses) within the static group required a double negation. A duty is 
not having the liberty to not do something. But, within the dynamic group, 
a disability is simply not having the power.52  
                                       
51 ibid 55. 
52 Kramer (n19) 21; Sumner (n2) 31. 
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As before, it is reasonable to categorise two of these positions as generally 
advantageous: the power and the immunity. Again, situations may exist 
where it is in fact disadvantageous to be a power or immunity-holder,53 but 
these need not cloud thinking on the matter since these fringe cases can 
be accounted for through consideration of the function of rights, as will be 
done in Chapter Five.54 Therefore, these can be added to the list of 
entitlements.  
 Entitlement Disadvantage 
Static 
Liberty 
Claim 
No-claim 
Duty 
Dynamic 
Power 
Immunity 
Liability 
Disability 
It is worth noting at this stage that the Hohfeldian positions are not all 
alike in terms of any prerequisites for their possession. For example, not 
everything that is capable of possessing claims will necessarily also be 
capable of bearing duties, since a duty demands particular behaviour of 
the bearer, whereas a claim makes no demands of the holder.55 At the 
very least, it must be possible for these demands to be communicated to 
                                       
53 David Lyons, Rights, Welfare and Mill’s Moral Theory (OUP 1994) 11; Rowan 
Cruft, ‘Rights: Beyond Interest Theory and Will Theory?’ (2004) 23 L and Phil 347, 
355, 358. 
54 §5.5.1. 
55 See Sumner (n2) 29; cf Visa Kurki, ‘Why things can hold rights: 
reconceptualising the legal person’ (2015) 7 University of Cambridge Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series 18-19. 
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the duty-bearer. This does not produce logical absurdities within the 
Hohfeldian framework: Y dφ X does not imply X dφ Y.  
4.4 BUNDLED HOHFELDIAN POSITIONS 
It has already been demonstrated that there are situations that cannot be 
modelled by a singular Hohfeldian position. In particular, the previous 
section showed that matching a real-world liberty to the Hohfeldian liberty 
requires two Hohfeldian positions. To model the situation whereby Ted is 
at56 liberty with respect to Bill to walk on Bill’s land, Ted must have both a 
Hohfeldian liberty-to-walk-on-Bill’s-land and a liberty-to-not-walk-on-Bill’s-
land. If the second one is missing, then Ted does not have a liberty-to-not-
walk-on-Bill’s-land and has, by definition, a duty-to-walk-on-Bill’s-land. 
The important point is that two Hohfeldian positions are required to 
accurately describe what is meant by the everyday (but legal) proposition 
that ‘Ted is at liberty (with respect to Bill) to walk on Bill’s land.’ 
Hohfeldian positions do not exist in isolation but rather come combined 
with one another. That is, Hohfeldian positions do not exist ‘atomically’ (ie 
isolated) but are ‘molecular’:57 they come as ‘bundles’,58 or ‘clusters’59 of 
positions. These bundles can often be rather complex. For example, 
Wellman suggests that ‘the right to life’ consists of at least the following:60 
                                       
56 supra n35. 
57 Wenar (n42) 229. 
58 Sumner (n2) 32. 
59 Wellman (n14) 7, 51. 
60 ibid 245-47. See also Wenar (n42) 233. 
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1) A claim not to be killed by another. 
2) A claim that others not endanger one’s life. 
3) A liberty to defend one’s life with all necessary force. 
4) A liberty to preserve one’s life by any necessary means. 
5) A claim to be rescued from the dangers of death. 
6) A liberty to risk one’s life. 
One may disagree with the particular details of Wellman’s breakdown,61 
but the crucial point is that things called ‘rights’ are often bundles of 
Hohfeldian positions. Another example of this is that claims will normally 
be bundled with an immunity against the claim being extinguished: that is, 
if X has a duty-to-φ owed to Y, then X cannot normally simply extinguish 
this duty.62 Correlatively, Y has both a claim and an immunity over X. 
Furthermore, although the ‘entitlement-holder’ (ie who the entitlements 
are vested in) must be the same for every position in the bundle, there is 
no requirement that the ‘disadvantage-holder’ must likewise remain 
constant. For example, in item 1 in Wellman’s bundle above, the claim not 
to be killed by another is in fact shorthand for a (very large) set of claims 
held against other people.63 
Understanding the structure of these bundles, and the interactions within 
them, is important for any model of the structure of rights but will prove 
particularly pertinent for analysing vital rights. 
                                       
61 Consider HRC, General Comment 6, HR1/GEN/1/ (Vol I). 
62 Matthew Kramer, ‘Some Doubts about Alternatives to the Interest Theory of 
Rights’ (2013) 123 Ethics 245, 247. 
63 See Kramer (n19) 41-42. 
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4.5 WHICH ENTITLEMENTS ARE RIGHTS? 
Although Hohfeld’s schema directly engages with the concept of rights, it 
does not itself determine which Hohfeldian positions should be described as 
‘rights’. Hohfeld’s insight was to realise that the language of rights is 
commonly used indiscriminately to refer to any of the four Hohfeldian 
entitlements (liberty, claim, power and immunity) and that this imprecision 
in usage is the source of much analytical confusion over rights.64 
Hohfeld sought to overcome this confusion by synonymising rights (“in the 
strictest sense”65) with claims. However, it is equally possible to avoid 
misunderstanding by acknowledging that there are four types of right, 
which all operate differently. Hohfeld’s identification of ‘rights’ as claims 
has received both support66 and criticism67 in the literature. As would be 
expected, Hohfeld’s definition of a ‘right’ is narrower than how the term is 
often used: “the statement that rights are claims is prescriptive for, not 
descriptive of, usage”.68 Therefore good reason needs to be found for 
limiting the notion of a ‘right’ exclusively to Hohfeldian claims, especially as 
                                       
64 Hohfeld (n1) 30. 
65 ibid 36, 31-32. 
66 HLA Hart, ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’ (1955) 64 The Philosophical Review 
175, 179; Hart (n14) 166-68, 185n88; Feinberg (n38) 257; Kramer (n19) 9-14; 
Matthew Kramer and Hillel Steiner, ‘Theories of Rights: Is There a Third Way?’ 
(2007) 27 OJLS 281, 294ff. 
67 Wellman (n14) 2-4, 7, 52-53, 66-67; MacCormick (n18) 189, 193-94, 205-206 
(see Simmonds (n49) 149); Neil MacCormick ‘Children’s Rights’ in Legal Right and 
Social Democracy (OUP 1984) 154, 161-62; Thomson (n42) 40-60; Raz (n2) 166-
75; Dworkin (n9) 171; Cruft (n53) 355-59; Wenar (n42) 236-37; Spector (n7). 
68 Wenar (n14). 
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it has already been seen that Hohfeldian positions often come bundled 
together. 
The following section will analyse some potential defining features of rights. 
It will do this by considering the merit of synonymising rights with claims, 
and the reasons why other Hohfeldian positions are referred to as rights. 
This requires two simultaneous balancing acts: between claims and 
liberties69 on one hand, and between legal and moral usage of the term 
‘right’ on the other. 
4.5.1 RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
Synonymising rights with claims is based on a connection between duties 
and rights. It endorses and emphasises that an important feature of ‘rights’ 
is that they must give rise to duties if they are to count as ‘rights’. This 
necessity of the existence of duties for rights has been designated by 
Kramer as the “Correlativity Axiom”.70 The axiom is understandable: if a 
right is to exist, then someone somewhere surely has to do something (or 
specifically not do something) about it. That is, someone must have a duty.  
Rights give rise to duties because rights exert authorised coercion – they 
necessarily restrict the behaviour of others.71 The necessity of coercion 
arises because rights exist in domains apart from virtue, grace and 
kindness. Rights do not indicate what would be honourable or benevolent 
                                       
69 See infra n74. 
70 Kramer (n19) 24-49. 
71 Kant (n18) 55-57; Hart (n66) 177, 183; Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights 
(Routledge 1988) 271; Simmonds (n49) 135, 176, 180, 203; Nickel (n7) 24-26. 
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to do, but what must be done.72 This means that it must be factually 
possible (though not legally/morally permissible) to violate a right, 
otherwise no coercion has been created. Rights must identify what 
behaviour they demand, and from whom, in order to count as rights. 
Compare the Hohfeldian duty and the Hohfeldian no-claim in this regard. It 
is clear that X can violate a duty-to-φ by simply not φ-ing. But the 
Hohfeldian no-claim cannot be violated in this way: it does not require any 
action (or indeed any inaction) by the no-claim-holder.73 Only duties can 
demand particular behaviour from particular actors. Since the correlative of 
a duty is a claim (and no other Hohfeldian position is logically entailed by a 
duty), the Correlativity Axiom thus seems to be valid.  
However, although it is uncontroversial that (at least legal) Hohfeldian 
claims are rights, the word ‘right’ is often used to refer to situations which 
cannot be parsed as Hohfeldian claims. This happens in (at least) two 
different ways: through other Hohfeldian entitlements being referred to as 
‘rights’ and through ‘right’ being used in a looser (often moral) fashion. 
These will be considered in turn to see if they are valid alternative 
meanings of a ‘right’, and what this implies for the Correlativity Axiom. 
                                       
72 ibid. 
73 §4.5.2. 
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4.5.2 RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 
It is sometimes the case that liberties are referred to as rights.74 For 
example, people may say that they have a right to walk down a street or a 
right to bear arms, both of which are in fact liberties. However, because of 
their very structure, Hohfeldian liberties (even when twinned) cannot 
themselves be violated. This is because liberties do not make any specific 
demands of the no-claim-holder. Liberties are discretionary – they allow 
the liberty-holder to exercise or not exercise their liberty as they wish. But 
liberties do not themselves restrict the actions of any other entity: “a mere 
liberty, in and of itself, is too weak to constitute a right … It is essential to 
the concept of a right that any right can be violated or infringed”.75  
For example, Paul’s liberty-to-walk-down-the-street cannot be violated. It 
does not itself prevent Jane from breaking his leg and preventing him 
doing so. Of course, it is not permissible for Jane to break Paul’s leg, but 
this is because Paul has a distinguishable claim-right against such injury – 
ie Jane has a duty not to assault Paul. Importantly, the liberty itself does 
not (and cannot) prohibit assault: Paul’s claim-right exists irrespective of 
his liberty. 
One may think that a no-claim holder must not prevent a liberty-holder 
from exercising their liberty, but this is not the case. For example, 
                                       
74 As are immunities and powers. However, both of these are less problematic: 
immunities do create coercion and can be violated since the disability-holder 
cannot exercise the power they are disabled from exercising. And powers can 
create duties, so they can be understood as a source of coercion. 
75 Wellman (n14) 3. 
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someone who is at liberty to register a charity called ‘Spark’ can be 
prevented from doing so by someone already having done so. As such, 
there is no general prohibition against no-claim-holders preventing liberty-
holders from exercise their liberty. 
An important realisation is that although liberties themselves do not entail 
duties, liberties are often protected by being bundled with accompanying 
claims. Hart referred to this as a ‘protective perimeter’, and noted that 
liberties are seldom left entirely unprotected: 
This is so because at least the cruder forms of interference, 
such as those involving physical assault or trespass, will be 
criminal or civil offences or both, and the duties or 
obligations not to engage in such modes of interference 
constitute a protective perimeter behind which liberties 
exist and may be exercised.76 
However, although these claims (ie the ones correlative to the duties) 
indubitably protect the liberty, they are merely incidental to the liberty 
itself. That is, they are rights-in-themselves; they do not exist in order to 
protect the liberty but do so as a side-effect. If Jane does assault Paul 
while he happens to be exercising his liberty-to-walk-down-the-street, 
Jane has violated a right regardless of Paul’s liberty. Since the right being 
violated is distinguishable from the liberty-to-walk-down-the-street, it is 
both unnecessary and misleading to refer to Paul’s liberty as a ‘right’. The 
                                       
76 Hart (n14) 171. 
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same is true of any liberty that is protected merely incidentally by 
distinguishable claim-rights.  
On the other hand, it is possible a protective perimeter to be specifically 
designed and constructed for the purpose of protecting a particular liberty 
(or bundle of Hohfeldian positions). Hart noticed that this will be the case 
regarding particularly important or fundamental rights.77 In this case, 
claims78 will be created that ensure that the liberty cannot be interfered 
with in certain ways. Because of their origins, these claims exist are not 
incidental, but exist because of the liberty in question.79 And as claims, 
they have correlative duties that can be violated, and so adhere to the 
Correlativity Axiom. In this way, claim-rights can be created in order to 
secure a liberty, giving meaning to the notion of a liberty-right. For 
example, in the US the liberty-right to bear arms has received specific 
constitutional protection, but in the UK no such legal structure exists.  
In such cases, it is better to think of these claim-rights as specifically 
securing the liberty, rather than merely existing in a protective perimeter. 
A specifically secured Hohfeldian liberty (or indeed bundle of liberties), 
rather than one incidentally benefiting from a protective perimeter, can 
thus meaningfully be thought of as a right. This latter conception, of 
specifically securing a bundle of positions with Hohfeldian claims, will be 
useful in explaining the structure of vital rights. 
                                       
77 ibid 172. 
78 And immunities etc, supra n62. 
79 Hart (n14) 172. 
224 
 
4.5.3 RIGHTS AND IMPORTANCE 
The second way in which ‘right’ is used in a sense looser than meaning a 
Hohfeldian claim appears most often in moral discourse. Here, the word 
‘right’ is often used to denote that an issue is of a high level of 
importance,80 rather than to refer to a specific Hohfeldian claim.81 For 
example, the ‘right to education’, or the ‘right to healthcare’ can be used 
as appeals for the provision of education or healthcare. Deploying the 
notion of ‘rights’ in this way is commonly done to stake a belief or to push 
for reform, rather than to identify specific duties that are owed. In the 
latter case it may even be precisely the absence of a suitable legal duty 
that motivates the appeal.82 Consider for example the debate over 
prisoners’ voting rights in the UK83 or the supposed ‘right to die’ regarding 
assisted dying.84 
The purpose of ‘rights-language’ here is not to describe a precise moral (or 
legal) relationship, but to indicate that an issue is morally important. The 
language of rights captures this importance in a succinct and powerful 
way.85 The power of the language of rights is noted by MacCormick when 
he points out that there is “a significant difference between asserting that 
                                       
80 §Introduction. 
81 Although moral rights can still invoke normative force through being correlative 
to moral duties: that is, there is more than one meaning of a moral right. 
82 §Introduction. 
83 See Alexander Horne and Isobel White, ‘Prisoners’ voting rights (2005 to May 
2015)’ (2015) House of Commons Briefing Paper SN01764. 
84 AC Grayling, ‘Right to die’ (2005) 330 BMJ 799. 
85 §Introduction. 
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every child ought to be cared for, nurtured, and, if possible, loved, and 
asserting that every child has a right to care, nurture, and love”.86 When 
used in this sense, ‘rights’ are less concerned with identifying precise 
duties, and more concerned with demonstrating the urgency of a particular 
issue. 
Furthermore, when used in this sense, a ‘right’ will often not refer to a 
singular Hohfeldian position. Instead, it will normally be used as shorthand 
for a bundle of connected Hohfeldian positions, and potentially also 
demands (ie ‘claims’ in a non-Hohfeldian sense) regarding these positions. 
Of the positions in this bundle, some may be Hohfeldian claims, but some 
may not. Consider for example Wellman’s composition of the ‘right to life’ 
above. Kramer likewise identifies this looser shorthand use of the word 
‘right’ regarding the ‘right to education’: 
To say that every child holds an unspecified ‘right’ to an 
education, for example, is to say merely that every child’s 
interest in receiving an education ought to enjoy moral or 
legal protection [and] … might eventuate in some of the 
following components, among others: a right not to be 
excluded or greatly hindered from obtaining an education, a 
right to be furnished with adequate pedagogical services 
and materials, a liberty to attend school and engage in 
lessons regularly, an immunity from being divested of these 
                                       
86 MacCormick (n67) 154, 158-59. 
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educational rights and liberties, and a power to seek 
enforcement of these educational rights.87  
When the word ‘right’ is used as a shorthand for a bundle of Hohfeldian 
positions, the positions within the bundle are frequently held in rem rather 
than in personam, as seen in both Wellman’s and Kramer’s examples 
above.88 This is because they detail general entitlements which everyone 
ought to abide by, rather than specific arrangements between two 
parties.89 
One could argue that this looser, sloganistic, sense of ‘right’ is simply a 
misuse of precise legal terminology. However, given the clear association 
between the word ‘right’ and issues of high moral importance, this would 
be overly prescriptive, and insufficiently descriptive,90 of what rights are. 
The normative force that comes associated with the use of  ‘rights-
language’ is in fact a key feature of rights as a whole, and especially vital 
rights (which exhibit this normative rhetorical force in a particularly potent 
way). This feature of rights must therefore not be overlooked. 
The Correlativity Axiom thus holds valuable information about strictly legal 
rights, but it should not supersede the important rhetorical force of the 
word ‘right’. A legal right must entail legal duties, but the word ‘right’ also 
                                       
87 Kramer (n19) 46-47. 
88 An in rem right can itself be seen as a bundle of rights of identical content but 
held against numerous entities. 
89 Consider Hart’s differentiation between ‘special rights’ and ‘general rights’: Hart 
(n66)183-88. 
90 supra n68. 
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has a distinguishable moral function via its rhetorical force. Both these 
meanings of ‘right’ are of importance with regards the subject of inquiry of 
this thesis: the Janus-faced vital rights. A model for their structure can 
now be detailed. 
4.6 A MODEL FOR VITAL RIGHTS 
Human rights are specifically both moral and legal rights. They exist as 
both bundled moral demands (such as the ‘right to education’) and as legal 
claim-rights within international law (with states as the correlative duty-
bearers). This ‘Janus-faced’ structure is an important characteristic of 
human rights which is symbolic of the broader category of vital rights as a 
whole: that they are both moral and legal rights.91 
The structure of vital rights is therefore somewhat complex: they both 
adhere to the Correlativity Axiom (as legal rights) and bypass its rigidity 
(as moral rights). This can be seen through considering the paradigmatic 
example of vital rights: those rights found in IHRL. On the one hand, 
human rights function as indicators of matters of moral importance, they 
“traditionally have been thought of as moral rights of the highest order”.92 
They are bundles of Hohfeldian positions which can be encapsulated by a 
                                       
91 Note that the shorthand/claim distinction is distinct from the moral/legal 
distinction.  
92 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Cornell 2013) 11. 
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shorthand expression taking the form of a moral right (eg the ‘right to 
education’),93 rather than a precise Hohfeldian claim.   
These bundles represent the core of the right, enlisting its key content. 
They can contain a mixture of Hohfeldian claims, liberties, immunities and 
powers, directed at various entities (although the entitlement holder must 
remain constant so as to preserve the coherence of the right: rights are 
vested in right-holders). As already noted, these positions will usually be 
held in rem due to their status as general moral principles rather than 
specific legal arrangements. These positions being held in rem further 
complicates the bundle since a single Hohfeldian position held in rem can 
itself be seen as a bundle of positions, each with identical content and 
holder, but held against different entities.94 
On the other hand, vital rights are legal rights. The necessary legal status 
of vital rights is ensured through the creation of legal claim-rights 
specifically in order to secure the content of the core bundle. Unlike a 
purely incidental protective perimeter, the creation of these legal claim-
rights is predicated on the existence and the importance of the bundled 
moral right. The existence of these claim-rights is not secondary or 
optional for vital rights, but rather axiomatic to their nature. In this way, 
vital rights adhere to the Correlativity Axiom. 
                                       
93 Within IHRL, the purpose of general comments is to pick apart these bundles: 
they “set out … understanding of the treaty language” (Christine Chinkin, ‘Sources’ 
in Moeckli et al (n4) 80).  
94 supra n88. 
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For human rights, these legal claim-rights primarily95 take the form of 
state duties under international law. These duties effectively secure the 
bundle in a number of ways as can be seen through the lens of the ‘respect, 
protect, fulfil’96 typology. Firstly, the state must respect human rights by 
not itself violating any claims in the bundle. These duties arise because the 
state itself will normally be one of the duty-bearers regarding claims97 in 
the bundle. For example, states must not conduct torture or any of the 
other acts prohibited by Article 7 ICCPR. 
But the state also has a further supervisory role as the guardian of these 
important moral entitlements, hence “the traditional role of the State as 
the guarantor [as well as] the prime violator of human rights”.98 The role 
of the state in securing human rights is thus twofold: as a matter of 
conduct, the state can be perpetrator or protectorate; but as a matter of 
law, it must be the latter and never the former. In order to effectively 
secure human rights, a state must also protect its citizens’ rights, and 
provide the conditions in which human rights can be fulfilled. As seen in 
Chapter Two, duties to protect and fulfil human rights require states to 
exercise control over other actors within their jurisdiction through the 
adoption of “legislative, judicial, administrative, educative and other 
                                       
95 But not exclusively: non-state actors do hold duties that secure human rights. 
See §2.5. 
96 §2.5. 
97 Or disability-holder regarding immunities etc. 
98 Heli Askola, ‘Globalization and Human Rights’ in Azizur Rahman Chowdhury and 
Jahid Hossain Bhuiyan (eds), An Introduction to Human Rights Law (Brill 2010) 
111. See also Frédéric Mégret, ‘Nature of Obligations’ in Moeckli (n4) 102-104. 
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appropriate measures”.99 This will result in the creation of further legal 
duties on non-state actors,100 which are normally correlative with claims 
held by the right-holder.101 The protective perimeter securing human rights 
is diverse and multifaceted in terms of both actors and content. 
For example, regarding the right to life, the state “should take measures 
not only to prevent and punish deprivation of life by criminal acts, but also 
to prevent arbitrary killing by their own security forces”,102 and regarding 
freedom from torture, the state must “afford everyone protection through 
legislative and other measures as may be necessary against the acts 
prohibited by Article 7, whether inflicted by people acting in their official 
capacity, outside their official capacity or in a private capacity”.103  
Many state duties will also contribute towards securing more than one 
human right.104 For example, ensuring compliance with toxic waste 
legislation is necessary to protect human rights to health, to life, and to a 
healthy environment. Rather than challenging the requirement that these 
state duties specifically exist in order to protect a particular core moral 
                                       
99 HRC, General Comment 31 [7]; §2.5 
100 ibid. 
101 Note that the value of vesting a human right to a healthy environment in 
peoples can be seen here: the claim-holder of environmental legislation is often 
the public in general.  
102 HRC, General Comment 6 [3]. 
103 HRC, General Comment 20 [2]. 
104 See HRC, General Comment 12 [2]. 
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right, this overlapping nature of state duties recalls and reflects the 
“indivisible, interdependent and interrelated”105 nature of human rights. 
Returning to an issue from Part I, the difference between defining a 
‘healthy environment’, and determining the state duties resulting from a 
human right to a healthy environment can now be seen. The definition of a 
‘healthy environment’ belongs in the core bundle: what is the moral 
entitlement to, and what ‘primary reference points’ does it contain? The 
claim-rights securing this entitlement will then reflect this. As seen in 
Kyrtatos, whether or not a right is “specifically designed to provide general 
protection of the environment as such”106 necessarily affects the content of 
state duties. For example, the creation of a specific and broadly defined 
human right to a healthy environment would create additional state duties 
regarding the protection of biodiversity and general protection of the 
environment as such. 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
An analytical model for both rights and vital rights has been detailed. In 
doing this, the forms of a number of different types of right have been 
seen. In a strict legal sense, the word ‘right’ can be understood to refer 
only to Hohfeldian claims, since only claims necessarily carry a coercive 
element (through being correlative to duties). However, the word ‘right’ 
has other valid meanings, such as a liberty that has been specifically 
                                       
105 World Conference on Human Rights, ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action’ A/CONF.157/23 (25 June 1993) Article 5. 
106 Kyrtatos v Greece (2005) 40 EHRR 16 [52]. 
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secured by the creation of additional claim-rights; or as an indicator of an 
issue of high moral importance. The Correlativity Axiom (that rights entail 
duties) contains important information about rights, but does not always 
hold true. This is because there is more than one meaning of the word 
‘right’, although this does not mean that the word ‘right’ is without 
meaning. A right either establishes a legal duty in another, or acts as an 
indicator of high moral importance (or both as in vital rights). If it does 
neither, then it cannot be a right.  
The Hohfeldian schema also facilitates understanding of what it means for 
a right to be vested in a right-holder. All Hohfeldian relations stipulate the 
existence of two specific position-holders: Hohfeldian relations do not 
simply exist in an abstract or untethered fashion. It is the entitlement-
holder who is the right-holder. More particularly, for rights that adhere to 
the Correlativity Axiom (which includes vital rights), it is the claim-holder 
that is the right-holder. Because claims are correlative with duties, duties 
are directed at a claim-holder. The Hohfeldian schema thus clarifies an 
observation first made in the Introduction: that, in modern legal systems, 
duties are owed to a right-holder, rather than to God or to ‘the Law’. It is 
for this reason that it is important to consider the nature of the subject of 
vital rights. 
It was also first seen in the Introduction that the tool of a ‘right’ is of great 
importance to both morality and law. That is, ‘moral rights’ signpost issues 
of high moral importance, and ‘legal rights’ are correlative to an essential 
engine for law: the duty. This Chapter has teased out the moral and legal 
dimensions of vital rights through exploring their structure. This has been 
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necessary since not only does the word ‘right’ have many meanings, but 
even the vital rights carved out for investigation in this thesis have more 
than one character. This Chapter has shown that vital rights are both 
general moral demands and correlative to legal duties. As moral demands, 
they are a bundle of many Hohfeldian entitlements, and as legal tools they 
are claim-rights that secure these entitlements. These claim-rights are not 
merely incidentally protective, but have been established specifically in 
order to secure the entitlements.  
As an example of the structure of vital rights, human rights recognised by 
international law are moral demands (justified by appeals to human 
dignity), which have been secured by claim-rights of people(s) held against 
states.107 As discussed in Part I, these claim-rights create duties for states, 
but also have secondary effects, creating duties held by non-state actors, 
including other individuals.108 This is because the state is the guarantor of 
human rights,109 and in order to fulfil this role effectively, the state must 
both restrict its own activities and those of others under its control.  
Although the structure of (vital) rights is complicated, Hohfeld’s schema 
provides clarity. There is no single precise and exact way to definitively 
state what is meant by (vital) rights because there is more than one 
perspective from which to view them. They are both strict legal claim-
                                       
107 This can be seen in the process that established human rights at the 
international level. First, the moral demands were enunciated in the UDHR. These 
were then specifically secured through the two Covenants. 
108 §2.5. 
109 §1.3.2(a). 
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rights, and they are not. Sumner’s analogy of different kinds of rights as 
different species demonstrates how the many different kinds of right are 
related, but separate.110 Species do merge into each other, but it is also 
possible to draw meaningful (although perhaps ultimately arbitrary) 
boundaries around them. 
                                       
110 Sumner (n2) 17-18, 93. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
WHAT RIGHTS DO 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will introduce the two main schools of thought that aim to 
describe what rights do rather than what they are – these are Interest 
Theory (IT) and Will Theory (WT). This is necessary in order to see 
whether rights can be vested in nonhumans, and if so, what function they 
can serve. Analysing IT and WT will allow for a better understanding of 
rights’ function to be gained. 
In Chapter Four it was demonstrated that there are a number of different 
varieties (or ‘species’) of rights. Rights often come in bundled packages 
and can be viewed from a number of perspectives. Chapter Five will look at 
what binds together this assortment of rights through considering what 
shared function rights serve. Both IT and WT offer plausible perspectives 
on what the function of a right is. IT states that rights protect interests, 
whereas WT analyses rights as protecting choices.1 Here, it will be shown 
that WT is less suitable a theory to describe rights than IT since it is only 
                                       
1 For a history of the roots of the theories, see Nigel Simmonds, ‘Rights at the 
Cutting Edge’ in Mathew Kramer, N Simmonds and Hillel Steiner, Debate Over 
Rights (OUP 1998). 
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applicable for a certain subset of rights (which is distinct from the subset of 
vital rights) whereas IT can explain the entire body of rights.  
As Leif Wenar points out, the disagreement between IT and WT is actually 
twofold “as it will be controversial not only which moral or jurisprudential 
theory is correct but also which rights are entailed by any such theory 
within a given set of circumstances”.2 Neither IT nor WT is able to provide 
an exhaustive catalogue (or a rule for generating such a catalogue) of 
what is and what is not a right since they simply describe what it is that 
rights do. It is the first concern – regarding which jurisprudential theory is 
correct – that is to be considered now. This will be done through a foray 
into the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two theories. 
There are two ways to determine how successful each theory is at 
describing what rights do.3 Firstly, through comparing what are (and are 
not) generally accepted to be rights with the function proposed by each 
theory. This is here labelled the accommodationist approach. Secondly, 
through a defence of why the label ‘right’ ought to be attached to a 
particular legal arrangement or function. This is labelled the revisionary 
approach. This chapter is mainly concerned with assessing the analytical 
merits of both IT and WT: this is primarily (but not exclusively) linked to 
the accommodationist approach since it tests how well the theories 
                                       
2 Leif Wenar, ‘The Nature of the Claim’ in Matthew Kramer (ed), The Legacy of HLA 
Hart (OUP 2008) 252. 
3 Although the two cannot be completely separated: LW Sumner, The Moral 
Foundation of Rights (Clarendon 1987) 50; Hillel Steiner, ‘Working Rights’ in 
Kramer et al (n1) 298; Neil MacCormick, ‘Rights in Legislation’ in P Hacker and 
Joseph Raz (eds), Law, Morality and Society (Clarendon 1977) 196-97. 
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describe existing rights. However, at the end of the chapter, the 
revisionary approach will be engaged with more directly in assessing the 
relationship between autonomy, dignity and rights. The chapter will reject 
any revisionary argument for WT since rights should not only protect 
autonomy.  
5.2 WILL THEORY 
The prominent characteristic of Will Theory (WT) is revealed by its 
alternative name: Choice Theory. WT focuses on the notion of choice and 
preserves it as intrinsic to both the meaning and the working of any right. 
That is, a right is construed as concerned with protecting a choice of the 
right-holder. WT is conceptually tied both to Hart’s idea of the “small-scale 
sovereign”4 and Nozick’s “area in moral space around an individual”.5 WT 
has thus been summarised by proponent-in-chief HLA Hart as finding that 
for all rights “one who has a right has a choice respected by the law”;6 and 
by one of its major detractors, Matthew Kramer, as entailing that “every 
right is a vehicle for some aspect of an individual’s self-determination or 
initiative”.7  
The motivation for WT is in preserving the prestige first afforded to 
autonomy and rationality by Kantian notions of justice.8 Early antecedents 
                                       
4 HLA Hart ‘Legal Rights’ in Essays on Bentham (Clarendon 1982) 183. 
5 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Blackwell 1974) 57. 
6 Hart (n4) 188-89. 
7 Matthew Kramer, ‘Rights Without Trimmings’ in Kramer et al (n1) 62.  
8 Horacio Spector, ‘Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights’ (2009) 46 San 
Diego L Rev 819, 829-31; §1.2-1.3. 
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of WT saw rights as things that could be exercised by the right-holder and 
having three inexorable and mutually entailing characteristics: (i) they 
indicated what behaviour was permissible; (ii) they authorised coercion in 
others; and (iii) they were inviolable.9 However, Hohfeld’s schema broke 
this apart as it demonstrated that these features are not connected by 
logical necessity: permissible behaviour is governed by liberties; 
authorisation by powers; coercion by duties; and inviolability by 
immunities. Thus the permissibility of rights does not invoke coercion or 
inviolability, since it is liberties that govern permissibility and these are not 
correlative with (Hohfeldian) duties or disabilities.10 Significantly too, the 
idea of ‘exercising’ a right is challenged by Hohfeld’s schema since one 
cannot ‘exercise’ a claim-right: a claim-right is something that simply 
exists.11 Hohfeld’s schema therefore questions the notion of rights as 
inviolable domains of freedom surrounding and to be exercised by the 
right-holder.  
HLA Hart overcame this dilemma by analysing a WT-right (ie a right as 
defined by WT) to be made up of a Hohfeldian claim-and-power bundle12 
both of which have the same position-holders. The merit to Hart’s 
analytical description is that it provides for both coercion (through the 
claim) and permissibility (through the discretionary exercise of the power): 
                                       
9 Simmonds (n1) 134-37, 178-80. 
10 Nigel Simmonds, ‘The Analytical Foundations of Justice’ (1995) 54 CLJ 306, 321. 
11 §4.3. 
12 Hart (n4). See also Jeremy Waldron (ed), Theories of Rights (OUP 1984) 9.  
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“to possess a right, on this view, is to have control over a duty incumbent 
on someone else”.13  
The content of the right (as found in the claim-right) and the ability to 
enforce this claim (the power) are held together by vesting both in the 
same entity. By providing the right-holder with both a claim and the power 
to control it, choice over the right’s deployment has been vested in the 
right-holder, who retains discretion over claims owed to them. The right-
holder in effect becomes a ‘small-scale sovereign’ in some domain 
concerning behaviour owed to them.14 
Hart’s other key insight was to realise that the power of a WT-right itself 
comes as a bundle.15 Control over a right is not a simple on/off switch – 
rather there are a number of switches that can waive or ensure 
enforcement at various stages. Hart distinguished three elements to the 
power: 
(i) the right-holder may waive … the duty or leave it in 
existence 
(ii) after breach or threatened breach of a duty he may 
leave it ‘unenforced’ or may ‘enforce’ it … 
(iii) he may waive or extinguish the obligation to pay 
compensation to which the breach gives rise.16 
                                       
13 Simmonds (n1) 215, 200. 
14 Hart (n4) 183, 188-89. 
15 ibid 183-84. 
16 ibid. 
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Power over a claim can therefore be split into three phases. Control over 
these three phases can, at least in theory, be held by three different 
power-holders.17 Dividing the power neither necessarily strengthens nor 
weakens a right in itself.18 Power being split (or delegated19) between more 
than one person does in fact happen in reality. This is particularly the case 
within criminal law, where the latter two stages of power are often 
controlled by state officials rather than the claim-holder (ie the victim).20  
To summarise, a WT-right vests both a Hohfeldian claim and some power 
to ensure that this claim is effective in the right-holder. However, there are 
two problems with WT that will be examined here: firstly by looking at 
inalienable (or powerless) rights and then by considering the potential pool 
of WT right-holders. 
5.3 PROBLEMS WITH WILL THEORY 
5.3.1 POWERLESS RIGHTS 
WT insists that the right-holder must have some control over their right. 
Contrariwise, an important characteristic often cited of some rights (eg 
                                       
17 See Steiner (n3) 240ff; Gopal Sreenivasan, ‘A Hybrid Theory of Claim-Rights’ 
(2005) 25 OJLS 257, 259. For a critique of the separation of WT powers, see 
Matthew Kramer, ‘Some Doubts about Alternatives to the Interest Theory of Rights’ 
(2013) 123 Ethics 245, 248-58. 
18 Simmonds (n1) 230; Sreenivasan (n17) 260-61. 
19 Steiner (n3) 246-47. 
20 ibid 248-55. 
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human rights) is their inalienability.21 Whether these two aspects can be 
synchronous warrants investigation. Their interplay can be analysed in the 
light of Hart’s identification of the three stages of power over a claim. The 
purpose behind this analysis is to examine how much power right-holders 
actually have over some rights.  
As already noted, the latter two Hartian stages of power for criminal law 
rights are often invested in the state. The power to press charges based on 
a criminal offence is not usually resident in the hands of the victim (ie the 
right-holder). There are a number of options to deal with this situation for 
WT. The first is to state, as Steiner does, that it is the power-holder who is 
the true right-holder, and that they need not be the same person as the 
claim-holder.22 Steiner is thus content with the following solution: 
The inference to be drawn is not that WT rights are absent 
from criminal and constitutional law. On the contrary, they 
are very much present in it and are to be found fairly high 
up in the hierarchy of state officials.23 
The separation breaks with Hart, who believed that: 
The idea is that of one individual being given by the law 
exclusive control, more or less extensive, over another 
person’s duty so that in the area of conduct covered by that 
                                       
21 §3.2.2; Spector (n8) 825-26. cf Michael Bayles, Hart’s Legal Philosophy (Kluwer 
1992) 149. 
22 Steiner (n3) 251-55. 
23 ibid 255. 
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duty the individual who has the right is a small-scale 
sovereign to whom the duty is owed.24 
Steiner’s modification to Hart’s WT is notable and creates a peculiar state 
of affairs whereby you are not the ‘right-holder’ of some duties that are 
owed to you. It also erases a significant asset of WT: the clarity it provides 
in understanding the directionality of a right (that it is vested in a specific 
entity).25 This modification will therefore not be followed. The WT deployed 
here is one that insists on the right-holder being owed the duty as well as 
holding some measure of control over it. 
A second possible solution to the problem of criminal law rights is to 
relinquish how much control the right-holder must have. Rather than 
insisting that all three Hartian levels of power must be held by the right-
holder, perhaps it is only the first that is needed.  
However, this also fails as a general model for rights because there are 
rights that do not come with this power: in the case of inalienable rights, it 
is not possible for the right-holder to waive the associated duties. For 
example, one cannot unilaterally ‘opt out’ of the protection offered by 
international human rights law (IHRL) – it is inalienable. In the case of 
human rights however, some control does exist since individuals often 
have the power to bring complaints concerning the violation of their human 
rights.  
                                       
24 Hart (n4) 183, emphasis added. cf Steiner (n3) 250ff. 
25 §4.3; Sreenivasan (n17) 259. 
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The solution may therefore be that some (but not necessarily all) of Hart’s 
three levels of power must be present for a right to exist. However, the 
spectre of a right without any control invested in the right-holder still 
looms over WT: if such rights do exist (or if they merely could exist), then 
WT cannot claim to describe all rights. As will be illustrated below, such 
rights can be found. These are rights that are both inalienable (thus 
lacking in the first stage of Hartian power) and without any means of 
enforcement lying in the hands of the right-holder. 
Neil MacCormick’s criticism of Hart’s WT draws attention to this 
shortcoming.26 A number of rights do not bestow any amount of small-
scale sovereignty (ie any of Hart’s three powers) on the right-holder. One 
example of this is the right not to be deprived of bodily liberty. This right is 
inalienable: nobody can be enslaved by another, even with consent27 (in 
fact the duties correlative to many criminal law claim-rights cannot be 
waived by the right-holder28). In addition to this, the latter two Hartian 
powers are missing since control over the enforcement of such rights is 
vested in the state.29  
                                       
26 MacCormick (n3) 195-99. 
27 Consider Armin Meiwes, who was convicted of murder despite his victim’s 
willingness to be murdered and eaten: BGH 2 StR 310/04 – Urteil vom 22 April 
2005 (LG Kassel). Consider also R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212; and Wackenheim v 
France (2002) HRC Communication No 854/1999, CCPR/C/75/D/854/1999. 
28 The merit of this arrangement may be contentious, but the point is that 
currently some rights are inalienable: MacCormick (n3); AV Dicey, Lectures on the 
Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth 
Century (first published 1914, Liberty Fund Inc 2008) 217-20. 
29 The applicability of the first power for private rights has also been questioned. 
See Kramer (n17) 254-58. 
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There are also examples within IHRL of rights where the right-holder has 
no power, since complaint mechanisms are not a necessary component of 
IHRL treaties.30 There are therefore a considerable number of rights that 
do not fit within the WT model. 
The final option available to WT is to conclude in a revisionary fashion that 
“legal rights are not conferred by criminal law”.31 And a parallel 
observation would have to be made for other varieties of powerless rights. 
That is, WT can only abide through arguing that certain existing ‘rights’ 
should not be described as rights after all. MacCormick sums up his 
contentions to such an approach by asking: 
[Are we] really to conclude that the language of the 
practical lawyer does such violence to common 
understanding as to extrude such protections of human 
interests, when arguably at their most efficacious, from the 
category which it is interesting or useful to describe as 
‘rights’?32 
The concept of rights should not be revised to exclude criminal law rights 
to (eg) bodily liberty and human rights that do not (yet) have complaints 
mechanisms. These are bona fide examples of rights that any theory of 
rights must be able to explain. Perhaps even more damaging to WT is that 
                                       
30 eg the ICESCR has no individual complaints mechanism – this was not 
established until the 2008 Optional Protocol UNGA A/RES/63/117 (10 December 
2008). 
31 Simmonds (n1) 230. 
32 MacCormick (n3) 196. See also Kramer (n17) 262. 
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it does not just fail to tally with currently existing rights, but it also 
prevents inalienability ever forming an aspect of any right: “it is worth 
emphasizing that the crucial question here concerns the possibility, rather 
than the fact, of inalienable claim-rights. WT makes inalienable claim-
rights incoherent in principle”.33 
The impossibility of inalienable WT-rights also has the knock-on effect of 
placing a surreptitious limitation on WT right-holders. This restriction is 
WT’s most serious shortcoming of both an accommodationist and 
revisionary nature from the perspective of this thesis. 
5.3.2 RIGHT-HOLDER RESTRICTION 
The second challenge to WT explored in this thesis is its underpopulated 
pool of right-holders. The issue arises since WT indicates that it is only 
possible for X to have a right if X can be a power-holder. However, there is 
an ‘entry policy’ to possessing a power: executing alterations to a system 
of norms requires certain capacities such as the abilities to design and 
subsequently communicate the change.34 WT therefore imposes analytical 
constraints on who can be a right-holder in the first place. 
It is reasonable for any rule-system to require certain capabilities of 
entities before permitting them to possess powers (and so qualify as a 
potential WT right-holder). A wielder of power must be able to understand 
the nature, purpose and procedural aspects of said power, and must be 
                                       
33 Sreenivasan (n17) 260.  
34 See Hohfeld’s requirement of ‘volitional control’ (Wesley Hohfeld, ‘Some 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1913) 23 The 
Yale Law Journal 16, 51); Steiner (n3) 259, 274ff. 
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able to factually deploy the power. Without these two aspects the 
existence of a power is rendered meaningless, or arbitrary at best.35 
Potential power-holders must be informed decision-makers.36 
Examples of entities that are probably not informed decision-makers 
include infants, animals, comatose adult humans and ships. But these 
entities are frequently said to have rights.37 There are, therefore, rights 
where the right-holder has no powers whatsoever, and so the right-holder 
has none of the Hartian powers related to the enforcement of a claim-right.  
One could disagree that these are correct invocations of rights. For 
example, giving rights to children could be dismissed as a mere normative 
preference.38 This would be a revisionary argument. To an extent it is true 
that vesting rights in children is simply a preference: there is no analytical 
reason why WT’s inability to bestow rights on children is a defect of WT, 
and an argument could be made that rights should only be vested in 
informed decision-makers. However, this argument cannot be made 
through analytical analysis: revising what the current definition of a ‘right’ 
is requires an argument that is both normative and revisionary. 
                                       
35 cf Visa Kurki, ‘Why things can hold rights: reconceptualising the legal person’ 
(2015) 7 University of Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper Series 18-19.  
36 Being ‘informable’ alone is not enough; power-holders must also be informed. 
See Matthew Kramer, ‘Getting Rights Right’ in Matthew Kramer (ed), Rights, 
Wrongs and Responsibilities (Palgrave 2001) 28.  
37 Consider CRC 1577 UNTS 3; CRPD (2006) 2515 UNTS 3; United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) 1833 UNTS 3 Article 23; Bumper 
Development Corpn v Commissioner of Police [1991] 1 WLR 74.  
38 See Simmonds (n1) 226n138.  
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To deny rights to a considerable convocation of entities through an 
adherence to WT runs a treacherous path that disguises normative 
preferences as analytical observations. As interesting as rights are from a 
purely analytical standpoint, they cannot be divorced in entirety and in 
perpetuity from their peremptory, or trumping,39 nature:  
It is morally important that we should recognize the moral 
importance and the significance of moral rights… There is a 
significant difference between asserting that every child 
ought to be cared for, nurtured, and, if possible, loved, and 
asserting that every child has a right to care, nurture, and 
love.40 
WT itself cannot explain why only informed decision-makers can have 
rights. There is nothing in the meaning of rights per se that attaches them 
to informed decision-makers, and there is a considerable 
accommodationist problem with asserting so.  
WT’s insistence that “every right is a vehicle for some aspect of an 
individual’s self-determination or initiative”41 deflates its universal 
applicability. It restricts rights to too narrow a domain by default rather 
than via an openly honest policy choice. Important normative arguments 
are disguised as mere terminological whims. It may turn out that this price 
of WT is worth paying, accepting that some inalienable rights are actually 
                                       
39 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth 1977) xi. 
40 Neil MacCormick ‘Children’s Rights’ in Legal Right and Social Democracy (OUP 
1984) 154, 158, 159. 
41 Kramer (n7) 62, emphasis added. 
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rights held by state officials and that children (and other such creatures) 
cannot have rights. However, this would require a revisionary normative 
argument, the merits of which will be considered more closely in the final 
section of this chapter. 
5.3.3 SUMMARY 
The two challenges to WT demonstrate how it presents a conception of 
rights that is limited to a certain subset of rights. That is, WT provides an 
excellent way to understand and analyse some rights (particularly in 
private law42), but it is unable to fully explain the whole range of rights. 
WT thus struggles to meet the accommodationist test. This restrictiveness 
is particularly damaging since it results in a situation whereby 
[a]ccording to WT, the firmest protections of our truly vital 
interests do not amount to rights, whereas the less 
formidable protections of relatively inconsequential 
interests do amount to rights.43 
5.4 INTEREST THEORY 
At the other end of the often polarised44 debate surrounding the nature of 
rights lies IT. Originating from Bentham’s account of duties,45 IT has since 
                                       
42 Although it has problems here too. Kramer (n17) 248-58. 
43 Kramer (n7) 73, emphasis added. 
44 For reconciliatory attempts, see Rowan Cruft, ‘Rights: Beyond Interest Theory 
and Will Theory?’ (2004) 23 L And Phil 347; Sreenivasan (n17); Siegfried van 
Duffel, ‘The Nature of Rights Debate Rests on a Mistake’ (2012) 93 Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly 104. 
45 Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham (11 vols, John Bowring (ed), 
William Tait 1843) iii, 159; Sumner (n3) 40n31. 
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been modified and/or annexed by David Lyons,46 Neil MacCormick,47 
Matthew Kramer48 and Joseph Raz.49 The key tenet of IT is that a right 
protects an interest of the right-holder. For example, according to IT, the 
discussion in Part I over the definition of a ‘healthy environment’ was 
ultimately concerned with what interest is protected by a human right to 
environment.50 IT is markedly different from WT as it neither postulates a 
particular Hohfeldian structure for a right nor is it as clear-cut as to what is 
and is not a right. The unifying factor of all rights according to IT is simply 
that every right must correspond to some interest of the right-holder.  
It is worth noting at the outset what is meant by an ‘interest’. Being 
interested in something is emphatically not the same as having an interest 
in something.51 This is an important distinction and it is the latter (having 
an interest) which is meant here. Regular exercise and a nutritious diet are 
interests of mine even if they consistently bore me. An interest is 
something that is, all things considered, beneficial for the interested party.  
                                       
46 David Lyons, ‘Rights, Claimants, and Beneficiaries’ (1969) 6 American 
Philosophy Quarterly 173. 
47 MacCormick (n3); MacCormick (n40). 
48 Kramer (n7). 
49 Joseph Raz, ‘Legal Rights’ (1984) 4 OJLS 1 (LR); Joseph Raz, The Morality of 
Freedom (OUP 1986) 165-92 (MoF). Not all these authors perceive Hohfeld’s 
analysis as a useful backbone for rights, but their thoughts on IT retain at least 
some relevance despite the fact that Hohfeld’s schema will be retained here. 
50 §2.3. 
51 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Routledge 1988) 87-88; Mariachiara 
Tallacchini, ‘Human Right to the Environment or Rights of Nature?’ (1997) 67 
Archiv fur Recht und Sozial Philosophie 125; Matthew Kramer, ‘Do Animals and 
Dead People Have Legal Rights?’ (2001) 14 Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 29, 33. cf Timothy Macklem and John Gardner, ‘Value, Interest, and 
Well-Being’ (2006) 18 Utilitas 352. 
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Interest Theory is less decisive than WT since the latter states that ‘when 
an arrangement has property W, then it is a right’ whereas IT operates in 
the opposite direction: ‘when an arrangement is a right, then it must have 
property I’. 
One justifies a statement that a person has a right by 
pointing to an interest of his and to reasons why it is to be 
taken seriously… One cannot specify in the abstract what 
importance those reasons must assign to the interest 
except circularly by saying 'sufficient to justify the 
conclusion that that person has a right'.52 
An essential caveat must be made for those wishing to dismiss IT at an 
early stage: it is not the case that IT must ascribe a right to every interest. 
IT states that rights protect interests, not that all interests are protected 
by rights. Differentiating between those interests that merit protection by 
rights and those that do not requires value judgment.53 However, this is 
not the present concern, which is determining the analytical interplay 
between rights and interests. 
Generally speaking, IT is more positivistic54 than WT in its outlook. WT 
seeks to provide informed decision-makers with control over some domain 
close to them, but is not concerned with how this control is exercised. On 
                                       
52 Raz (LR n48) 5n10.  
53 §6.5; §8.2. 
54 That is, it seeks to create a more determinate state of affairs than WT can hope 
to do. Simmonds (n1) 196-98. WT on the other hand emphasises the systematic 
character of law. Simmonds (n1) 134-35. 
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the other hand, IT implies that there are some particularly important 
interests that warrant the protection (or perhaps imposition) of rights. 
These differences in the thrust of the two theories demonstrate how an 
entirely analytical approach to rights is difficult. Those more politically 
aligned to libertarianism will be tempted by WT; whereas IT may be more 
enticing for egalitarians.55 
Interest Theory has been criticised as being paternalistic for removing the 
autonomy of informed decision-makers to decide how best to manage their 
own existence.56 This apparent demotion of the importance of autonomy is 
not actually a necessary feature of IT. It is possible for IT to accept that 
autonomy is an important interest of informed decision-makers and to 
protect it via rights that take the form of WT-rights. These can comfortably 
sit alongside other formulations of IT-rights.  
5.5 PROBLEMS WITH INTEREST THEORY  
The main arguments against IT are of an opposite fashion to those against 
WT. Where WT explains too few rights, it can be claimed that IT ascribes 
the label ‘right’ too indiscriminately. The first line of examination concerns 
whether all rights do actually protect an interest. 
                                       
55 See Spector (n8). 
56 Simmonds (n1) 164; Dicey (n28) 217-20. 
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5.5.1 UNINTERESTING RIGHTS 
The first challenge to IT is the possibility of a right for which no interest 
can be identified.57 The most straightforward way to see this possibility is 
through inheritance rights. For example, my mother is the owner of an 
angel ornament, which my sisters and I all agree is hideous. None of my 
generation has any interest in the ornament, yet one of us may one day 
gain a right to it were it to be left to us in a will. This appears to jar with 
IT: none of us have any interest in possession of the angel, we do not 
stand to benefit anything from ownership of it (it is not worth any money 
and would be a nuisance to dispose of), and it does nothing for our overall 
welfare. It may appear that a right without an interest has been identified. 
However, this is not as problematic for IT as it first seems. There are two 
possible routes to take to demonstrate that such a right does not defeat 
IT. Firstly, through the identification of an interest of the right-holder that 
is being protected. Secondly, through a minor adjustment to IT. Within the 
first route, at least two such interests can be found: my interest in having 
my mother’s wishes respected and my interest in administering my own 
property.58  
The former interest is straightforward to see,59 and provides a glimpse of 
the fact that interests often exist between and amongst people.60 The 
                                       
57 Kramer (n7) 93-97; MacCormick (n3) 202; Cruft (n44) 372ff. 
58 Another possibility is the interest in being able to determine how my mother’s 
property is disposed of.  
59 Raz (MoF n49) 175-76; Sreenivasan (n17) 264; Kramer (n7) 79.  
60 §5.5.2; §9.2-9.4. 
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latter interest is a demonstration of how IT can also protect choices. In the 
present example, I may not be enamoured to own my mother’s angel but I 
would be more perturbed if the state ruled on my behalf and extinguished 
my right to it. There may be plenty of things we own which we have no 
interest in owning, but this is a small price to pay compared to 
relinquishing control over how to administer our own property. There is a 
clear interest in retaining autonomy over such matters. The law may 
sometimes confer burdens on us where it usually protects us, but better 
this compromise than losing the right to decide: ‘too much’ autonomy is at 
times preferential. 
If unsatisfied by this argument, then uninteresting rights can still be 
accounted for via a minor adjustment to IT. This is to say that rights 
protect an assumed interest of the right-holder, meaning that “from the 
fact that a right is normally beneficial … we should not conclude that it is 
invariably so.”61 The need for this adjustment arises because of failures 
which occur when generalisations or categorisations are made.62 In the 
inheritance example my right is protecting an interest in owning the 
ornament, which is assumed to exist because I have a general interest in 
owning property. The reasoning is as follows: 
X has a general interest in T 
t is an instance of T 
∴ X has an interest in t 
                                       
61 Kramer (n7) 93. See also Paola Cavalieri, The Animal Question (OUP 2001) 74. 
62 Although such categorisations are necessary for legal systems: §9.5. 
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But X may have a general interest in T without having an interest in every 
possible t which is an instance of T. Uninteresting rights can also arise 
through a slightly different failure in categorisation: when decision-making 
over individuals’ lives has been transferred to the state. For example, a 
person suffering from a terminal illness who wishes to end their own life 
and a masochist who delights in being tortured are examples of right-
holders who have no interest in their right to life and freedom from torture 
respectively. These are arguably a consequence of too little autonomy 
being given to rights-holders, rather than too much. There is also a subtle 
interplay between having an interest and taking an interest here: arguably 
it is in the masochist’s best interest to not be tortured despite their denial 
of the existence of said interest. 
The difference here is that rather than one individual’s general right 
generating an uninteresting derivative right for them;63 a right bestowed 
upon an entire class of entities (because such entities usually have a 
particular interest in living/not being tortured) has come up against a niche 
case. That is, the existence of such rights is based on an argument along 
the following lines:  
X belongs to class C 
All things in class C have an interest in T 
∴ X has an interest in T 
                                       
63 Raz (MoF n48)168-70; HLA Hart, ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’ (1955) 64 The 
Philosophical Review 175, 187. 
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But, as demonstrated by masochism and euthanasia, this is not always 
true. The reasoning in both cases is robust and a decent approximation for 
a functioning rule-system to adhere to. But both can produce errors. The 
root of these errors lies in the middle line of reasoning: assuming that a 
general interest in T must carry over to every instance of t, or that 
everything of a certain class has the same interests. Neither of these are 
necessarily true. In both cases the purported interest the right protects can 
be identified but it just so happens that the interest does not exist. The 
right is therefore protecting an assumed interest. 
WT’s structure may allow for these uninteresting rights to be waived, but 
there are certain rights that should not be susceptible to waiver (some 
rights are inalienable). No suggestion that a child or animal seems to enjoy 
being subjected to physical pain can warrant torturing them and so 
exceptions should not be made. IT implies that entities who cannot engage 
in legal discourse must have their interests best-guessed according to the 
sort of reasoning outlined above. Categorisation may occasionally result in 
failure (and uninteresting rights), but this is potentially a price worth 
paying.  
In any case, the two versions of categorisation-failure for uninteresting 
rights can arise through opposite approaches to the protection of 
autonomy. The balancing act between liberty and order is a complex one64 
                                       
64 “Liberty is not the daughter, but the mother of order” Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, 
Solution of the Social Problem (1849). 
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and as long as the universe continues to produce uniqueness, 
categorisations will always experience failure. To summarise: 
Interest Theorists do not submit that every entitlement 
classifiable as a right is invariably promotive of the interests 
of someone who holds it. Those theorists’ basic test for 
right-holding inquires about entitlements that are generally 
rather than always beneficial for their holders.65 
Thus IT may have to be adjusted slightly to allow for these fringe cases. 
Rather than boldly proclaiming that every right protects an interest of the 
right-holder, it may be wiser to declare that a right attempts to protect an 
interest, or that collections of rights protect categories of interests. That an 
IT-right attempts to protect an interest (which may or may not exist) 
suggests that an IT-right may also protect interests that it does not intend 
to, and this is the next problem to be examined. 
5.5.2 CASCADING INTERESTS 
Interest Theory may supply too many rights since it is less strict than WT 
about their function. Since numerous entities can benefit from any one 
action in an indirect, cascading fashion, it may appear that IT must ascribe 
numerous rights too. This is emphatically not the case. IT states that every 
right protects an interest, not that every interest is protected by a right. 
The possibility of cascading rights does however mean that IT needs to find 
                                       
65 Matthew Kramer and Hillel Steiner, ‘Theories of Rights: Is There a Third Way?’ 
(2007) 27 OJLS 281, 292. 
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a way to determine precisely whose interests are relevant to the 
performance of a given duty.  
For example, suppose that Sofia is owed a large sum of money by a bank, 
a significant portion of which she intends to donate to various charitable 
organisations. Clearly it is in Sofia’s interest that the bank pay her the 
money; but it is also in the interest of the various organisations Sofia 
donates to, as well as the staff and service users of these organisations, 
that the bank honour its debt. With so many interests in play, a way of 
determining which of these interests actually merit rights is needed. If IT 
were to ascribe a right to anyone who might benefit from the carrying out 
of a contract, then it “would merit no further consideration as a serious 
theory of rights”.66 However, this is not the case because interest is a 
necessary rather than sufficient condition for a right.67 
Kramer deals with this challenge eloquently by ironing out a solution first 
proposed by Bentham. The test put forward is that “any person Z holds a 
right under a contract or norm if and only if a violation of a duty under the 
contract or norm can be established by simply showing that the duty-
bearer has withheld a benefit from Z or has imposed some harm upon 
him”.68 This test efficiently draws the boundaries between those with rights 
and those without. For example, Sofia may in fact choose not to donate 
any of the money the bank owes her. This is clearly of detriment to those 
                                       
66 Kramer (n7) 81. 
67 ibid 81-82. 
68 ibid 81. 
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who were expecting additional funding, but is not sufficient to demonstrate 
a breach of the bank’s duty. Thus, the charities and their affiliates hold no 
rights against the bank. They may hold a right against Sofia (if Sofia had 
already promised to donate money to them) but this is a separate issue. In 
the words of Kramer: 
No version of IT postulates a one-to-one correspondence 
between being a right-holder and being a beneficiary of a 
correlative duty. Proponents of IT maintain that every right-
holder is a beneficiary of a duty, but they do not maintain 
that every beneficiary of a duty is a right-holder.69  
At this point it is worth noting that the reality of cascading interests 
suggests that it may be challenging to identify exactly which interests 
ought to be protected by rights (or vital rights) and to whom these 
interests belong. This is because interests are often not as 
compartmentalised as analytical jurisprudence might like: one right can 
have many beneficiaries. This has already been seen in the idea of having 
an interest in seeing someone else’s wishes fulfilled, and is also 
demonstrated by the concept of the ‘chilling effect’,70 which notes that 
violating the right of one individual may affect the behaviour of others. It is 
in my interest that people are not imprisoned unjustly, although I clearly 
have no right that other people are not so treated. This issue does not 
                                       
69 ibid 67. 
70 HRC, General Comment 34 [47], HRI/GEN/1/ (Vol I); Dinah Shelton, ‘Human 
Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to Environment’ (1991) 28 Stanford 
Journal of International Law 103, 124-25. 
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undermine IT, but simply points out that it is rare for a particular interest 
to be neatly and exclusively attached to just one individual. I have a 
genuine interest in the wellbeing of my friends and family that is not 
exclusively derivative or secondary. The reality of interests being spread in 
this way is particularly pertinent in the environmental context. For 
example, it is in the interests of humans and nonhumans that natural 
systems are clean, beautiful, diverse and functioning.71 
Interests do cascade and a theory of rights must be able to identify to 
which entity an interest worthy of rights is attached. The concept of group 
rights (and in particular corporate rights72), with the associated realisation 
that groups, as groups per se, can have interests,73 may provide a method 
to better understand these continuous (as opposed to discrete) interests.74 
5.5.3 THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES 
The other problem with IT to be considered in this thesis is the problem of 
third party beneficiaries. This is usually formulated by an example of A 
agreeing with B that A will do something to benefit C. Although IT can be 
critiqued by the third party beneficiary problem, this is often a result of 
mixing up the substance of a number of threads. Dismantling the third 
                                       
71 §2.3; §3.3; §8.3. 
72 §1.4. 
73 Kramer (n7) 9, 31, 49-60, 78. 
74 §9. 
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party beneficiary problem into its constituent pieces helps clarify the 
situation. The following have all been raised under its banner:75 
i. A fourth party, D, who will benefit from the completion of the 
promised act, has an interest in it, but no right. 
ii. The promisee, B, has a right, but no interest. 
iii. The third party, C, has an interest, but no right. 
iv. If B waives A’s duty, then C’s interest remains, but her right does 
not. 
Problem (i) is a version of the cascading interests problem and so can be 
dealt with in the same way. 
Problem (ii) is a version of an ‘uninteresting right’ and does not appear to 
pose too great a challenge. Surely there is an interest of B’s here: the 
interest in having her wishes fulfilled and promises to her kept. The 
interest may not be relevant to the content of the promise itself, but there 
certainly is an interest to be discovered. Thus, IT has no problem 
explaining B’s right, who is by most accounts “the one uncontroversial 
right-holder”.76 
Problem (iii) is slightly more tricky and is the real third party beneficiary 
problem. Consider Hart’s argument in this regard: 
In many jurisdictions contracts expressly made for the 
benefit of third parties e.g. a contract between two people 
                                       
75 Steiner (n3) 284; Hart (n4) 185-88. 
76 Sreenivasan (n17) 264. 
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to pay a third part a sum of money, is not enforceable by 
the third party and he cannot waive or release the 
obligation. In such a case although the third party is a 
direct beneficiary since breach of the contract constitutes a 
direct detriment to him, he has no legal control over the 
duty and so no legal right.77 
However, Hart’s reasoning is circuitous: it only matters that the third party 
cannot waive or release the obligation if one is already committed to a WT 
definition of rights. Without WT, there is no reason why it is irreconcilably 
incoherent to say that there is a right belonging to the third party, C, to be 
enforced by another entity, B.78 Neil MacCormick has astutely pointed out 
that the third party challenge can be applied to WT as well as IT simply by 
drawing up a contract that gives C some power over an action that also 
benefits her.79  
In any case the ability of law to bestow rights onto third parties should not 
be in doubt. It is demonstrated aptly by examples such as Article 36 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties80 and IHRL treaties. Both of 
these demonstrate the possibility of awarding rights to non-contracting 
parties, and so any theory of rights must be able to either incorporate 
them or give a revisionary reason why they ought not to be considered 
rights.  
                                       
77 Hart (n4) 187. 
78 Kramer (n7) 66-68, 82-83; Kramer (n36) 60. 
79 MacCormick (n3) 208-209. 
80 (1969) 1155 UNTS 331. 
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Problem (iv) demonstrates a consequence of a claim and the associated 
power over it being located in separate entities.81 In this case, it is possible 
for the interest behind the claim to remain but the right not to (if B, the 
power-holder, waives the duty). If a state were to withdraw from all IHRL 
treaty regimes, its citizens would no longer hold human rights (in the 
international legal sense),82 although their interest in them would surely 
remain (dignity cannot be taken away). Rights are created to protect 
interests. They are logically secondary to them and not every interest must 
generate a right. 
The third party beneficiary problem(s) does prompt consideration over how 
IT operates and how it negotiates between interests and rights. However, 
these problems are not insurmountable. They simply require care and 
precision to be taken over joining the dots between interests and rights. 
Not every interest creates a right, and the lack of waiver power does not 
mean that someone cannot have an IT-right. 
5.5.4 SUMMARY 
Although either WT or IT can be adopted by a legal theorist for explaining 
rights, here a choice must be made between the two. In this regard, the 
decision is over whether WT’s incompatibility with inalienable rights and 
restriction on right-holders weigh more heavily than IT’s slight fuzziness as 
to where rights begin and end.  
                                       
81 Sreenivasan (n17) 264. 
82 Except those protected by customary international law. 
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Clearly, IT is to be preferred from an accommodationist perspective since it 
is able to provide the more general model for what rights do. It can 
accommodate the full range of rights, whereas WT cannot model some of 
them. Interest Theory’s slight imprecision can be overcome by careful 
reasoning and acceptance of the inevitability of unpredictability, whereas 
WT’s restrictiveness significantly curtails its usefulness. 
An important explanation as to why IT performs better than WT at 
modelling the function of rights is that WT is in fact a subset of IT. This is 
because WT is itself a theory based on an interest – the interest in having 
choices respected (ie in autonomy). That is, since “autonomy can be 
treated as a particular component of individual welfare, anything which 
counts as a right under the choice conception will also count as such under 
the interest conception”.83 This also explains why the potential pool of IT-
right-holders is wider than that of WT-right-holders: because “the set of 
creatures who are capable of exercising powers can never amount to more 
than a very small subset of the creatures who have interests, however 
interests are construed”.84 Exercising a power can be modelled as an 
interest of a power-holder. 
Because IT includes all WT-rights, it can absorb some of the pertinent 
insights of WT. For example, IT can provide right-holders with suitable 
powers over their rights when necessary. We should therefore 
                                       
83 Sumner (n3) 96. cf Spector (n8) 829. 
84 Steiner (n3) 259, 274ff. 
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(provisionally) opt for IT as the better theory for explaining what rights in 
general do.  
The possibility remains that a valid revisionary argument can be made for 
WT. That is, it could be argued that those rights that do not fit with the WT 
model ought not be considered as rights. This is a necessarily normative 
argument: WT – as an analytical tool – does not have the license to 
explain why rights ought to be redefined as exclusively concerned with 
choice preservation and autonomy. In order to see whether this is the 
case, an exploration of autonomy and its relationship to rights will 
conclude this chapter. 
5.6 A REVISIONARY ARGUMENT FOR WT? 
WT fails as an accommodationist theory for rights because it cannot 
explain all rights. This is because WT is based on “a desire to preserve an 
association between rights and the values of autonomy”,85 but not all 
rights are concerned with autonomy. Autonomy, as understood here, is the 
capacity to self-govern through making active and independent choices 
concerning one’s own life.86 Making choices is therefore exercising one’s 
autonomy87 – and because it is choices that WT-rights seek to protect, it is 
                                       
85 Simmonds (n1) 137. WT has evolved beyond Kantian thought, but remains 
wedded to a link between rights and autonomy. 
86 This is a notion of ‘personal/individual autonomy’, as distinct from 
‘moral/principled autonomy’. See Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of 
Autonomy (CUP 1988) 17; Onora O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (CUP 
2002) 21ff; John Christman and Joel Anderson (eds), Autonomy and the 
Challenges to Liberalism (CUP 2005) 3. 
87 The relationship between autonomy and choices is complex, but it is clear that 
choices are considered important because of the value of autonomy. See Mary 
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with the right-holder’s autonomy that they are predominantly concerned. 
As identified by Kramer, restricting rights in this way is a normative rather 
than analytical choice: 
When will theorists reserve the term ‘rights’ for claims that 
are combined with enforcement/waiver powers and liberties 
in the hands of the claim-holders, they do so primarily 
because they want to stress the importance of individual 
discretion and self-determination. They are less concerned 
to highlight logical differences and logical relations than 
they are to pay homage to the value of individual choice, a 
value which they present as integrally connected with 
rights. Because the term rights is a highly respectful and 
respected label in the modern West, the will theorists wish 
to confine it to situations that are characterised by the ideal 
(namely, the ideal of individual self-determination) which 
they themselves respect most.88 
A revisionary argument is therefore required if WT is to be accepted as a 
theory to explain what rights do. This revisionary argument must make a 
case that only autonomy is worthy of the potent protection of rights. This 
section will examine whether autonomy can play such a role, in particular 
for the sort of rights under consideration in this thesis (vital rights). That 
                                                                                                              
Donnelly, Healthcare Decision-Making and the Law (CUP 2010) 10-48; Michael 
Rosen, ‘Dignity: The Case Against’ (2013) 192 Proceedings of the British Academy 
143, 150. 
88 Kramer (n7) 75. See also Hans Reinders, The Future of the Disabled in Liberal 
Society (University of Notre Dame Press 2000) ch2; Sumner (n3) 98. 
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is, whether autonomy can play the role of dignity in justifying the very 
existence of vital rights.  
Reliance on autonomy is understandable for some (predominantly legal) 
rights. However, this has less to do with the charms of autonomy than with 
basic practicalities: a functioning legal system requires considered 
interaction and such interaction is likely performable only by those who can 
exercise choices in some meaningful way (informed decision-makers). 
Thus, where possible, a legal system can deflect control and choice over 
certain issues onto those most affected by them.89 This mirrors the WT 
structure of rights. But making the revisionary argument that all rights 
should be modelled in such a way runs aground. 
In the first instance, there are certain infans90 that cannot exercise choices 
in the manner demanded by WT (they lack this form of autonomy), but 
which ought to be protected by the legal and rhetorical force of rights. Any 
theory of rights must take seriously the presence of (eg) children’s rights, 
given their considerable entrenchment and almost universal support.91 This 
is “the problem faced by all children’s rights theorists: children may be too 
young to say anything. Even if they are not, their opinions may be 
coloured by ignorance or parental influence. Yet they surely have rights”.92 
                                       
89 §5.5.1. 
90 Literally ‘unable to speak’. 
91 Hart was aware of this difficulty with WT: Hart (n4) 184n86, 185n88, which 
softens an earlier view of Harts found in Hart (n63) 181. See also Kramer (n7) 69-
70; Carl Wellman, An Approach to Rights (Kluwer 1997) 127-39. 
92 John Eekelaar, ‘The Importance of Thinking That Children Have Rights’ (1992) 6 
International Journal of Law and the Family 221, 228-29. 
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This is not to say that (eg) children lack any sense of autonomy, but rather 
that they do not have the relevant autonomy capabilities required to have 
WT-rights (they are not informed decision-makers). Infans are not 
themselves be able to speak to legal institutions, but this does not mean 
that they are incapable or undeserving of possessing rights.  
WT’s emphasis on autonomy restricts not only who can have rights, but 
also what rights can protect. As seen in Chapter One, the suffering and the 
flourishing of humans is dependent on more than choice preservation, 
hence the enriching content of IHRL.93 People do not spend their entire 
lives acting as informed decision-makers: we bleed and breathe, we get ill 
and we love. This limitation of WT is especially pertinent for vital rights 
given their particular potency and the ‘fleshy’ nature of their subjects.94 
The human rights subject is an embodied and embedded being, not a 
rationalistic machine.95 However, WT constructs a legal person whose 
interests amount to concern for their independent choice making. This 
legal person is “the archetypal rational, choosing, will-exercising ‘discrete 
possessor of rights’, distinctly bounded and separative”.96 But this is a 
mask - a persona - that does not fit ‘fleshy’ human beings.97 WT thus 
                                       
93 §1.3.1. 
94 §1.3-1.4; §6.3.1. 
95 Anna Grear, ‘The vulnerable living order: human rights and the environment in 
a critical and philosophical perspective’ (2011) 2 JHRE 23. 
96 Anna Grear, ‘Law’s Entities: Complexity, Plasticity and Justice’ (2013) 4 
Jurisprudence 76, 90-91 (footnotes omitted). 
97 ibid 82-83, 90-100. 
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presupposes and constructs a legal person which does not in fact exist in 
the real world. 
The sterility of the WT idea of a perfectly rational self-governing being is 
fertile ground for private law, but shackles progress outside this domain. 
Hart’s legally respected choices98 are suitable for those who can (in the 
eyes of the legal system) make choices, yet nonsensical and pernicious for 
those who cannot. Through its focus on autonomy, WT prevents rights 
from serving a number of valuable purposes. Following WT at best 
represents a significant oversight regarding who has rights and what rights 
protect. At worst, it raises suspicion of gerrymandering to ensure only a 
desired ‘in-crowd’ (of supposedly autonomous rational beings) are capable 
of enjoying the protection of rights. Both of these should be avoided, in 
particular within the realm of vital rights.99  
This does not deny the importance of autonomy. Although IT is the better 
theory to explain what rights do, many rights are in fact built in a WT-
manner as claims with accompanying powers. Autonomy is worthy of the 
protection of rights. In looking at ‘uninteresting rights’ earlier, the 
importance of individual self-determination (ie autonomy) was mentioned. 
The key point is that there is also a need to protect matters other than 
autonomy itself, as implied in Gerald Dworkin’s very description of 
autonomy: 
                                       
98 And Nozick’s “area in moral space around an individual” Nozick (n5) 57. 
99 cf the ‘inclusionary’ nature of IHRL: §1.3. 
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Autonomy is conceived of as a second-order capacity of 
persons to reflect critically upon their first-order 
preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity 
to accept or attempt to change these in light of higher-
order preferences and values.100 
Autonomy is illustrious. It is worthy of esteem and respect, but not to the 
exclusion of the first- and higher-order preferences it marshals.101 
Autonomy ought not be instrumentalised – it is worthy of protection itself – 
but neither should it instrumentalise all other values but itself. Autonomy is 
evidently important, including for those that lack the form of autonomy 
that WT focusses on. Consider for example John Eekelaar’s definition of the 
“best interests” that shall be a “primary consideration” under Article 3(1) 
of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.102 These include 
‘basic’ interests, (to physical, emotional and intellectual 
care); their ‘developmental’ interests (that their potential 
should be developed so that they enter adulthood as far as 
possible without disadvantage); and their ‘autonomy’ 
interests, (the freedom to choose a lifestyle of their 
own).103 
                                       
100 Dworkin (n86) 20. 
101 Consider ‘too much’ and ‘too little’ autonomy in §5.5.1. 
102 CRC (n36). See also Michael Freeman, Commentary on the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 3 (Brill 2007) 25-64. 
103 Eekelaar (n92) 231. 
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Rights thus should protect autonomy, but not only autonomy. There are 
other interests and values that merit the protection of rights and exalting 
autonomy alone is blinkered: “autonomy, unqualified by other principles, is 
the philosophy of the snivelling, selfish, atomistic brat”.104 Besides, too 
much focus on autonomy is flawed. Too strong a concentration of it is 
counterintuitive and counterproductive. What use is free will105 if we are 
trapped between a rock and a hard place? Exercising choice cannot always 
solve problems and improve situations in order to prevent suffering and 
promote flourishing. 
Insisting that autonomy is the underlying fundamental justification for vital 
rights would result in a narrow view of what vital rights can protect and 
consequently a one-dimensional view of the subject of vital rights. 
Douzinas criticises Griffin’s autonomy-based106 account of human rights 
because 
[t]hey protect that ‘somewhat austere state, a 
characteristically human life’. This is indeed an austere 
definition of self, almost Scrooge-like for anyone who does 
not belong to the ranks of the well-off middle classes.107  
                                       
104 Charles Foster, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Law (Hart 2011) 62. 
105 The debate over the actual existence of ‘free will’ is potentially explosive to all 
the discussion here.  
106 Specifically, ‘normative agency’, which Griffin defines as “the agency involved 
in living a worthwhile life” (James Griffin, On Human Rights (OUP 2008) 45) and 
includes autonomy, minimum provision and liberty (ibid 149). 
107 Costas Douzinas, ‘The poverty of (rights) jurisprudence’ in Conor Gearty and 
Costas Douzinas (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Human Rights Law (CUP 
2012) 67. 
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Overreliance on autonomy fails to account for the embodied nature of the 
subject of vital rights as physical (and vulnerable108) beings. It ignores 
arational (not irrational) bodies due to a fixation on supposedly rational 
minds (which are of course a part of bodies). Not everything that matters 
is about choice and autonomy; there is more to human existence than this. 
It is for this reason that it is dignity, not autonomy, that is the foundation 
for IHRL.109 Autonomy is not able to play this role because it is too narrow 
in its focus and does not properly reflect the embodied and embedded 
nature of the human rights subject. 
Furthermore, the concept of autonomy has moved beyond how WT 
understands it. Feminist critiques of autonomy and literature on rights of 
disabled persons have developed the understanding of autonomy to one of 
‘relational autonomy’.110 This appreciates that the decisions people make 
and the lives they lead do not take place in isolation, but rather are heavily 
dependent on the people and the world around them. It is for reasons such 
as these that highly atomistic notions of rights, which see them as “areas 
                                       
108 Anna Grear, ‘Towards a New Horizon: in Search of a Renewing Socio-Juridical 
Imaginary’ (2013) 3 Oñati Socio-Legal Series 966, 973. 
109 Foster (n104) 110. cf Ruth Macklin, ‘Dignity is a useless concept: It means no 
more than respect for persons or their autonomy’ 327 BMJ 1419; Deryck Beyleveld 
and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (OUP 2001); Carl 
Wellman, The Moral Dimension of Human Rights (OUP 2010) 21-22. 
110 Catriona MacKenzie and Natalie Stoljar (eds), Relational Autonomy: Feminist 
Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self (OUP 2000); Jennifer 
Nedelsky, Law’s Relations (OUP 2011) ch3; Piers Gooding, ‘Supported Decision-
Making: A Rights-Based Disability Concept and its Implications for Mental Health 
Law’ (2013) 20 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 431, 435. 
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in moral space around an individual”,111 falter when fuller versions of 
reality and human personhood are painted.  
For example, Quinn and Arstein-Kerslake argue that the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities112 – and Article 12 in particular – “forces 
an understanding that human personhood is not atomised but in fact 
shared”.113 This shared, relational, mode of being reaches beyond the 
narrower confines of personal autonomy expressed through exercising 
independent choice by noting that decision-making processes are not 
purely individual, but shared. However, even if this expansive notion of 
relational autonomy were argued to be the sole justification for rights, this 
would not sit comfortably with a WT interpretation of rights where an 
individual right-holder holds exclusive autonomy over certain matters. 
It is therefore inappropriate to revise the function of rights in line with WT. 
This can be seen quite clearly within IHRL, where reconceptualising human 
rights as WT-rights would mean significantly altering its structure by 
removing human rights’ inalienability, denying that a great number of 
rights not concerned with autonomy should exist, abandoning the presence 
of the rights of children, and adjusting IHRL’s understanding of the human 
rights subject. It is therefore an unsuitable revision to suppose that WT 
can model human rights, and so WT cannot explain the function of vital 
                                       
111 Nozick (n5) 57. 
112 The CRPD (n37) is the only major human rights treaty to refer to autonomy, 
but where it does so, it also mentions dignity (Articles 3, 16(4), 25(d)). 
113 Gerard Quinn with Anna Arstein-Kerslake, ‘Restoring the ‘human’ in ‘human 
rights’: personhood and doctrinal innovation in the UN disability convention’ in 
Gearty and Douzinas (n107) 40. 
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rights in general. Since WT is exclusively concerned with matters of 
individual choice, it is unable to provide a satisfying account for what vital 
rights do.  
Vital rights protect interests, and require a broader justification than 
autonomy can provide. Dignity can serve this purpose because of its 
diversity and plurality.114 The next chapter will examine more closely the 
concept of dignity to see how it can be better understood through the lens 
of IT.  
5.7 CONCLUSION 
Chapter Five has considered the two major theories which seek to explain 
what rights do. Interest Theory, although imperfect, is superior to WT 
because WT is too restrictive regarding rights’ function, structure and 
subjects. The fact that many rights take the form detailed by WT is 
unproblematic since these rights can be accommodated by the more 
comprehensive IT. This is because choice, as an interest, can be protected 
by IT. That is, WT is a subset of IT.  
In this chapter, WT was first rejected analytically through predominantly 
accommodationist reasoning. WT cannot explain a great number of 
existing rights (many of which are vital rights). WT was then normatively 
rejected (in particular for vital rights) through examining a revisionary 
argument: autonomy neither is nor should be the sole justification for vital 
rights. Dignity is not just autonomy. 
                                       
114 §1.5. 
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Not only do rights in general protect interests, but this is also true – 
perhaps even especially true – of vital rights.115 Human rights are 
inalienable, whereas WT insists on rights retaining an element of discretion 
– they are distinctively alienable. Human rights have real living beings as 
their subjects, whereas WT constructs an abstract legal person as its right-
holder. Significantly for this thesis, the superiority of IT over WT means 
that nonhuman rights remain technically possible, since the only formal 
requirement to qualify as a right-holder is to have interests (rather than 
the ability to exercise powers). 
The rejection of WT at an analytical level runs parallel to the rejection of 
the standalone virtue of autonomy at a normative level. Rights are not 
inherently connected to choices: it just so happens that humans have 
value their ability to choose (their autonomy) and have deployed rights for 
this purpose. However, choice is not the only valuable interest worthy of 
the protection of rights, as seen by the content of IHRL. Autonomy is the 
helmsman of WT and the essential structural ties between the two mean 
there is a danger of mixing analytical and normative argumentation when 
considering the merits of WT. 
Distinguishing between the structure and the function of rights runs 
treacherous ground. As a legal tool, rights can be defined howsoever one 
wishes. However, rights come encumbered with a history that influences 
                                       
115 supra n43; cf Siegfried van Duffel, ‘Moral Philosophy’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), 
The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (OUP 2013) 32.  
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ideas about their structure.116 Their roots lie in Enlightenment notions of 
autonomy and rationality, and this is reflected in their historical structure, 
which is closer to the WT model. But today the function of rights is broader 
and their structure correspondingly altered. The potential function of rights 
should not be restricted by arguing that they must conform to a historical 
WT-structure, especially as there is a viable (and in fact better) alternative 
available through IT.  
There is a danger in issues of fundamental moral importance becoming 
conflated with Enlightenment notions of autonomy and rationality through 
analytical rather than normative arguments. That is, when the WT-style 
structure of rights that emerged to protect land-owning men is held up as 
‘objective’ evidence to restrict what it is that rights today can protect (and 
consequently, what is of fundamental moral value117). But analytical 
theories of rights can define neither what dignity is nor what ought to be 
protected by vital rights. After all, “human rights present only one path to 
the realization of human dignity”.118 Rights are simply the tool that 
happens to have been used to protect dignity: vital rights serve dignity, 
not vice-versa. 
This chapter has argued that autonomy is not able to provide the grounds 
of vital rights because it is not broad enough. A more diverse and 
pluralistic concept, such as dignity, is needed. This does not reject the 
                                       
116 §1.2-1.3. 
117 The ‘dizzying circularity’: §3.2.1n10. 
118 Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Rights and Human Dignity’ (1982) 76 The American 
Political Science Review 303, 303. 
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value of autonomy, but rather locates it within a wider context. Just as WT 
is contained within IT, so too is autonomy contained within dignity. The 
next chapter begins to question what else dignity is composed of through 
analysing what is so vital about vital rights and the interests they protect. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
VITAL RIGHTS, VITAL INTERESTS, AND DIGNITY 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
So far this thesis has shown that human rights protect both dignity 
(rhetorically)1 and interests (functionally).2 Furthermore, the more general 
category of vital rights also protect interests (since they are rights) and the 
potent moral character of human rights can be ensured within vital rights 
by understanding them too to be protecting dignity.3 It is therefore 
possible to make progress in understanding the nature and function of vital 
rights by overlapping these two observations. This is the task of Chapter 
Six, which will provide a framework for analysing the meaning of 
nonhuman dignity through the lens of ‘vital interests’. 
Chapter Six begins by using an expanded version of Joseph Raz’s 
‘grounding’ process4 to develop the Interest Theory (IT) of rights adopted 
in the previous chapter. This process states that rights are grounded in 
interests, and that rights and interests both operate at varying levels of 
generality. The analysis here will define ‘vital interests’ (ie the interests 
                                       
1 §1.5. 
2 §5. 
3 §1.5; §4.2; §5.6. Notwithstanding the possibility that some other foundation 
may be possible for vital rights. 
4 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (OUP 1986) 165-70. 
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that ground vital rights) as operating at a high level of generality, and will 
note that these vital interests are often overlapping and mutually 
supportive. 
The remainder of the chapter will be committed to exploring the 
relationship between dignity and vital interests. It will do this by first 
explaining why the term ‘vital rights’ has been chosen to label the sort of 
rights under consideration in this thesis. Simply put, vital rights are vital in 
two senses of the word: they are vested in living beings, and they protect 
interests that are essential. That is, vital rights protect the essential 
interests of living beings.  
Since dignity serves as a justification for vital rights, the two meanings of 
the word ‘vital’ can be deployed to illuminate the concept of dignity. 
Linking dignity to vitality will build directly on the analysis of dignity found 
in Chapter One, where it was shown that (a) human dignity is inherent in 
(living) human beings; and (b) human dignity functions as a metric for 
determining what is essential to human flourishing and as a justification for 
protecting these matters through international human rights law (IHRL).5 
Together, these show that dignity captures what is essential to living 
beings. This chapter will then argue that dignity is not necessarily 
exclusively human, opening the door to the possibility of nonhuman vital 
rights to be examined in Part III. 
The final section of this chapter works the proximity of dignity and vital 
interests into a clear framework. Given that “human rights… can be 
                                       
5 §1.5.3. 
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conceived as specifications of human dignity”,6 and that “it follows from 
the structure of human rights… that human rights protect fundamental [ie 
vital] human interests”,7 vital interests can themselves be conceived of as 
specifications of dignity. This arises from both a structural overlap between 
vital interests and dignity (ie vital rights protect both dignity and vital 
interests) and a conceptual overlap between the concepts of dignity and 
vitality (ie both are concerned with matters that are essential to living 
beings).  
6.2 GROUNDING 
Having adopted IT as the preferred model for rights in the previous 
chapter, the nature of the relationship between interests and rights can be 
more fully elucidated through Joseph Raz’s ‘grounding’ process. Although 
born in a non-Hohfeldian framework,8 Raz’s concept of grounding can still 
serve a purpose here. It will provide a useful way to understand how rights 
and interests are related, and, in particular, will allow identification of the 
structural role of ‘vital interests’. 
                                       
6 Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of 
Human Rights (2010) 41 Metaphilosophy 464, 464. 
7 Samantha Besson, ‘Justifications’ in Daniel Moeckli et al (eds), International 
Human Rights Law (2nd edn, OUP 2014) 41. 
8 Raz holds that rights are the grounds of duties in others since otherwise rights in 
rem are impossible. However, this can be bypassed by considering an in rem right 
as an equivalence class of rights. See Raz (n4) 186; Joseph Raz, The Concept of a 
Legal System (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 1980) 180; Matthew Kramer, ‘Rights 
Without Trimmings’ in Mathew Kramer, N Simmonds and Hillel Steiner, Debate 
Over Rights (OUP 1998) 10n2, 45-46. 
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6.2.1 RIGHTS ARE GROUNDED IN INTERESTS 
According to IT every right is protecting some interest. Raz draws out this 
relationship in outlining his process of ‘grounding’, which states that: 
‘X has a right’ if and only if X can have rights, and, other 
things being equal, an aspect of X's well‐being (his interest) 
is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be 
under a duty.9 
The basic idea of grounding is that each and every right must be guarding 
some particular interest that is sufficiently significant to bring about the 
coercion entailed by a ‘right’.10 In this way, an interest contributes towards 
the justification for the existence of a right: X has a right because X has a 
(corresponding) interest. The possession of interests is therefore a 
necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the possessing of rights. It is 
not sufficient because it is also necessary for X to be capable of having 
rights in the first place. Raz states that it is those whose “well-being is of 
ultimate value”11 that are capable of having rights in the first place. In this 
thesis, however, the possession of dignity is used as the determinant of 
                                       
9 Raz (n4) 166. See also Matthew Kramer, ‘Getting Rights Right’ in Matthew 
Kramer (ed), Rights, Wrongs and Responsibilities (Palgrave 2001) and Joel 
Feinberg ‘The Rights of Animals and Future Generations’ in Rights, Justice and the 
Bounds of Liberty (Princeton University Press 1980) 159 for discussion of what 
kinds of entities can have interests. 
10 Through the existence of the duty, see §4.5.1. 
11 Raz (n4) 166.  
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being capable of possessing vital rights, since dignity is a known 
justification for the bestowing of vital rights.12 
In order to determine whether nonhumans can have rights, it is necessary 
therefore to determine whether or not they have interests and dignity. This 
Chapter will explore the relationship between dignity and interests. The 
first step towards this is to be more precise over the relationship between 
interests and (vital) rights.  
On one level, it is trivial to discern the interest that grounds a right. By 
definition, a right-to-φ is protecting an interest-in-φ; a right to form and 
join associations is grounded in an interest in forming and joining such 
associations. However, this does not allow any analysis of interests or 
rights, but simply notes the existence of two parallel lists, one of ‘rights-to-
φ’, and another of ‘interests-in-φ’.  In order to develop understanding of 
rights and interests, further analysis is required as to why such an interest 
exists. 
Enquiring why an interest-in-φ exists demands a more considered and 
informative response. It requires the identification of a more general 
interest that explains the existence of a specific interest-in-φ. Recall the 
discussion of ‘uninteresting rights’ in the previous chapter.13 There, 
establishing the general interest being protected was nontrivial: it required 
careful thinking over the interest being protected by a property right 
created through inheritance. It was shown that inheritance rights can be 
                                       
12 See §8.4 for a comparison of ultimate/intrinsic value and dignity. 
13 §5.5.1. 
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grounded in a general interest in administering one’s own affairs or in a 
general interest in having promises fulfilled. It is this sort of reasoning that 
allows the identification of a general interest that does not simply parrot 
the language of rights (as with a right-to-φ/interest-in-φ).  
As an example of a general interest of a vital right, consider again the right 
to freedom of association. Article 16 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights notes that the right to association may be exercised for 
“ideological, religious, political, economic, labor, social, cultural, sports, or 
other purposes”.14 The protection of such a broad range of associations 
indicates that the very process of associating is itself of genuine 
importance. As such, a general interest in belonging to communities can be 
considered to give rise to the specific interest in forming and joining 
particular associations.   
In short, a general interest gives rise to a specific interest, which grounds 
a specific right. Advancing Raz’s model allows us to say that a right is 
grounded in a general interest. This can be represented as follows: 
                                       
14 (1969) 1144 UNTS 123. See Kevin Boyle and Sangeeta Shah, ‘Thought, 
Expression, Association, and Assembly’ in Moeckli (n7) 231-32. 
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However, the relationship between rights and interests is often not quite as 
straightforward and linear as this suggests. This is because interests 
overlap with one another, as already demonstrated in the inheritance 
example above, and the discussion of cascading interests in the previous 
chapter.15 This overlapping nature of general interests is worthy of closer 
consideration.  
6.2.2 COMPLICATIONS IN THE PROCESS 
Although each and every right-to-φ is grounded in a general interest, the 
pathway from general interests to specific rights can at times be more 
convoluted. As a starting point, consider what Raz refers to as ‘derivative 
                                       
15 §5.5.2. 
Specific interest-in-φ 
(eg an interest in 
forming and joining 
association) 
Right-to-φ (eg the 
right to freedom of 
association with 
others) 
General interest-in-Φ 
(eg an interest in 
community) 
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rights’.16 Derivative rights are justified by other rights rather than 
interests.17 One of Raz’s examples of this is that someone who inherits a 
whole residential street has a derivative right to each house on that street, 
derived from their right to the street.18 Such an example is a case of 
simple logical entailment – it would not be coherent to have a right to the 
street without a right to each house too.  
However, it is also possible for derivative rights to be established through 
normative argument.19 The idea underlying this is that rights can be 
justified by appeals to the existence of other rights rather than by direct 
appeal to interests. This process can be seen within IHRL where the 
creation of derivative human rights from other human rights is possible. 
For example, the right to water has been derived by the CESCR from the 
right to an adequate standard of living,20 and the human right to 
environment can be conceived of as deriving from other human rights 
established by treaties.21  
                                       
16 Raz (n4) 168-70. 
17 ibid 168. 
18 ibid 169. 
19 See Raz’s discussion of freedom of expression and freedom of 
political/artistic/scientific/academic communication, ibid 169-70. 
20 General Comment 15 (1999), HRI/GEN/1/ (Vol I). 
21 Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Costa et al Hatton v UK (2003) 37 EHRR 28 
[GC] [4]; Antonio Trindade, ‘Environmental Protection and the Absence of 
Restrictions’ in Kathleen Mahoney and Paul Mahoney (eds), Human Rights in the 
Twenty-First Century: A Global Challenge (Martinus Nijhoff 1992) 561, 572-82; 
Margaret DeMerieux, ‘Deriving Environmental Rights from the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ 
(2001) 21 OJLS 521. In general see James Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights 
(2nd edn, Blackwell 2007) 87-90. 
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The derivative establishment of rights can also be seen in the creation of 
state duties that specifically secure human rights.22 That is, the state duty 
not to torture X exists because X has a right (in the sense of a broad 
entitlement) to be free from torture. This aligns with the state duty to 
respect human rights. But the state also has duties to protect and fulfil 
human rights, and these duties also derive from the broad entitlements 
that humans have to be treated in certain ways. The state is not only 
bound to not violate human rights, but also to be their guarantor.23  
The existence of derivative rights does not undermine the relationship 
between interests and rights. This is because although derivative rights 
can be justified by other rights, they are also simultaneously grounded in 
an interest that is sufficient to hold someone under a duty.24 Raz’s right to 
each house is also grounded in an interest in owning each house; the 
human right to water is also grounded in an interest in water; and X also 
has an interest in not being tortured by the state. There can thus be more 
than one pathway from general interest to specific right.  
The pathway from general interest to specific right can also be complicated 
by the fact that a right can be grounded in more than one general interest. 
This overlapping has already been seen in the example of a right to an 
inherited item: this is grounded in interests in having promises kept, in 
                                       
22 §4.6. 
23 §4.6. 
24 This is not necessarily true of all of Raz’s examples because he allows unsecured 
liberties (eg “the right to walk on my hands” [Raz (n4) 169]) to creep in to his 
analysis as instantiations of particular liberty-rights.  
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administering one’s own affairs, and (potentially) in owning the item itself. 
Within human rights any such overlapping should not be surprising given 
that they are “indivisible, interdependent and interrelated”.25 For example, 
the right to freedom of association can be grounded in an interest in 
community, but could also be grounded in freedom of thought (through 
joining groups of like-minded individuals). 
Consider too the example of state duties within international law to provide 
access to environmental information. These duties can be seen to be 
grounded in either a human right to a healthy environment26 or other 
‘greened’ human rights,27 all of which are themselves grounded in 
(potentially similar) general interests. But rights to environmental 
information could also be grounded in an interest in having access to 
information in general.28 It is therefore quite possible that particular rights 
can be justified by more than one interest. Indeed, “any given human right 
will typically be grounded in a cluster of affected interests”.29 
                                       
25 World Conference on Human Rights, ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action’ A/CONF.157/23 (25 June 1993) Article 5. 
26 Article 1 of the Aarhus Convention begins: “In order to contribute to the 
protection of the right of every person of present and future generations to live in 
an environment adequate to his or her health and well-being, each Party shall 
guarantee the rights of access to information, public participation in decision-
making, and access to justice in environmental matters”. 
27 Consider the case law of the ECtHR on this matter, §2.2.1. 
28 Consider Article 10(1) ECHR, which includes the freedom “to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers”. 
29 John Tasioulas, ‘Human Dignity and the Foundation of Human Rights’ (2013) in 
Christopher McCrudden (ed), Understanding Human Dignity (OUP 2013) 296. 
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The overarching point is that there can be more than one route from 
general interest to specific right. Although the reality of the grounding 
process may be complex and contain a number of different pathways, the 
fundamental theory behind it is more straightforward: all rights are 
grounded in at least one general interest. The potential multiplicity of 
pathways does not undermine the process at all. Rather, it acknowledges 
that there is sometimes more than one way to construct a valid argument, 
and adds strength to a system of rights as a whole. 
6.2.3 VITAL RIGHTS ARE GROUNDED IN VITAL INTERESTS 
The preceding analysis is valid for any type of right. However, this thesis is 
concerned with a particular subset of rights: the sort found within IHRL. 
Since these have been labelled as ‘vital rights’, it stands to reason to label 
the interests protected by vital rights as ‘vital interests’ in parallel. That is, 
vital rights are grounded in vital interests. Furthermore, for the sake of 
clarity, the term ‘vital interests’ will be used in this thesis to refer to the 
general interests that ground vital rights, rather than the specific interests 
in between. Focussing on general vital interests is appropriate because 
these allow deeper analysis of what vital rights are protecting. There is 
limited value to a consideration of specific interests that ground vital rights 
since these simply parrot the rights themselves. 
Considering vital interests at the more general level also allows a set of 
vital rights (IHRL for example) to be categorised under a set of vital 
interests in which they are grounded. The usefulness of such a 
categorisation will be seen later in this chapter. In any such categorisation, 
each vital right may be grounded in more than one vital interest and each 
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vital interest is likely to be grounding more than one vital right. A set of 
vital interests is therefore likely to be overlapping – but this does not mean 
that the interests contained within it are substitutable or superfluous, since 
there may be rights that are only grounded in that interest (see figure 
below). 
This section has set out a framework for vital rights. According to this 
framework, vital rights are grounded in (and so exist because of) general 
vital interests. This chapter will go on to demonstrate how the notion of 
vital interests can be profitably compared with the notion of dignity, since 
vital rights protect both vital interests (functionally) and dignity 
(rhetorically). As a first step in this process, it is now necessary to explain 
why the label ‘vital rights’ has been chosen to describe the sort of rights 
under consideration in this thesis.  
Vital Interest  
1 Vital Interest  
2 
Vital Interest  
3 
Vital Right 
1 
Vital Right 
4 Vital Right 
5 
Vital Right 
3 
Vital Right 
2 
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6.3 WHY VITAL RIGHTS ARE ‘VITAL’  
It has already been seen that vital rights have both moral and legal 
characters (they are ‘Janus-faced’), and that they are particularly potent 
rights (they are ‘Colossal’).30 Yet more can be learnt about vital rights by 
synthesising what has been seen about rights in general and human rights 
– the paradigmatic example of vital rights – in particular.  
Part II has so far identified two key features of human rights that result 
from their status as ‘rights’. Firstly, they are vested in a right-holder to 
whom the correlative duties are owed; and secondly, they are grounded in 
(and so exist because of) an interest of the right-holder.  
But the first word of ‘human rights’ also contains important information 
about their nature,31 and consequently the nature of ‘vital rights’. In 
particular, the ‘human’ part of ‘human rights’ deepens understanding of 
the two features identified in the previous paragraph. The word ‘human’ 
indicates that human rights are vested in humans, and exist because of 
human interests. However, the phrase ‘human rights’ is a stronger one 
than this, as a result of an important distinction captured by Tomuschat: 
“not every right held by a human being deserves to be called a human 
right”.32 Human rights are different from other ‘rights held by humans’.   
                                       
30 §4.2. 
31 Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights (Hart 2000) 18. 
32 Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights (3rd edn, OUP 2014) 3-4. Allen Buchanan, 
The Heart of Human Rights (OUP 2014) 10. See also Jerome Shestack, ‘The 
Philosophic Foundations of Human Rights’ (1998) 20 HRQ 201, 203. 
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It is clear that ‘human rights’ have a distinct, and indeed superior, status 
as compared to ‘rights held by humans’. They have a “special character”,33 
and are “resistant to trade-offs”.34 They are “of paramount importance”,35 
and have “law-exceeding energies and institutionally elevated juridical 
status”. 36 This section will show how this special character of human rights 
results from the nature of the subjects in which they are vested (ie 
humans as living beings) and the interests that they seek to protect (ie 
those of paramount importance).37  
It is here that the terminology of vital rights comes into its own in 
describing the sort of rights found in IHRL. The word vital has two 
meanings – ‘living’ and ‘essential’ – both of which are found in vital rights. 
Firstly, human rights are vital because they are vested in vital (as in living) 
beings. Secondly, human rights are vital because they are grounded in 
vital (as in essential) interests. These two characteristics of vital rights 
distinguishes them from the set of rights as a whole.  
6.3.1 PROTECTING THE LIVING 
Because rights are vested in a right-holder, and are grounded in the 
interests of that right-holder, the nature of the right-holder is of 
                                       
33 HRC, General Comment 24 [18].  
34 James Griffin, On Human Rights (OUP 2008) 76.   
35 Maurice Cranston, What are Human Rights? (Bodley 1973) 67-68. 
36 Anna Grear and Louis Kotzé, ‘An invitation to fellow epistemic travellers’ in Anna 
Grear and Louis Kotzé (eds), Research Handbook on Human Rights and the 
Environment (Elgar 2015) 2. 
37 Which Baxi refers to as the two perplexities of human rights: “the nature of 
human nature [and] the question of who is to be counted as ‘human’”: Upendra 
Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (OUP 2002) 51; §1.3. 
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consequence for the nature of the rights themselves. Tomuschat’s 
distinction between ‘human rights’ and ‘rights held by humans’ can be 
developed by returning to the nature of the ‘human rights subject’ as seen 
in Chapter One. 
Chapter One showed that IHRL understands the human rights subject to be 
a real, living, embodied and embedded being.38 Unlike with other legal 
rights (‘rights held by humans’), which are vested in a legal persona,39 the 
human rights subject cannot be completely parsed in this technical legal 
sense.40 The subject of human rights cannot be some entirely abstract 
entity or constructed subject if human rights are to take human suffering 
seriously41 because neither humans nor their suffering are entirely 
abstract.42 Human rights are vested in real life human beings because they 
seek inter alia to protect against real life visceral suffering.  
The sort of rights found in IHRL are therefore vital because they are vested 
in living beings. Although IHRL may at times fail to live up to the promise 
of protecting the real life human being,43 it has this as its goal.44 Because 
they are vested in humans qua living beings, human rights are 
                                       
38 §1.3.2. 
39 Anna Grear, ‘Law’s Entities: Complexity, Plasticity and Justice’ (2013) 4 
Jurisprudence 76, 83. 
40 Douzinas (n31) 19; §1.3.2. 
41 §1.3. 
42 Notwithstanding the fact that ‘the human’ is always, to some extent, 
constructed (Baxi (n37) 152). 
43 §1.3.2. 
44 §1.3.1, §1.5.1. 
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fundamentally connected to humans’ status as living beings. This is why 
they are vital, and any other ‘vital rights’ must also be vested in living 
beings in order to retain the ‘law-exceeding energies’ and ‘special 
character’ of human rights.  
Of course, since human rights are also ‘rights held by humans’,45 there will 
always be a layer of legal personality between the human rights subject 
and the actual living human being.46 The real must somehow be 
transformed into the legal. The nature of this layer will be influenced by 
both the design of traditional legal persons (ie “the archetypal rational, 
choosing, will-exercising, ‘discrete possessor of rights’”47) and IHRL’s 
imagining of the real human being. But, because the holders of vital rights 
are living beings, IHRL drives it away from the former and towards the 
latter.48 Indeed, IHRL does this by dialogically, ‘carnivalistically’,49 and 
asymptotically re-imagining and enriching the content of IHRL and the 
human rights subject to move towards capturing actual lived experience.50 
                                       
45 That is, vital rights are still legal rights, and are a subset of rights as a whole. 
46 §1.3.2(a). 
47 Grear (n39) 90-91. 
48 Human rights do not always achieve this goal: consider the application of 
human rights to companies (Marius Emberland, The Human Rights of Companies 
(OUP 2006)). But the point is that if human rights are to retain their status as vital 
rights, developments of this type must be opposed. (See Anna Grear, Redirecting 
Human Rights (Palgrave Macmillan 2010)). 
49 §1.3. 
50 §1.3.2(c). 
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Here some of the “law-exceeding energies”51 of vital rights become evident, 
as they grasp beyond the legal person and reach out to real living beings. 
6.3.2 PROTECTING WHAT IS ESSENTIAL 
The second feature of the sort of rights found in IHRL captured by referring 
to them as ‘vital rights’ is that they protect matters that are vital – in the 
sense of urgent, essential, crucial and fundamental – to the right-holder. 
Vital rights do not protect trivial matters or mere desiderata, but instead 
are grounded in those interests that are essential to the right-holder. This 
is evidenced by the fact that human rights seek to prevent human 
suffering and promote human flourishing (both of which are crucial to the 
right-holder) and is also outlined more directly in a number of descriptions 
of the nature of human rights. 
The vital nature of the sort of rights found in IHRL has been captured by 
the UN General Assembly, which has stated that human rights are “of 
fundamental character”.52 This statement was made in the context of 
setting standards for new human rights, and so clearly demonstrates a key 
property of the sort of rights found in IHRL. Furthermore, Tomuschat 
describes the UDHR as a “legal document reflecting the basic needs of all 
human beings”,53 and John Nickel argues that human rights protect 
‘fundamental interests’, which he defines as “interest[s] in conditions 
necessary to surviving during a normal lifespan or to developing and 
                                       
51 Grear and Kotzé (n36) 2. 
52 UNGA, ‘Setting international standards in the field of human rights’ 
A/RES/41/120 (4 December 1986) [4(b)]. 
53 Tomuschat (n32) 74. 
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exercising central features of human personality”.54 Such interests in 
survival and exercising central features are clearly essential to the right-
holder: this is what makes vital rights ‘vital’. 
The essential nature of vital rights distinguishes them from rights in 
general. Human rights have been described as recognising “extraordinarily 
special, basic interests, and this sets them apart from rights, even moral 
rights, generally”.55 Likewise, John Rawls distinguishes human rights from 
other rights, noting that “human rights … express a special class of urgent 
rights”.56 There is thus a noticeable difference between the interests that 
ground vital rights (ie vital interests) and interests in general.  
The “special character”57 of vital rights arises because the interests that 
ground vital rights are themselves urgent and essential. The interests 
grounding vital rights are not ‘vital interests’ only for terminological 
convenience, but rather because of their fundamental, crucial, urgent and 
basic nature. We can therefore define vital interests, the grounds of vital 
rights, as ‘the essential interests of living beings’, bringing together the 
two meanings of the word vital. 
                                       
54 Nickel (n21) 55. 
55 William Edmundson, An Introduction to Rights (CUP 2004) 191. 
56 John Rawls, Law of Peoples (HUP 1999) 78-79. For more on the special status of 
human rights, see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth 1977) 199. 
See also Leif Wenar, ‘Rights’ in Edward Zalta (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2011 edn) 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/rights/> (accessed 
14/1/2015) ch5.1-5.2; Hillel Steiner, ‘Working Rights’ in Kramer et al (n8) 257. 
57 HRC, General Comment 24 [18]. 
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The aim of this chapter is to detail the relationship between vital rights, 
vital interests and dignity. Two of these linkages are clear: vital rights are 
grounded in the essential interests of living beings (vital interests), and 
vital rights can be justified by appeals to dignity.58 Steps can now be made 
towards the third linkage (between dignity and vital interests) by 
ascertaining what can be learnt about the nature of dignity from the 
characterisation of rights justified by dignity as ‘vital’. 
6.4 DIGNITY AND VITALITY 
There are two ways in which the sort of rights found in human rights can 
be distinguished from rights as a whole. Firstly, they are grounded in the 
essential interests of living beings. Secondly, human rights are specifically 
justified by dignity. In both of these ways, human rights can be set apart 
from rights that are simply ‘held by a human being’. Indeed, Tomuschat 
specifically appeals to dignity to set ‘human rights’ apart from those ‘rights 
simply held by humans’, stating that “human rights are rights intimately 
connected to human existence in dignity”.59 
These two ways of distinguishing human rights from rights as a whole 
provide a platform by which to develop understanding of dignity. Because 
dignity justifies the existence of rights that are distinguishably vital, the 
vitality of vital rights is connected to the notion of dignity. This section will 
show how properties of dignity that have already been established – that 
                                       
58 See §4.2. 
59 Tomuschat (n32) 4. 
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dignity is inherent and that it functions as a justification/metric60 – can be 
mapped onto the two meanings of vital, drawing out some implications for 
the concept of dignity.  
6.4.1 DIGNITY IS INHERENT IN LIVING BEINGS 
Chapter One noted that human dignity is inherent in human beings. This is 
linked to the universalism of human rights: all humans have both dignity 
and human rights.61 Human dignity is not a status to be earned nor an 
aspirational target, it is simply something humans have. Morsink describes 
dignity as being a result of our “real, historical, and biological birth”,62 
demonstrating that dignity is dependent on humans’ status not just as 
human persons but also as a living, embodied and embedded, human 
being. 
The physical origin of (human) dignity can also be seen in another 
observation from Chapter One: that ignoring or violating dignity often 
evokes concrete physical scenarios.63 The possibility of being treated in an 
undignified manner is a consequence of our vulnerability64 – a vulnerability 
that arises through our embodied and embedded status as living 
organisms, since vulnerability is “an irreducible incident of physical 
                                       
60 §1.5.3. 
61 §1.5.2. 
62 Johannes Morsink, Inherent Human Rights (University of Pennsylvania 2009) 34. 
See also Grear (n39) 92.  
63 §1.5.2. 
64 Habermas (n6) 468; Clemens Sedmak, ‘Human Dignity, Interiority, and Poverty’ 
in McCrudden (n29) 565-69. 
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embodiment”.65 It is because humans are physical living beings that they 
are vulnerable, and because they are vulnerable that they can suffer 
(because they are harm-able). Human dignity evokes this possibility for 
suffering and calls out for it to be avoided. 
Understanding dignity as an inherent property of living beings allows 
further clarification of what dignity is. As in Chapter One, this can be done 
by noting what dignity is not. In particular, dignity’s attachment to living 
beings means that dignity is not some spiritual, non-material or 
supernatural mystery, but rather arises through biological, physical and 
natural processes.66  
For this reason, the value of Rosen’s characterisation of dignity as an 
“inner transcendental kernel” cited in Chapter One is highly dependent on 
how the word ‘transcendental’ is understood. If understood as 
‘supernatural’,67 then transcendental implies that dignity is something 
beyond the natural. This clearly goes against the understanding of dignity 
developed here as arising through natural, living processes. The idea of 
dignity being ‘supernatural’ conjures up images of dignity being something 
additional and non-material implanted into the living human being, such as 
a Cartesian res cogitans, a vitalist élan vital, or a Christian eternal soul. 
                                       
65 Anna Grear, ‘The vulnerable living order: human rights and the environment in 
a critical and philosophical perspective’ (2011) 2 JHRE 23, 43. 
66 Just as “the stream of consciousness itself may have a physical rather than a 
spiritual source”: Robin Headlam Wells and Johnjoe McFadden, ‘Introduction’ in 
Wells and McFadden (eds), Human Nature: Fact and Fiction (Continuum 2006) 13. 
67 See Douzinas (n31) 3. 
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But this is not the case. Dignity arises through our “real, historical and 
biological births”.68 
On the other hand, Rosen may be using the word ‘transcendental’ to mean 
that dignity is a “representation only”.69 In this sense, the idea of dignity 
as an ‘inner kernel’ can be understood as a metaphorical representation of 
the complexity, the aliveness and indeed the vital interests of the living 
being. This is a rather different dignity to a supernatural one, and indeed 
must be preferred in order to retain a human dignity that is inherent in 
living beings. The important result is that the idea of dignity as being 
supernatural must be discarded, since dignity is inherent in living beings, 
and so a result of material processes. 
There is a difference between dignity being intangible (which it is) and it 
being supernatural (which it is not). Although dignity clearly is an abstract 
concept, this does not imply that its existence is dependent on a 
connection to an ethereal realm. The intangibility of dignity is a result of its 
complexity and the multiple roles it plays as metric, justification and so on, 
rather than because dignity is somehow akin to a non-material ‘implant’ 
(eg res cogitans, élan vital, or eternal soul). As a parallel, consider the 
concept of ‘green’, which is clearly abstract and intangible, but also 
                                       
68 Morsink (n62) 34. See also Grear (n39) 92.  
69 ‘transcendental idealism’, Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy (Penguin 1997); 
Stang, s6.2. See Michael Rosen, Dignity (HUP 2012) 9, 31, 55, 143, 157; Nicholas 
Stang, ‘Kant’s Transcendental Idealism’ in Edward Zalta (n56 Spring 2016 edn). 
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emerges through evidently physical processes rather than because of some 
inherent mystical property of ‘greenness’.70  
It is significant that dignity arises through living processes. It implies that 
there is no need to search for some non-material ‘implant’ to explain why 
humans merit the urgent protection of human rights. Humans are 
complete without such trimmings.71 Dignity emerges through vital physical 
processes, and not through divine intervention or the supposed 
metaphysical capacities of the pineal gland.72 While some may lament the 
muting of the human soul (or other similar concept),73 it is remarkable that 
something as complex and as vital as the human and its dignity can 
emerge from living material processes.74 Rather than deny these processes 
and their significance, it is more prudent to focus on them.  
The reason why dignity’s materiality is important to note for the purposes 
of this thesis is that the non-material ‘implants’ typically used to explain 
human dignity also have the result (perhaps even the intention) of dividing 
the human from the rest of the natural world.75 However, with a material 
conception of dignity in hand, “the qualities of self-reflection, self-
                                       
70 See Keekok Lee, ‘The Source and Locus of Intrinsic Value: A Reexamination’ 
(1996) 18 Environmental Ethics 297. 
71 This is not to say the IHRL human rights subject is a complete version of the 
human being (it may approach it asymptotically), but that completeness of the 
human being does not require non-material ‘implants’ such as a soul. 
72 Descartes believed the pineal gland to be the ‘seat of the soul’: Darren Gobert, 
The Mind-Body Stage (Stanford University Press 2013) 22-24. 
73 Vining in McCrudden (n29) 583ff. 
74 See Kenan Malik, ‘What science can and cannot tell us about human nature’ in 
Wells and McFadden (n66). 
75 See Catherine Dupré, The Age of Dignity (Hart 2015) 34; Tasioulas (n29) 294. 
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awareness, and rationality traditionally used to distinguish [the human 
species] from the rest of nature, may now seem little more than contingent 
and provisional forms or processes within a broader evolutionary or cosmic 
productivity”.76 That is, self-reflection, self-awareness and rationality are 
functional human capacities that exist in order to achieve other goals (in 
particular ones related to our embodied and embedded physical existence).  
Focussing exclusively on these functional capacities at the expense of their 
underlying goals is a limited pathway towards explaining the full 
complexity of dignity (human or otherwise), because doing so overlooks 
the very physical origins and purposes of the capacities. Rationality and 
autonomy are means rather than ends.77 This does not mean that their 
value should be ignored (as seen in Chapter Five), but it does mean that a 
description of dignity cannot only include capacities such as rationality and 
autonomy. The physicality of vital beings cannot be ignored. 
The realisation that dignity is a material phenomenon can be linked to new 
materialist modes of thinking that “call for … a renewed emphasis on 
materiality”78 based in part on developments made in physics in the 20th 
Century.79 In particular, Einstein’s famous expression that E = mc2 (ie that 
energy and matter (via mass) are equivalent) succinctly demonstrates how 
                                       
76 Diane Coole and Samantha Frost (eds), New Materialisms (Duke University 
Press 2010) 20. 
77 And even as means, they are contingent, provisional and replaceable: they are 
simply some of the tools that one particular organism has focussed on in order to 
effect their survival. 
78 Coole and Frost (n76) 5. 
79 ibid. 
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matter has the raw potential within it for action and process. However, 
although new materialism is to the point in noticing that agency is neither 
the exclusive preserve of the human, nor an ‘other-than-matter’ act,80 it 
glosses too quickly over the distinction between the living and the non-
living81 – a distinction that is crucial to this thesis. Part III will demonstrate 
how a notion of dignity that arises through physical processes can be found 
throughout the living world, and identify ways in which living organisms 
are fundamentally different from non-living matter.82 
6.4.2 DIGNITY CAPTURES WHAT IS ESSENTIAL 
Another key role of dignity seen in Chapter One is as the justification for 
the existence of human rights in the first place.83 This is seen most clearly 
                                       
80 eg Coole and Frost (n76) 20, 97-98, 113 
81 This glossing is witnessed in the work of Coole and Frost who note that it is 
possible to distinguish “between the sort of mechanical, inorganic matter 
described by physicists and the evolving organic systems described by biologists. 
But new materialists are attracted to forms of vitalism that refuse this latter 
distinction. They often discern emergent, generative powers (or agentic capacities) 
even within inorganic matter, and they generally eschew the distinction between 
organic and inorganic, or animate and inanimate, at the ontological level” (Coole 
and Frost (n76) 9); Bennett, who aligns herself with a tradition in which “the 
distinctions between life and matter, organic and inorganic … are not necessarily 
the most important ones to honor” (Jane Bennett, ‘A Vitalist Stopover on the Way 
to a New Materialism’ in Coole and Frost (n76) 48), resulting in a “materialism, 
which eschews the life-matter binary” (ibid 63); Barad, who argues for “a new 
sense of aliveness [that] applies to the inanimate as well as the animate” (Karen 
Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway (Duke University Press 2007) 437n81); and 
Coole, who points to Schelling’s account where “there is no essential difference 
between organic and inorganic nature in this account; they are merely potencies 
with different powers of organisation such that inanimate matter becomes living 
being through its internal development. This already anticipates a common thread 
running through many new vitalisms and materialisms”. (Diana Coole, ‘The Inertia 
of Matter and the Generativity of Flesh’ in Coole and Frost (n76) 99)  
82 In particular through the lens of ‘autopoiesis’: §9.2. 
83 Mary Ann Glendon, World Made New (Random House 2002) 146. 
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in the Preambles to the ICESCR and the ICCPR, which state that human 
rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.84 Dignity is 
therefore used as the justification for the existence and creation of vital 
rights, which are grounded in the essential interests of living beings. 
Because dignity can be used to justify rights that protect essential 
interests, dignity serves to indicate (a) that a particular bearer of 
dignity/holder of rights has essential interests, and (b) what those 
essential interests are. This latter function is related to dignity’s role not 
only as a justification, but also a metric within IHRL (these two roles are in 
any case intertwined85). Rights justified by dignity are protecting an 
essential interest of the right-holder, and the need to protect these 
essential interests is articulated through appeals to dignity. In this way, 
human dignity captures what is essential to humans (and likewise dolphin 
dignity can capture what is essential to dolphins). 
Human dignity capturing what is essential to humans does not mean that 
there is a singular ‘essence’ of being human to be found within the notion 
of ‘human dignity’. Morsink criticises essentialism (ie the idea that there is 
some essence that defines being human) as creating “atomic and abstract 
individuals” with “an essence [one] may or may not have”,86 and thus 
potentially leading to situations where certain portions of society are 
deemed not to possess such an essence (and hence become susceptible to 
                                       
84 §1.5.1. 
85 §1.5.3. 
86 Morsink (n62) 34, 32-38, 178. See also Baxi (n37) 160ff.  
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discrimination and oppression).87 Dignity must avoid this problem because 
human rights are universal: it is not up for debate whether or not any 
individual human being has dignity. Human dignity cannot capture what is 
essential to humans by being a singular or precisely-defined reduction (and 
also dilution) of humanity. There is no monolithic ‘essence’ that defines 
being human.88 
Dignity can avoid the problems of essentialism by ensuring that it has 
many dimensions and perspectives. Human dignity must be pluralistic, 
encompassing a range of values and ideas as to what is essential to 
humans.89 Furthermore, dignity capturing what is essential must not 
function as a challenge. It does not mean that in order to achieve the 
status of ‘having (human) dignity’,90 one must exhibit properties {d1, d2, d3 
…}. Rather it means that if one has (human) dignity, then {d1, d2, d3 …} 
are of essential importance. 
The need for a conception of dignity to be pluralistic rather than singular is 
a direct consequence of the complexity of the real life human rights 
subject. If the human being were simply a straightforward, one-
dimensional rational actor, then dignity could likewise be simplified as 
being primarily about rationality or autonomy.91 However, this is not the 
                                       
87 ibid. 
88 Ngaire Naffine ‘Legal personality and the natural world: on the persistence of 
the human measure of value’ (2012) 3 JHRE 68, 69-79. 
89 See §1.5. 
90 The status which is, by definition, ‘being human’: §1.5.2; Michael Rosen, 
‘Dignity: The Case Against’ in McCrudden (n29) 145. 
91 See §5.6. 
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reality of human existence. There is a varied range of matters that are 
essential to humans, and human rights must protect all of these not just 
some subset of vital human interests. This is recognised by the 
‘carnivalistic’92 nature of contemporary IHRL, the wide range of interests it 
protects, and the consequently enriched understanding of the human 
rights subject. 
The bearer of universal human rights is… no individual 
human being or community with a pre-posited ‘essence’ but 
a being born with a right to invent practices of 
identification, contest identities pre-formed by tradition, 
and the power to negotiate subversive subject-positions.93  
Dignity is not austere, but is pluralistic and celebratory of diversity. By 
being so, it can accommodate Quinn and Arstein-Kerslake’s concern “that 
humans cannot be reduced to an essence… we are who we are because of 
our interaction in community”.94 Dignity can encompass the essential value 
of our interaction in community along with the many other dimensions of 
being human. This can be seen directly in the presence of collective and 
corporate rights within IHRL,95 and, more generally, by the fact that 
human rights are not perfect substitutes for each other: one cannot 
                                       
92 §1.3. 
93 Baxi (n37) 174. 
94 Gerard Quinn with Anna Arstein-Kerslake, ‘Restoring the ‘human’ in ‘human 
rights’: personhood and doctrinal innovation in the UN disability convention’ in 
Conor Gearty and Costas Douzinas (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Human 
Rights Law (CUP 2012) 54. 
95 §1.4; §8.2.1.6. 
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necessarily compensate somebody for a restriction on one of their rights by 
providing greater freedom elsewhere.96 Dignity is pluralistic. 
This section has so far shown that dignity arises through living processes 
and that dignity captures what is essential to the bearer of dignity. It 
concludes by observing that dignity, understood in this way, is not 
necessarily exclusively human. 
6.4.3 DIGNITY IS NOT NECESSARILY EXCLUSIVELY HUMAN 
Given that this thesis is interested in the deployment of vital rights beyond 
humans, it would be problematic if linking vital rights to dignity implied 
that only humans can have vital rights. However, there is no a priori 
reason why only humans can have dignity.97 Necessarily, human dignity 
can only arise in human beings. However, it is at the very least 
semantically meaningful to conceive of other forms of dignity: for example, 
dolphin dignity that arises in dolphins. Even though the concept of 
nonhuman dignity is yet to receive explicit recognition within international 
law,98 it is possible that other living beings have dignity too. Nonhuman 
dignity will be investigated more thoroughly in Part III, but some 
                                       
96 This is distinct to the balancing of one person’s rights with another person’s.  
97 See Martha Nussbaum, ‘Beyond “Compassion and Humanity”’ in Cass Sunstein 
and Martha Nussbaum (eds), Animal Rights (OUP 2004) 299, 305ff; Phillip Balzer 
et al, ‘Two Concepts of Dignity for Humans and Non-human Organisms in the 
Context of Genetic Engineering’ (2000) 13 Journal of Agricultural Ethics 7; Arne 
Naess, Life’s Philosophy: Reason and Feeling in a Deeper World (Roland Huntford 
tr, University of Georgia Press 2002) 109; Arne Naess, Ecology of Wisdom 
(Counterpoint 2008) 250, 282; Tasioulas (n29) 307. 
98 Though it has within some national jurisdictions: see §8.3.4. 
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preliminary remarks regarding nonhuman dignity can be made at this 
stage. 
To begin, it is worth acknowledging that it is tautologically true that only 
humans can have human rights and human dignity. But it is also 
tautologically true that only dolphins could have dolphin rights and dolphin 
dignity.99 This is not problematic: dignity is malleable and so it need not 
always be identical. Nonhuman vital rights need not have the exact same 
form or content as human rights. In the words of Thomas Berry, “[r]ivers 
have river rights. Birds have bird rights. Insects have insect rights. 
Humans have human rights”.100 
The need to consider species membership leads us back to the first word of 
‘human rights’ – in particular, what is it about these rights that makes 
them ‘human’? Juengst warns of “a risk here of confusing the biological 
sense of ‘human’ as a taxonomic term (like ‘canine’ or ‘simian’) and the 
word’s use in ‘human rights’, where it serves as a synonym for ‘natural’, 
‘inalienable’ or ‘fundamental’ to distinguish that class of moral claims from 
other conferred, negotiated or legislated rights”.101 But in fact, the word 
                                       
99 Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice (HUP 2006) 346-47; Ramona Ilea, 
‘Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach and Nonhuman Animals’ (2008) 39 Journal of 
Social Philosophy 547; Rutger Claassen, ‘Human dignity in the capability approach’ 
in Marcus Düwell et al (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity (CUP 
2014) 240. 
100 Cited in Cormac Cullinan, Wild Law (2nd edn, Green Books 2011) 103). See 
also Judith Koons, ‘Key Principles to Transform Law for the Health of the Planet’ in 
Peter Burdon (ed), Exploring Wild Law (Wakefield 2011) 49. A ‘river’ here must be 
understood as the entire watershed ecosystem, not just the watercourse. 
101 Eric Juengst, ‘What’s Taxonomy Got To Do With It?’ (2009) in Julian Savulescu 
and Nick Bostrom (eds), Human Enhancement (OUP 2009) 43, 51-52. See also 
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‘human’ serves both of these purposes: it indicates that human rights are 
vested in humans102 and it differentiates human rights from ‘rights held by 
humans’. 
The terminology of ‘vital rights’ used in this thesis refers to Juengst’s class 
of natural, inalienable or fundamental moral claims.103 But this thesis also 
notes that ‘vital rights’ are not synonymous with ‘human rights’; the latter 
is a subset of the former (Juengst goes on to “spurn as moral idolatry… 
that taxonomy might determine a creature’s moral status”104). The 
important point is that although use of the word ‘human’ in ‘human rights’ 
does indicate their ‘vital-ness’, such a trick is, almost paradoxically, not 
restricted to ‘human rights’.  
Furthermore, the fact that species emerge through continuous evolutionary 
processes prevents dignity from being restrained within Homo sapiens. 
There is no sharp dividing line between Homo sapiens and its ancestors or 
contemporaries (this is not how speciation works: there was not a 
nonhuman mother who had a human child, and species barriers are often 
permeable105). And so to preserve dignity exclusively within the human 
species is ultimately impossible, even if we are able today to make a 
                                                                                                              
Carl Wellman, An Approach to Rights (Kluwer 1997) 15; Frédéric Mégret, ‘Nature 
of Obligations’ in Moeckli et al (n7) 96, 100. 
102 cf Emberland (n48). However, this does demonstrate law’s capacity to be 
flexible with regards to legal personhood. 
103 supra n101. 
104 Juengst (n101) 52. 
105 See Richard Dawkins, ‘Gaps in the Mind’ in Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer 
(eds), The Great Ape Project (Fourth Estate 1993) 82-87; Robert Wilson (ed), 
Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays (MIT 1999). 
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relatively clear-cut division between ‘human organisms’ and ‘not human 
organisms’.106  
This evolutionary perspective in fact provides yet another reason why we 
must consider dignity as a material phenomenon: it is unclear how 
evolutionary processes could produce something immaterial. The deep 
implications that evolution has for the idea of dignity as a non-material 
soul or spirit were even acknowledged by Pope John Paul II: 
The theories of evolution which… consider the spirit as 
emerging from the forces of living matter, or as a simple 
epiphenomenon of that matter, are incompatible with the 
truth about man. Furthermore, they are incapable of 
grounding the dignity of the human person.107 
John Paul unsurprisingly thus ends up only tentatively endorsing evolution 
because of its necessary implications about human dignity:108 that there is 
no obvious reason why it is exclusively human after all. Evolution makes it 
clear that the only way to restrain dignity within Homo sapiens is to use 
some non-material ‘implant’, such as being “rational, self-aware, free and 
                                       
106 The distinction is not entirely clear-cut because of controversies such as those 
over when (human) life begins.  
107 Pope John Paul II, ‘Message to the participants in the Plenary of the Pontifical 
Academy of Science’ (22 October 1996) [5]. Available at 
https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-
ii/en/messages/pont_messages/1996.index.html (in French, Spanish and Italian, 
author’s translation, last accessed 12/6/2016).  
108 See also Francis Fukukyama, Our Posthuman Future (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 
2002) 161. 
309 
 
self-moving agents”,109 rather than simply relying on being a human, 
chimpanzee, or otherwise. 
As such, a common method by which dignity is restricted to humans is to 
isolate some particular characteristic that only (and all) humans 
supposedly have, and then to use this as the touchstone for dignity. The 
usual suspects in such a procedure are rationality,110 autonomy,111 or 
language capabilities.112 However, all of these fail for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, it is apparent that not all humans express such characteristics 
(infans being the usual demonstrators of this), yet they are denied neither 
dignity nor human rights under IHRL. Secondly, not only humans hold 
these capabilities. It may be that humans have usually developed more 
sophisticated skills of rationality and language, but this is a difference in 
degree, not kind.113 Thirdly, it is clear that dignity is composed of more 
than just one of these characteristics. IHRL endorses this with its 
‘carnivalistic’ nature; there is more to being human than being rational or 
                                       
109 Coole and Frost (n76) 8. 
110 See Martha Nussbaum, ‘Capabilities and Human Rights’ (1997) 66 Fordham 
Law Review 273, 273; Paola Cavalieri, ‘Are Human Rights Human?’ (2005) 4 Logos 
2, II; Douzinas (n31) 52; Alexander Alexander Gillespie, International 
Environmental Law, Policy, and Ethics (2nd edn, OUP 2014) 5-10. 
111 eg Griffin (n34) 32-33. Consider also Stephen Wise’s quality of ‘practical 
autonomy’: Stephen Wise, ‘Animal Rights, One Step at a Time’ in Sunstein and 
Nussbaum (n97) 27, 32-41. 
112 eg Douzinas (n31) 173-74; Baxi (n37) 162, 188; See also Lesley Rogers and 
Gisela Kaplan, ‘All Animals are Not Equal’ in Sunstein and Nussbaum (n97) 193; 
Paola Cavalieri, The Animal Question (OUP 2001) 118. 
113 For discussion on nonhuman language capability for example, see Francine 
Patterson and Wendy Gordon, ‘The Case for the Personhood of Gorillas’ in Cavalieri 
and Singer (n105); Irene Pepperberg, Alex & Me (Harper Perennial 2009); 
Lawrence Johnson, A Morally Deep World (CUP 1991) 27.  
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being autonomous.114 Fourthly, there is a significant risk in standing by a 
monolithic conception of dignity, which is that “a fraction of humanity 
decides that it embodies such a dignity in a more eminent way than 
others”.115 Being human does not lie in one property but in the magnificent 
entirety of our existence. The main pathways for restricting dignity to 
humans are therefore severely limited. 
As further motivation for considering the possibility of nonhuman dignity, 
note that a theory of dignity that ascribes it exclusively to humans may fail 
the test of being culturally acceptable across the world. A particularly clear 
rejection of a human-only format for dignity is found in Native American 
thinking where “they have indeed asked and continue to ask: what kind of 
existential dignity prevails when it applies only to human beings?”116 Other 
worldviews may also struggle with a conception of dignity that displaces 
humanity from the rest of creation.117  
Restricting dignity to humans therefore fails the test of cultural universality 
(an important feature of human rights) and lacks an obvious justification 
that can decisively separate the human from the nonhuman. One could 
                                       
114 §1.3; §5.6. 
115 Claude Lévi-Strauss, ‘L’idéologie marxiste, communiste et totalitaire n’est 
qu’une ruse de l’histoire, entretien avec Jean Marie Benoist’ (January 21-22 1979) 
Le Monde 14, cited in Annabelle Dufourcq, ‘Editorial Preface’ (2014) 11 
Environmental Philosophy v, vi. See also Morsink (n62) 34; Costas Douzinas (n31) 
199. 
116 Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, Who Believes in Human Rights? (CUP 2006) 2. 
117 See The Mandukya Upanishad; Michael Ashkenazi, Handbook of Japanese 
Mythology (OUP 2003) 291; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and 
Human Well-being (Island Press 2003) 142. 
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instead resort to an argument of ‘for simplicity’s sake’.118 That is, since 
humans are uncontroversial holders of dignity, and since it is convenient to 
draw a boundary somewhere so as to know what has dignity and what 
does not, it might make sense to declare that all humans, and only 
humans, have dignity. This line of reasoning may have merits, but it 
remains suspect. 
Comembership of the human species is, like membership of 
the same race, a purely biological relation: it is a matter of 
genealogy, similarity of genome, or potential for 
interbreeding. It seems hardly credible that these 
commonalities could be morally significant, any more than 
membership in the same race could be.119 
The charge of speciesism bears similarities to that of racism.120 Using 
membership of the species Homo sapiens as the defining criterion for 
dignity is therefore questionable. This is not to say that it is definitely 
indefensible to conclude that only humans have dignity but rather that to 
do so requires a more detailed and convincing argument.  
                                       
118 eg as discussed (and rejected) by Stephen Wise (n111) 39. See also Cavalieri 
(n113) 82-83. 
119 J McMahan, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (OUP 2002) 
225 cited in Julian Savulescu, ‘The Human Prejudice and the Moral Status of 
Enhanced Beings’ in Savulescu and Bostrom (n101) 234. 
120 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (Random House 1975) 3-9, 239; LW Sumner, 
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The key point is that dignity (and so vital rights) can conceivably belong to 
individuals with taxonomic designations other than human.121 Just as the 
earlier terminology of ‘rights of man’ as a synonym for 
‘natural/fundamental rights’ has been replaced, so too could ‘human 
rights’: “the expression ‘human rights’ suggests that there is some deep 
conceptual connection between belonging to the human species and having 
rights, perhaps it should be retired – just as the phrase ‘the rights of man’ 
has given way to gender-neutral equivalents”.122  
Understanding why vital rights are indeed ‘vital’, and drawing out the 
implications for dignity of the vitality of these rights opens the door to 
living beings other than humans possessing dignity. By definition, it is not 
only humans that are vital in the sense of living, although it is not the case 
that simply being alive points to the existence of dignity. At the very least, 
the second meaning of vital must exist too – the possession of vital 
(essential) interests is therefore of crucial importance. In order to provide 
a platform for Part III to analyse nonhuman dignity through the lens of 
vital interests, the technical structure between dignity and vital interests 
needs clarification. This is the task of the remainder of this chapter.  
                                       
121 See Sumner (n120) 205-206. 
122 Edmundson (n55) 191. See also Linda Hajjar Leib, Human Rights and the 
Environment: Philosophical, Legal and Theoretical Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff 
2011) 44; Edward Rubin, ‘Rethinking Human Rights’ (2003) 9 International Legal 
Theory 5, 9. 
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6.5 DIGNITY AND VITAL INTERESTS 
This chapter concludes by clarifying the nature of the relationship between 
dignity and vital interests.123 This will allow Part III to explore the 
possibility of nonhuman vital rights through the lens of vital interests. 
A method for illuminating the relationship between dignity and vital 
interests is found in Habermas’ statement that “human rights… can be 
conceived as specifications of human dignity”.124  Habermas argues that 
there are different aspects to human dignity, and that these aspects can be 
found within the content of different categories of human rights.125 Though 
varied, these categories of rights are united by all being specifications of 
dignity.126 The meaning and the content of dignity can thus be found within 
this range of categories of rights. 
Though Habermas refers to a particular categorisation of human rights 
(roughly aligning with the ‘generations’ of human rights), it is perfectly 
possible to categorise human rights in a number of ways. Moreover, the 
construct of ‘vital interests’ introduced by this chapter provides a means by 
which human rights (and indeed any set of vital rights) can be categorised. 
That is, vital rights can be categorised according to the vital interest(s) in 
which they are grounded.  
                                       
123 See Tasioulas (n29) 295-99, 304-305, 310. 
124 Habermas (n6) 464. 
125 ibid 467-68. 
126 ibid 468. 
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Because of the close connection between vital rights and vital interests 
(the former are grounded in the latter), they cover the same ground and 
share the same content. As Tasioulas’ analysis of Raz’s grounding process 
for human rights shows, the “fact that human rights characteristically 
further and protect human interests is, therefore, not a brute coincidence; 
it is explained by the grounding role of such interests in arguments for 
human rights”.127 As such, vital interests (which, like human rights, 
Tasioulas argues are universal, objective and pluralistic128) are themselves 
specifications of dignity.129  
                                       
127 Tasiouslas (n29) 295. 
128 ibid.  
129 The set of vital interests shows some conceptual similarity with the concept of 
the ‘good-of-its-kind’, which refers to conditions that are fitting for something and 
are required by something. See Michael Bowman et al, Lyster’s International 
Wildlife Law (2nd edn, CUP 2010) 73-78. See also Feinberg (n9) 165-66; HLA Hart, 
Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (OUP 1983) 17; Paul Taylor, Respect For 
Nature (Princeton University Press 1986) 60-71; Gary Varner, In Nature’s 
Interests? (OUP 1998) 55-76; Hugh McDonald, John Dewey and Environmental 
Philosophy (SUNY 2004) 39-40. The ‘good-of-its-kind’ is subtly different from the 
concept of ‘good-of-its-own’, which has a more individual hue to it. Vital rights 
regimes have to be generalised so as to be applicable to all vital right-holders 
within their target category (see §5.5.1), and so are derived from the good-of-its-
kind, but designed to enable the good-of-its-own to be realised. 
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The three way relationship between vital rights, vital interests, and dignity 
can be represented diagrammatically as follows. As already seen, vital 
rights are functionally grounded in vital interests, and dignity rhetorically 
justifies vital rights. Additionally, vital interests are specifications of 
dignity: they explain some portion of it, but cannot capture the holistic 
sense, meaning and power of ‘dignity’: 
 
Dignity (being both inherent in living beings and capturing what is 
essential to them) manifests itself in the essential interests of living 
beings. Vital interests provide handles to explain and explore both dignity 
and, by extension, the nature of the subject of vital rights.  
The relationship between dignity and vital interests is explanatory rather 
than synonymising: vital interests explain what dignity comprises, but do 
not replace its conceptual value and validity. This is because dignity refers 
to the integrated, cohesive and unified fusion of vital interests. Because 
DIGNITY 
Vital Interest  
1 Vital Interest  
2 
Vital Interest  
3 
Vital Right 
1 
Vital Right 
4 Vital Right 
5 
Vital Right 
3 
Vital Right 
2 
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dignity operates at this overarching level, it can serve as an overall 
rhetorical justification for vital rights (a role that vital interests are too 
prosaic to do): dignity and vital interests operate in “intimate union… in 
grounding human rights [affirming] both moral (equal human dignity) and 
prudential (universal human interests) elements among the grounds of 
human rights”.130 Dignity’s overarching position also permits its function as 
a metric, facilitating interpretation of vital interests and vital rights, and 
striking a balance between them when necessary.131 Vital interests 
describe dignity in ways more easily understood, but they do not replace 
dignity nor its usefulness as a rhetorical justification for the existence of 
vital rights in the first place.  
This recalls Raz’s characterisation of interests as a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for the possessing of rights.132 Raz also deems it 
necessary that one is capable of holding rights in the first place. Although 
Raz identifies this with the case where one’s “well-being is of ultimate 
value”,133 in this thesis the concept of dignity functions as a rhetorical 
justification for the possession of vital rights. Although interconnected, 
both dignity and vital interests serve valuable and distinguishable purposes 
in the grounding of vital rights.134  
                                       
130 Tasioulas (n29) 304-305. 
131 See §1.5.3; Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation 
of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 EJIL 655; Wackenheim v France (2002) HRC 
Communication No 854/1999, CCPR/C/75/D/854/1999.  
132 See also Tasioulas (n29) 304-305. 
133 Raz (n4) 166. 
134 See Tasioulas (n29) 304-309. 
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Part III will utilise this relationship between dignity and vital interests in its 
investigation of the possibility of nonhuman vital rights. It will do this by 
extracting a set of vital interests that are protected by IHRL, and exploring 
their presence in nonhumans. It will also explore how dignity bears 
similarities to the notion of ultimate, or indeed intrinsic, value.  
6.5 CONCLUSION 
Chapter Six has developed understanding of vital rights, vital interests and 
dignity through exploring their linkages and bringing together a number of 
themes from across Parts I and II of the thesis. The chapter has explained 
what is so ‘vital’ about vital rights: they are (i) vested in living beings, and 
(ii) protect matters of essential importance to those living beings. 
According to Raz’s grounding process, vital rights are grounded in the 
essential interests of living beings (vital interests). Furthermore, because 
dignity can justify the existence of such vital rights, there is a conceptual 
link between the concept of dignity and the dual ‘vitality’ of vital rights.  
This link between dignity and vitality has allowed understanding of dignity 
to be developed. Through making links to Chapter One’s analysis of 
dignity, this chapter has shown that dignity is inherent in living beings and 
captures what is essential to these living beings. In particular, dignity can 
be conceived of as being specified by a set of vital interests. This does not 
mean that dignity can be entirely collapsed into vital interests, however, 
since dignity retains value as an overarching and cohesive notion that can 
serve as a rhetorical justification for vital rights. 
Furthermore, the chapter has shown that dignity arises through material 
processes; is pluralistic; and is potentially applicable to nonhumans. These 
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features of dignity are maintained through parsing dignity as being 
‘specified in vital interests’, since sets of essential interests of living beings 
must also have these characteristics.  
Because dignity can be considered through the lens of the essential 
interests of living beings, it is plausible to examine whether living beings 
other than humans can be said to have dignity. If they do, this would 
provide a justification for the creation of nonhuman vital rights. Such rights 
represent a potential answer to the thesis’ research question of how vital 
rights can be used to protect the natural world through international law 
that do not fall foul of the main critique of using human rights (that they 
are anthropocentric). The final Part of this thesis will therefore consider the 
possibility of such rights. 
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PART III 
The final Part of this thesis investigates pathways for nonhuman vital rights 
to be used to protect the natural world through international law. Enquiring 
into the potential value of nonhuman rights is necessary in response to the 
anthropocentric critique of human rights seen in Part I, and is framed by 
the structure of vital rights developed in Part II. The analysis of rights in 
Part II demonstrated that rights certainly can be vested in nonhumans. 
The task of Part III is determining whether this should be done. This is 
complex, requiring consideration of the vital interests, and the dignity, of 
nonhumans. Chapters Eight and Nine will construct a case for the 
establishment of nonhuman vital rights based on the vital interest and the 
dignity of living organisms. That is, the thesis adopts an Interest Theory 
approach in order to provide a solid foundation for nonhuman vital rights.  
As with human rights, it is important to be clear as to who the subjects of 
vital rights are. Nonhuman rights are complicated by the fact that the 
realm of the nonhuman is both enormous and diverse in almost every 
sense imaginable. Possible subjects for nonhuman rights include 
nonhuman animals, plants, species, ecosystems, rivers, genes, species, 
and so on. Furthermore, it is not only important who the subjects of 
nonhuman rights are, but it is also crucial how these subjects are 
understood. This has already been demonstrated with regards to the 
human rights subject in Chapter One: the nature and the content of rights 
depends on the ideology of the underlying subject. The thesis will argue 
that the vital rights subject, akin to the human rights subject, must be 
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understood as a ‘fleshy’1 being: one that is embodied and embedded. 
Importantly, this embeddedness will be shown to be not only social, but 
also ecological.  
A theme running throughout Part III is an interplay between rights of 
individual organisms and rights of ecosystems.2 The former may be more 
smoothly aligned with human rights (because they are both predominantly 
rights of organisms), but the latter may be more suitable for 
environmental protection (because of their more holistic approach).3 To 
address this interplay, this thesis notes that there is a parallel to be found 
between the concepts of peoples’ rights4 and ecosystem rights. That is, 
peoples’ rights are to individual human rights roughly as ecosystem rights 
are to organism rights. This congruence arises because part of what it is to 
be a human is to belong to peoples (hence the need for peoples’ rights), 
and part of what it is to be an organism is to belong to ecosystems (hence 
the need for ecosystem rights).  
Chapter Seven will survey some existing approaches to nonhuman rights in 
theory and in practice. This will demonstrate a sense of the diversity of 
nonhuman rights approaches and provides a base for the more theoretical 
                                       
1 While plants and other non-animals might not be ‘fleshy’ in a literal sense as 
they are not composed of flesh, they are still made of living tissue.  
2 As well as other ecological ‘levels-of-organisation’. See §9.3.2. 
3 This mirrors the perceived conflict between animal rights and environmentalism. 
See eg J Baird Callicott, ‘Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair’ (1980) 2 
Environmental Ethics 311; Mark Sagoff, ‘Animal liberation and environmental 
ethics: Bad marriage, quick divorce’ (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 297; Liz 
McKinnell, ‘Environmental Rights’ (Doctoral thesis, Durham University 2010) 158.  
4 See §1.4. 
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discussion presented in Chapters Eight and Nine. These chapters construct 
a case for bestowing vital rights on nonhumans. Chapter Eight will 
primarily discuss the content of vital rights. Chapter Nine focuses on the 
subjects of such rights. Although addressed in separate chapters, these 
two topics are closely interrelated. This is because how the right-holder 
(the subject) is understood will necessarily influence the content of vital 
rights. 
In order to determine the potential content of nonhuman rights, Chapter 
Eight constructs a list of vital interests that ground existing vital rights (ie 
those in international human rights law (IHRL)). These vital interests 
demonstrate what sorts of interests merit the protection of vital rights. The 
existence of these vital interests in the nonhuman world will then be 
examined. Finally, the chapter will argue that having dignity is equivalent 
to having a vital interest additional to continued biological functioning. It is 
not just being alive that matters to something with dignity, but the kind of 
life matters too.  
Chapter Eight identifies forming ecological communities as a proposed vital 
interest of all living organisms that is additional to the one in continued 
biological functioning. Chapter Nine has the task of determining whether 
such an interest does in fact exist, and if so, how this could be protected 
by vital rights. Chapter Nine examines the existence of a vital interest in 
forming ecological communities primarily through the biological concept of 
‘autopoiesis’. Autopoiesis describes the defining characteristics of living 
organisms, and demonstrates that organisms are necessarily relational 
with one another. Biological and ecological consideration of these relations 
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shows them to be far-reaching and multi-dimensional: organisms are 
deeply ecologically embedded and so are better thought of as ‘organisms-
in-their-integrons’.5  
The ecological embeddedness of organisms indicates that all living 
organisms have a vital interest in forming ecological communities. 
Although life can be maintained despite the frustration of this interest 
(think caged animals or monocultures), the kind of life matters too. Just as 
being members of social groups is essential to humans, so too is being 
members of ecological groups to living organisms (including humans). 
Chapter Nine will argue that this interest can be protected through vesting 
rights in ecosystems, whilst remaining open to the possibility of nonhuman 
individual rights.  
An underlying issue for Part III is the issue of legal personality: can bears, 
snakes or forests be vital rights subjects? This is not as problematic as it 
may appear. Given that the notion of ‘(international) legal personality’ is 
constructed by humans, it can be defined however we wish.6 It is entirely 
possible for (international) legal personality to be bestowed on nonhumans. 
Consider two examples: firstly, the extension of legal personality to 
individual humans through the creation of IHRL as considered in Chapter 
One.7 Secondly, in the Reparations case, the ICJ held that the UN has legal 
                                       
5 §9.4. 
6 Consider Grear’s discussion of Naffine’s three conceptions of legal personhood 
which reveals them to all be a constructus: Anna Grear, ‘Law’s Entities: 
Complexity, Plasticity and Justice’ (2013) 4 Jurisprudence 76. 
7 §1.2.1. 
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personality, and is therefore “an entity capable of availing itself of 
obligations incumbent upon its Members”.8 The ICJ recognised that this 
need not lead to legal absurdities: “It is not the same thing as saying that 
[the UN] is a State, which it certainly is not, or that its legal personality and 
rights and duties are the same as a State”.9 Rather, they are non-identical 
subjects in one system of law. 
There is an obvious parallel here. Granting nonhumans legal personality 
would not be saying that they are humans (or states, or the UN), which 
they certainly are not; or that their legal personality and rights and duties 
would be the same as those of humans.10 Instead what is under 
consideration is the creation of new legal subjects and thus new domains 
of law. The better parallel is that contained in Simpson’s characterisation of 
the position of individuals before the adoption of the UDHR as being similar 
to the “way one might fit animals, or trees, or the environment, into 
thinking about the existence of domestic law aimed at protecting them”.11 
The aim of Part III is to consider whether animals, or trees, or the 
environment might make the move from being legal objects to legal 
                                       
8 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory 
Opinion) [1949] ICJ Rep 174, 178. 
9 ibid 179. 
10 And any nonhuman rights themselves have to be variable; “[species-]specific 
and limited. Rivers have river rights. Birds have bird rights. Insects have insect 
rights. Humans have human rights.” Thomas Berry, ‘Rights of the Earth’ in Peter 
Burdon (ed), Exploring Wild Law (Wakefield 2011) 227, 229; Christopher Stone, 
‘Should Trees Have Standing?’ (1972) 45 S Cal L Rev 450, 457-58. 
11 AWB Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire (OUP 2001) 93. §3.5. 
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subjects.12 There is a difference, which this thesis maintains, between 
stating that certain nonhumans should have vital rights and stating that 
certain nonhumans should have human rights.  
The transition of nonhumans from legal objects to legal subjects is perhaps 
obstructed by their long-established status as the former and the apparent 
conflict between these two forms of status.13 However, this is by no means 
impassable. Humans are undoubtedly legal (and moral) subjects, but this 
does not prevent them being treated at times as resources by, for example, 
determining their labour to be worth a certain hourly rate.14 Similar 
directions are possible for nonhumans.15 Human creativity is an asset that 
can be explored and exploited in constructing fitting legal structures. 
A relevant point in this regard was raised in the Separate Opinion of Judge 
Pinto de Albuquerque of the ECtHR in Herrmann v Germany.16 The case 
concerned freedom of expression and hunting, and so ecological ethics 
were thematic to the case. Judge Pinto de Albuquerque noted that animals 
are already protected by the ECHR in two ways: as property and as 
                                       
12 Ecofeminism has criticised the subjectification of natural entities on the basis 
that it is not entirely dissimilar to their objectification. Ariel Kay Salleh, ‘Deeper 
than Deep Ecology: The Eco-Feminist Connection’ (1984) 6 Environmental Ethics 
339, 344; Patrick Curry, Ecological Ethics (Polity Press 2011) 107-109. 
13 Gary Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law (Temple University Press 1995). 
14 Similarly, things can be of both intrinsic and instrumental value, see Mattia Fosci 
and Tom West, ‘In Whose Interest? Instrumental and Intrinsic Value in 
Biodiversity Law’ in Michael Bowman, Peter Davies and Edward Goodwin (eds), 
Research Handbook on Biodiversity and Law (Edward Elgar 2016) 76-77. 
15 Herrmann (n16) Separate Opinion 34. 
16 (2013) 56 EHRR 7. 
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components in an ecosystem.17 Vesting rights in animals would provide a 
third dimension of legal protection.  
Part III contemplates how these many perspectives of living organisms – 
as property (or resources), as components of ecosystems, and as beings-
in-themselves – can be held together. To mirror the continuity between 
organism and ecosystem, between subject and object, between choice and 
chance,18 a multiplicity of perspectives is demanded. Part III provides 
pathways towards this goal.
                                       
17 Since the ECHR does provide some measure of environmental protection: §2.2.1. 
18 cf: “This decisive line between chance and choice is the backbone of our 
morality” Ronald Dworkin, ‘Die Falsche Angst, Gott zu Spielen’ (1999) Zeit-
Dokument 39 cited in Jürgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (Polity 
2003) 28. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
A SURVEY OF NONHUMAN RIGHTS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter demonstrates the legal plausibility and current direction of 
nonhuman vital rights. It does this by surveying existing approaches to 
nonhuman rights in theory and in practice.  
There is a relatively long history of nonhuman animals being involved in 
legal proceedings. From a Roman legal concept that animals, as part of the 
natural order, were also to be included in the legal order (jus animalium)1 
to the prosecution of a variety of lifeforms in mediaeval courts,2 the 
extension of the legal system beyond the human domain has already 
occurred in a number of ways.  
However, Part III of this thesis is not about nonhumans and the law in 
general, but rather specifically on the concept of nonhuman vital rights. It 
is therefore necessary to focus on this specific conception of rights. As Part 
II has shown, there are fewer theoretical barriers to being a right-holder 
                                       
1 Roderick Nash, The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics 
(University of Wisconsin Press 1989)16-17. 
2 ibid 18; Philip Jamieson, ‘Animal Liability in Early Law’ (1988) 19 Cambrian Law 
Review 45; EP Evans, The Criminal Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals 
(Heinemann 1906). 
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than there are to being a duty-bearer or power-holder,3 with the result 
that it is theoretically possible for nonhumans to have rights even if they 
cannot bear duties or wield powers. This chapter starts to consider who 
else exactly might vital rights be vested in and why. 
There are two broad approaches that seek to bestow rights on nonhumans: 
‘animal rights’ and ‘rights of nature’ (RoN). Although there are a number of 
academic discussions of these approaches,4 they are not exactly aligned 
with the direction of this thesis, which specifically uses Interest Theory (IT) 
in order to ascertain how the sort of rights found in international human 
rights law (IHRL) can be used to protect the natural world. This thesis 
follows an IT approach because it allows precision and clarity over what 
exactly it is that rights are5 and what exactly it is that rights do.6 Given the 
numerous ways in which the term ‘right’ is used, it is essential to have 
clarity over these issues.  
                                       
3 §4.2; §5.2. 
4 Christopher Stone, ‘Should Trees Have Standing?’ (1972) 45 S Cal L Rev 450; 
Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Routledge 1988); Anthony D’Amato and 
Sudhir Chopra, ‘Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life’ (1991) 85 AJIL 21; Paola 
Cavalieri and Peter Singer (eds), The Great Ape Project (Fourth Estate 1993); 
Cass Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum (eds), Animal Rights: Current Debates and 
New Directions (OUP 2004); David Favre, ‘Living Property: A New Status for 
Animals Within the Legal System’ (2010) 93 Marq L Rev 1021; Gary Francione and 
Robert Garner, The Animal Rights Debate (Columbia University Press 2010); Sue 
Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights (OUP 
2011); Cormac Cullinan, Wild Law (Green Books 2011); Peter Burdon (ed), 
Exploring Wild Law (Wakefield 2011). 
5 §4. 
6 §5. 
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At a general level, there is often a mismatch between the approach 
adopted by this thesis and ‘animal rights’ and/or RoN theories because the 
terms are often used in a much vaguer sense than the specific meaning of 
‘vital rights’ utilised in this thesis. For example, Peter Singer and Jeremy 
Bentham are at times cited as supporters of ‘animal rights’ even though 
they both reject recourse to the notion of rights within the project of 
altering how humans treat nonhumans.7 This is in fact an example of the 
word ‘right’ being used in the looser sense of an important moral demand.8 
Furthermore, as will be seen shortly, even those theories that do engage 
directly with the concept of rights have shortcomings that mean that they 
are unsuitable to provide a foundation for nonhuman rights based on an IT 
approach. 
7.1.1 AN ANIMAL RIGHTS APPROACH? 
A pertinent example of an animal rights approach is Paola Cavalieri’s 
argument that seeks to extend human rights to animals.9 Cavalieri argues 
for an ‘expanded theory of human rights’10 based on similarities in the 
nature and functioning of human beings and (certain11) animals.12 Because 
of its alignment with human rights, her theory may seem particularly 
pertinent to this thesis, especially as Cavalieri briefly mentions that human 
                                       
7 Liz McKinnell, ‘Environmental Rights’ (Doctoral thesis, Durham University 2010) 
158-62. 
8 §4.5.3. 
9 Paola Cavalieri, The Animal Question (OUP 2001). 
10 ibid 137ff. 
11 Mammals, birds “and probably vertebrates in general” (ibid 139). 
12 ibid 88-113. 
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rights can be thought of as protecting ‘vital interests’.13 However, Cavalieri 
does not openly engage with IT despite its ability to provide clarity over 
both why and which (nonhuman) rights could exist.14  
The overlooking of IT in Cavalieri’s approach is found in her criteria for 
“being endowed with full moral status, [which is] being an intentional 
being”.15 As such, Cavalieri specifically details that “the criterion for the 
access to the protection that human rights warrant lies only in being… an 
intentional being that cares about its goals and wants to achieve them”.16 
However, her understanding of intentionality limits it to conscious beings,17 
as seen in her assertion that “consciousness is the prerequisite for access 
to moral consideration”.18 Cavalieri believes that rights require 
intentionality and that intentionality requires consciousness. Her theory 
thus moves away from interests and towards consciousness when 
considering the grounds of rights.  
This overlaying of intentionality and consciousness arises through a claim 
that “in order to have the desire to go on living, a being must be aware of 
itself as a distinct entity, endowed with a past and a future”.19 However, 
this clearly moves Cavalieri away from IT since having an interest in living 
                                       
13 Paola Cavalieri, ‘Are Human Rights Human?’ (2005) 4 Logos 2. In particular, the 
interests in welfare, freedom and life itself – Cavalieri (n9) 88-113. 
14 Cavalieri (n9) 88, 103. 
15 ibid 137. 
16 Cavalieri (n13) III.  
17 Cavalieri (n9) 39-40, 87, 101-02, 109, 121-43. 
18 ibid 109. 
19 ibid 102. 
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is not the same as having a desire to go on living. It seems clear that 
‘living’ is a broader process than ‘being aware of itself as a distinct entity’ 
(eg fungi are probably not conscious in any meaningful sense of the 
term).20 As such, an interest in living is (at least potentially) broader than 
a desire in living, yet Cavalieri’s approach overlooks this possibility. 
This by-passing of interests by Cavalieri21 results in her theory having too 
limited a scope.22 The scope is too limited because, as an animal rights 
approach, it does not adequately engage with the possibility of organisms 
other than animals (hereinafter ‘nonanimals’) having interests or rights. 
Given that this thesis enquires into how vital rights can be used to protect 
the natural world in general, and that a substantial proportion of the 
natural world is made up of nonanimals, such a narrow scope cannot fulfil 
the aims of this thesis.  
Given the adoption of IT in this thesis, it is appropriate to remain focussed 
on interests, rather than desires, which are arguably more closely 
orientated to a Will Theory perspective. It would of course be possible to 
adhere to IT, while arguing that it is only the interests of 
intentional/conscious beings that are eligible for the protection of (vital) 
rights.23 But Cavalieri does not adequately consider the possibility of 
                                       
20 See §8.3. 
21 Cavalieri (n9) 132. 
22 This limitation can also be found in the work of Peter Singer and Tom Regan, on 
whom Cavalieri bases much of her argument (Cavalieri (n9) 88-97). 
23 See §6.2. 
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nonanimal intentionality, or even nonanimal interests,24 nor does she 
provide a convincing case for the exclusion of nonanimals from the domain 
of potential right-holders.  
Cavalieri dismisses the possibility of nonanimals being moral patients (and 
subsequently right-holders) based on an ‘imaginative identification’ 
argument:25  
Imaginative identification is usually seen as the key 
instrument of ethics, so much that it is defined as “the 
primary form of moral argument.” To put oneself in the 
shoes of others allows us to (attempt to) understand how 
they may be affected by what happens to them. But can 
one try, for example, as Leopold suggests, to “think like a 
mountain”? In spite of what some advocates of the land 
ethic maintain, it seems that imaginative identification 
cannot play any role here… since if we put ourselves in [the 
shoes of non-conscious entities], what we find is a complete 
blank.26  
Cavalieri thus argues that because humans cannot imagine what it is like 
to be (eg) a tree or an ecosystem, nonanimals are therefore outside the 
domain of moral argument, and so cannot be right-holders.27 However, it 
                                       
24 See §8.3. 
25 Cavalieri (n9) 33-37. 
26 ibid 33-34, footnotes omitted. 
27 ibid 39-40, 87, 101-02, 109, 121-43. 
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hardly seems reasonable to reject the possibility of certain organisms 
having rights based on a (purported) human limitation.  
In any case, it is not clear that such a limitation exists. As Cavalieri is 
aware, Aldo Leopold’s powerful exhortation to “think like a mountain”28 
specifically urges the exploration of this supposed limitation.29 The 
possibility of thinking like a mountain (and the difficulty of it) is analysed 
by Warwick Fox in his exploration of three different types of self-
identification:30 personal (the most ‘usual’ kind31); ontological (which 
“refers to experiences of commonality with all that are brought about 
through deep-seated realization of the fact that things are”32); and 
cosmological (a “deep-seated realization of the fact that we and all other 
entities are aspects of a single unfolding reality”33). Fox argues that all 
three have value in understanding the natural world and its relations, 
allowing us to conceive “of all entities as leaves on the tree of life”.34 Most 
importantly, Fox’s analysis shows that even though it may be easier to 
                                       
28 ibid 33; Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (OUP 1949) 129. 
29 See John Tallmadge, ‘Anatomy of a Classic’ in J Baird Callicott (ed), Companion 
to A Sand County Almanac (University of Wisconsin 1987) 124-26. 
30 Warwick Fox, Toward A Transpersonal Ecology (SUNY Press 1990) 249-68. 
31 ibid 249-50, 259. Although not to be confused with identity, “that I literally am 
that tree over there, for example. What is being emphasized is the tremendously 
common experience that through the process of identification my sense of self 
(my experiential self) can expand to include the tree even though I and the tree 
remain physically ‘separate’ (even here, however, the word separate must not be 
taken too literally because ecology tells us that my physical self and the tree are 
physically interlinked in all sorts of ways).” (ibid 231-32, emphasis in original) 
32 ibid 250. Fox compares with the training of consciousness associated with Zen 
Buddhism. 
33 ibid 252. 
34 ibid 261. 
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identify with pandas than trees, the latter is not impossible. This limited 
scope of the ‘animal rights’ approach demonstrates that Cavalieri’s 
approach is often in need of “a deeper and more extended consideration of 
environmental philosophy’s contribution to the animal rights debate than is 
achieved by Cavalieri’s mere handful of comments”.35 
Cavalieri rightly rejects speciesism, noting that “discrimination based on 
species in analogous to those forms of discrimination that the very doctrine 
condemns in sexism and racism”.36 But by dismissing nonanimals from her 
inquiry at an early stage, this discrimination is simply displaced to a 
different taxonomical level (ie to the kingdom Metazoa).37 This 
discrimination – ‘kingdom-ism’ – is comparable with the ‘sentientism’ found 
in many other theories of animal rights,38 which has been criticised as 
simply recreating the same problem as speciesism but in a different 
location.39  
Cavalieri’s thesis, along with other ‘sentientist’ approaches, unsatisfactorily 
excludes a great number of organisms from the scope of its enquiry. 
Having seen the dangers of ‘exclusionary’ theories in Chapter One, 
whereby the protection of (modern) human rights was denied based on 
                                       
35 Chris Belshaw, ‘Review of Paola Cavalieri, The Animal Question’ [2002] Notre 
Dame Philosophical Review 12. 
36 Cavalieri (n13). 
37 Cavalieri (n9) 29. 
38 In particular Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (Random House 1975); Regan (n4). 
39 See Gary Varner, In Nature’s Interests (OUP 1998) 14, 39, 78, 98, 118; Gary 
Varner, ‘Sentientism’ in Dale Jamieson (ed), A Companion to Environmental 
Philosophy (Blackwell 2001) 192; cf Richard Ryder, ‘Sentientism’ in Cavalieri and 
Singer (n4) 220. 
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race or sex, care must be taken to avoid exclusivity creeping back in via 
species or any other human-constructed biological taxon.40 It is therefore 
prudent to advance without relying too heavily on any such theory that 
prematurely narrows the scope of enquiry through ‘kingdom-ism’ or 
sentientism. Focussing the present inquiry on nonhuman interests can help 
overcome this concern, and will be the approach adopted in this thesis. 
7.1.2 AN EARTH JURISPRUDENCE APPROACH? 
An alternative approach for nonhuman rights is that of ‘rights of nature’ 
(RoN). A wider net is cast by RoN theories, which seek to vest rights in 
many natural entities, including plants, species and ecosystems. The 
leading example of a theory underpinning a RoN approach is that of ‘Earth 
Jurisprudence’, a term coined by Thomas Berry and developed by Cormac 
Cullinan and Peter Burdon.41 Earth Jurisprudence is associated with holistic, 
ecocentric accounts of value and moral subjecthood,42 and has been 
deployed by Cullinan and Burdon as a basis as to justify Berry’s claim that 
“[r]ivers have river rights. Birds have bird rights. Insects have insect rights. 
Humans have human rights”.43 Although Earth Jurisprudence is not 
                                       
40 Cavalieri (n9) 70 
41 Cullinan (n4); Burdon (n4). 
42 See Vito de Lucia, ‘Towards an ecological philosophy of law: a comparative 
discussion’ (2013) JHRE 167, 173-79; Judith Koons, ‘Key Principles to Transform 
Law for the Health of the Planet’ in Burdon (n4) 47-49. 
43 Cited in Cullinan (n4) 103. 
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necessarily committed to the notion of rights, “the prevailing strategy 
employed within [Earth Jurisprudence] is a rights-based approach”.44 
The core idea of Earth Jurisprudence is that human constructed laws 
should be attuned with the ‘laws’ that govern the functioning of the natural 
world. According to Burdon and Cullinan, Earth Jurisprudence is in turn 
founded on ‘the Great Jurisprudence’ or ‘the Great Law’45 (the terms should 
be understood as synonymous46) which Cullinan describes as “the ‘laws’ or 
principles that govern how the universe functions”.47 These are thus more 
like the ‘laws of physics’ than the juridical meaning of law.48 
Burdon’s understanding of ‘the Great Law’ is narrower than Cullinan’s. 
Rather than all physical ‘laws’, Burdon narrows the scope of the Great Law 
to ecological ones: “the  Great  Law  represents  the  ecological  conception  
of  community  articulated  by  Berry.  More  specifically,  I  interpret  it  to  
refer  to  human  interconnectedness  with  nature  and  the ecological 
integrity  of  the  Earth  community”.49 In any case, both Cullinan and 
Burdon agree that the Great Jurisprudence/Law underpins Thomas Berry’s 
claim that “rights originate where existence originates. That which 
                                       
44 De Lucia (n42) 175. 
45 ibid 174. 
46 Peter Burdon, ‘The Earth Community and Ecological Jurisprudence’ (2013) 3 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series 815, 827n23. 
47 Cullinan (n4) 78. 
48 See Lynda Warren, ‘Wild Law – the theory’ (2006) 18 ELM 11, 13. 
49 Burdon (n46) 827; Peter Burdon, ‘The Great Jurisprudence’ in Peter Burdon (ed), 
Exploring Wild Law (Wakefield 2011) 65-67. 
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determines existence determines rights”.50 Earth Jurisprudence thus states 
that RoN arise as a consequence of, and are justified by, physical laws of 
nature; and it seeks to situate law within an ecological framework, 
redirecting law towards a “conscious reintegration of human societies into 
the Earth Community”.51 
In this regard, Cullinan states that “humans are not the only members of 
the Earth Community that have rights, and the source of those rights is not 
human laws”,52 and Burdon claims that “Earth Jurisprudence has the 
potential to provide the jurisprudential foundation for human rights law”.53 
However, it is unclear how exactly Earth Jurisprudence justifies the 
creation of rights within international law that protect the essential 
interests of living beings. The holistic, ecological perspective of Earth 
Jurisprudence urges that “human laws and governance systems must be 
designed to promote human behaviour that contributes to the health and 
integrity not only of that human society, but also of the wider ecological 
communities, and of Earth itself”54 akin to how conservationist-turned-
philosopher Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic has long urged that “a thing is right 
when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic 
                                       
50 Thomas Berry, The Great Work (Crown 2000) 103. Although this is inconsistent 
with Berry’s claim that “All rights have been bestowed on human beings” cited in 
Burdon (n49) 63. 
51 Cullinan (n4) 170.  
52 ibid 100. 
53 Burdon (n46) 830. 
54 Cullinan (n4) 82-83. See also Ian Mason, ‘One In All: Principles and 
Characteristics of Earth Jurisprudence’ in Burdon (n4) 36-37. 
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community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise”.55 But the value of rights 
as tools for identifying what duties are owed to whom does not necessarily 
feature in such a design, hence the fact that Earth Jurisprudence is not 
committed to a rights-based approach.56 
Since Earth Jurisprudence does not demand the legal tool of a right, and 
IHRL did not originate where existence originated, but through a process of 
intergovernmental negotiation that recognised the inherent dignity of the 
human person, Earth Jurisprudence requires additional theorising to justify 
vital rights. Dignity, as an intrinsic property of (at least some) living beings, 
may well originate with existence,57 and can serve this justificatory role. 
But Earth Jurisprudence does not detail any such concept in order to 
explain what (or even who) RoN should protect and why they should do so.  
There is a crucial step missing in Earth Jurisprudence’s justification of RoN. 
This step requires articulation of who RoN should be vested in, and what it 
is about these proposed right-holders that makes them worthy of the 
protection of vital rights. The final Part of this thesis will work in this lacuna 
through the tools provided by IT and dignity. Part II of this thesis has 
already shown that vital rights are grounded in the essential interests of 
living beings. This provides a pathway to specifically justify the existence 
of nonhuman vital rights in a way that is broadly compatible with Earth 
Jurisprudence and other calls for law to develop along more ecological lines. 
                                       
55 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (OUP 1949) 224. See Cullinan (n4) 114. 
56 See Burdon (n49) 66; Mason (n54) 36-44; Koons (n42) 45-47. 
57 See §1.5; §6.4. 
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Earth Jurisprudence as a rallying cry for designing law based on the laws of 
ecology bears similarities to the ecosystem approach outlined in Chapter 
Three, which “embodies knowledge of how complex, dynamic, interacting 
ecological and physical systems operate at different scales, and… highlights 
that environmental limits must be adhered to”.58 Indeed, Burdon 
acknowledges that “the Great Law should be defined with reference to ‘first 
principles’ uncovered in the scientific discipline of ecology. This approach is 
also consistent with the current direction of environmental law”.59 Another 
example of this is found in Tallacchini’s ‘Law for Nature’60 approach which 
provides a comparable ecological legal theory that does not necessitate 
deploying ‘rights’ and whose tenets can already be found in existing 
environmental law.61 This thesis is attuned with furthering the movement 
of law into harmony with ecological principles, and does this through 
careful analysis of vital rights through the lens of IT. 
7.1.3 A NONHUMAN VITAL RIGHTS APPROACH 
It is therefore necessary to forge new ground in analysing and justifying 
nonhuman vital rights. While animal rights theories too readily discard 
other organisms, RoN theories do not provide clear justification for the 
creation of (new) vital rights. This thesis will thus investigate nonhuman 
vital interests as the grounds for nonhuman vital rights. The terrain for this 
lies both between and beyond that of animal rights and Earth 
                                       
58 UK National Ecosystem Assessment, Technical Report (UNEP-WCMC 2011) 1317.  
59 Burdon (n49) 66.  
60 De Lucia (n42). 
61 ibid. 
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Jurisprudence. Like animal rights, it seeks to directly link nonhuman rights 
to existing human rights; and like RoN, it seeks to design a law that better 
reflects sound ecological principles. 
The remainder of this chapter will survey legal attempts to vest vital rights 
in nonhuman organisms and ecosystems. The purpose of this survey is to 
demonstrate the sort of rights under consideration in Part III, to 
demonstrate how varied they are, and to demonstrate their similarity to 
the vital rights found in IHRL.  
7.2 CASES 
There have been a number of attempts to secure the legal protection of 
nonhumans through judicial routes. As will be seen, these have in general 
relied on demonstrating similarities between certain nonhumans and the 
humans whose interests the law was designed to protect. As such, they 
have sought to extend existing human rights to nonhumans, in a similar 
fashion to Cavalieri’s animal rights approach.  
7.2.1 PRIMATES 
A number of attempts to establish nonhuman rights through courts have 
been made on behalf of chimpanzees. These attempts have in general 
relied upon the genetic, evolutionary and behavioural similarities between 
humans and other great apes.62  
                                       
62 See Jared Diamond, The Rise and Fall of the Third Chimpanzee (Radius 1991). 
Behavioural similarity may be more important than genetic similarity. Octopuses 
are an intriguing example: Richard Dawkins, ‘Gaps in the Mind’ in Cavalieri and 
Singer (n4) 85. 
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In Brazil63 a petition was brought in 2005 on behalf of Suíça, a chimpanzee 
held at Salvador Zoo in conditions unsuitable for her wellbeing.64 Brought 
by two public prosecutors, Heron and Luciano Santana, the key strategy in 
the writ was demonstrating the genetic, evolutionary and taxonomical 
similarity between chimpanzees and humans.65 Suíça died before the judge 
could hear the case. However, it does appear that the judge may have 
been favourable to the case since he did not dismiss it in limine and stated 
that he believed the issue will remain a live one.66   
Another attempt to get courts to recognise the personhood of a 
chimpanzee concerns Matthew ‘Hiasl’ Pan. Hiasl is a chimpanzee who was 
abducted from Sierra Leone in 1982 and taken to Austria for the purposes 
of medical research.67 Hiasl was intercepted by customs on his arrival after 
the intervention of animal rights activists under the regulations of CITES.68 
Hiasl was brought up by a guardian family and an animal shelter despite 
frequent attempts by the medical research company (Immuno) to have 
                                       
63 National legal processes are used as examples of the principles of nonhuman 
vital rights, not as evidence of their practice at the international level. 
64 ‘Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus’ (9th Salvador Criminal Court, Salvador, 
Bahia, Brazil no 833085-3/2005, O9/19/2005) (Valdelane Azevedo Clayton tr) 
<https://www.animallaw.info/sites/default/files/Habeas%20Corpus%20on%20Beh
alf%20of%20a%20Chimp%20Rev2.pdf> (accessed 19/8/2014). 
65 ibid.  
66 Official Diary for October 4th 2005, Judge Edmundo Lucio da Cruz (833085-
3/2005), available at <https://www.animallaw.info/case/suica-habeas-corpus> 
(accessed 19/8/2014).  
67 Martin Balluch, ‘Personhood Trial for Chimpanzee Matthew Pan’ < 
https://www.vgt.at/publikationen/texte/artikel/20080118Hiasl.htm> (accessed 
19/8/2014). 
68 ibid. 
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him extracted. In 2006 a large amount of money was donated to an animal 
rights association on the condition that a legal guardian be appointed for 
Hiasl and that Hiasl (through his guardian) and the association jointly 
decide how to spend the money.69  
The Austrian District, Provincial and Supreme Courts all turned down the 
application to appoint a legal guardian for Hiasl based on predominantly 
technical issues.70 The courts reasoned that as Hiasl is not mentally 
handicapped or facing imminent threat, it was impossible to appoint a legal 
guardian, and that this ruling could not be challenged on his behalf.71 
Attempting to transfer legal structures designed for humans directly onto 
nonhumans can result in poorly fitting outcomes. When apprised of the 
case, the ECtHR ruled the application inadmissible without any detailed 
examination of the substantive arguments.72  
Finally, there are currently a number related habeas corpus claims under 
consideration in New York.73 The cases have been brought by the 
Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) on behalf of four chimpanzees kept in 
                                       
69 ibid. 
70 ibid. 
71 ibid. 
72 Balluch v Austria (26180/08, 4 May 2008) and Stibbe v Austria (26188/08, 6 
May 2008). (See Herrmann v Germany (2013) 56 EHRR 7 Separate Opinion 
38n22). 
73 Nonhuman Rights Project on behalf of Tommy v Lavery 124 AD.3d 148 (2014) 
(Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, 3rd 
Department); Nonhuman Rights Project on behalf of Kiko v Presti 124 AD.3d 1334 
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Department); Nonhuman Rights Project on behalf of Hercules and Leo v Stanley 
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captivity: Tommy and Kiko are owned by (separate) individuals; and 
Hercules and Leo are used for research at Stony Brook University.  
The approach adopted by NhRP has been to demonstrate the similarity 
between humans and the chimpanzees in question through considering the 
exhibited characteristics of Tommy et al. Eleven experts from a range of 
fields have submitted affidavits to support the NhRP petitions74 chronicling 
the emotional, psychological, and cognitive development of the 
chimpanzees as evidence of both their sense of self and their autonomy, 
which the NhRP considers “the most important cognitive ability”.75 
As of December 2016, none of the cases have yet been successful. They 
are currently being appealed or re-filed by the NhRP. In the case against 
Stony Brook University an ‘Order to Show Cause’ was issued requiring the 
University to give a legally sufficient reason for detaining Hercules and 
Leo.76 However, Justice Jaffe ruled that a previous determination that 
Tommy could not be a legal person because he could not bear duties 
bound her to deny the petition for habeas corpus in the present case.77 The 
University announced in May 2016 that they would be relocating all their 
                                       
74 Available at <http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2013/12/02/legal-
documents-re-tommy-kiko-hercules-and-leo-2/> (accessed 20/8/2014). 
75 Tommy (n73), Verified Petition, State of New York Supreme Court, County of 
Fulton [21]. 
76 Hercules and Leo (n73), ‘Order to Show Cause’. 
77 ibid 27-31. 
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chimpanzees (including Hercules and Leo) to a sanctuary, in line with the 
remedy argued for by the NhRP.78  
Justice Jaffe also maintained this ruling in follow-up habeas corpus 
petitions on behalf of Tommy79 and Kiko,80 which contained additional 
evidence showing that “chimpanzees routinely shoulder duties and 
responsibilities both in chimpanzee communities and in human/chimpanzee 
communities”.81 In January 2017 the Appellate Division of the New York 
Supreme Court will hear the NhRP’s question as to whether “the capacity 
to bear duties and responsibilities [has] any relationship to being deemed 
a ‘person’ for the purpose of demanding a writ of habeas corpus”.82 
Certainly, the analysis presented in Chapter Four of this thesis has 
demonstrated that it is not necessary to bear duties in order to hold rights. 
                                       
78 NhRP, ‘Nonhuman Rights Project Chimpanzee Clients Hercules and Leo to Be 
Sent to Sanctuary’ (3 May 2016) 
http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2016/05/03/nonhuman-rights-project-
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7.2.2 CETACEANS 
Another animal taxon comparable to humans in terms of their intelligence 
and social nature is cetaceans.83 Whales, dolphins and porpoises exhibit 
characteristics similar to primates and are thus obvious candidates when it 
comes to extending vital rights to nonhumans. 
Because of this similarity, in 2011 PETA filed a complaint against Seaworld 
on behalf of five orcas (Tilikum, Katina, Corky, Kasatska and Ulises) held in 
captivity by Seaworld.84 PETA’s strategy was to use the Thirteenth 
Amendment to the US Constitution (designed to abolish slavery) to secure 
the freedom of these nonhumans.85  
Rather than drawing directly on the behaviour of Tilikum et al, the case 
focussed on the suitability of the conditions in which the orcas are held 
captive.86 To do this, it was necessary to make reference to the natural 
repertoire of orcas in general, such as their complex social and 
communicative behaviours, their community structures and emotional 
                                       
83 eg Lori Marino, ‘Convergence of Complex Cognitive Abilities in Cetaceans and 
Primates’ (2002) 59 Brain Behavior and Evolution 21. 
84 Tilikum et al v SeaWorld No 11 Civ 2476, 842 F Supp.2d 1259 (Southern District 
Court, California 2011).  
See also David Mence, ‘The cetacean right to life revisited’ (2015) 11 International 
Journal of Law in Context 17; Indian Central Zoo Authority, ‘Policy on 
establishment of dolphinarium’ 20-1/2010-CZA(M)/2840 
<http://www.moef.nic.in/assets/ban%20on%20dolphanariums.pdf>(accessed 
17/7/2014); and a proposed bill brought by Romanian MP Remus Cernea to 
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<www.senat.ro/legis/lista.aspx?cod=17966>(in Romanian, accessed 7/9/2014). 
85 ‘Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief’, Tilikum (n84) [1]. 
86 ibid [1], [19]-[66]. 
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processing.87 The conditions the orcas are held in by Seaworld prevent 
them from expressing their normal behaviour and frustrate some of their 
most basic needs.88  
The case was thrown out for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.89 The court 
ruled that only humans were intended to, and can, benefit from the 
Thirteenth Amendment. In reaching this conclusion, the Court determined 
that “the Amendment is not reasonably subject to an expansive 
interpretation… as ‘slavery’ and ‘involuntary servitude’ are uniquely human 
activities”.90 This is however by no means an unchallengeable proposition, 
and given the longstanding extension of the Fourteenth Amendment 
(regarding equal protection of the law) to the US Constitution to 
corporations,91 it is clear that it would be legally possible to also interpret 
the Thirteenth Amendment expansively. 
7.2.3 ANIMAL RIGHTS IN THE INDIAN COURTS 
There have also been developments regarding animal rights from the 
Indian judiciary. In the Jallikattu case,92 concerns over the welfare of bulls 
used in jallikattu (an activity similar to bullfighting) were brought to the 
Supreme Court of India by the Animal Welfare Board. The concerns 
included twisting bulls’ tails, poking bulls with knives and sticks, cramped 
                                       
87 ibid [10]-[18]. 
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89 ‘Order Granting Motion to Dismiss’, Tilikum (n84) 7. 
90 ibid 6-7. 
91 Santa Clara County v Southern Pacific Railroad Co 118 US 394 (1886).  
92 Animal Welfare Board of India v A Nagaraja & Ors Civil Appeal No 5387 of 2014. 
346 
 
conditions, and a lack of food and water.93 The Supreme Court accepted 
that the treatment of bulls in jallikattu caused them to suffer mentally and 
physically94 and ruled that bulls must not be used in jallikattu or other 
similar activities anywhere in India.95  
The Supreme Court’s readiness to refer to ‘animal rights’ throughout its 
judgment is notable. In particular, the Court acknowledged that the case 
concerned “an issue of seminal importance with regards to the Rights of 
Animals”.96 It also acknowledged the need for responsible guardianship in 
order to protect nonhumans,97 and lamented the lacuna at the 
international level between the rights of humans and of other species.98  
However, the Court’s understanding of ‘rights’ is at times blurry. As 
demonstrated in Part II, there is a difference between a purely legal claim-
right and the sort of right found in IHRL. This distinction is indeed 
acknowledged by the Court: 
Rights guaranteed to the animals under Sections 3, 11, etc. 
are only statutory rights. The same have to be elevated to 
the status of fundamental rights, as has been done by few 
                                       
93 ibid [17]. 
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countries around the world, so as to secure their honour 
and dignity.99 
This refers to a process of turning statutory rights into vital rights (in order 
to secure dignity). However, this process has not taken place in other 
countries. Despite this obscurity, it seems likely that the Supreme Court 
does endorse the concept of vital animal rights. Evidence of this 
endorsement can be gleaned from Nair v Union of India, a case heard by 
the Kerala High Court, and cited in Jallikattu: 
It is not only our fundamental duty to show compassion to 
our animal friends, but also to recognise and protect their 
rights… If humans are entitled to fundamental rights, why 
not animals?… While the law currently protects wildlife and 
endangered species from extinction, animals are denied 
rights, an anachronism which must necessarily change.100 
7.3 LEGISLATION 
Although there is no binding international legal agreement that bestows 
vital rights on any organism other than humans, there have been a 
number of texts drafted that demonstrate what form any such treaty might 
take. These are worth examining to get a sense of the form of proposed 
nonhuman vital rights. 
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no 155/1999 [13]. Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice (HUP 2006) 325. 
348 
 
7.3.1 1978 UNESCO DECLARATION OF ANIMAL RIGHTS 
This declaration was proclaimed at the UNESCO headquarters in 1978 but 
failed to meet with international approval.101 Its 14 Articles contain a 
mixture of potentially enforceable rights (“All animals belonging to a wild 
species have the right to live freely in their natural environment, and have 
the right to reproduce”102), more general exhortations (“To abandon an 
animal is a cruel and degrading act”103) and provisions in-between (“Every 
animal has the right to be respected”104).  
Certain key themes can be found in the provisions. For example, issues of 
biological functioning,105 physical liberty,106 and torture107 all feature.108 
There is also a reference to animal dignity: the Declaration stating that 
                                       
101 Available at <http://www.vier-
pfoten.ro/files/Romania/Diverse/universal_declaration_of_animal_rights.pdf> 
(accessed 10/6/2015).  
The Declaration was revised by the International League of Animal Rights in 1989 
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103 Article 6(2). 
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108 §8.2-8.3. 
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“animal exhibitions and entertainments involving animals are incompatible 
with animal dignity.”109 
7.3.2 HELSINKI DECLARATION 
A more recent animal rights declaration is the 2010 Helsinki Declaration of 
Rights for Cetaceans.110 An output of an interdisciplinary conference, the 
Declaration is “based on the principle of equal treatment of all persons”.111 
The Declaration is not meant to be legally binding, but is a primarily 
rhetorical device. The species (or in this case order112) specific approach 
may be necessary to account for the diversity in the natural world: it is 
highly unlikely that all nonhumans should have the same rights.  
The rights contained within the Declaration include: a right to life;113 a 
right to freedom of movement;114 freedom from captivity, servitude, and 
cruel treatment;115 a right to protection of their natural environment;116 a 
right to not have their culture disrupted;117 and a right to an international 
order in which their rights can be realised.118 These all have clear parallels 
                                       
109 Article 10(2). 
110 <http://www.cetaceanrights.org/> (accessed 19/5/2015). See also ‘A 
Declaration on Great Apes’ in Cavalieri and Singer (n4) 4-7. 
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in IHRL and are even overlapping. For example, a dolphin right to 
environment will inevitably overlap with a human right to environment 
since both humans and dolphins will be negatively affected by certain 
pollutants or alterations to ecological dynamics. The important observation 
is that human and nonhuman rights will often end up working in the same 
direction.  
7.3.3 RIGHTS OF NATURE 
As already noted, attempts to establish nonhuman rights have not 
exclusively focussed on animals. RoN approaches seek to vest rights in a 
diverse range of natural beings, including nonanimals, ecosystems and the 
Earth itself. The concept of RoN has been debated by the UNGA on a 
number of occasions119 and the idea of bestowing rights on ecosystems 
and other such natural entities has a long history and a growing 
following.120  
The standout RoN instrument is the 2010 Universal Declaration of Rights of 
Mother Earth (UDRME).121 Adopted at a World Peoples’ Conference on 
Climate Change (a response to the contemporaneous Copenhagen COP 15), 
this exhortative Declaration ascribes rights to “Mother Earth and all beings 
                                       
119 eg ‘Harmony with nature’ A/71/266 (1 August 2016)’; ‘The Future We Want’ 
A/RES/66/288 (11 September 2012) [39]; 
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121 <http://therightsofnature.org/universal-declaration/> (accessed 12/5/2015). 
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of which she is composed”.122 The language used is a result of the heavy 
South American influence,123 where the concepts of Pachamana (or Mother 
Earth) and ‘buen vivir’124 have emerged and taken root. The UDRME 
appears designed to mirror the UDHR, although it does not mention the 
concept of dignity. Within the Declaration are rights to life, to identity and 
integrity, to water and to clean air.125 Notably, these rights are attached to 
organisms, species, natural communities and Mother Earth herself.126 
Article 4(2) UDRME also opens the door to the creation of further species- 
(or other taxon-)specific rights (such as IHRL and the Helsinki Declaration) 
complementary to those contained in the UDRME. 
There are also instances of legally binding RoN within the national law of 
two South American states.127 Chapter VII of the Ecuadorian 
Constitution128 is entitled ‘Rights of Nature’ and bestows on “Nature, or 
Pacha Mama… the right to integral respect for its existence and for the 
                                       
122 Article 2(1). See also Article 4(1): “The term “being” includes ecosystems, 
natural communities, species and all other natural entities which exist as part of 
Mother Earth.” 
123 Although similar ideas are being investigated in Europe through a European 
Citizens’ Initiative: <http://www.rightsofnature.eu/ECI-DraftDirective-Draft.pdf> 
(accessed 3/10/2016, ‘ECI Draft Directive’) and in the US through municipal level 
law.  
124 A concept with roots in indigenous thinking which critiques the Western 
economic development paradigm. It has been incorporated into the Constitutions 
of Bolivia and Ecuador. Eduardo Gudynas, ‘Buen Vivir: Today’s Tomorrow’ (2011) 
54 Development 441. 
125 Article 2. 
126 Articles 2(1) and 4(1). 
127 See also <http://www.harmonywithnatureun.org/rightsofnature.html> 
(accessed 12/11/2016). 
128 Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, National Assembly Legislative and 
Oversight Committee (October 20, 2008). 
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maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles, structure, functions and 
evolutionary processes”,129 a right to be restored,130 and the right of 
persons, communities, peoples and nations to benefit from the natural 
environment, “enabling them to enjoy the good way of living”.131 Chapter 
VII coalesces human and nonhuman rights, seeing them as mutually 
interdependent rather than antagonistic.132  
These constitutional rights are legally enforceable, and Article 73 of the 
Constitution sets out responsibilities of the state: “The State shall apply 
preventive and restrictive measures on activities that might lead to the 
extinction of species, the destruction of ecosystems and the permanent 
alteration of natural cycles”. Such a provision is far-reaching and a 
provincial court in Ecuador has held a judgment against the state based on 
Chapter VII in Wheeler and Huddle v Attorney General of the State of 
Loja.133 In its judgment, the court noted that “even when there are two 
collective interests to consider, the environment is the most important”.134 
This demonstrates the potentially far-reaching impact of RoN. 
                                       
129 Article 71. 
130 Article 72. 
131 Article 74. 
132 See also UDRME Article 1(6), ECI Draft Directive Article 4(3). 
133 (2011) Judgment No 11121-2011-0010. See Erin Daly, ‘Case Note’ (2012) 21 
RECIEL 63; Karen Hulme, ‘International environmental law and human rights’ in 
Scott Sheeran and Nigel Rodley (eds), Routledge Handbook of International 
Human Rights Law (Routledge 2013) 285, 287, 298; Boyd (n46) 140; Laurel Fish, 
‘Homogenizing Community, Homogenizing Nature’ (2013) 12 Stanford 
Undergraduate Research Journal 6. 
134 ibid [Décimo Segundo] (author’s translation). 
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Secondly, although not at the constitutional level, Bolivia has introduced a 
Law of the Rights of Mother Earth.135 Unlike the Ecuadorian Constitution, 
but like the UDRME, the Bolivian Law assigns rights to a wide variety of 
subjects: to Mother Earth and all her components.136  
7.3.4 TE UREWERA AND TE AWA TUPUA 
A final example comes from New Zealand where new legislation is 
emerging that bestows rights on particular parts of the natural world. The 
Te Urewera Act (2014)137 and the Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims 
Settlement) Bill (2016)138 respectively declare Te Urewera (previously a 
National Park) and Te Awa Tupua (“an indivisible and living whole, 
comprising the Whanganui River from the mountains to the sea, 
incorporating all its physical and metaphysical elements”139) to be legal 
entities/persons with “all the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal 
person”.140 
Not only do these instruments bestow rights on nonhuman parts of the 
natural world, but they also set out the legal mechanisms through which 
these rights are to be exercised and protected. The Te Urewera Act 
                                       
135 Ley de Derechos de la Madre Tierra (2010), Law 071 of the Plurinational State. 
For further examples see 
<http://www.harmonywithnatureun.org/rightsofnature.html> (accessed 
3/8/2015). 
136 Article 5. 
137 2014/51 (27 July 2014). 
138 2016/129-2. See Elaine Hsiao, ‘Whanganui River Agreement’ (2012) 42 
Environmental Policy and Law 371. 
139 ibid s12. 
140 Te Urewera Act (n137) s11(1).  
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appoints a Board to act as legal guardians who must inter alia “act on 
behalf of, and in the name of, Te Urewera”141 and “promote or advocate for 
the interests of Te Urewera”.142 The Te Awa Tupua Bill contains comparable 
provisions through the establishment of ‘Te Pou Tupua’ (comprising one 
representative from the iwi and one from the Crown), whose purpose is to 
be “the human face of Te Awa Tupua”143 and who must “promote and 
protect the health and well-being of Te Awa Tupua”.144 
It is interesting to note that these laws have been developed to improve 
the legal protection offered to traditional Maori iwi and cosmologies as 
much as for reasons of environmental protection.145 Maori cosmology 
appears to more easily capture the interconnected relations between 
humans and their environments:146 protecting human interests and 
nonhuman interests are not seen as incompatible, but rather as 
complementary. The retention of Maori terminology in the English 
language texts potentially signals understanding that some relevant iwi 
concepts (such as Te Awa Tupua) are missing from Western cosmologies, 
and that legal structures can learn from, and adapt to, indigenous 
philosophical and spiritual concepts.147   
                                       
141 ibid s17(a). 
142 ibid s18(1)(g). 
143 supra n138 s18(2). 
144 ibid s19(1)(c). 
145 Catherine Iorns Magallanes, ‘Nature as an Ancestor: Two examples of Legal 
Personality for Nature in New Zealand’ (2015) VertigO Hors-série 22 [45]. 
146 See n138 s71. 
147 Magallanes (n145) [29]. 
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7.4 CONCLUSION 
Nonhuman rights are diverse. This diversity is itself multidimensional: 
there are a number of potential subjects of nonhuman rights, various 
potential justifications for them, and variations in their content. Broadly 
speaking, approaches through the courts have focussed on animal rights, 
whereas legislative approaches have had a broader scope. As a result, the 
most suitable subjects for nonhumans rights is unclear. Focus at the 
ecosystem-level is more in line with current environmental protection, but 
organism rights coalesce more smoothly with existing human rights.  
The general approach behind animal rights both in theory and in practice is 
normally one of demonstrating a similarity between humans and the 
animals in question, and so arguing for an extension of existing human 
rights to nonhumans. This has been seen in the work of Cavalieri and in 
the cases brought by the NhRP and PETA. An important shortcoming of 
using ‘similar-to-humans’ type arguments is that it can lead to 
expectations that chimpanzees (for example) must exhibit identical 
properties to humans in order to be legal persons. However, this is not the 
case, and comparisons between certain nonhumans and certain ‘fringe 
cases’ of humans (such as infans) risks portraying both in an unfavourable 
and unfair light.148 Rather than being ‘almost-human’, other forms of life 
have adopted their own strategies for survival and for flourishing that are 
distinct from – although related to – human ones.  
                                       
148 John Rodman, ‘The Liberation of Nature?’ (1977) 20 Inquiry 83, 94. 
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Although moral extensionism (ie ascribing moral importance to new 
subjects based on comparisons and similarities with existing moral 
subjects) can have some traction in improving how humans treat 
nonhumans, it maintains a hierarchical ideology whereby a particular 
image of  ‘the human’ is considered the ideal form. This invokes the 
outdated ideas contained in Plato’s ‘Great Chain of Being’, an analogy that 
still pervades despite the discovery of evolution.149 In the words of Darwin, 
“[i]t is absurd to talk of one animal being higher than another — We 
consider those, when the intellectual faculties/cerebral structure most 
developed, as highest — A bee doubtless would when the instincts 
were”.150 
Animal rights approaches are also limited in their ability to protect the 
natural world because they often focus on the plight of individual 
organisms, and in particular on domesticated or encaged animals. They 
thus overlook both the need to consider more holistic issues that are key 
to environmental protection measures (such as species and habitat loss 
and ecosystem functioning), and the need to protect wild animals and 
other organisms. 
On the other hand, the RoN approach is more all-encompassing and 
ascribes rights to not only many organisms, but other ecological levels-of-
organisation (species, ecosystem etc) too. RoN may however be too 
                                       
149 Note too that the idea of being ‘more evolved’ is essentially meaningless. 
Species are as evolved as they need to be. 
150 Charles Darwin, R. Notebook B: Transmutation of Species (CUL-DAR121, 1837-
38) [74]. 
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indiscriminate with important moral and structural components of rights: 
does an ecosystem have dignity or a species interests? To answer these 
questions, clarity is needed over the nature of dignity and the content of 
vital interests. Any theory on these matters must avoid being overly 
prescriptive about how immediately comparable their manifestation in 
nonhumans is with human equivalents in order to avoid the pitfalls of 
moral extensionism.  
The following two chapters build on this one by analysing and developing 
the theory behind nonhuman rights. They will analyse in more detail the 
sort of interests that ground vital rights, how these relate to dignity, and 
their existence within living organisms. This will fill a lacuna within Earth 
Jurisprudence’s justifications for RoN, showing that the dignity of living 
organisms arises through their interconnections with other beings, and that 
this dignity can be protected through bestowing rights on ecosystems.
358 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
INTERESTS AND DIGNITY, HUMAN AND NONHUMAN 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having seen the diversity of nonhuman rights in Chapter Seven, this 
chapter will provide clarity and precision for the way ahead. It considers 
the content of vital rights through the lens of vital interests. It uses the 
framework of dignity, vital interests and rights developed in Part II to 
construct a pathway for Chapter Nine to make a case for nonhuman vital 
rights. Chapter Eight is chiefly concerned with the construct of nonhuman 
dignity (what it is), and Chapter Nine with its location (where it is).  
In order to analyse nonhuman vital interests and dignity, a three phased 
approach will be taken. Firstly, a list of the vital interests that ground 
international human rights law (IHRL) will be constructed. Recalling that 
IHRL currently offers the only example of vital rights,1 determining what 
interests are protected by IHRL will generate a (non-exhaustive) list of 
vital interests. Secondly, the chapter will demonstrate the existence of (at 
least some of) these vital interests in (at least some) nonhumans.  
Thirdly, having seen that nonhuman vital interests do exist, it becomes 
necessary to develop Chapter Six’s description of the relationship between 
                                       
1 §4.2n8. 
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dignity and vital interests. Since dignity is a valid justification for the 
existence of vital rights (though not necessarily the only one), the 
presence of nonhuman dignity opens the way to making a case for the 
creation of nonhuman rights. 
In analysing the nature of vital interests and dignity, this chapter will use 
intrinsic value (a concept from ecological philosophy2) to construct a 
definition of dignity. This definition states that dignity is present when 
something has a vital interest additional to the one in continued biological 
functioning. This is because it is not just life, but the kind of life that 
matters to something with dignity. This definition is compatible with 
dignity’s role as both a justification and as a metric, as well as with the 
conceptualisation of vital interests as specifications of a pluralistic dignity 
seen in Chapter Six. 
8.2 INTERESTS IN IHRL 
Though useful, Part II’s analysis that the function of vital rights is to 
protect vital interests does not determine which interests ought to be 
protected by what rights. Recall that: 
When [IT] contends that rights are modes of protection for 
interests that are treated as worthy of such protection, it is 
setting forward a thesis about the general nature or 
structure of rights. It is not advancing any criterion or set 
                                       
2 Ecological ethics provides an appropriate resource for ideas in this regard, given 
its concern with both living (ie vital) beings, and with justifying and prioritising 
human behaviour towards the natural world. 
360 
 
of criteria for what should count as the ‘worthiness’ of an 
interest.3 
The same is true of vital interests. However, it is possible to discover some 
interests that are worthy of vital rights by considering extant vital rights. 
The interests grounding the rights in IHRL are definitive examples of 
interests that are deserving of both the moral impetus and the 
accompanying legal structure of vital rights. By analysing what these 
interests are, a list of vital interests will be generated. As such, the 
approach taken to enlist vital interests in this thesis is not to investigate a 
priori which interests merit vital rights, but to discover some vital interests 
by looking at existing IHRL.  
This list will be non-exhaustive. There is no reason to expect IHRL to 
already include all possible vital interests, but it will provide a clear and 
concrete description of the content of vital rights. Recalling the relationship 
between dignity, vital interests and vital rights detailed in Chapter Six (see 
diagram), understanding the nature of vital interests will also develop 
understanding of dignity.  
 
                                       
3 Matthew Kramer, ‘Rights Without Trimmings’ in Mathew Kramer et al, A Debate 
Over Rights (OUP 1998) 79. 
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No categorisation of human rights under vital interests is immutable or 
undebatable. There is not one single bridge between dignity and vital 
rights. There are a number of consequences of this. Firstly, it is by no 
means the case that the set of vital interests presented here ought to be 
considered the only possible set. A number of other academics have 
undertaken similar tasks and produced lists that are congruent but not 
identical.4 This congruence suggests that finding ground between human 
                                       
4 Oscar Schachter, ‘Human Dignity as a Normative Concept’ (1983) 77 AJIL 848, 
852; Dieter Birnbacher, ‘Ambiguities in the Concept of Menschenwürde’ in Kurt 
Bayertz (ed), Sanctity of Life and Human Dignity (Kluwer 1996) 110; AC Grayling, 
‘Foreword’ in Robin Headlam Wells and Johnjoe McFadden (eds), Human Nature, 
Fact and Fiction (Continuum 2006) xi; Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice (HUP 
2006) 70, 76-78, 155-59, 392-401; James Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights 
(Blackwell 2007) ch4; Johannes Morsink, Inherent Human Rights (University of 
Pennsylvania Press 2009) 161ff; James Nickel and David Reidy, ‘Philosophy’ in 
Daniel Moeckli et al (eds), International Human Rights Law (1st edn, OUP 2010) 
39, 40-41; Charles Foster, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Law (Hart 2011) 49. 
Consider also the UK Farm Animal Welfare Council’s five freedoms: Clare 
McCausland, ‘The Five Freedoms of Animal Welfare are Rights’ (2014) 27 J Agric 
Environ Ethics 649. 
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rights and dignity is not a hopeless task; there are some common features 
that can be picked out. Secondly, the fact that they are congruent rather 
than identical points to the fact that dignity can be specified in alternative 
ways. This supports the claims that dignity is pluralistic and malleable. 
Once a list has been constructed, it will be compared to others established 
in the literature to demonstrate common features. 
Thirdly, no set of vital interests will provide a watertight categorisation of 
rights. That is, some human rights are grounded in more than one vital 
interest. Again, this reinforces the “indivisible, interdependent and 
interrelated”5 nature of human rights and is a result of the inherent 
continuities in the world: sometimes it simply is not possible to define 
strict boundaries around phenomena. It is not problematic if it seems that 
a particular human right is grounded in more than one vital interest (the 
rights to education and to family will provide two good examples). This is 
to be expected. 
Finally, it should be acknowledged that there are a number of other ways 
by which one could go about defending, justifying or contemplating human 
rights.6 However, here the focus is on the conclusion of Part II that rights 
protect interests. The fact that there are other conceptualisations of human 
rights does not negate the validity, appropriateness, usefulness or 
                                       
5 World Conference on Human Rights, ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action’ A/CONF.157/23 (25 June 1993) Article 5. 
6 Such as seeing them as being about equality, prudence, protest, or as being 
historically or religiously contingent. These are not necessarily incompatible with 
an interest theory of vital rights, but rather emphasise different characteristics of 
said rights. See §4.2n7. 
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relevance of seeing them as being about protecting vital human interests. 
Moreover, it is a reminder that there are often a number of perspectives 
available to view any particular phenomenon. 
8.2.1 INTERESTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 
A set of vital interests protected by IHRL has been generated here through 
surveying the provisions of the three key IHRL instruments: the UDHR, 
ICCPR and ICESCR. General Comments from the HRC and the CESCR and 
authoritative commentaries7 have been used to provide additional evidence 
as to the intended purpose and meaning of the rights. Using this method, 
the following general interests can be distilled. 
1. AN INTEREST IN CONTINUED BIOLOGICAL FUNCTIONING AND REPRODUCTION 
The precise nature of the human condition has been debated since time 
immemorial, and a key part of this debate is the balance or interaction 
between our bodies and our souls.8 Although to be human may well involve 
more than a physical existence, this aspect of our lives is undeniable. 
Humans may not be able to live by bread alone, but it is still necessary. As 
                                       
7 Asbjørn Eide et al (eds), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A 
Commentary (Scandinavian University Press 1992); Gudmundur Alfredsson and 
Asbjørn Eide (eds), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 
1999); Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (3rd edn, OUP 2013); Ben Saul et al, The International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (OUP 2014). 
8 (eg) Catechism of the Catholic Church Part One, Section Two, Chapter One, 
Article I, Paragraph 6, Part II; Descartes and the pineal gland (Gert-Jan Lokhorst, 
‘Descartes and the Pineal Gland’ in Edward Zalta (ed), The Standford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Spring 2014 edn) 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/pineal-gland/> (accessed 
27/7/2015); the eight consciousnesses in Yogācāra Buddhism, Tsong kha pa, 
Ocean of Eloquence (Gareth Sparham tr, SUNY 1993) 11-12. 
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such, suitable conditions for biological continuation are a vital interest of 
the embodied human being (the subject of IHRL).  
This is recognised in IHRL through rights that protect the basic biological 
needs of human beings. The right to life is clearly grounded in this interest. 
It protects against arbitrary deprivation of life,9 including seeking to reduce 
infant mortality, malnutrition and epidemics.10 Other relevant rights include 
the right to health, which, although not a right to be healthy,11 is 
concerned with “the proactive responsibility of promoting health and 
wellbeing”.12 This right has a clear connection to biological survival (it is a 
right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health after 
all). There is also the right to adequate food, which has been interpreted to 
mean that “the diet as a whole contains a mix of nutrients … that are in 
compliance with human physiological needs at all stages throughout the 
life cycle”;13 and the right to rest, which recognises the biological 
limitations of humans through noting the importance of “giving the 
individual a possibility to regain [their] strength”.14  
At a broad level, the existence of this vital human interest in is also found 
in the right to social security and to secure a means of existence through 
                                       
9 ICCPR Article 6(1); HRC, General Comment 6 [3], HRI/GEN/1/ (Vol I). 
10 HRC, General Comment 6 [5]. 
11 CESCR, General Comment 14 [8]. 
12 Saul (n7) 979 ; CESCR, General Comment 14 [4]. 
13 CESCR, General Comment 12 [9]. 
14 Eide (n7) 380.  
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work,15 since “the right to work contributes … to the survival of the 
individual and to that of his/her family”16 since it “provides an income 
allowing workers to support themselves and their families".17 And “like the 
right to work … the right to social security is a vital means of ensuring an 
individual’s subsistence”.18 Both these rights demonstrate awareness that 
humans have basic physical needs which need sustenance.19  
There is also a trans-generational component to the interest in continued 
biological functioning. Biological survival also takes place through the 
continuation of the species. The trans-generational component to this vital 
interest can be found in the focus on reproductive health within the right to 
health20 and the right to life (regarding infant mortality21). The Special 
Rapporteur on the right to health has affirmed that this right means that 
people should “have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide 
if, when and how often to do so”22 as well as access to infertility 
treatment.23 It can also be found in the right to found a family, which 
                                       
15 This is distinct from the right to work since it concerns the fruits of the labour 
rather than the opportunity to work itself. UDHR Article 22, Article 23(3), Article 
25(1), ICESCR Article 6(1), Article 7(a)(ii), Article 9. The right to work cuts across 
the interests identified here since it achieves multiple goals: Saul (n7) 271-86,  
16 CESCR, General Comment 18 [1]. 
17 CESCR, General Comment 18 [7]. 
18 Saul (n7) 611. 
19 See CESCR, General Comment 19 [12]-[21].  
20 Article 12(2)(a) ICESCR. See also CESCR, General Comment 14 [44(a)]. 
21 HRC, General Comment 6 [5]. 
22 Echoing the declaration of an International Conference on Population and 
Development held in Cairo in 1994, cited in Saul (n7) 1014. 
23 Saul (n7) 1015. 
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“implies, in principle, the possibility to procreate”.24 As such, human rights 
also protect and promote the human interest in reproducing and continuing 
the genetic line. 
2. AN INTEREST IN FREEDOM FROM EXPLOITATION 
IHRL recognises that it is not just being alive that matters but that 
conditions while alive are essential too. Freedom from torture is a 
particularly salient aspect to this. Torture does not cause an end to 
biological continuation, yet is protected against by IHRL.25 As well as 
physical (or indeed mental26) suffering, there is an additional important 
component to torture: according to the Convention Against Torture, it 
is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person 
has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any 
reason based on discrimination of any kind.27  
This additional component of coercion, intimidation or discrimination 
signposts the general interest that grounds freedom from torture. It 
demonstrates that freedom from torture can be understood more broadly 
as freedom from exploitation; that is, freedom from taking advantage of 
                                       
24 HRC, General Comment 19 [5]. 
25 Note that derogations from torture are often forbidden. ICCPR Article 4(2), 
ECHR Article 15(2). 
26 CAT Article 1; HRC, General Comment 20 [2], [5]. 
27 Article 1. See also Joseph and Castan (n7) 217. 
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physical and mental vulnerabilities in order to achieve some ulterior 
motive. Such a reading is consistent with the fact that torture is already 
grouped with similar exploitative activities in Article 7 ICCPR, namely 
‘inhuman’ and ‘degrading’ treatment.28 There are also complementary 
positive requirements under Article 10(1) ICCPR to treat all persons 
deprived of their liberty with humanity (ie to not exploit them).29  
The HRC has noted a need for “safeguards for the special protection of 
particularly vulnerable persons”30 under Article 7 ICCPR. Whilst this is 
clearly true, it is important to note that as living (vital) beings, all humans 
are inherently vulnerable. It is this vulnerability that generates the very 
possibility of exploitation that IHRL has set out to protect against. 
Other rights within IHRL that are grounded in the vital interest in freedom 
from exploitation include: the right not to be enslaved or held in 
servitude,31 since “slavery occurs where one human being effectively 
‘owns’ another, so that the former can thoroughly exploit the latter with 
impunity”;32 freedom from forced or compulsory labour,33 which the CESCR 
                                       
28 ICCPR Article 7; HRC, General Comment 7 [2]. 
29 HRC, General Comment 20 [2], Joseph and Castan (n7) 216ff. 
30 HRC, General Comment [11]. 
31 ICCPR Article 8. 
32 Joseph and Castan (n7) 330. 
33 ICCPR Article 8(3). 
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considers a “form of exploitation”;34 and the right of children and young 
people to be protected from economic and social exploitation.35  
More broadly, the right to just and favourable conditions of work36 and the 
right to benefit from one’s own work37 also prevent exploitation. They 
ensure that one’s labour is not treated instrumentally or used for ulterior 
means. In particular, the CESCR has noted that it is the author of a work 
that has the “exclusive right to exploit his scientific, literary or artistic 
production”.38   
3. AN INTEREST IN PHYSICAL FREEDOM 
IHRL does not only protect against physical restrictions when there is an 
exploitative element present. Rather, some measure of physical freedom 
for human beings is secured through a number of rights contained within 
IHRL. In particular, rights to freedom of movement;39 to not be subjected 
to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile;40 and to private life41 all maintain at 
least some degree of physical freedom. 
The interest in physical freedom is also concerned with bodies: it entails 
having control over one’s physical movements. Although overlapping with 
                                       
34 CESCR, General Comment 11 [4]. 
35 ICESCR Article 10(3); see also Committee on the Rights of the Child, General 
Comment 8. 
36 ICESCR Article 7. 
37 ICESCR Article 15(1)(c). 
38 CESCR, General Comment 17 [16]. 
39 UDHR Article 13; ICCPR Article 12, Article 13. 
40 UDHR Article 9; ICCPR Article 9. 
41 UDHR Article 12; ICCPR Article 17(1). 
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both the interests seen so far, the interest in physical freedom can be 
distinguished by considering it as concerned with how bodies are used 
rather than the conditions in which they are found or how they are treated. 
This distinction is meant as an explanatory one that helps to understand 
the interests, not as an analytically divisive and decisive one, since vital 
interests are interrelated. 
The importance of this interest has been endorsed by the HRC, which has 
stated that “liberty of movement is an indispensable condition for the free 
development of a person”42 when interpreting the right to freedom of 
movement, and has noted that physical freedom is valuable per se since it 
“must not be made dependent on any particular purpose or reason”.43 It is 
thus valid to identify it as a distinguishable interest. 
Another grounding of this interest is found in Article 9 ICCPR, which 
stipulates, inter alia, that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or 
detention”. Inevitably what amounts to ‘arbitrary’ detention is subject to 
interpretation, but the HRC has argued that avoiding arbitrariness requires 
(for example) demonstrating that “rehabilitation could not have been 
achieved by means less intrusive than continued imprisonment or 
detention”.44 That imprisonment or detention is seen as inherently 
intrusive demonstrates that this right recognises physical freedom as a 
human interest. 
                                       
42 HRC, General Comment 27 [1]. 
43 HRC, General Comment 27 [5]. 
44 Joseph and Castan 361 (n7) emphasis added. 
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Other rights grounded in this interest include the right not to be enslaved45 
(whilst also grounded in the previous interest, slavery also imposes a clear 
restriction on physical freedom); the right against interference with private 
life46 (which includes the need for “personal and body search [to be] 
carried out in a manner consistent with the dignity of the person being 
searched”47); the right against being compelled to join an association;48 
and the right to free choice of employment.49 All of these are, at least to 
some extent, concerned with maintaining control regarding what one’s 
body is used for.  
4. AN INTEREST IN PSYCHOLOGICAL FREEDOM 
Alongside physical freedom, there is also an interest in psychological 
freedom protected by IHRL. This interest perhaps most obviously grounds 
the rights to freedom of thought, conscience or religion50 and to freedom of 
opinion and expression.51 But psychological freedom also grounds the right 
to education (since “a well-educated, enlightened and active mind, able to 
wander freely and widely, is one of the joys and rewards of human 
existence”52) and the right to work (since “dignity is expressed through the 
freedom of the individual regarding the choice to work”53).  
                                       
45 UDHR Article 4, ICCPR Article 8(1&2). 
46 UDHR Article 12; ICCPR Article 17(1). 
47 HRC, General Comment 16 [8]. 
48 UDHR Article 20(2). 
49 UDHR Article 23(1), ICESCR Article 6(1). 
50 ICCPR Article 18. 
51 ICCPR Article 19, ICESCR Article 15. 
52 CESCR, General Comment 13 [1]. 
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The importance of psychological freedom can thus be conceived of from 
two directions: a lack of restraint or coercion on the psychological realm,54 
and the ability to explore and develop one’s own ideas, as seen with 
regards to education and work. The ability not just to express opinions, but 
to be able to form them too,55 is essential for psychological freedom. 
Autonomy – in some ways the absence of coercion56 – thus forms an 
important aspect of this interest.  
This interest also grounds the right to consent to enter into marriage:57 
there are both physical and psychological components to this and “men 
and women have an equal right to choose if, whom and when to marry”.58 
Likewise, the freedom for scientific research and creative activity59 
protected by the ICESCR contributes towards safeguarding the 
psychological freedom of humans. 
The psychological interest is considered to be distinguishable from physical 
activity within IHRL. “Article 18 [ICCPR] distinguishes the freedom of 
thought, conscience, religion or belief from the freedom to manifest 
religion or belief”.60 It is therefore not enough to simply be able to carry 
                                                                                                              
53 CESCR, General Comment 18 [4] emphasis added, [6].  
54 HRC, General Comment 22 [5] and General Comment 25 [19]-[20]. 
55 HRC, General Comment 10 and General Comment 22 [2]-[5]. 
56 When autonomy is understood as “freedom from external control or influence”: 
Shorter OED (6th edn, OUP 2007). 
57 ICCPR Article 23(3). 
58 CESCR, General Comment 16 [27]. 
59 ICESCR Article 15(3). 
60 HRC, General Comment 18 [3]. 
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out a certain practice, the freedom to have one’s own thoughts is also 
crucial.  
The interest in psychological freedom is not an exclusively personal one: 
IHRL also protects an interest in forming groups and sharing ideas with 
others (both within and through generations). This is witnessed in the 
rights to peaceful assembly61 and to freedom of association,62 which the 
HRC has tied to freedom of opinion and expression.63  
5. AN INTEREST IN DEVELOPING A PERSONALITY 
IHRL also recognises that development of personality is key to being (and 
becoming) a human. The right to education is in fact openly grounded in 
this interest. Article 13(1) ICESCR states that “education shall be directed 
to the full development of the human personality”.64 Additionally, the 
CESCR has recognised that the right to work65 contributes to “development 
and recognition within the community”66 because of “the importance of 
work for personal development”.67 The right to leisure68 is also grounded in 
this interest, since “‘Leisure’ … should make it possible for the individual to 
cultivate his mind and interests”.69 As such, IHRL provides the prerequisite 
                                       
61 ICCPR Article 21. 
62 ICCPR Article 22. See Joseph and Castan (n7) 645, 665. 
63 Joseph and Castan (n7) 647. 
64 Article 13(1). See UDHR Article 26(2); CESCR, General Comment 13 [4]. 
65 UDHR Article 23(1), ICESCR Article 6. 
66 CESCR, General Comment 18 [1]. 
67 CESCR, General Comment 18 [4]. 
68 UDHR Article 24, ICESCR Article 7(d). 
69 Eide (n7) 380. 
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conditions for humans to develop their personalities through striving and 
pursuing their own satisfaction.  
Other relevant rights include the right to marry and found a family;70 the 
right to own property (including intellectual property);71 the right to self-
determination;72 and the right to a name and nationality.73 All of these can 
contribute towards the narrative that each individual traces for themselves. 
Also included are those economic, social and cultural rights that are 
specifically designated in the UDHR as “indispensable for … the free 
development of … personality”.74 Whilst these matters are certainly 
connected to the interest in psychological freedom, they can be 
distinguished since there is also a temporal aspect to them as implied by 
the very notion of development.  
There is also an important recognition contained in Article 29(1) UDHR that 
“[e]veryone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his personality is possible”: personality development is not 
a purely individual affair. Taking part in cultural life is protected by the 
                                       
70 UDHR Article 16(1), ICCPR Article 23. 
71 Property ownership can be individual or with others, foreshadowing the social 
interests. UDHR Article 17(1), Article 27(2), ICESCR Article 15(1)(c). 
72 In the sense of individual self-determination: ICCPR Article 1, ICESRC Article 1. 
73 UDHR Article 15(1), ICCPR Article 24(2) and 24(3). 
74 UDHR Article 22. 
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ICESCR,75 and this can benefit not only the individual, but also contributes 
to “progress of society as a whole”.76 
The broad array of rights grounded in this interest is necessary since the 
interest in developing a personality requires that individuals must be given 
the scope to develop their life and their personality as they wish, choosing 
or not choosing options (such as to marry or not).  The ability to forge 
routes through life must be protected, even if the routes themselves need 
not be prepared. 
6. AN INTEREST IN KINSHIP AND FORMING COMMUNITIES 
Despite the indubitable importance of individual personal development, 
IHRL acknowledges that this alone is not sufficient for a satisfactory human 
life. Humans are social beings, forming ties both within our blood lines and 
beyond. As Allen Buchanan notes, IHRL makes it “very clear that human 
beings are social by nature and [goes] out of [its] way to repudiate any 
notion that humans are ‘atomistic individuals’.”77 We live in togetherness 
and union with others, and human flourishing happens in community. This 
is recognised both directly and indirectly by a number of human rights, and 
by the construction with IHRL of a subject that is socially embedded.  
For example, the right to found a family is based on recognition that 
“family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society”.78  The basic 
                                       
75 ICESCR Article 15(1)(a). 
76 CESCR, General Comment 7 [4]. 
77 Allen Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights (OUP 2013) 27n30. 
78 UDHR Article 16(3); HRC, General Comment 19 [1], emphasis added.  
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understanding that there is such a thing as a group unit demonstrates the 
vital human interest in forming and participating in communities with 
others. Furthermore, such groups must not be understood as being limited 
to a particular conception of what ‘family’ might mean, since it is “not 
possible to give the concept [of family] a standard definition”.79 As such, 
IHRL recognises that humans form a number of different communities, and 
these can all be of value. 
These are not limited to bloodlines. Rights to peaceful assembly and 
association80 (including the right to form a trade union81) also grounded in 
acknowledge the value of communities formation and participation. The 
intentionally broad formulation of Article 20 UDHR is based on an 
understanding that these rights “are essential for many human 
activities”.82 The breadth of this is further witnessed by the general right to 
participate in the cultural life of the community,83 and a right to a social 
and international order in which human rights can be fully realised84 within 
IHRL.  
                                       
79 HRC, General Comment 19 [2]. See also HRC, General Comment 16 [5]. 
80 UDHR Article 20(1), ICCPR Articles 21-22. Including religious practice – ICCPR 
Article 18(1). 
81 UDHR Article 23(4), ICESCR Article 8. 
82 Martin Scheinin, ‘Article 20’ in Alfredsson and Eide (n7) 417, 418-19, emphasis 
added. 
83 UDHR Article 27(1). See also the duties to the community in UDHR Article 29(1), 
ICESCR Article 15(1)(a). 
84 The first element of this right is the relevant one here: that humans have a right 
to be a part of such an order. UDHR Article 28, ICCPR Article 20(1). 
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Other rights grounded in this interest include the right to manifest religion, 
which is explicitly to be exercised “either individually or in community with 
others”,85 and the right to education, which exists in part because it 
provides the holders “the means to participate fully in their 
communities”.86 Finally, the right to self-determination, as a right held by 
peoples rather than individuals, is evidently grounded in the social 
groupings that humans form. It seeks to protect these groupings per se. 
Rights of minorities,87 while certainly distinguishable from the right to self-
determination,88 are also grounded in this interest, since they are 
concerned with ensuring that persons are not denied rights which are to be 
exercised “in community with the other members of their group”.89   
This interest concerns human relationships with other humans. It 
demonstrates the impossibility of understanding human rights (or humans 
themselves) in an exclusively individualistic sense. Rather, in order to 
promote human flourishing, the tendency to form communities with one 
another must be recognised and protected, and this includes protection of 
the communities themselves. 
7. AN INTEREST IN SOCIETAL MEMBERSHIP AND RECOGNITION 
This interest also concerns humans’ social nature, but is focussed on 
formal institutions rather than personal communities. The previous interest 
                                       
85 ICCPR Article 18(1). 
86 CESCR, General Comment 13 [1]. 
87 ICCPR Article 27. 
88 HRC, General Comment 23 [2]-[3]. 
89 ICCPR Article 27. 
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concerns the formation of and participation in communities, whereas this 
interest is about an individual’s access to social institutions. For example, 
access to social welfare is recognised by IHRL as a vital right, but it is not 
directly grounded in an interest in forming communities.90  
There are rights that are grounded in this interest both directly and 
indirectly. At a direct level, the right to recognition before the law;91 the 
right to political participation;92 the right to registration, a name and a 
nationality;93 and the right to take part in and benefit from public services 
(including the cultural, artistic and scientific life of the community),94 all 
directly acknowledge that humans live within societies, and that being 
recognised by and receiving the benefits of society are of direct interest to 
everyone. 
Other rights are grounded in this interest more obliquely. For example, the 
right to education exists in part to “enable all persons to participate 
effectively in a free society”95 and “as an empowerment right, education is 
the primary vehicle by which economically and socially marginalized adults 
and children can lift themselves out of poverty”.96 The right to work 
                                       
90 Saul (n7) 611. 
91 UDHR Article 6, Article 8; ICCPR Article 13, Article 16. 
92 UDHR Article 21(1,3); ICCPR Article 25(a,b). 
93 UDHR Article 15; ICCPR Article 24(2,3). 
94 UDHR Article 21(2), Article 27(1); ICCPR Article 25(c); ICESCR Article 
15(1)(a,b)(4). In particular, to appreciate the “external manifestations” of culture: 
Saul (n7) 1180. 
95 ICESCR Article 13(1). 
96 CESCR, General Comment 13 [1] 
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contributes to “recognition within community”,97 and the right to join (as 
opposed to form) a trade union98 is a means by which political and 
economic participation in society can be ensured. Rights to benefit from 
public services (such as healthcare and food) are also components of this 
interest, as captured in the CESCR’s comments on the need to ensure the 
‘availability and accessibility’ of these rights.99 
8. AN INTEREST IN EQUALITY, NON-DISCRIMINATION AND FAIRNESS 
The Preambles to the UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR all declare that human 
rights are held equally by all members of the human family. Article 1 of the 
UDHR does not contain a right as such, but provides that “all human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”.100 In addition, other 
human rights, such as to a fair trial,101 to equal enjoyment of human 
rights,102 and to equal recognition before the law103 are grounded in an 
interest in equality, non-discrimination and fairness. Article 26 ICCPR is 
also of relevance, it affirms that “the law shall prohibit any discrimination”.  
                                       
97 CESCR, General Comment 18 [1]. 
98 UDHR Article 23(4); ICESCR Article 8. 
99 See CESCR, General Comment 12 [12]-[13]; CESCR, General Comment 14 [12]. 
100 See also Tore Lindholm, ‘Article 1’ in Eide (n7); Saul (n7) 174ff. 
101 ICCPR Article 14; HRC, General Comment 32. 
102 That is, without prejudice based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion etc (see ICCPR Article 20(2)), and they should only be 
limited for certain reasons. UDHR Article 2, Article 29(2); ICCPR Article 2, Article 
3; ICESCR Article 2(1,2), Article 3. 
103 UDHR Article 7, Article 10, Article 11; ICCPR Article 14, Article 16, Article 26. 
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Again, this interest is discoverable within the content of other human 
rights too. In particular, the right to fair access to public services;104 the 
right to work (in particular the right to equal pay for equal work105 and “the 
right not to be deprived of work unfairly”106); the right of children and 
mothers to proper treatment;107 and equal rights of women and men108 all 
demonstrate an overarching interest in fair, non-discriminatory and equal 
treatment. 
8.2.2 SUMMARY 
These vital interests are specifications of human dignity,109 and they 
demonstrate how IHRL understands the human rights subject.110 Because 
of the plurality of human dignity and the diversity of human rights 
subjects, the set is neither monolithic nor discrete but rather overlapping 
and interactive. The interests flow into one another, which is to be 
expected since (i) dignity is vague and broad, and (ii) human rights are 
interrelated. But the interests are not substitutes for one another. They 
cannot be traded because, like human rights, they are non-fungible.111 It is 
                                       
104 UDHR Article 21(2). 
105 UDHR Article 23(2); ICESCR Article 7(a)(i)(c). 
106 CESCR, General Comment 18 [4], [6]. 
107 UDHR Article 25(2); ICCPR Article 6(5), Article 24(1). 
108 ICCPR Article 3; ICESCR Article 3, Article 7(a)(i). See also CESCR, General 
Comment 16 and HRC, General Comment 4.  
109 §6.5. 
110 §1.3. 
111 Martha Nussbaum, ‘Beyond “Compassion and Humanity”’ in Cass Sunstein and 
Martha Nussbaum, Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions (OUP 
2004) 304; Nussbaum (n4) 85, 175; Ramona Ilea, ‘Nussbaum’s Capabilities 
Approach and Nonhuman Animals’ (2008) 39 Journal of Social Philosophy 547, 550. 
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not necessary to be convinced that this list is the only way of specifying 
human dignity, or the best possible for all purposes, since there are 
inevitably many ways of conceptualising what dignity is. However, it is 
necessary for the list to be convincing, and to cover all the ground 
contained within IHRL. In order to confirm whether this is the case, this list 
will be compared with others from the literature. 
8.2.3 ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS 
As already acknowledged, drawing up a list of vital interests which operate 
somewhere between dignity and human rights has been done before. It is 
worth looking at some of these listings112 to check that they are compatible 
with the set developed here and also to demonstrate why they do not 
provide more suitable frameworks.  
8.2.3(A) NICKEL 
James Nickel accepts that there are many justifications for human rights 
and adopts a pluralistic approach to their grounding.113 He acknowledges 
that although simplicity is satisfying, it is not really possible to justify 
human rights with a straightforward account since they are fundamentally 
multifaceted.114 A pluralistic account is therefore required as the grounds of 
human rights. 
As well as considering prudential, utilitarian and pragmatic justifications, 
Nickel looks for arguments from plausible moral norms and values: he 
                                       
112 For others see supra n4. 
113 Nickel (n4) ch4. 
114 supra n6. 
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distils these down to four ‘secure claims’ which are universal, broadly 
agreed on and able to justify all human rights. All four of these claims 
protect aspects of human dignity, and in turn respecting dignity requires 
respecting all four claims.115 These are (with the congruent vital interests 
parenthesised): 
 A secure claim to have a life (VI1) 
o This includes rights to life and health and covers basic 
physical needs. 
 A secure claim to lead one’s life (VI3, VI4, VI5, VI6, VI7) 
o This includes freedom from slavery, rights to marriage, 
association, movement and belief; participation in society; 
freedom of thought; and education. It also includes rights 
relevant to autonomy. In this regard, Nickel notices that 
nonhumans have agency too, but does not investigate what 
the implications of this might be.116 
 A secure claim against severely cruel or degrading treatment (VI2) 
o This includes the prohibition of torture and slavery. 
 A secure claim against severely unfair treatment (VI7, VI8) 
o This includes aspects of equality and non-discrimination 
although it is only relevant to human rights in so far as they 
ought to prevent severe unfairness and “matters of ruinous 
injustice”.117 
Nickel realises that these claims do not form the only possible 
arrangement. “If someone proposed that one or more of these principles is 
derivable from one or two of the others … I would not be opposed to the 
possibility [and] on the other side, the theory proposed may be too simple 
for the job at hand”.118  
                                       
115 Nickel (n4) 66. 
116 ibid 63-64. 
117 ibid 65. 
118 ibid 67. 
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Although Nickel’s list is viable and valuable, it is too simple for the job at 
hand here. In particular, the secure claim to lead one’s life is too compact. 
Finer granularity as to the interests specified by dignity and protected by 
human rights is needed in the present context in order to assess how they 
may be applicable beyond humanity.  
8.2.3(B) NUSSBAUM 
Martha Nussbaum opts for a different approach in determining humans’ 
“basic entitlements”.119 Inspired, but not convinced, by John Rawls’ 
contractarianism,120 Nussbaum develops Amartya Sen’s capabilities 
approach121 to map out the core requirements that any just society ought 
to protect as a ‘basic social minimum’. For her,   
[t]he best approach to this idea of a basic social minimum 
is provided by an approach that focuses on human 
capabilities, that is, what people are actually able to do and 
to be, in a way informed by an intuitive idea of a life that is 
worthy of the dignity of the human being.122  
As such, “the capabilities approach … starts from the notion of human 
dignity and a life worthy of it”.123 Nussbaum’s list of capabilities and the set 
of vital interests developed in this thesis merit comparison since they both 
                                       
119 Nussbaum (n4) 155.  
120 ibid 56ff. 
121 ibid 70ff. 
122 Nussbaum (n4) 70.  
123 Nussbaum (n111) 305 
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operate at a level of abstraction between dignity and human rights,124 even 
though Nussbaum’s approach is not directly tied to existing IHRL. The 
capabilities identified by Nussbaum are broad, potentially as a result of an 
approach that “sees rationality and animality as thoroughly unified”.125 This 
rather embodied approach to specifying dignity makes Nussbaum’s list of 
particular relevance to this thesis.126 The capabilities she identifies are:127  
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of 
normal length; not dying prematurely… (VI1) 
 
2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including 
reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have 
adequate shelter. (VI1) 
 
3. Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to 
place; to be secure against violent assault… having 
opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in 
matters of reproduction. (VI2, VI3) 
 
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the 
senses, to imagine, think, and reason—and to do these 
things in a "truly human" way, a way informed and 
cultivated by an adequate education … Being able to use 
imagination and thought in connection with experiencing 
and producing works and events of one's own choice … 
Being able to use one's mind in ways protected by 
guarantees of freedom of expression … Being able to 
                                       
124 See Martha Nussbaum, ‘Capabilities and Human Rights’ (1997) 66 Fordham 
Law Review 273, 278, 292-97; Morsink (n4) 166-72. 
125 Nussbaum (n4) 159.  
126 Nussbaum agrees that her theory “can be extended to provide a more 
adequate basis for animal entitlements than the other two theories under 
consideration” (ie contractarianism and utilitarianism). Nussbaum (n111) 305. 
127 Nussbaum (n4) 76-78. 
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have pleasurable experiences and to avoid non-beneficial 
pain. (VI4, VI5) 
 
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and 
people outside ourselves; to love those who love and care 
for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to 
grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified 
anger. Not having one's emotional development blighted 
by fear and anxiety … (VI4, VI5, VI6) 
 
6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the 
good and to engage in critical reflection about the 
planning of one's life… (VI4, VI5) 
 
7. Affiliation. 
A. Being able to live with and toward others… to engage 
in various forms of social interaction… (VI6) 
B. Having the social bases of self-respect and non-
humiliation… This entails provisions of non-
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual 
orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin 
and species. (VI7, VI8) 
 
8. Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in 
relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature. 
(VI6128) 
 
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational 
activities. (VI5) 
 
 
10. Control over one's Environment. 
A. Political. Being able to participate effectively in 
political choices that govern one's life…. (VI7) 
B. Material. Being able to hold property… having the right 
to seek employment on an equal basis with others; 
                                       
128 Once expanded, see §9. 
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having the freedom from unwarranted search and 
seizure… 129 (VI3, VI6, VI7). 
 
Again, a clear congruence is observable between Nussbaum’s list and the 
one developed in this thesis (the congruent vital interests are indicated 
above); however, Nussbaum’s is further reaching.130 Significantly, one 
additional aspect which Nussbaum’s list covers is ‘Other Species’. Whilst 
this thesis will go on to acknowledge that humans, as living organisms, 
form essential relations with other forms of life,131 the list of vital interests 
constructed does not include this aspect because it is not currently 
protected by the International Bill of Rights.132 Note also Nussbaum’s 
inclusion of non-discrimination on the basis of species in capability 7B. 
Given Nussbaum’s list of capabilities does not emerge directly from a 
consideration of the interests protected by IHRL, it would be inappropriate 
to adopt it here. However, in view of the similarity of her task, it is 
reinforcing to note not only its congruence with the one generated here, 
but also its agreement that such a listing can be made relevant beyond the 
human genus.133  
                                       
129 Nussbaum (n4) 76-78, 392-401; Nussbaum (n111) 312-19. 
130 See Morsink (n4) 170-71. 
131 §9.2-9.4. 
132 Although a human right to a healthy environment is groundable in such an 
interest.  
133 supra n126. 
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8.2.3(C) BIRNBACHER 
German philosopher Dieter Birnbacher134 travels directly from dignity135 to 
rights in detailing how dignity ought to feature in ethical discourse. 
However, the sort of rights which Birnbacher details as the content of 
dignity are not rights found in IHRL, but rights of a higher level of 
generality, thus making his list relevant to our analysis. They are: 
 Right to the provision of the biologically necessary means of 
existence (VI1) 
 Right to freedom from strong and continued pain (VI2) 
 Right to minimal liberty (VI3, VI4) 
 Right to minimal self-respect (VI5, VI6, VI7, VI8) 
 
They are considered as minimal basic goods and as such are of a similar 
vein to the vital interests outlined above (the congruence is indicated in 
parentheses). They share with these interests the characteristics of 
minimalism and generality. That is, they apply widely and define only the 
minimum requirements to respect dignity. There is an overlap between 
these rights and the list constructed in this thesis, although only if ‘self-
respect’ is considered as covering a considerable number of the identified 
vital interests. Although it is arguable that self-respect includes the 
development of a personality, equality and kinship, the extra work required 
renders Birnbacher’s list less suitable for present purposes than the list of 
eight vital interests.  
                                       
134 Birnbacher (n4) 110. See Philipp Balzer et al, ‘Two Concepts of Dignity for 
Humans and Non-human Organisms in the Context of Genetic Engineering’ (2000) 
13 Journal of Agricultural Ethics 7.  
135 He uses the word ‘Menschenwürde’, which is essentially equivalent to dignity as 
deployed here. See Lennart Nordenfelt and Andrew Edgar, ‘The four notions of 
dignity’ (2005) 6 Quality in Ageing and Older Adults 17. 
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  *   
These three other bridges between dignity and human rights are 
congruent, but not identical, to the list proposed here. They provide 
evidence to support not only the possibility of extracting vital interests, but 
also the content of the interests extracted. However, as Nickel points out 
(although with different terminology) different constructions of vital 
interests may be suitable for different purposes.136 The list of eight vital 
interests is the most suitable for purpose here as it is both directly reliant 
on existing vital rights (unlike Nussbaum’s), and detailed enough to allow 
full exploration of these interests in nonhumans (unlike Nickel’s and 
Birnbacher’s). It is not proposed that the list constructed here is inherently 
better than any of the others but rather the most appropriate one for the 
purpose of this thesis, which seeks to understand dignity through the lens 
of IHRL, assisted by IT. 
8.3 NONHUMAN VITAL INTERESTS 
We started by cutting man off from nature and establishing 
him in an absolute reign. We believed ourselves to have 
thus erased his most unassailable characteristic: that he is 
first a living being.137  
The purpose of constructing a list of vital interests was to consider the 
existence of these interests beyond the human genus. A brief foray into 
                                       
136 Nickel (n4) 67. 
137 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology Volume II (first published 1973, 
Monique Layton tr, Penguin 1977) 41. 
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ethology will now reveal how prevalent these interests are in the natural 
world. Looking for these interests in nonhumans at times requires 
understanding the interests in a broadened sense. That is, one must often 
understand them as interests of (first) living beings. Given that the rights 
contained in IHRL are predominantly vested in individual humans, this 
section will first focus on organisms and their interests. However, 
consideration will also be given to the possibility of ecosystems having 
interests, since rights can also potentially be vested in ecosystems.138 
8.3.1 ORGANISMS 
At a basic level, all living beings seek to continue their existence. They all 
have an interest in continued biological functioning (the first vital interest 
identified above). This interest is evidenced by rather straightforward 
activity. Animals eat and plants put down roots so that they may prolong 
their existence. Nonhumans are not inert with respect to their 
environments; they measure, react, and respond to it through internal 
feedback systems.139 Unlike many of the other vital interests present in 
IHRL, this interest is not only immediately apparent in animals, but in 
plants and microorganisms too.140  
                                       
138 §7.3.3-7.3.4. 
139 In animals, the two main ones are the endocrine and the nervous systems: Lee 
Drickamer and Stephen Vessey, Animal Behavior (Prindle, Weber & Schmidt 1986) 
152.  
140 Colin Tudge, The Secret Life of Trees (Penguin 2005) 266-76; Peter Scott, 
Physiology, and Behaviour of Plants (Wiley 2008) 76, 149, 175, 184-190, 193-208, 
225; Florianne Koechlin, ‘The dignity of plants’ (2009) 4 Plant Signaling & Behavior 
78. 
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However, this interest is often only contingent. Some organisms willingly 
sacrifice themselves for the sake of procreation.141 The interest in 
continued biological functioning in such a case is only present until genetic 
information has been passed on. Since reproduction is essential to the 
process of life (and so an interest of all lifeforms142), the interest in 
continued biological functioning is thus poignantly tied to the interest in 
reproduction. To continue functioning must at times be considered at a 
larger scale than the individual organism.  
As for the second vital interest, it was shown above that the vital interest 
in freedom from exploitation has two components to it: physical (or 
mental) pain143 and coercion, degradation or discrimination. Pain is an 
example of nociception – the detection of harmful situations144 – which is 
by no means an exclusively human trait: it is prevalent throughout the 
biosphere.145 Although it is unclear exactly which animals experience pain 
(rather than simply nociception),146 a reasonable (and indeed probable) 
                                       
141 Semelparous organisms (ie those which only reproduce once, such as Pacific 
salmon) die immediately after reproduction.  
142 §7.3. 
143 See HRC, General Comment 20 [5]. 
144 ‘nociception’, Oxford Dictionary of Biology (6th edn, OUP 2008). 
145 David Julius and Allan Basbaum, ‘Molecular mechanisms of nociception’ (2001) 
413 Nature 203, 203. 
146 National Research Council, Recognition and Alleviation of Pain in Laboratory 
Animals (National Academies Press 2009); Elisa Aaltola, Animal Suffering: 
Philosophy and Culture (Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 5-15; Lynne Sneddon et 
al, ’Defining and assessing animal pain’ (2014) 97 Animal Behaviour 201. 
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assumption is that pain is not exclusive to humans.147 It is also reasonable 
to work under the principle that pain is experienced negatively by the vast 
majority of those that sense it.148 This is what makes pain a suitable 
leverage point for exploitation, and this is not limited to the human 
domain. 
The idea of degradation is also not necessarily restricted to humans. As 
recognised by the High Court of England and Wales, degradation does not 
require self-awareness: “treatment is capable of being 'degrading' within 
the meaning of article 3 [ECHR], whether or not there is awareness on the 
part of the victim”.149 Thus even if it is only possible to ‘torture’ a certain 
subset of organisms (not necessarily just humans150), it is evidently 
possible to ‘exploit’ a greater number (consider the Jallikatu case151). It is 
of course common to talk about the ‘exploitation’ of natural resources. 
However, this vital interest does not mean that all use of natural resources 
should be protected against; but identifying the difference between ‘use’ 
and ‘exploitation’ of resources would be a useful avenue to pursue in 
defining this interest further. The Convention on Biological Diversity’s 
differentiation between the ‘conservation of biological diversity’ and the 
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Bolhuis and Luc-Alain Giraldeau (eds), The Behavior of Animals (Blackwell 2005) 
358-60. 
148 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (Random House 1975). 
149 R (Burke) v General Medical Council [2005] QB 424 [178]. 
150 UDRME Article 2(3); Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer (eds), The Great Ape 
Project (Fourth Estate 1993) 4-7. 
151 §7.2.3. 
391 
 
‘sustainable use of biological resources’152 could prove useful in this regard, 
helping to generate a principle such as allowing resources to be used as 
long as diversity is maintained. 
The vital interest in physical freedom is also evidently relevant beyond the 
human species: it is hardly controversial to claim that restrictive cages are 
unsuitable for animals. The fact that this is no longer considered 
acceptable in zoos or circuses, but is in factory farming potentially has 
more to do with the visibility of the degradation than its existence. The 
Seaworld case discussed in Chapter Seven was heavily reliant on this 
interest.153 The relevance of physical freedom to almost exclusively 
stationary plants is questionable, but this would not render their other vital 
interests immediately irrelevant. 
The psychological element of freedom may be less straightforward to 
discover in nonhuman organisms. Many animals and all plants (and other 
domains of life) do not have a brain or a central nervous system. However, 
seeing as reliance on complex psychological processes is just one particular 
strategy for survival,154 this is to an extent irrelevant. Plants do not have 
brains because they do not require them. Those animals that do have a 
psychological life (alternatively, an awareness of self)155 are likely to have 
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a vital interest in psychological freedom. The NhRP’s legal cases are 
predominantly reliant on this interest.156  
Moreover, as with all the interests under discussion here, one must 
remember that they exist in various degrees rather than being existent or 
non-existent. “A pluralistic approach [has] led many authors to assert that 
all mental phenomena we find in humans can be found in the other 
animals, and that the most important capacities traditionally 
conceptualized as all-or-nothing – self-consciousness, capacity for 
autonomy, rationality, capacity for moral agency and so on – are instead 
multidimensional and gradational”.157 That dogs (eg) do not have a 
psychological life of the same form as that of humans does not mean that 
they do not have one at all. 
Another interest that is less obviously widespread is personality 
development. Many nonhuman animals do of course exhibit personality 
traits (as any dog owner will know).158 Furthermore, dolphins use names 
(‘signature whistles’)159 and chimpanzees have (relatively poorly 
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understood) mechanisms behind switching social roles,160 thus 
demonstrating some sense of being able to identify themselves amongst 
conspecifics. The ‘mirror test’ and ‘sniff test’ for self-recognition have been 
passed by a number of nonhumans,161 demonstrating that they do have 
some sense of self. 
However, personality development must involve not only a notion of 
personality (through being able to differentiate one from another), but also 
mental time-travel (remembering, planning and so on)162 in order for the 
inherently temporal process of personality development to make any sense 
as an interest. Although it is clear that many nonhumans take actions that 
will benefit them in the future (caching of food for example), it is less clear 
that this demonstrates true mental time travel and so “all that we can say 
about planning ahead is that it has not yet been tested in any more than a 
preliminary way, and so it is premature to claim that animals other than 
humans lack this ability”.163  
Many nonhuman animals exhibit social behaviours, operating as groups 
rather than as individuals. Examples of this range from the very humanlike 
social structures of chimpanzees and orcas, to pack animals such as wolves 
and lions,164 to eusocial insects and colonial invertebrates.165 In each of 
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these instances, individual organisms would not thrive (and would perhaps 
fail to survive at all166) if they were cut off from their kin and ken. Even 
more widespread than a fully social existence are bonds between parents 
and offspring. Parental care is common in mammals, fish and birds,167 and 
is essential for the development of many young into adults.  
More broadly again than this, living organisms form not only social 
communities but also ecological ones.168 Bonds and relations permeate 
living systems, and so this interest – extrapolated to the ecological – may 
be one of all forms of life. This is recognised in Article 2(2) of the Universal 
Declaration of Rights of Mother Earth (UDRME): “Each being has the right 
to a place and to play its role in Mother Earth for her harmonious 
functioning”. Flourishing happens not just in social community, but in 
ecological community too. This observation, that living organisms exist 
within interrelated networks and communities and so potentially have a 
vital interest in forming ecological communities, will be central to Chapter 
Nine’s construction of a justification for RoN. 
The interest in participation in society and culture is less directly relevant 
to nonhumans because it is human society and culture which are referred 
to. Although nonhumans certainly form a part of human society and 
culture (eg pet dogs, racing horses, national emblems etc) they do not 
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participate in it in the same way that humans do. Despite the undoubtable 
benefits that guide dogs provide, it would be quizzical to see them given 
rights to be guide dogs.169 However, it is not fanciful to suggest that 
nonhumans have their own forms of society and culture.170 These 
civilisations are however lacking in the formal institutions to which most of 
the human rights grounded in this interest are directed. The conclusion is 
an indecisive one; there may be a widespread interest in participating in 
culture, but this is even harder to divorce from the previous interest for 
nonhumans than it is for humans. 
Finally, the interest in equality, non-discrimination and fairness may be 
relevant in two ways. Firstly, nonhumans may themselves have such an 
interest: although an internal sense of fairness may not be present in the 
majority of nonhuman organisms, it is in some.171 Secondly, human 
interest in equality also concerns the creation of a just social order, which 
may also encompass nonhumans. Equal consideration is not equal 
treatment, but the demands of non-discrimination may require that we 
give consideration to those interests that happen not to be human. 
“Mankind's true moral test, its fundamental test (which lies deeply buried 
from view), consists of its attitude towards those who are at its mercy: 
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animals”.172 It is this which motivates the Helsinki Declaration, whose 
Preamble states that is it “based on the principle of the equal treatment of 
all persons”.173 It may be that the human interest in equality can actually 
justify nonhuman rights. That is, part of what it is to be a human is to be a 
moral agent, and this results in the taking on of duties. A unique 
component of human dignity may thus ground duties as well as rights.174  
This principle of inter-species non-discrimination can already be found in 
international law. The Agreement on the Conservation of Gorillas and their 
Habitats175 states that “where human-gorilla conflict occurs, parties must 
take measures to reduce the conflict [which must be] to the benefit of both 
humans and gorillas”.176 This provision demonstrates that the law is able to 
acknowledge nonhuman interests.177 
8.3.2 ECOSYSTEMS 
Having seen that nonhuman rights can potentially be vested in ecosystems 
as well as organisms,178 it is necessary to consider whether ecosystems 
can be intelligibly said to have interests. However, doing so cannot be too 
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closely reliant on the vital interests of organisms, since ecosystems and 
organisms are entities of an entirely different kind.179 As such, “[w]e do 
not want in an undiscriminating way to extrapolate criteria of value from 
organism to biotic community, any more than from person to animal or 
from animal to plant”.180 
At the very least, ecosystem dynamics are not congruent with the vital 
interests outlined above, with the possible exception of the interests in 
continued biological functioning and freedom from exploitation. But even 
these take on a different format. “An ecosystem has no brain, no genome, 
no skin, no self-identification, no telos, no unified program. It does not 
defend itself against injury or death. It is not irritable”.181 Its processes do 
not result in the maintenance of the same structure of components 
through time, and its vulnerability to exploitation is not a result of 
nociception. As noted, the use of components of an ecosystem does not 
necessarily result in its exploitation as understood in the vital interest here. 
A potential lens through which to view the interests of ecosystems is 
through their exhibition of emergent properties182 and response to change 
(for example through ecological succession183). In these ways, the 
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behaviour of ecosystems is somewhat184 directed and predictable. 
However, ecosystem behaviour is homeorhetic rather than homeostatic; 
their flows are similar and predictable, rather than their states.185 This 
means that that ecosystems do not head towards some particular steady-
state ‘goal’. They have no preference over what form they take.186 For 
example, shallow lakes can reach two different stable states: “a clear state 
dominated by aquatic vegetation, and a turbid state characterised by high 
algal biomass”.187 Although the former is generally preferred by humans 
for aesthetic reasons, it is not obvious that this is in the ecosystem’s 
interests. 
Thus although it is potentially intelligible to talk of actions that benefit an 
ecosystem, this benefit is not really discernible from the perspective of the 
ecosystem itself. Rather, it is beneficial for the organisms that constitute 
the ecosystem (or some subset of them), or even simply to human 
aesthetics. An ecosystem is agnostic whereas an organism is involved and 
interested. The idea of ecosystem interests will therefore not be pursued 
                                                                                                              
(4th edn, Prentice-Hall 1996) 299ff; Patrick Whitefield, The Living Landscape 
(Permanent 2009). 
184 Although the successional process is not a perfectly predictable, neatly linear 
one, it does exhibit a certain directionality: Fakhri Bazzas, Plants in Changing 
Environments (CUP 1996); Marten Scheffer et al, ‘Catastrophic shifts in 
ecosystems’ (2001) 413 Nature 591. 
185 Eugene Odum and Gary Barrett, Fundamentals of Ecology (5th edn, 
Brooks/Cole 2005) 9, 68. 
186 ibid.  
187 Marten Scheffer et al, ‘Alternative Equilibria in Shallow Lakes’ (1993) 8 Trends 
in Ecology and Evolution 275, 275; Marten Scheffer and Egbert van Nes, ‘Shallow 
lakes theory revisited: various alternative regimes driven by climate, nutrients, 
depth and lake size’ (2007) 584 Hydrobiologia 455. 
399 
 
by this thesis as a justification for RoN because it does not appear to be 
the case that ecosystems have interests, and even if they do, they are 
distinct from the vital interests enlisted above since they are not the 
essential interests of living beings (since ecosystems are not themselves 
living beings). 
8.3.3 SUMMARY 
The vital interests grounding IHRL are not, as a whole, unique to humans. 
The underlying point is that having interests is not uniquely human, since 
all living organisms have interests in the state of the world around them in 
order to effect their own survival: vital interests are the essential interests 
of living beings.188 In this regard, note Kramer’s observation that Interest 
Theory is applicable to animals189 and “could be formulated more 
expansively by someone who believes that legal rights can be correctly 
ascribed to certain insentient entities such as trees or rivers”.190 For the 
purposes of this thesis, this indicates that congruent nonhuman vital 
interests can be pieced into the framework in which vital interests were 
first conceived. That is, the structure presented in Chapter Six of dignity, 
vital interests and vital rights is applicable beyond humans.  
However, a difference must be maintained between entities such as trees 
and rivers. Trees, as living beings, do have vital interests; whereas rivers, 
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as entities of an entirely different kind, do not have vital interests. 
However, as will be seen, this does not entirely erase the possibility of vital 
rights being vested in rivers and other ecosystems.191  
The presence of vital interests outside humanity should not be too 
surprising. This is because many of the interests outlined above have their 
roots in ‘being alive’ rather than in ‘being human’. They describe the basics 
of what it is to live a (human) life and so are human embodiments of ‘how 
to live’. The eight interests identified above are human versions of 
interests that operate at a more general level: the essential interests of 
living beings.  
Other species have their own embodiment of these. Inevitably, some 
important ways in which humans live will not be relevant to certain 
nonhumans (and vice-versa), but a considerable portion of vital interests 
arise from humans’ animality and the way humans have evolved to 
express this. Like Nussbaum’s capability approach, we must “see 
rationality and animality as thoroughly unified”.192 We are animal just as 
much as we are human, and those behaviours of ours which are 
thoroughly animal are unlikely to be exclusively human.  
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Further, as Lévi-Strauss noted, as well as being animals, humans are first 
living beings.193 In unearthing great secrets of the human mind and our 
physical universe, we may also have ‘unEarthed’ ourselves from those 
crucially physical, unavoidably biological, fundamentally ecological aspects 
of our selves. In reflecting on this ‘unEarthed’ existence, humans have 
often overplayed their logical rationality at the expense of biological 
status.194 But no scientific or theological framework can extricate us from 
our bodies. Because humans are embodied living organisms in a web of 
life, some vital human interests will be common to all forms of life, and it is 
these that this thesis is interested in: 
The focus, then, is on qualities that human beings have in 
common with many animals and/or the rest of the larger 
natural world; they are powerful indicators of what we 
share more broadly as the essence of being.195  
There is a connection above and beyond direct similarities between 
humans and (eg) chimpanzees. We are bound together not just by directly 
comparable behaviour, but by a common ancestry that engenders a 
commonality across all living organisms. Importantly, this connection is 
not a result of moral extensionism. It is not about describing the Platonic 
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Form of a human and then drawing nonhuman comparisons.196 It is about 
realising that much of what is vital to humans is vital to other organisms 
too; not because they are similar to us, but because our ancestry and 
genetic nature is shared. The presence of vital interests beyond humans 
suggests that organisms are not only vital in the sense of living, but there 
are also matters that are vital (ie essential) to them. This opens the 
gateway to the possibility of ‘nonhuman dignity’ being used as a 
justification for nonhuman vital rights.197 
8.3.4 NONHUMAN DIGNITY 
Many, if not all, living organisms have vital interests that are comparable 
to human vital interests. All organisms have certain basic requirements 
that are required to live a life worthy of who they are. More poetically, all 
organisms exhibit “their own existence, their own character and 
potentialities, their own forms of excellence, their own integrity, their own 
grandeur”.198 This thesis enquires whether they also have their own 
dignity. If a notion of nonhuman dignity can be shown to exist, then a 
normative argument for the creation of nonhuman rights will also exist 
(notwithstanding the fact that dignity is not necessarily the only 
justification for vital rights).  
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The need to evaluate the notion of nonhuman dignity is reinforced by the 
fact that it appears within a number of legal regimes (although it has not 
yet been used to justify any vital nonhuman rights).199 Article 120 of the 
Swiss Constitution refers to “the dignity of living beings” within the context 
of gene technology.200 Additionally, a number of national courts have 
referred to nonhuman dignity. In a judgment on ‘alligator-man fights’, the 
Israeli Supreme Court drew a comparison between animals and minors, 
stating that “neither of them can protect themselves, or claim their insult, 
or regain their dignity”.201 The Supreme Court of India acknowledged that 
animals have dignity in Jallikattu;202 and the Separate Opinion of Judge 
Pinto de Albuquerque of the ECtHR in Herrmann v Germany also refers to 
the “inherent dignity of all species” as well as “the existence of basic 
comparable interests between humans and other animals and therefore the 
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need to safeguard certain ‘animal rights’, metaphorically speaking, in a 
similar way to human rights”.203  
International environmental law has not employed the word ‘dignity’, but 
frequently refers to the concept of intrinsic value,204 most notably in the 
Preamble to the Convention on Biological Diversity which is “conscious of 
the intrinsic value of biological diversity”. The concept of ‘intrinsic value’ 
shares some conceptual terrain with that of dignity, in particular with 
regards to dignity’s role as justification.205 It is therefore worth inquiring 
into this overlap further in order to determine whether the existence of 
nonhuman vital interests does indeed imply the existence of nonhuman 
dignity. The following section will therefore analyse more rigorously the 
relationship between dignity, intrinsic value and vital interests, and present 
a framework that permits consideration of the idea of ‘nonhuman dignity’. 
8.4 DIGNITY, VITAL INTERESTS AND INTRINSIC VALUE 
The three concepts of dignity, intrinsic value and vital interests are 
interlinked, and achieving clarity over their precise relations will allow for a 
clear conception of (nonhuman) dignity to be developed. As far as 
possible, the remainder of this chapter will not engage with what actually 
has dignity or intrinsic value, but rather with the theoretical concepts 
themselves. Its task is to identify what dignity is, rather than where it is.  
                                       
203 Herrmann v Germany (2013) 56 EHRR 7 Separate Opinion 37.  
204 §3.4. 
205 infra. 
405 
 
Chapter Six showed that vital interests can be thought of as specifications 
of dignity.206 This section will first outline the meaning of intrinsic value, 
and then argue that dignity is similar, but not identical, to intrinsic value.  
8.4.1 INTRINSIC VALUE 
Intrinsic value is an important topic within ecological philosophy,207 which 
shows considerable conceptual overlap with the concept of dignity.208 The 
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linkage between dignity and intrinsic value can be clearly seen in Kant’s 
early definition of dignity: 
What is related to general human inclinations and needs 
has a market price; that which, even without presupposing 
a need, conforms with a certain taste, that is, with a delight 
in the mere purposeless play of our mental powers, has a 
fancy price; but that which constitutes the condition under 
which alone something can be an end-in-itself has not 
merely a relative worth, that is, a price, but an inner worth, 
that is, dignity.209  
In modern parlance, what Kant is talking about is respectively, 
instrumental value (value that accrues from direct or indirect use); 
inherent value (value that arises simply through existence or amenity); 
and intrinsic value (value that something has regardless of the utility or 
amenity of others).210 These forms of value are all commonly deployed 
within ecological ethics,211 and intrinsic value – as employed there – is of 
considerable similarity to the concept of dignity employed in this thesis. 
This is because both are concerned with matters that are fundamentally 
constitutive of (ie intrinsic to) an entity, and also with signposting what is 
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of value, worth and importance. Given the similarities between dignity and 
intrinsic value, and given that it is commonly argued within ecological 
ethics that all (or at least many) organisms have intrinsic value,212 this 
section will determine the nature of dignity and intrinsic value through the 
lens of vital interests. 
8.4.1(A) DEFINITION OF INTRINSIC VALUE 
John O’Neill has highlighted at least three definitions of ‘intrinsic value’. 
Intrinsic value has been defined as value which (a) is non-instrumental, (b) 
relates to the intrinsic properties of something, and/or (c) is objective as 
opposed to subjective.213 For the purposes of this thesis, a maximalist 
stance will be adopted, whereby intrinsic value is defined as combining all 
three definitions so as to ensure that the term is not defined too loosely. 
Put simply, this means that an entity is intrinsically valuable if it is an end 
in itself (non-instrumental), of itself (through intrinsic properties), and for 
itself (objective value). Perhaps the most important signifying feature of 
intrinsic value is that something can only intrinsically value itself: valuing 
something else cannot be intrinsic value.214 
                                       
212 eg Taylor (n207); Rolston (n180); Fox (n198) 161-76; Nicholas Agar, Life’s 
Intrinsic Value (Columbia University Press 2001); Curry (n207); Gillespie (n207) 
114-27; Varner (n198). 
213 O’Neill (n207); Mattia Fosci and Tom West, ‘In Whose Interest? Instrumental 
and Intrinsic Value in Biodiversity Law’ in Michael Bowman et al (eds), Research 
Handbook on Biodiversity and Law (Edward Elgar 2016) 56-57. 
214 cf ‘inherent value’ which is often confused with intrinsic value and can meet the 
first two definitions above. Inherent value is found when something is valued for 
its mere existence, for its aesthetics, or for its amenity. See Bowman (n210) 62-
63. 
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Because intrinsic value does not come about through an external valuer, it 
is self-generated and self-referential. As such, an intrinsically valuable 
entity is a “locus of valuational activity”.215 At this locus value is generated, 
rather than being bestowed by external valuational activity. For example, 
Sam may value their pet dog. However, this value is not intrinsic value 
because it is generated by Sam. At the same time, Sam’s pet dog may also 
have intrinsic value, which is distinguishable from Sam’s valuation of their 
dog. In this case, this is because Sam’s dog is of value in itself, of itself, 
and for itself. As a locus of valuational activity, the dog values herself. 
In order to better understand the differences between dignity and intrinsic 
value, the concept of vital interests will be used. This approach is 
warranted because vital interests are specifications of dignity,216 and 
because interests can be used to justify the intrinsic value of organisms.217 
8.4.1(B) THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF ORGANISMS 
Although there are other approaches to showing that organisms have 
intrinsic value,218 the most prudent way for the intrinsic value of organisms 
to be demonstrated in this thesis is through the notion of interests. That is, 
                                       
215 Bruce Morito, ‘Intrinsic Value: A Modern Albatross for the Ecological Approach’ 
(2003) 12 Environmental Values 317. See also Lee (n207). 
216 §6.5. 
217 eg Varner (n198) 55ff; Regan (n155); Harley Cahen, ‘Against the Moral 
Considerability of Ecosystems’ 114-19 in Light and Rolston (n207). 
218 As well as arguments for the intrinsic value of ecosystems. See Leopold 
(n207); Rolston (n180); Bowman (n208) 50-51; Mathews (n207) 117ff; Robert 
Elliot, ‘Instrumental Value in Nature as a Basis for the Intrinsic Value of Nature as 
a Whole’ (2005) 27 Environmental Ethics 43. 
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it will be argued that organisms have intrinsic value because they have 
interests.  
The key to seeing how interests generate intrinsic value lies in the fact that 
the state of the world is not value-neutral for organisms because of their 
interests. Things can go well or go badly for them depending on the 
fulfilment or the frustration of their interests. This is because organisms 
value certain objects, matters or states of affairs as determined by the 
content of their interests. As such, organisms value things instrumentally. 
For example, dogs instrumentally value food and sticks because they have 
an interest in them. 
The fact that organisms instrumentally value food, sticks and so on must 
be based on some underlying notion of utility, worth or value. That is, if D 
instrumentally values S, this implies (a) that D is capable of valuation 
(things can go well or badly for D), and (b) that there is some reason or 
purpose as to why D values S. If this reason or purpose is itself also of a 
merely instrumental character, then one can again enquire why this reason 
or purpose is instrumentally valued. Continuing this chain of reasoning, 
one must always end up, at the bottom, with something which is of value 
‘simply because it is’. In the words of O’Neill, “it is a well-rehearsed point 
that, under pain of an infinite regress, not everything can have only 
instrumental value”.219 The existence of instrumental value thus logically 
requires the existence of intrinsic value of some form. Dogs value food 
because they value themselves.  
                                       
219 O’Neill (n207) 119.  
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The self-valuing that arises through the presence of interests meets the 
three definitions of intrinsic value outlined above. Firstly, such value is by 
definition non-instrumental value (definition (a) of intrinsic value): 
organisms do not value themselves for any reason other than because they 
do. Secondly, given that this non-instrumental value derives from an 
organism’s own interests, this value is related to the intrinsic properties of 
the organism: D does not have an interest because E does, but rather 
because of the nature of D. The intrinsic value that arises through interests 
is not dependent on relative characteristics like rarity or social status, but 
derives from intrinsic characteristics of the organism (definition (b)). And 
finally, such value is not dependent on a value-judgment by an external 
observer: if all humans disappeared tomorrow, dogs would still be valuing 
sticks, food and themselves (definition (c)). As such, anything that 
possesses interests is itself a ‘locus of valuational activity’ and so a 
possessor of intrinsic value.   
Given the proximity between intrinsic value and dignity, that organisms 
have intrinsic value is relevant to a consideration of nonhuman dignity. 
However, the existence of nonhuman intrinsic value does not imply that 
nonhumans have dignity. The following subsection will consider the 
differences between intrinsic value and dignity through the lens of vital 
interests in order to develop a more precise notion of what dignity is.  
8.4.2 A DEFINITION FOR DIGNITY 
Intrinsic value and dignity are both closely related to vital interests. The 
above subsection showed that if something has interests then it has 
intrinsic value. Additionally, Chapter Six has already shown that vital 
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interests are specifications of dignity.220 Both dignity and intrinsic value are 
connected to the interests of organisms. However, a means to distinguish 
them can be found by considering the implications of intrinsic value and 
dignity.   
Consider two entities, X and Y, that both have both intrinsic value and 
dignity. As they are intrinsically valuable, they are both ends-in-
themselves and so ought to be treated as such.221 And as the possessors of 
dignity, they should lead a life of dignity.222 The crucial difference between 
these two normative implications is that X’s and Y’s intrinsic values provide 
rather limited information as to how they should be treated: as ends-in-
themselves. On the other hand, X’s and Y’s dignities provide more in-depth 
information concerning how they should be treated. They should not be 
exposed to any form of undignified treatment, and should be allowed to 
flourish.223 
The meaning of ‘X leading a life of dignity’ is more nuanced than that of ‘Y 
being treated as an end-in-itself’. In particular, the meaning of the latter is 
not specific to Y, but a rather general proposition. ‘Leading a life of dignity’ 
on the other hand requires further interpretation, which can be done 
                                       
220 §6.5. 
221 Kant (n209), Fox (n198) 161-76. 
222 See McCrudden (n201) 679; Dina Townsend, ‘Taking dignity seriously? A 
dignity approach to environmental disputes before human rights courts’ (2015) 6 
JHRE 204, 216. 
223 §1.5. 
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through dignity’s specifications via vital interests.224 As such, dignity is a 
fuller notion: it implies that the kind of life one leads matters, as specified 
by the relevant vital interests. Intrinsic value is only concerned with 
whether something has vital interests, dignity needs to know what these 
vital interests are. 
To state that ‘Y has intrinsic value’ provides less information than stating 
that ‘X has dignity’. This is because intrinsic value is simply a thing that Y 
has or does not have. Intrinsic value is ‘off the shelf’. Dignity is richer; it is 
‘à la carte’. X’s intrinsic value and Y’s intrinsic value provide the same 
information: an observation that X and Y have vital interests and so are 
loci of valuational activity.225 Whereas X’s dignity and Y’s dignity will take 
on different shapes and features, as defined by the content of the vital 
interests of X and Y.226  
Dignity’s dual-function within IHRL captures this difference. It is as 
justification that dignity shares its terrain with intrinsic value (“these rights 
derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”227); but it is as a 
metric (eg “aspects of school discipline may also be inconsistent with 
human dignity”228) that dignity demonstrates itself to be a fuller notion 
than intrinsic value. This is because dignity, when operating as a metric, 
                                       
224 Although dignity can be specified via vital interests, it is important to recall that 
it cannot be reduced to them: dignity also operates as an overarching and 
cohesive justificatory level: §6.5. 
225 See Mathews (n207) 122. 
226 §1.3-1.5; §6.5. 
227 ICCPR/ICESCR Preamble. 
228 CESCR, General Comment 13 [41]; §1.5. 
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provides some information about appropriate treatment: dignity covers 
both what matters and why it matters.229 Intrinsic value, on the other 
hand, exists statically as a consequence of vital interests: it can serve as a 
justification but not a metric. 
This theoretical difference between dignity and intrinsic value reveals an 
important distinction between them. If something has dignity, then it is 
possible (though undesirable) for it to lead an undignified life. As such, 
dignity refers not only to the fact that something should be treated as an 
end-in-itself, but also to how it should be treated while it is alive. That is, 
dignity arises when there are things other than mere survival that are of 
value. To something with dignity, not only life, but the kind of life one 
leads matters: they should not just survive, but flourish. The following 
subsection will link this distinction back to vital interests. 
8.4.3 HOW MANY VITAL INTERESTS? 
Because matters other than mere survival are of value to something with 
dignity, the interest in continued biological functioning is not in itself 
enough to demonstrate the existence of dignity, even though it does 
demonstrate that something has intrinsic value. For something to have 
dignity at least one additional vital interest must be present in order to 
provide a way in which its dignity can be violated while it remains alive.230  
Requiring an additional vital interest in order to have dignity may seem to 
suggest that plants and other nonanimal lifeforms may not be the 
                                       
229 §1.5. Claassen (n199) 244-45. 
230 See Nussbaum (n4) 362.  
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possessors of dignity. Whereas it takes little imagination to see how 
Tommy or Tilikum231 can be treated in an undignified manner without 
necessarily killing them (simply consider some other vital interests of 
theirs),232 the same is not so immediately obvious for trees or bacteria 
because other vital interests of theirs are not as immediately apparent. 
However, the dignity of plants is potentially meaningful,233 and should not 
be dismissed in limine. 
In this regard, it is important to realise that the content of dignity is not 
everywhere identical; it varies across species just as vital interests vary.234 
That it is not immediately apparent what a violation of tree dignity looks 
like may simply be a result of a lack of imagination (or even an 
unwillingness) to explore the abstract concept of dignity in its poorly-
chartered territories.235  
                                       
231 §7.2. 
232 See Sarah McFarland and Ryan Hediger (eds), Animals and Agency (Brill 2009) 
especially 1-22. 
233 See Claassen (n199); Koechlin (n140); Ariane Willemsen (ed), ‘The dignity of 
living beings with regards to plants’ (ECNH 2008) 
<http://www.ekah.admin.ch/fileadmin/_migrated/content_uploads/e-Broschure-
Wurde-Pflanze-2008.pdf> (accessed 27/7/2015); Balzer (n134) 14-19; Joel 
Feinberg, ‘The Rights of Animals and Future Generations’ in Rights, Justice, and 
the Bounds of Liberty (Princeton University Press 1980) 159, 164-66; Matthew 
Hall, Plants as Persons (SUNY Press 2011). 
234 Nussbaum (n4) 351. 
235 This is perhaps tied to human difficulty in understanding what it might be like 
to be another organism. See Jakob von Uexküll, A Foray into the Worlds of 
Animals and Humans (first published 1934, Joseph O’Neill tr, University of 
Minnesota Press 2010); Steven Bartlett, ‘Roots of Human Resistance to Animal 
Rights: Psychological and Conceptual Blocks’ (2002) 8 Animal Law 1. 
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A way to conceptualise plant dignity can in fact emerge from considering 
that all forms of survival for a plant are hardly equivalent. For example, 
petrochemical-fuelled monocultural agribusiness is not the same as 
agroecology, permaculture236 or rewilding farming methods. The oil-slicked 
Ogoniland is not only bad for humans, but for the land community itself 
too. Life may continue in fragmented ecosystems, but it seems a poorer 
variety of life than in better connected ones where it can truly flourish. 
Such ideas are found in Deep Ecology,237 Leopold’s Land Ethic,238 and many 
other branches of ecological thought.239 For instance, the Earth Democracy 
Movement is based on the understanding that “every from of life is 
intrinsically valuable, and diversity is to be prized because it signifies 
freedom, whereas monocultures are produced by the dominance of one 
species, variety, race, or religion, and the exclusion of others”.240  
These intuitions may simply be reflecting an aesthetic human preference. 
Or they may be capturing an important manifestation of the dignity of 
plants and other organisms:241 a plant may be able to survive in many 
                                       
236 Patrick Whitefield, Permaculture in a Nutshell (Permanent 1993). 
237 Devall and Sessions (n207). 
238 Leopold (n207); J Baird Callicott (ed), Companion to A Sand County Almanac 
(University of Wisconsin Press 1987). 
239 Sylvan (n207) 205; Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature (Fontana 1980); 
Masanobu Fukuoka, The Road Back to Nature (Japan Publications 1987); John 
Muir, My First Summer In the Sierra (first published 1911, Sierra Club Books 
1988); Morton (n207); Curry (n207); Schlosberg (n195). 
240 Cited in Cormac Cullinan, Wild Law (2nd edn, Green Books 2011) 163. 
Productivity is actually dependent on diversity: Whitefield (n183) 10ff. 
241 John Rodman, ‘Four Forms of Ecological Consciousness Reconsidered’ in Alan 
Drengson and Yuichi Inoue (eds), The Deep Ecology Movement (North Atlantic 
Books 1995) 251; Taylor (n207) 122; Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of 
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conditions, but to truly flourish and to have its dignity respected, it must 
fulfil its role in a diverse and interconnected ecological community. Such an 
interest can in fact be found in the vital interests outlined above. The 
human vital interest in forming social communities can be considered an 
example of a broader interest in forming communities in general, including 
ecological ones. Already it has been seen that human flourishing happens 
in community;242 and it is potentially meaningful to understand organism 
flourishing as happening in ecological community. Dignity can be 
understood – in line with ideals from Earth Jurisprudence that refer to the 
Earth as a communion of subjects243 – to include the existence of a vital 
interest in forming ecological communities. The presence of such an 
interest in living organisms would demonstrate the presence of nonhuman 
dignity. 
A pivotal vital interest of organisms has thus been identified for their 
possession of dignity. The remainder of this thesis will be concerned with 
the proposed vital interest of living organisms in forming ecological 
communities. This is pivotal because if this vital interest can be shown to 
exist, then all organisms will be shown to have dignity and thus potential 
bearers of vital rights. 
                                                                                                              
Nature (Routledge 1993) 210; Schlosberg (n195) 137; Angela Kallhoff, ‘Plants in 
Ethics: Why Flourishing Deserves Moral Respect’ (2014) 23 Environmental Values 
685.  
242 §1.3.1; §1.4.1. 
243 Cullinan (n240) 79-83; Ian Mason, ‘One In All: Principles and Characteristics of 
Earth Jurisprudence’ 37 and Judith Koons, ‘Key Principles to Transform Law for the 
Health of the Planet’ 46-52 both in Peter Burdon (ed), Exploring Wild Law 
(Wakefield 2011)37. 
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8.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has constructed a list of eight vital interests through 
establishing the grounds of existing vital rights (ie those found in IHRL). 
These vital interests are worthy of the elevated protection of vital rights 
because they are the essential interests of living (human) beings and 
together sketch the contours of human dignity. The list is neither 
monolithic nor exhaustive: it is plausible that human vital interests can be 
categorised in alternative ways, and that new vital interests will emerge as 
IHRL continues to enrich its understanding of the human rights subject.  
The chapter has also shown that at least some of these vital interests are 
present in at least some nonhumans. This is not surprising, since they are 
the essential interest of living beings and humans are not the only living 
beings. Importantly, the existence of nonhuman vital interests is not a 
result of moral extensionism: the argument is not that nonhumans have 
vital interests because they are similar to humans, but rather that all living 
beings have essential interests that arise through their physically 
embodied and embedded nature. 
Because dignity can be specified through vital interests, the existence of 
nonhuman vital interests opens the door to nonhuman dignity. Closer 
engagement with the concept of nonhuman dignity can assist theories 
seeking to justify both animal rights and RoN. This thesis seeks to do just 
that through exploring more closely what it means to have dignity – and 
whether nonhumans do indeed have it. This will allow the creation of a 
case for nonhuman vital rights through the lens of Interest Theory. 
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In order to do this, this chapter developed the relationship between dignity 
and vital interests through comparison with ‘intrinsic value’, a concept 
which is comparable to dignity and often seen in environmental philosophy 
and law. It argued that intrinsic value simply requires the presence of an 
interest, whereas to have dignity require the existence of a vital interest 
additional to the one in continued biological functioning. This is because it 
is not just mere survival that matters to something with dignity, but the 
kind of life matters too. It is possible (though not desirable) to live an 
undignified life. This aligns with dignity’s dual-role as both justification and 
metric within IHRL. As a justification, dignity signposts that things matter, 
as a metric it indicates what kind of life matters. 
The chapter concluded by identifying a vital interest (additional to the one 
in continued biological functioning) that may be present in all living 
organism: a vital interest in forming ecological communities. This interest 
can be conceived of through a broadening of the human interest in kinship 
and forming social communities (and a consequent enriching of the vital 
rights subject). Chapter Nine will complete this thesis by investigating 
whether such an interest does indeed exist, and how it is best protected.  
Although the focus remains on the interests and dignity of organisms, the 
thesis will retain the possibility of vesting rights in ecosystems. This is 
because the individualism latent in assessing the dignity, interests and 
rights of individual organisms may prove unsuitable for the ecocentric 
approaches found in environmental law and philosophy. Although rights 
may historically have their roots in unassailable individualism, this need no 
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longer be the case.244 In particular, it has already been seen that IHRL has 
softened its individualism through the establishment of group rights and other 
rights grounded in the vital interest in forming communities. Vesting rights in 
ecosystems may prove to be an effective means to protect the ecologically 
relational aspects of organisms’ dignity, in a comparable fashion to how 
peoples’ rights are used to protect the socially relational aspects of human 
dignity. 
                                       
244 cf Holmes Rolston III, ‘Rights and Responsibilities on the Home Planet’ (1993) 
18 YJIL 251, 253-62. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
ECOLOGISING 
To ecologize any field … is to radicalize it. This is because 
ecology stands for an interrelational view of reality that 
radically contradicts our ruling ontologies [which are] 
dualistic, particularistic, mechanistic, reductionistic, 
individualistic, commodifying, etc.1 
The capacity of a being as an entitlement-holder will not 
hinge on the unproblematic unity of the being, but on the 
status bestowed by the relevant legal system.2 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Nine demonstrates how nonhuman vital rights can be justified and 
designed. It does this through demonstrating and analysing of the 
relational nature of living organisms. In particular, it will use biological and 
ecological insights to demonstrate that all organisms have a vital interest 
in forming ecological communities, and then argue that this interest can be 
protected through vesting rights in ecosystems. 
                                       
1 Andy Fisher, ‘Three Arguments for a Radical Ecopsychology’ (2013) 5 
Ecopsychology 225, 225-26. 
2 Matthew Kramer, ‘Rights Without Trimmings’ in Mathew Kramer et al, A Debate 
Over Rights (OUP 1998) 57. 
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The vital interest in forming ecological communities has two pertinent 
consequences for the purposes of this thesis. Firstly, it demonstrates the 
existence of nonhuman dignity, since it is a vital interest additional to the 
one in continued biological functioning.3 In other words, there are matters 
other than mere survival that are of value to living organisms. Secondly, it 
means that living organisms are ecologically embedded. That is, organisms 
do not exist apart from the environment(s) in which they live, but rather 
the two mutually constitute each other. The first consequence indicates 
that nonhuman vital rights can be justified, the second informs how these 
rights should be designed. 
Although it is individual organisms that have vital interests (and so dignity), 
this chapter demonstrates that these organisms are not so individual after 
all. Like many investigations into the nature of living systems, Chapter 
Nine is concerned with the construction and consequences of “a 
metaphysics that takes account of the reality and importance of 
relationships and systems as well as of individuals”.4 It will demonstrate 
that entirely individualistic or ‘closed-box’ models of organisms are 
insufficient in their ability to capture the nature of vital rights subjects and 
their interests. There are numerous ways in which notions of organisms as 
entirely isolated and atomistic can be questioned. The three main strands 
that will be identified throughout the course of this chapter are that: 
                                       
3 §8.4.3. 
4 John Rodman, ‘Four Forms of Ecological Consciousness Reconsidered’ in Alan 
Drengson and Yuichi Inoue (eds), The Deep Ecology Movement (North Atlantic 
Books 1995) 242, 250. See also Michael Nelson, ‘Teaching Holism in 
Environmental Ethics’ (2010) 32 Environmental Ethics 33, 36. 
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(a) External relations are just as important as internal properties; 
(b) The natural world is as much continuous as it is discrete; and 
(c) There are always many perspectives from which to view reality. 
These three strands are themselves intertwined with one another. As such, 
this chapter will demonstrate the relational, continuous and perspectived 
(or together ‘ecological’ in a semi-metaphorical sense5) from a number of 
angles, exploring a number of related perspectives through which to 
approach and understand ecologising. The conclusions of these many 
approaches point in the same direction: towards a re-imagining of 
organisms (the primary subjects of vital rights) as truly ecological.  
The relationality, continuity and perspectived nature of the natural world 
forces a re-imagining of the vital rights subject as deeply ecologically 
embedded. In response to this ecological embeddedness, the thesis 
proposes that vital rights should be vested in ecosystems in order to 
protect the vital interests of organisms in forming ecological communities. 
This parallels the use of peoples’ rights to protect human interests in 
forming social communities.6 
                                       
5 Mesology is an older term for ecology which helps understand this meaning. It 
derives from mesos, meaning ‘middle’ or ‘the midst’. Mesology is the study of 
what happens in intervening spaces. See Augustin Berque, ‘Offspring of Watsuji’s 
theory of milieu (Fudo)’ (2004) 60 GeoJournal 389, 391; Augustin Berque, 
‘Médiance et pensée japonaise’ (traduction d’un article à paraître dans Kan環 n 54, 
juillet 2013); Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, ‘Actors or Spectators? 
Vulnerability and Critical Environmental Law’ (2013) 3 Oñati Socio-Legal Series 
854, 860-63, 867. 
6 §1.4. 
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Understanding organisms as relational and continuous, and shifting 
towards an ecosystem perspective, does not negate the significance of 
individual organisms. This chapter recognises that although living 
organisms are interrelated, they still retain meaning as individuals: the 
ecological world is one of continuity without indistinguishability.7 
Distinguishability must be maintained in order to be able to identify 
meaningful units (of differing kinds) within the natural world. The many 
ways of doing this (such as through the organism perspective or the 
ecosystem perspective) simply provide different perspectives of the same 
reality. 
9.2 THE RELATIONALITY OF AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS  
The first section of this chapter introduces the concept of ‘autopoiesis’ and 
demonstrates that autopoietic systems8 are a priori relational. Autopoiesis 
is a biological description of the defining characteristics of living organisms 
that is “on the one hand close to [being based on] strictly empirical 
grounds, yet provides the decisive entry point into the origin of 
individuality and identity, connecting it, through multiple mediation with 
                                       
7 Val Plumwood, ‘Nature, Self, and Gender: Environmental Philosophy, and the 
Critique of Rationalism’ (1991) 6 Hypatia 3, 19. 
8 Autopoietic entities are systems, but they are also ‘composite unities’. It is the 
very fact that they are autopoietic that allows them to be considered both systems 
and unities – Francisco Varela et al, ‘Autopoiesis: The Organization of Living 
Systems, Its Characterization and a Model’ (1974) 5 Biosystems 187, 187-88; 
Maturana, ‘Man and Society’ in Frank Benseler (ed), Autopoiesis, Communication 
and Society (Campus Verlag 1980) 29; Andreas Weber and Francisco Varela, ‘Life 
after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic foundations of biological 
individuality’ (2002) 1 Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 97, 115. 
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human lived body and experience, into the phenomenological realm”.9 Its 
potential to illuminate the nature of the vital rights subject, and the fact 
that it has been used to justify the intrinsic value of organisms,10 renders 
autopoiesis a useful starting point for considering the vital interests of 
living organisms in general. 
9.2.1 DEFINITION 
Autopoiesis, from the Greek autos meaning self and poiein meaning 
creation or production, is a term coined by biologists Francisco Varela and 
Humberto Matarana to describe living organisms.11 Its theoretical approach 
to understanding what distinguishes living organisms from inanimate 
matter12 makes it a pertinent concept for this thesis to consider. An 
autopoietic system is defined as being self-organising and self-producing.13 
                                       
9 Weber and Varela (n8) 116. 
10 See Warwick Fox, Toward A Transpersonal Ecology (SUNY Press 1990) 165-76; 
Freya Mathews, The Ecological Self (Routledge 1991) 125n9; Robyn Eckersley, 
Environmentalism and Political Theory (SUNY 1992) 60-61; J Baird Callicott, ‘Aldo 
Leopold’s Metaphor’ in Robert Costanza et al, (eds), Ecosystem Health: New Goals 
for Environmental Management (Island Press 1992) 51-53; Michael Bowman, 
‘Biodiversity, Intrinsic Value, and the Definition and Valuation of Environmental 
Harm’ (2002) in Michael Bowman and Alan Boyle (eds), Environmental Damage in 
International and Comparative Law (OUP 2002) 48-49; David Schlosberg, Defining 
Environmental Justice (OUP 2007) 136-37; Cormac Cullinan, Wild Law (Green 
Books 2011) 79-80. 
11 Varela (n8) 188; Francisco Maturana and Humberto Varela, Autopoiesis and 
Cognition (Kluwer 1980); John Mingers, Self-Producing Systems (Plenum Press 
1995) 13-17; Pier Luigi Luisi, ‘Autopoiesis: a review and reappraisal’ (2003) 90 
Naturwissenschaften 49, 51.  
12 A valid distinction, and a crucial one for this thesis. See Ernst Mayr, This is 
Biology (HUP 1997) 21-22 for the distinguishing characteristics of life: evolved 
programs, regulatory mechanisms, organisation, teleonomic systems, life-cycles, 
open systems, self-replication, metabolism, self-regulation, response to stimuli. 
13 Maturana and Varela (n11) 100-102; Luisi (n11) 51-56; Mingers (n11) 13-17, 
43-45. 
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These two processes are reliant on one another: it is through self-
organisation that autopoietic systems produce themselves, and through 
self-production that they organise themselves. That is, “autopoietic 
systems are self-producing systems – their components participate in 
processes of production the result of which is those very same 
components”.14 An autopoietic system therefore has some concept of ‘self’ 
(autos) that is continually produced and organised.  
A third condition for autopoietic systems is that they organise and produce 
themselves within a well-defined spatial region: their self must be bounded 
and this bounding is done by semi-permeable membranes.15 This spatial 
delimitation received less emphasis in Varela and Maturana’s initial 
definition, despite the fact that “the notion of boundary is, in fact, central 
in the theory of autopoiesis”16 since without it there could be no identifiable 
‘self’ to be organised and produced. 
There are thus three necessary conditions for autopoiesis: self-
organisation, self-production, and the existence of a boundary delimiting 
the ‘self’ relevant for these reflexive actions. Although autopoiesis was 
initially coined to characterise unicellular lifeforms, it can be applied to 
multicellular ones too.17 Autopoiesis provides a way to distinguish between 
                                       
14 Mingers (n11) 206. 
15 Note that it is not strictly necessary for this boundary to be produced by the 
organism, even though this is usually the case: Pablo Razeto-Barry, ‘Autopoiesis 
40 years Later. A Review and a Reformulation’ (2012) 42 Orig Life Evol Biosph 543, 
550-52. 
16 Luisi (n11) 50. 
17 Mingers (n11) 21, 41-43; Luisi (n11) 51-52, Razeto-Barry (n15) 559-60.  
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living and non-living systems,18 and so can be used to identify the 
particular features and functions of living systems. It will be used here to 
understand why it is that living organisms have vital interests and what 
these vital interests are. 
9.2.2 AUTOPOIESIS AND INTRINSIC VALUE 
Because they are autopoietic, organisms have a goal: the continued 
organisation and production of themselves. Because they have a goal, 
organisms are not neutral or impartial as to how the world unfolds: they 
tend towards their own self-production and self-organisation, allowing their 
biological functioning to continue. 
Not only do autopoietic systems have a goal, they also participate in 
activities in order to achieve this goal. They self-organise in order to self-
produce, and self-produce in order to self-organise. As such, organisms are 
not inert; they do not simply ‘hope for the best’, but rather have agency in 
the world.19 Organisms tend towards activities that promote their goals 
and away from those that do not. They sense and perceive relevant 
                                       
18 Razeto-Barry (n15) 560. 
19 Analysis of the concept of agency is beyond the scope of this thesis, though 
autopoiesis – and its connection with autonomy – provide useful starting points for 
such analysis: see Weber and Varela (n8) 115-17; Humberto Maturana and 
Francisco Varela, The Tree of Knowledge (Shambhala Publications 1987) 48; Luisi 
(n11) 49-52; Bernd Rosslenbroich, On the Origin of Autonomy (Springer 2014) 
ch3; Mingers (n11) 37-38; Rodman (n4) 242, 251; Thomas Heyd (ed), 
Recognizing the Autonomy of Nature (Columbia University Press 2005); Matthew 
Hall, ‘Plant Autonomy and Human-Plant Ethics’ (2009) 31 Environmental Ethics 
169; Sarah McFarland and Ryan Hediger (eds), Animals and Agency (Brill 2009) 5-
8, 13-14. 
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changes in circumstances and then react and respond to these changes so 
as to make the best of them from their own point of view.20  
Such goal-oriented behaviour demonstrates that organisms prefer some 
particular states of affairs over others: they “are subjects having purposes 
according to values encountered in the making of their living”.21 They have 
values: things can go better or worse for them. For example, being 
quenched is (normally) better than being thirsty since dehydration inhibits 
metabolic processes that are crucial for self-production. Organisms value 
situations that aid their self-production and self-organisation (‘the making 
of their living’) and disvalue those that do not. Through this valuing, 
organisms have interests in the state of the world around them. As a very 
minimum, autopoietic organisms have an interest in continued biological 
(ie autopoietic) functioning. Rolston captures this feature of organisms in a 
way that makes clear the shortcomings of some animal rights based 
approaches: 
So the oak grows, reproduces, repairs its wounds and 
resists death. The physical state that the organism seeks, 
idealised in its programmatic form, is a valued state. Value 
is present in this achievement. A life is defended for what it 
is in itself … [thus] a really vital ethic respects all life, not 
                                       
20 §9.4.2. 
21 Weber and Varela (n8) 102. 
428 
 
just animal pains and pleasures, much less just human 
preferences.22  
All organisms therefore have intrinsic value; their vital interest in 
continued functioning renders them loci of valuational activity. However, 
this thesis is interested in whether organisms have dignity, which requires 
the presence of an additional vital interest since it is not just life, but the 
sort of life, that matters to something with dignity. In order to explore the 
potential existence of another vital interest of all organisms, the third 
characteristic of autopoiesis – the autopoietic boundary – must be 
examined. It will be shown that this boundary, and crucially its semi-
permeability, implies the existence of a vital interest in forming ecological 
communities. 
9.2.3 THE AUTOPOIETIC SELF 
In order to be able to self-organise and to self-produce, autopoietic 
systems must have a ‘self’ on which to perform these actions. This self is 
defined by the semi-permeable boundary or membrane that is a necessary 
component of an autopoietic organism. This boundary creates an ‘inside’ 
and an ‘outside’; a ‘self’ and an ‘other’. However, an organism is by no 
means a closed system.23 Its boundary is not only semi-permeable but it in 
                                       
22 Holmes Rolston, cited in Alexander Gillespie, International Environmental Law, 
Policy, and Ethics (2nd edn, OUP 2014) 127. 
23 Razeto-Barry (n15) 547. From the point of view of entropy, this must be the 
case: the second law of thermodynamics states that entropy, or disorder, must 
increase over time within a closed system. However, each organism is itself an 
example of matter coming together in a highly structured and organised fashion. 
Therefore, an individual organism cannot be a closed system. See Erwin 
Schrödinger, What Is Life? (CUP 1944); Jeremy England, ‘Statistical physics of 
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fact must be permeated in order for the organism to continue. Organisms 
are dependent on exchange (of energy, nutrients, ideas etc) with the 
‘other’ for their survival. 
The continued existence of autopoietic organisms is dependent on 
exchange that takes place across its membrane. The creation and 
continuation of the autopoietic ‘self’ is thus entirely dependent on the 
‘other’. Isolationism is futile, and the organism constantly (re-)defines and 
(re-)shapes both its self and its environment.24 There is thus a “mutual co-
emergence of environment and living structure”.25 The living structure (the 
organism) is both clearly demarcated from and totally bound up with its 
environment. Nobel Prize winning biochemist Peter Mitchell states that:  
I cannot consider the organism without its environment… 
From a formal point of view the two may be regarded as 
equivalent phases between which dynamic contact is 
maintained by the membranes that separate and link 
them.26 
                                                                                                              
self-replication’ (2013) 139 The Journal of Chemical Physics 121923; Natalie 
Wolchover, ‘A New Physics Theory of Life’ Quanta Magazine (22 January 2014) 
<https://www.quantamagazine.org/20140122-a-new-physics-theory-of-life/> 
(accessed 13/3/2015). 
24 Note that what is being ‘environ-ed’ here is not (necessarily) a human. The 
world is replete with multitudinous environments.  
25 Luisi (n11) 58. 
26 Cited in Nick Lane, The Vital Question (Profile 2015) 77. 
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Autopoietic organisms are, by definition, “organisationally closed”27 by 
semi-permeable membranes. But they are also reliant on ‘dynamic contact’ 
with the outside – they are “interactively open”.28 Living organisms persist 
both by having membranes that both separate and link them with their 
environment. Understanding organisms thus requires a dialethic29 
viewpoint: they are both closed and open simultaneously (organisms are 
‘clopen’30). 
There is a poignant juxtaposition here: the organism divides the world into 
‘self’ and ‘other’, only for the self and the other to be inextricably bound 
together. Interacting across the boundary is essential to autopoietic 
organisms: without such interactions the organism could not self-organise 
and self-produce (hence they are perhaps better thought of as ‘intra-
actions’31). But such interactions could not take place without the organism 
having some boundary demarcating the self from the other in the first 
place.  
Autopoiesis therefore demonstrates that organisms are necessarily 
relational. “There cannot be an individuality which is isolated and folded 
                                       
27 Mingers (n11) 31. 
28 ibid 33. See also Razeto-Barry (n15) 553. 
29 Dialethism, or dialetheism, is the view that contradictions may be true. See 
‘dialethism’, Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy (Penguin 1997); Graham Priest, 
Richard Routley and Jean Norman (eds), Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the 
Inconsistent (Philosophia Verlag 1989) 3ff. 
30 A technical mathematical term that describe a set that is both open and closed. 
Furthermore, the inverse of a clopen set is by definition itself also clopen: 
clopenness is mutual. 
31 Barad’s term, see infra §9.4.1. For Barad’s discussion of boundaries see Karen 
Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway (Duke University Press 2007) 153-61. 
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into itself. There can only be an individuality that copes, relates and 
couples with the surroundings”.32 This suggests that the vital interests of 
living organisms cannot be restrained within an isolating and enclosing 
boundary.  
Furthermore, autopoiesis forces a reconceptualization of the notion of 
‘self’. The ‘self’ of an autopoietic system cannot be only a closed, bounded 
self, but instead must also be open and relational. This seeming paradox is 
a useful observation for this thesis. In order to vest rights it is necessary to 
be able to identify a holder (the enclosed self), but this holder must 
necessarily be relational in order to survive – forming bonds are vital to 
the Self. 
The expansive idea of selfhood is also found in Arne Naess’s Deep 
Ecology,33 and other related theories of ecological ethics.34 Naess’ idea of 
Selfhood (and the one resulting from full consideration of autopoiesis) is 
fundamentally relational.35 Naess understands the Self (capitalised), contra 
the narrow ego,36 to be composed of relations, including those with nature:  
                                       
32 Weber and Varela (n8) 117. 
33 See eg Arne Naess, ‘The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement’ 
(1973) 16 Inquiry 95; Arne Naess, ‘Self-Realization: An Ecological Approach to 
Being in the World’ (1987) 4 The Trumpeter 35; Bill Devall and George Sessions, 
Deep Ecology (Gibbs Smith 1985); Arne Naess, Ecology, community and lifestyle 
(David Rothenberg tr, CUP 1989) 197; Drengson and Inoue (n4); Arne Naess, 
Ecology of Wisdom (Counterpoint 2008). 
34 In particular Mathews (n10); Fox (n10). See also UNEP, ‘Bio-Cultural 
Community Protocols: A Community Approach to Ensuring the Integrity of 
Environmental Law and Policy’ (2009) 69-70. 
35 Naess (n33 1987); Naess (n33 2008) 88-92. See also Fox (n10) 215.  
36 Naess (n33 2008) 172. 
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We may be said to be in, and of, nature from the very 
beginning of ourselves. Society and human relationships 
are important, but our own self is much richer in its 
constitutive relationships. These relationships are not only 
those we have with other humans and with the human 
community… but also those we have with other living 
beings.37  
This Self is fundamentally ecological38 because it forms relations with all 
living beings. Naess’ notion of Self has “incorporated insights from modern 
physics and ecology into human understanding of the natural world. Much 
Western philosophy, Naess argued, relies on an outdated view of the world 
in which humans are believed to be separate from one another and from 
the natural world”.39 Naess’ Self addresses this separatism through 
understanding that seemingly external relations are in fact essential 
components of living organisms.  
An intrinsic relation between two things A and B is such 
that the relation belongs to the definition or basic 
constitutions of A and B, so that without the relation, A and 
B are no longer the same things.40 
                                       
37 Naess (n33 1987) 35. 
38 Hence the title of Mathews (n10). See also Naess (n33 2008) 81-119. 
39 Clare Palmer, Environmental Ethics, (ABC-Clio 1997) 16. 
40 Naess (n33 1973) 95. 
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Without the relation, they are no longer the same thing. Autopoietic 
relations are not secondary: they are primary, describing and defining the 
thing itself. Thus, although they are external (because they are relations), 
they are still intrinsic.41 Much environmental philosophy is based on this 
fundamental relationality of life,42 which leads to a “metaphysical holism 
[which] originates in ecology and recognizes that no individual can be 
understood independently of its environment”.43 Autopoiesis demonstrates 
that this relationality can be traced down to a fundamental level: 
autopoietic systems, and so living organisms, are by definition relational. 
9.3 AN ‘ECOLOGICAL’  WORLD 
This section will consider how the relationality of autopoietic organisms 
manifests itself in reality. It will consider the multiple interconnections 
between living organisms that arise through their biological and ecological 
relations. This will demonstrate that living organisms are not just relational 
                                       
41 cf GE Moore, Philosophical Studies (Routledge 1922) 253-75; John O’Neill, ‘The 
Varieties of Intrinsic Value’ (1992) 75 The Monist 119, 123-25. 
42 John Muir, My First Summer In the Sierra (first published 1911, Sierra Club 
Books 1988); Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (OUP 1949); Richard Sylvan, 
‘Is There a Need for a New, An Environmental, Ethic?’ (1973) 1 Proceedings of the 
XV World Congress of Philosophy, Varna, Bulgaria 205; John Rodman, ‘The 
Liberation of Nature?’ (1977) 20 Inquiry 83; Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature 
(Fontana 1980); Devall and Sessions (n33); Paul Taylor, Respect for Nature 
(Princeton University Press 1986); Holmes Rolston III, Environmental Ethics 
(Temple University 1988); Patrick Whitefield, Permaculture in a Nutshell 
(Permanent 1993); J Baird Callicott, Beyond the Land Ethic (SUNY Press 1999); 
Fox (n10); Bryan Norton, Toward Unity Among Environmentalists (OUP 1991); 
Robin Attfield and Andrew Belsey (eds), Philosophy and the Natural Environment 
(Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 36, CUP 1994); Gary Varner, In 
Nature’s Interests? (OUP 1998); Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought (HUP 
2010); Patrick Curry, Ecological Ethics (2nd edn, Polity Press 2011). 
43 Norton (n42) 223. 
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but deeply ecologically embedded. This indicates that living organisms 
have a vital interest in forming ecological communities, and has 
implications for how the subjects of vital rights are to be understood in a 
comparable fashion to the (re-)imagining of the human rights subject as 
embodied and socially embedded.44 
9.3.1 BIOLOGICAL RELATIONS 
There are such things as individual living organisms. Pandas and bamboo, 
sponges and mosquitos, all exist and are readily identified as ‘things-in-
themselves’. Not only can organisms be identified and named as instances 
of their species, but they can also be given individual names. Humans are 
the most obvious example of this, but pets, farmyard animals, and trees 
(such as The Major Oak) are also often given names to distinguish them 
from everything else in the universe. However, autopoietic living 
organisms also form relations with the world outside them, and the 
intertwining nature of these relations demonstrate how the organism is not 
an entirely individualistic and separable being. Some examples from 
biology illustrate this. 
The human body is awash with life. Healthy human bodies contain many 
more nonhuman microbial cells than they do human ones.45 These 
microbes (collectively known as the human microbiome) play a crucial role 
in the continued functioning of the human body.46 Digestive tracts in 
                                       
44 §1.3-1.4. 
45 Peter Turnbaugh et al, ‘The Human Microbiome Project’ (2007) 449 Nature 804. 
46 ibid.  
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particular are home to hundreds of different species of gut flora that allow 
humans (and indeed all animals47) to digest and metabolise food. Without 
these distinguishable living organisms sharing our bodies, our ability to 
continue functioning would be hampered. The makeup of mammalian gut 
flora is not identical for every individual of a particular species and 
furthermore can have a noticeable impact on the appearance and 
properties of the host,48 affecting aspects as diverse as propensity to 
obesity49 and sexual attractiveness.50 What are commonly presented as 
traits of humans are in fact the result of ‘intrinsic relations’ with 
microscopic organisms. 
Buried even deeper inside living bodies is another biological 
interrelationship. Mitochondria are organelles found in most cells that are 
essential to cell (and so organ and therefore organism) functioning. They 
play a number of crucial roles such as the production of the chemical 
ATP,51 which is required for metabolism. Yet mitochondria have their own 
DNA, independent of the rest of the cell (and body) to which they belong. 
This appearance of distinct mitochondrial genes within cells can be 
                                       
47 Ruth Ley et al, ‘Worlds within worlds: evolution of the vertebrate gut microbiota’ 
(2008) 6 Nature Reviews Microbiology 776. 
48 Eugene Rosenberg and Ilana Zilber-Rosenberg, ‘Symbiosis and Development: 
The Hologenome Concept’ (2011) 93 Birth Defects Research C Embryo Today 56. 
See also Eric Juengst, ‘What’s Taxonomy Got To Do With It?’ in Julian Savulescu 
and Nick Bostrom (eds), Human Enhancement (OUP 2009) 43, 52-53. 
49 Michele Petruzzelli and Antonio Moschetta, ‘Intestinal Ecology in the Metabolic 
Syndrome’ (2010) 11 Cell Metabolism 345. 
50 Through smell: Mahmood Bhutta, ‘Sex and the nose: human pheromonal 
responses’ (2007) 100 Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 268, 270. 
51 Michel Jacob Morange, Life Explained (Yale University Press 2008) 102. 
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explained by the theory of endosymbiosis. According to this theory, 
mitochondria (and other endosymbiotic organelles, such as chloroplasts) 
have their origins in more fully-formed standalone bacteria, which became 
assimilated into cells and today constitute an entwined part of them.52 
The concept of endosymbiosis is a particular example of the general and 
more well-known concept of symbiosis where two or more organisms are 
closely reliant on the behaviour or characteristics of one another. This need 
not result in mutual benefits occurring for both species (as in mutualism) 
and may even be detrimental to one of the two species (parasitism). 
Classical examples of this include: specific bee populations that are 
responsible for the pollination of particular plants; the ‘three sisters’ 
farming method; tapeworms living in the guts of humans; and nitrogen-
fixing bacteria that live in root nodules.53 Each demonstrates how intimate 
the interrelations composing living organisms can be.  
Probing further into the worlds of other lifeforms reveals additional 
challenges to notions of organisms as individual and isolatable. A striking 
example of this is slime moulds. These can exist either as single-celled 
organisms or as a conglomerate multicellular mass, a ‘grex’. As single-
celled amoebae they are perfectly well-contained and able to survive until 
their environment changes (a reduction in available food for example). 
They then send signals to one other to combine into a multicellular 
organism that exhibits behaviours not possible for the individual amoebae 
                                       
52 Michael Gray et al, ‘Mitochondrial Evolution’ (1999) 283 Science 1476.  
53 Colin Tudge, The Secret Life of Trees (Penguin 2005) 258-62. 
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(such as standing upright and cell specialisation).54 However, exactly how 
the grex is able to co-ordinate its behaviour is unknown.55 The dry 
scientific observation that slime moulds are “social amoeba that lie in the 
interface between unicellular and multicellular organisms”56 indicates the 
interrelatedness and the continuity of living systems. 
More generally, the lifestyles of fungi,57 ant colonies,58 yeasts,59 polyps,60 
brittlestars,61 some deepwater fish62 and lichens63 demonstrate the flexible 
approach living organisms have towards self-identification. Through their 
‘intrinsic relations’, organisms often continuously blur into one another 
                                       
54 Andreas Wagner, Paradoxical Life: Meaning, Matter, and the Power of Human 
Choice (Yale University Press 2009) 78-79. 
55 Eirikur Palsson and Hans Othmer, ‘A model for individual and collective cell 
movement in Dictyosteliumdiscoideum’ (2000) 97 PNAS USA 10448. 
56 Arturo Casadevall, ‘Amoeba and Slime Mold: Host of Virulence Evolution’ in 
Joseph Heitman et al (eds), Molecular Principles of Fungal Pathogenesis (ASM 
Press 2006) 231. 
57 The Armillaria ostoyae can live for over 2,000 years and reach a size of over 
2,000 acres. Craig Schmitt and Michael Tatum, ‘The Malheur National Forest, 
Location of the World’s Largest Living Organism [The Humongous Fungus]’ (2008) 
United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service 
<http://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/fsbdev3_033146.pdf> 
(accessed 3/6/2014). 
58 Deborah Gordon, Ant Encounters (Princeton University Press 2010). 
59 Horst Feldmann, Yeast: Molecular and Cell Biology (Wiley-VCH 2010). 
60 Laurence Simmons, ‘Towards A Philosophy of the Polyp’ in McFarland and 
Hediger (n19) 343. 
61 Barad (n31) 369-84. 
62 Theodore Pietsch, ‘Dimorphism, parasitism, and sex revisited: modes of 
reproduction among deep-sea ceratioid anglerfishes’ (2005) 52 Ichthyological 
Research 207. 
63 Thomas Nash III (ed), Lichen Biology (2nd edition, CUP 2008). 
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across their semi-permeable membranes, often resulting in ambiguity over 
where a living organism begins and where it ends. 
DNA may seem to provide a way to distinguish decisively between 
organisms, but this has its limitations too. Recall organelles, and consider 
also that identical twins have the same DNA (although identical twins often 
have non-identical scents, which can be detected by trained German 
Shepherds64). Furthermore, asexual reproduction abounds in the natural 
world:65 propagation, budding, sporulation, fission, cloning and 
fragmentation all allow the creation of new organisms that have identical 
DNA to the parent. Even the humble garden lawn calls into question any 
straightforward notion of a clearly defined organism: should each blade of 
grass be considered the relevant unit; or a patch connected by the same 
rhizome; or even the entire lawn? Different DNA does not straightforwardly 
mean a different organism, and nor does the same DNA necessarily 
signpost the same one. As such, DNA cannot be an indicator providing 
clear differentiation between living organisms. 
Sharpening the focus on living organisms reveals them to have blurred 
edges. It may be intuitively obvious what a slug or a termite is, but when 
they are looked at in more detail defining this both precisely and 
accurately is challenging. Thus although it is eminently possible to identify 
organisms, to give them names, assign them properties and make them 
                                       
64 Ludvík Pinc et al, ‘Dogs Discriminate Identical Twins’ (2011) 6 PLoS ONE 1. 
65 Whole domains of life (eg bacteria) reproduce asexually, as do some animals: 
polyps, annelid worms and even sharks: DD Chapman et al, ‘Parthenogenesis in a 
large-bodied requiem shark, the blacktip Carcharhinus limbatus’, (2008) 73 
Journal of Fish Biology 1473. 
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Hohfeldian position-holders,66 it must be acknowledged that organisms are 
interrelated and continuous with one another. This suggests that their 
interests, and therefore their dignity, will be interrelated and continuous 
too. Zooming out and looking at lifeforms from wider perspectives further 
demonstrates the intrinsic relationality of living systems.  
9.3.2 ECOLOGICAL INTEGRONS 
Drawing a clear boundary around an organism is not trivial. Although in a 
sense it is correct to understand autopoietic semi-permeable membranes 
as demarcating organisms (autopoietic functioning requires distinction 
between self and other), the relations that organisms form across this 
membrane (again a necessary aspect of autopoietic functioning) blur the 
boundary. Attempts to divorce the self from the other are further 
challenged by the ecological networks that living organisms form. 
Living organisms are reliant on inputs and outputs in order to survive. It is 
well-known that the cells and molecules a living organism is made of do 
not remain static over time but are in a state of constant flux. It is not 
what an organism is made of that defines it but rather how it makes 
itself:67 through exchange with the outside. 
[T]he particles of matter that make up the organism in 
each moment are only temporary and passing contents. 
Their identity does not converge with the identity of the 
whole through which they pass. But it is exactly by the 
                                       
66 §4.3. 
67 Lane (n26) 53-86. 
440 
 
passing of alien matter as part of itself that the whole 
maintains its spatial system, the living form. From a 
material point of view it is never the same, although it 
keeps its identity exactly by not keeping the same matter.68  
Inputs and outputs of passing content do not only exist in theory; they are 
clearly observable. An obvious example is through digestion. A more subtle 
example is the leaves on a tree. These certainly form part of the tree when 
they are green and attached, but what about when the leaves fall to the 
ground in Autumn? Is that mosaic of brown and yellow crumples still a part 
of the tree or have those fallen leaves suddenly become ‘other’? The fallen 
leaves may no longer be attached, but the tree designed to shed those 
leaves just as much as it designed to grow them. The leaves will 
decompose, recycling nutrients, creating food and habitats for other 
creatures, which the tree itself depends on in turn. Dropping leaves is part 
of the function of deciduous trees: their leaves fall and perform a new task. 
It is not entirely clear cut when a leaf is no longer part of a tree. 
Because organisms are dependent on constant inputs and outputs, 
intricate networks are formed amongst living organisms that tightly 
enmesh69 them with their surroundings. Food webs provide an obvious 
example of this, as they show how each organism is dependent on 
numerous predator/prey and decomposition relations. Trophic cascades – 
when changes in predator behaviour have far-reaching effects on other 
                                       
68 Hans Jonas, cited in Weber and Varela (n8) 113. 
69 See Morton (n42) 28. 
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species through food web dynamics –demonstrate how organism 
functioning both influences and is dependent on the networks of 
inputs/outputs around it.70 Other nutrient cycles similarly demonstrate 
this: consider, for example, the ‘whale pump’ whereby “marine mammals 
can enhance primary productivity in their feeding areas by concentrating 
nitrogen near the surface through the release of flocculent fecal plumes”.71 
The activities of marine mammals can quite directly alter the composition 
of their surroundings through the redistribution of nutrients.  
The relationality between organisms and their environments is also 
witnessed by invasive species, which can often “change whole ecosystems 
by altering hydrology, fire regimes, nutrient cycling, and other ecosystem 
processes”,72 and by the processes of ecological disturbance and 
succession, whereby external pressures can severely alter the structure 
and/or behaviour of organisms, populations, and ecosystems.73 Organisms 
must be considered in the light of the networks they form and are part of. 
The interrelatedness of living organisms with their surroundings is in many 
ways the fundamental principle underlying the study of ecology.74 John 
                                       
70 See eg William Ripple and Robert Beschta, ‘Trophic cascades in Yellowstone: 
The first 15 years after wolf reintroduction’ (2012) 145 Biological Conservation 
205. 
71 Joe Roman and James McCarthy, ‘The Whale Pump: Marine Mammals Enhance 
Primary Productivity in a Coastal Basin’ (2010) 5 PLoS ONE 1, 1. 
72 Rüdiger Wittenberg and Matthew Cock (eds), Invasive Alien Species (CABI 
2001) 4. 
73 See STA Pickett and PS White (eds), The Ecology of Natural Disturbance and 
Patch Dynamics (Academic Press 1985) 4. 
74 Michael Begon et al, Ecology: From Individuals to Ecosystems (4th edn, 
Blackwell 2006) 3-5. 
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Muir’s famous statement that “when we try to pick out anything by itself, 
we find it hitched to everything else in the Universe”75 could be considered 
as the ‘Fundamental Theorem of Ecology’.76  
There is added depth to ecological connectedness because organisms are 
not simply connected to other organisms, cells to other cells, and so on, 
but connections run ‘up and down’ as well as ‘side to side’. That is, not 
only is a squirrel fundamentally connected to other squirrels, the tree 
where its drey is built, and the humans which (inadvertently) feed it, but it 
is also impregnably bound up with its cells and its ecosystem, entities of an 
entirely different kind. The study of ecology is concerned with various 
interlocking ‘levels-of-organisation’ at which living systems can be 
considered, as represented in the figure below.77 
                                       
75 Muir (n42) 110. 
76 This is not a theorem in the strict mathematical sense, but in the looser sense of 
the fundamental theorems of calculus, arithmetic and algebra. It both gives a 
flavour for the discipline as a whole and provides a crucial idea which underpins it. 
77 Eugene Odum and Gary Barrett, Fundamentals of Ecology (5th edn, Brooks/Cole 
2005) 5. 
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Relations exist between as well as within these levels since the “individual 
organism, for example, cannot survive for long without its population, any 
more than the organ would be able to survive for long as a self-
perpetuating unit without its organism”.78 Furthermore, each one of these 
levels provides a new perspective from which to view the natural world, 
providing insight and information not available from the other levels. 
Modern ecology is based on the realisation that to understand any one of 
these levels, one must also understand how it is situated within these 
nested levels. 
Thus although each level may seem ‘complete’ in itself, there is always 
additional information and value in understanding how relations operate 
                                       
78 ibid 7. 
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between the layers. This is captured in François Jacob’s conceptualisation 
of the levels-of-organisation as ‘integrons’.79  
‘An integron is formed by assembling integrons of the level 
below it; it takes part in the construction of the integron of 
the level above.’ Each integron has new characteristics and 
capacities not present at any lower level of integration; 
these can be said to have emerged.80  
The ‘integron’ conceptualisation captures the entwined nature of the levels-
of-organisation, the value of switching perspective to a new level, and the 
“wholey part and partly whole”81 nature of the levels. The useful 
terminology of ‘integron’ will be retained in this chapter as a synonym for 
‘level-of-organisation’. 
Ecological realities demonstrate that the living world is composed of 
interrelated integrons at a number of levels. The relations of organisms 
both within and between these integrons are neither superfluous nor 
secondary: organisms are not just reliant on ecological and biological 
relations – they mutually constitute one other. Your environment 
determines what you are like. The future of an acorn depends not only on 
its genetic material but also where it lands. 
                                       
79 François Jacob, Logic of Life (Betty Spillman tr, Vintage 1976) 299-324. See 
also Cullinan’s concept of ‘holons in holarchy’: Cullinan (n10) 147; Linda Sheehan, 
‘Earth Day Revisited’ in Peter Burdon (ed), Exploring Wild Law (Wakefield 2011) 
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80 Mayr (n12) 19 (citing Jacob). See also Morange (n51) 101-109. 
81 Wagner (n54) 62ff. 
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An oak is a noble tree in a forest or a park but an acorn 
that falls in a fissure in some Scottish crag may spend a 
couple of centuries in bonsai’d mode, never more than a 
twisted stick. Yet it may turn out acorns which, if they 
should be carried to some fertile field, could again 
reproduce magnificence. Is the twisted stick less of an oak 
because it fell on stony ground?82 
In part, this is the nature versus nurture debate reformulated. However, it 
is clear that external surroundings are partly nature and partly nurture. As 
with the debate as a whole, the answer is that it is impossible (and 
possibly futile) to separate the two.83  
Just as it is impossible to extract an organism from all its (endo)symbiotic 
relations and internal parts, it is impossible to extract any living thing from 
its environment (ie its external parts). Thinking of (other) integrons as 
external parts of an organism may seem strange. But this can be relieved 
by realising that it is the relations with the other integrons that form a part 
of the organism, not the other integrons themselves. Organisms form 
‘intrinsic relations’ not just with other organisms but with cells and 
ecosystems too.  
                                       
82 Tudge (n53) 14. This emphasises that there is not one ‘ideal’ status for any 
(kind of) organism. There is not one best way for a human life to be lived, but 
value in diversity: we cannot all be lawyers.  
83 See Dale Goldhaber, The Nature-Nurture Debates (CUP 2012). 
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9.3.3 A VITAL INTEREST IN FORMING ECOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES  
So far this section has demonstrated that relationality permeates the living 
world. This relationality is inevitable given the relationality of autopoietic 
systems, and manifests itself in the formation of biological and ecological 
integrons. Organisms do not (want to84) live in isolation; as autopoietic 
systems they seek bond-formation. They (want to) form integrons. Just as 
the human rights subject is socially embedded,85 so the vital rights subject 
is ecologically embedded. 
Being ecologically embedded is essential to the very nature of organisms. 
It is not just vital to their continuation but also to their mode of being. An 
organism divorced from its integrons and unable to form the ‘intrinsic 
relations’ it naturally would has had a fundamental aspect of its 
constitution frustrated: ‘without the relations, it is no longer the same 
thing’.86 Organisms therefore do have a vital interest in forming ecological 
communities,87 an essential interest that directly arises from their status as 
                                       
84 In the sense that they are autopoietic and so goal-directed. 
85 §1.4. 
86 supra n40. 
87 The language of ‘communities’ is retained here, not only to maintain correlation 
with the human vital interest in forming social communities, but because the 
technical ecological meaning of ‘community’ provides an appropriate integron 
perspective through which to understand this interest. A community is a group of 
populations of different organisms in a particular place: it is “essentially, the biotic 
component of an ecosystem” (‘community’, Oxford Dictionary of Ecology (4th edn, 
OUP 2010)). It is thus communities that are formed through organism-organism 
intrinsic relations, and it is the organism, as the locus of valuational activity, with 
which this thesis is primarily concerned.  
However, that the interest is in forming communities should not be taken too 
literally to mean that it is only the community integron that organisms form. This 
cannot be the case, given the interrelatedness of all levels-of-organisation.  
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living beings. This implies that living organisms do indeed have dignity 
since they have more than one vital interest; it is not just life itself that 
matters to them, but also the sort of life they lead.  
To break organisms (including humans) apart from their integrons is a 
violation of their dignity. It compromises their very nature, and means 
treating them in a way that they should not be treated. Though such 
treatment will often endanger the survival of the organism in question, it is 
also possible to threaten an organism’s relationality without necessarily 
threatening its survival. As Bateson points out, “[t]he artificially 
homogenized populations of man’s domestic animals and plants are 
scarcely fit for survival”.88 Zoos, monocultures, factory farms, laboratory 
specimens and other ways in which living organisms are prevented from 
fulfilling their role within ecological communities all present potential 
violations of dignity. Organisms flourish when in community with one 
another. 
How nonhuman flourishing and dignity, and in particular the vital interest 
in forming ecological communities, can be best protected is of central 
concern to this thesis. The following two sections will argue that it is valid 
to protect the vital interest of living organisms in forming ecological 
communities through shifting perspective and establishing ecosystem 
rights. This in some ways mirrors the protection of humans’ social 
                                       
88 Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (first published 1972, University 
of Chicago 2000) 457, emphasis added. 
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embeddedness through peoples’ rights.89 The first step in this process is to 
construct a conceptualisation of organisms that better imagines the 
ecologically embedded subject of vital rights.  
9.4 ORGANISMS-IN-THEIR-INTEGRONS 
The previous section demonstrated that living organisms are constituted by 
their relations with other organisms and are inextricably embedded in 
ecological integrons. This has implications for how the organism, the 
bearer of dignity and so primary subject of vital rights, is to be understood. 
An important lesson of the previous section is that an organism is 
constituted as much by its surroundings as by its internal components. In 
the words of Powhatan-Ren’pe writer Jack Forbes: 
You could cut off my hand, and I would still live. You could 
take out my eyes, and I would still live. Cut off my ears, my 
nose, cut off my legs, and I could still live. But take away 
the air, and I die. Take away the sun, and I die. Take away 
the plants and the animals, and I die. So why would I think 
my body is more a part of me than the sun and the earth?90 
That organisms do not exist as discrete units has been demonstrated 
through a number of fields, including biochemistry,91 ecology,92 and 
                                       
89 §1.4. 
90 Cited in Kathleen Moore, The Pine Island Paradox (Milkweed Editions 2004) 58-
59. 
91 supra n26. 
92 §9.3.2. 
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ecological philosophy.93 Within evolutionary biology, Dawkins’ concept of 
the ‘extended phenotype’ refers to a comparable idea,94 compelling us to 
ask whether “the beaver phenotype stop[s] at the end of its whiskers or at 
the end of a beaver’s dam?”95 Given that part of being a beaver is to 
construct dams, there seems good reason to consider the dam just as 
much part of the beaver as any other part. Naturally, the damming of a 
river has a considerable knock on effect for the other nearby organisms. 
These organisms are dependent on the beaver just as a parasite is 
dependent on its host. Understanding the vital rights subject requires 
understanding its ecological context(s) and intrinsic relations.  
A valuable way to conceptualise organisms’ deeply seated ecological 
embeddedness is to re-imagine the organism, paraphrasing Bateson, as an 
‘organism-in-its-integrons’.96 Bateson argues that there is no such 
meaningful unit as an isolated organism, but rather the organism must 
always be considered as ‘always-already’ bound up with, embedded in, and 
constituted by, its environment (ie its integrons).97 The following sub-
sections will draw out the meaning of ‘organism-in-its-integrons’, a term 
densely packed with information.  
                                       
93 supra n42. 
94 Though Dawkins wished to focus attention the gene, a different perspective shift 
to the one adopted in this thesis. 
95 Morton (n42) 34. 
96 Bateson refers to an ‘organism-in-its-environment’: Bateson (n88) 457; 
Mathews (n10) 106; Begon (n74) ch1. 
97 Bateson (n88) 457. 
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9.4.1 BEING-INTRA-ACTIVE 
The idea of something being ‘always-already’ the case is important in the 
work of Martin Heidegger,98 and his philosophy helps draw out what is 
meant by an organism being in-its-integrons. Heidegger’s 
phenomenological analysis in Being and Time reveals that being happens 
in a space (both spatially and temporally) and this situating is fundamental 
to being. Heidegger refers to the human as Dasein, literally translated as 
‘being-there’. The point is that Dasein finds itself always-already bound up 
in the world around it, and this is how Dasein makes sense of existence. 
Situations are essential to Dasein’s way of being,99 and these situations are 
not secondary to Dasein but form a primary constitutive part of how 
Dasein experiences being. Dasein exists in a relational mode to the world 
around it, which Heidegger terms ‘being-in-the-world’, a term bearing 
conceptual similarity to ‘organism-in-its-integrons’. Consider the following 
passage, and consider its meaning with the words ‘Dasein’ and ‘the-world’ 
replaced by ‘organism’ and ‘its-integrons’: 
[B]eing-in is not a ‘property’ which Dasein sometimes has 
and sometimes does not have, without which it could be 
just as well as it could with it. It is not the case that human 
being ‘is’, and then on top of that has a relation of being to 
the ‘world’ which it sometimes takes upon itself. Dasein is 
                                       
98 Michael Inwood, Heidegger: A Very Short Introduction (OUP 2000) 52-53. 
99 After ‘The Turn’, Heidegger shifted focus from Dasein’s being to understanding 
Dasein as a mode of being. Significantly, this can overturn the more 
anthropocentric elements of Heidegger’s thought. 
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never ‘initially’ a sort of being which is free from being-in, 
but which at times is in the mood to take up a ‘relation’ to 
the world. This taking up of relations to the world is 
possible only because, as being-in-the-world, Dasein is as it 
is.100 
Organisms are never ‘initially’ free from their integrons: their taking up of 
relations is simply a matter of how they are. The hyphenation of organism-
in-its-integrons is thus also crucial: the organism exists always-already in-
its-integrons, not as first an isolated organism that is subsequently placed 
into integrons.101 An organism-in-its-integrons is “not a detached observer 
but a participant in the system”.102 The hyphenation of organism-in-its-
integrons must be understood like the hyphenation of Heidegger’s ‘being-
in-the-world’, where the hyphenation emphasises that 
it is a ‘unitary phenomenon’ that can only be understood 
when ‘seen as a whole’. Dasein and the world are 
fundamentally misunderstood if taken as two self-sufficient 
entities that can subsequently enter into an external 
relationship.103  
                                       
100 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (first published 1927, Joan Stambaugh tr, 
SUNY 2010) 57. 
101 cf Naess (n33 1973) 95; Christian Diehm, ‘Arne Naess and the Task of Gestalt 
Ontology’ (2006) 28 Environmental Ethics 21, 21-22. 
102 Cullinan (n10) 12. Referring to the famous observer effect. See also 
Christopher Stone, ‘Should Trees Have Standing?’ 45 S Cal L Rev 450, 456n26.  
103 Mark Wrathall and Max Murphey, ‘An Overview of Being and Time’ in Mark 
Wrathall (ed) The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger’s Being and Time (CUP 
2013) 6 (footnote omitted). See also Haim Gordon, Heidegger-Buber Controversy: 
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The organism-in-its-integrons formulation captures the depth of organisms’ 
embeddedness:104 the organism and its integrons are co-constitutive105 of 
each other.  
This immediacy of embeddedness is also found in Watsuji Tetsurō’s 
etymological analysis of the Japanese word for humanity, ningen (人間).106 
Watsuji suggests that the two characters which together compose 人間 
unravel its meaning.107 As standalone characters, the first represents an 
individual human being, and the second represents the concept of 
relationship or ‘betweenness’ (aidagara). The individual does not precede 
the betweenness (nor vice-versa) and it is in this space of betweenness 
that ‘intrinsic relations’ and communion with other beings takes place. A 
single isolated human (人) is not an individual unit of ningen because the 
                                                                                                              
The Status of the I-Thou (Greenwood Press 2001) 87; Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-
the-World (Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1999) 43; Inwood (n98) 22. 
104 Note that Heidegger implores Dasein to break free of its embeddedness in 
order to live an ‘authentic’ life. Wrathall and Murphey (n103) 12. 
105 Or mutually constitutive. See Barad (n31) 33, 57, 147, 181, 197, 241. 
106 Steve Odin, The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism (SUNY Press 
1996) ch1; Harumi Befu, ‘Watsuji Tetsuro’s Ecological Approach: Its Philosophical 
Foundation’ in Pamela Asquith and Arne Kalland (eds), Japanese Images of Nature 
(Curzon Press 1997); Robert Carter, ‘Watsuji Tetsurō’ in Edward Zalta (ed), The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 edn) 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/watsuji-tetsuro/> (accessed 
27/7/2015). Note that Watsuji was writing in response to Heidegger.  
107 See also Merleau-Ponty in (eg) Anna Grear, ‘The vulnerable living order: 
human rights and the environment in a critical and philosophical perspective’ 
(2011) 2 JHRE 23, 38-44; Anna Grear, ‘Towards a New Horizon: in Search of a 
Renewing Socio-Juridical Imaginary’ (2013) 3 Oñati Socio-Legal Series 966, 972-
75, 978-79; and Levinas in (eg) Mark Coeckelbergh and David Gunkel, ‘Facing 
Animals: A Relational, Other-Oriented Approach to Moral Standing’ (2014) 27 
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 715, 721-22. 
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body forms only the first (although still crucial) part of人間 (humans are 
socially embedded). The twofold nature of ningen is not sequential: it is 
not the case that there are first atomised individuals, which then proceed 
to enter into relationships.108 Rather, existence in shared betweenness 
arises at the same time as existence as an individual: ningen is always-
already contextual. A clear analogy exists with the organism (人) and its 
integrons (間), which arise and emerge together rather than sequentially.  
Thus it is not enough to say that organisms are merely ‘part of’ their 
integrons: they are much more intensely bound up than this; they are 
‘partly whole and wholey parts’. This intense relationality is also captured 
in Karen Barad’s idea of ‘intra-action’, which refutes the idea of “separate 
individual agencies that precede … interaction”109 based on Bohr’s 
interpretation of quantum physics.110 In contrast, intra-action “signifies the 
mutual constitution of entangled agencies”.111 Organisms are entangled 
with their integrons; one does not exist without the other. Intra-action 
recognises the “ontological inseparability”112 of distinguishable entities 
(such as integrons), and acknowledges that things like organisms and 
                                       
108 For discussion relating these ideas to law, see Richard Parker, ‘Law, Language, 
and the Individual in Japan and the United States’ (1988-1989) 7 Wisconsin 
International LJ 179. 
109 Barad (n31) 33. See supra n19.  
110 ibid 97-131. 
111 ibid 33, emphasis added. 
112 ibid 128. 
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ecosystems “do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-
action”.113  
Like intrinsic relations, intra-actions are primary constitutive aspects of 
organisms, not secondary capabilities. And like Barad, ecological realities 
call into question traditional Newtonian ontologies with their isolated 
interacting entities. As such, both ecological philosophy and new 
materialism (of which Barad’s work is an important example) have 
emphasised alternative cosmologies, such as Spinozan substance 
monism,114 Eastern mysticism,115 or modern physics.116  
Because of their relationality, organisms operate through intra-active 
processes. Barad refers to a brittlestar’s “boundary-drawing practices by 
which it differentiates itself from the environment with which it intra-acts 
and by which it makes sense of its world”.117 This recognises the dialethic 
(‘clopen’) nature of an organism’s intra-action with its integrons: the 
organism must differentiate itself by drawing boundaries in order to ‘make 
sense of its world’, but it must also intra-act through this boundary to 
maintain its autopoietic status. 
It is precisely because organisms and integrons intra-act rather than inter-
act that it is valuable to think of organisms as organisms-in-their-integrons. 
                                       
113 ibid 33. 
114 Naess (n33 2008) 233; Diane Coole and Samantha Frost (eds), New 
Materialisms (Duke University Press 2010) 8. 
115 Fritjof Capra, Tao of Physics (Wildwood House 1975). 
116 Mathews (n10) 50-59; J Baird Callicott, ‘Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and 
Environmental Ethics’ (1985) 7 Environmental Ethics 257; Barad (n31). 
117 Barad (n31) 375. 
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Of course it is not only organisms that intra-act, but intra-action takes 
place within and across all levels-of-organisation. There are (eg) 
ecosystems-through-their-organisms and genes-in-their-biome too118 – 
indeed, “when we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to 
everything else in the Universe”.119 
9.4.2 UMWELT 
It is also important to note that organisms are embedded not in the 
environment but in their integrons. This does not simply refer to the fact 
that different species occupy different functional niches (penguins cannot 
live in the desert), but rather that each and every organism has its own 
relations with – and so perspective on – the world it is embedded in. This 
is significant, as it demonstrates that Heidegger’s and Watsuji’s description 
of a deeply relational existence is not limited to the human domain. 
An organism’s perspective arises because every living organism, as an 
autopoietic system and hence locus of valuational activity, finds its own 
meaning in the world around it. Each organism is an “autonomous centre 
of concern capable of providing an interior perspective”.120 In the words of 
Jakob von Uexküll, all living organisms construct their own Umwelt 
                                       
118 This is the very perspective that Dawkins seeks to adopt via the extended 
phenotype. 
119 Muir (n42) 110. 
120 Weber and Varela (n8) 97. See also Barad (n31) 149 who notes that “in some 
instances, ‘nonhumans’ … emerge as partaking in the world’s active engagement 
in practices of knowing [which is a matter of intra-acting]”. It appears that the 
instances that Barad is referring to is those instances when the ‘nonhuman’ in 
question is a living organism. 
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(lifeworld), their own conception of the world they find themselves in.121 It 
is through their Umwelt that each organism makes sense of its existence 
through focussing attention on those features and relations that are 
relevant to its autopoietic continuation. 
Von Uexküll uses the example of a tick and how it senses and reacts to the 
presence of a mammal through sensing butyric acid.122 The tick must be 
able to find out when a mammal is near in order to be able to feed, and it 
does this through the senses it has available to it. The tick thus constructs 
its own lifeworld according to its own senses and its own interests. 
Because it has a perspectived conception of the world it is a tick-in-its-
integrons; its Umwelt has butyric acid odours and warm bodies, not four-
legged creatures and mating calls.  
An organism’s Umwelt is constructed through those relations that are 
meaningful to it:123 organisms are in their environment, not the 
environment. A dog lives predominantly in a lifeworld of smells rather than 
images and, although unable to recognise itself in the mirror, is able to 
                                       
121 Jakob von Uexküll, A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans (first 
published 1934, Joseph O’Neill tr, University of Minnesota Press 2010). See also 
Lee Drickamer and Stephen Vessey, Animal Behavior: Concepts, Processes and 
Methods (Prindle, Weber and Schmidt 1986) 295; Jörg-Peter Ewert, ‘Stimulus 
Perception’ in Johan Bolhuis and Luc-Alain Giraldeau (eds), The Behavior of 
Animals (Blackwell 2005) 14-16; Traci Warkentin, ‘Whale Agency’ in McFarland 
and Hediger (n19) 23; Kelly Oliver, Animal Lessons: How They Teach Us to Be 
Human (Colombian University Press 2009) 20; Berque (2013 n5) (referring to “la 
mésologie d’Uexküll”); Ted Toadvine (ed), 11(1) Environmental Philosophy 
(2014); Rodman (n4) 251-53; Simmons (n60) 343, 353-54; Curry (n42) 53; 
Grear (2013 n107) 979. 
122 von Uexküll (n121) 44ff. 
123 See Mayr (n12) 72-73. 
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distinguish scents (including its own) with an aptitude unavailable to 
humans. A dog and its human owner may live in the same house but they 
occupy different lifeworlds; the integrons they intra-act with are both the 
same and different. 
To summarise the meaning of each word in ‘organism-in-its-integrons’: 
‘organisms-’ are autopoietic systems intra-acting across semi-permeable 
membranes; ‘-in-‘ must be understood not simply as physically located in, 
but as always-already embedded in; ‘-their-‘ indicates that this 
construction is unique to each organism and its Umwelt; and ‘-integrons’ 
are themselves intra-acting levels-of-organisation with their own emergent 
properties.   
As the autopoietic possessor of vital interests, the central subject of 
concern for nonhuman vital rights is the organism. But the organism is in 
fact an organism-in-its-integrons because of its vital interest in forming 
ecological communities. It may therefore not be straightforward for the law 
to protect the vital interests of these highly complex and deeply relational 
subjects. Questions arise as to who the right-holder will be and what rights 
they will have. The remainder of this chapter argues that organisms’ vital 
interest in forming ecological communities can be best protected through 
vesting rights in another level-of-organisation: the ecosystem.  
9.5 MULTISTABLE PHENOMENA  
In order for the law to vest rights, it needs to be able to extract meaningful 
units to be legal subjects with identifiable interests from the ecological 
mesh. Despite the multitude of ecological relations, this is evidently 
possible (else IHRL could not exist) through focussing on particular levels-
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of-organisation. It is important to realise that the different extractions 
offered by different integrons present different perspectives of the same 
reality. 
9.5.1 GESTALTISM AND PHENOMENA 
The existence of ecological (and social etc) webs does not mean that all is 
a homogeneous blur. As aptly demonstrated by ecology’s integrons, it is 
possible to isolate parts of these webs and to consider these parts as units, 
and therefore as subjects of study in their own right. The world is one of 
continuity without indistinguishability.124 This is true at many levels of 
reality. 
[T]he idea of chemical ‘atoms’, for instance, is [not] 
completely false. Such entities as the hydrogen and oxygen 
‘atoms’ exist. But they are not fundamental building blocks. 
They are more like eddies on the surface of a river. The 
Universe is seamless but not featureless.125 
Neither of course is it false that organisms and ecosystems exist. The 
natural world is made up of a continuous mesh of interrelations, but this 
does not prevent the extraction and categorisation of meaningful units (or 
integrons) from within it. In fact, such categorisation is commonplace. 
Humans are not only able to make distinctions along continuous spectra 
and to group things together, but they also exhibit a tendency to do so. 
                                       
124 Plumwood (n7) 13, 19. 
125 Brian McCusker, The Quest for Quarks (CUP 1983) 150.  
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This has been termed ‘gestaltism’126 and has influenced some 
environmental philosophers.127 Gestaltism – demonstrated in the figures 
below – echoes von Uexküll’s Umwelt and Heidegger’s being-in-the-world 
in that it suggests that perceptions are dependent as much on the 
perceiver as on the perceived.128  
 
This should not be taken to mean that any perception is valid, but rather 
that there are often many valid perceptions. Through gestaltism, it is 
possible to identify, extract and analyse valid and meaningful unities, or 
gestalts, from the mesh. ‘Organisms’ and ‘ecosystems’ exist, even if they 
are fundamentally intra-active with and continuously blur into everything 
else. 
                                       
126 Wolfgang Metzger, Laws of Seeing (first published 1936, Lothar Spillman tr, 
MIT Press 2006) ch3. 
127 Naess (n33 1989) 54-61; Diehm (n101); Bateson (n42) 47-49. 
128 Metzger (n126) 30.  
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In ecology the isolated community is an abstraction in that 
no real collection of species exists which interacts solely 
with its own members and which receives no propagules 
from outside. But the total isolation of a group of species 
from all interactions with other species is not a requirement 
of the usefulness of the community as an analytical tool… 
thus, it is not an argument against the population or the 
community as entities, that boundaries are not absolute 
between them, any more than that the existence of some 
intersexes destroys the usefulness in biology of 
distinguishing males and females.129 
The same is valid for ecosystems and any other integron.130 Like organisms, 
biomes and ecosystems do have boundaries, even if these boundaries are 
neither definitive nor impermeable. Although it is impossible to determine 
precisely where the edge of a lake, forest or mountain actually is,131 it is 
still possible to understand an ecosystem as a thing: as a unit which can 
be studied and have various properties assigned to it.  
                                       
129 Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin, ‘Dialectics and Reductionism in Ecology’ 
in Esa Saarinen (ed), Conceptual Issues in Ecology (Kluwer 1980) 128-29. See 
also Morton (n42) 84-85. 
130 See Arthur Tansley, ‘The Use and Abuse of Vegetational Concepts and Terms’ 
(1935) 16 Ecology 284, 299; Edward Kormondy, Concepts of Ecology (4th edn, 
Prentice-Hall 1996); ‘ecosystem’, Oxford Dictionary of Ecology (4th edn, OUP 
2010). 
131 Karin Limburg et al, ‘Complex systems and valuation’ (2002) 41 Ecological 
Economics 409, 410; Cullinan (n10) 77. 
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The key is to acknowledge that organisms, ecosystems and atoms exist 
without insisting that they are completely isolated and discrete entities or 
fixed pictures of reality.132 Instead, each gestalt provides a particular 
perspective of that part of the universe. As Barad highlights, this 
perspectived viewpoint is a direct consequence of the intra-active nature of 
reality: “the primary ontological unit is not independent objects with 
independently determinate boundaries and properties but rather what Bohr 
terms ‘phenomena’ … phenomena are the ontological inseparability of 
agentially intra-acting components”.133 Bohr and Barad understand that 
phenomena – the basic units of reality134 or existence135 – are not 
“independent objects with inherent boundaries and properties”136 but are, 
like autopoietic organisms-in-their-integrons, always-already embedded in 
everything they intra-act with. 
Phenomena arise through a ‘cut’ being made that “marks off and is a part 
of a particular instance of wholeness”.137 That is, the gestalt offered by a 
particular phenomenon is dependent on (and intra-acts with) a particular 
‘cut’ being taken. Consider how different ‘cuts’ can be made to view the 
above figures, even if they do “require effort and fall apart immediately 
when the effort subsides”.138 Gestaltism and phenomenal cuts do not 
                                       
132 Another dialetheia (n29). 
133 Barad (n31) 33.  
134 ibid 33. 
135 ibid 333. 
136 ibid. 
137 ibid 119. 
138 supra n128. 
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provide access to Ultimate Truths, but instead provide perspectived ways 
to intra-act with the world. In fact, they “[call] into question the very 
notion that objects have an independent existence”,139 whilst also 
generating ways of understanding and perceiving.  
Gregory Bateson captures this possibility of extracting perspectived 
gestalts from the ecological mesh in noticing that “there are times when I 
catch myself believing that there is such a thing as something, which is 
separate from something else”.140 This belief is possible thanks to 
Gestaltism and phenomenal cuts, both of which transform entwined and 
intra-related meshes into meaningful units. It is therefore both true and 
false (dialethic) that there are things which are separate from other things. 
The upshot is that there is not only one way that the world can be 
conceptualised, but many. A multistable outlook must therefore be 
adopted, one which allows the existence of different perspectives of the 
same reality. 
9.5.2 MULTISTABILITY 
The concept of multistability comes from the realm of optical illusions. The 
most common example of this is the Necker cube. Although it is familiar 
that this two-dimensional representation of a cube can be seen to ‘pop up’ 
or ‘pop down’ from the paper, it is not possible to actually see both cubes 
                                       
139 Barad (n31) 127. 393. 
140 Gregory Bateson in ‘An Ecology of Mind: The Gregory Bateson Documentary’, 
available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=118&v=AqiHJG2wtPI> 
(accessed 26/3/2015). 
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at once.141 Although we know they are both there, we cannot directly 
perceive them simultaneously. Just as more than one perception of the 
cube exists, so are there many available perspectives and categorisations 
of the natural world. 
 
This multistability is inherent in Barad’s phenomena, which “designate 
particular instances of wholeness”142 rather than being fixtures of reality. 
Other instances of wholeness are always available and “[i]t is only through 
specific intra-actions that the boundaries and properties of ‘components’ of 
phenomena become determinate and that particular articulations become 
meaningful”.143 Boundaries and properties are thus multistable: they are 
dependent on the ‘cut’ made, on the perspective adopted, on the question 
asked. Different perspectives (such as ‘popping up’/‘popping down’, or 
organism/ecosystem) provide different pictures of the same reality.  
                                       
141 J Orbach et al, ‘Reversibility of The Necker Cube’ (1963) 17 Perceptual and 
Motor Skills 439. See also Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (first 
published 1953, GEM Anscombe tr, Blackwell 2001) 165-66, 171-77 
142 Barad (n31) 119, emphasis added. 
143 ibid 148. 
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Multistability operates in the real world in almost every place one cares to 
look: at the subatomic level (electrons are both waves and particles); 
within relationships (a person can be an employee, a brother, and a 
friend); at a biological/ecological level (a tree is a collection of cells and an 
element of a forest); within legal theory (is law codified morality or distinct 
from moral concerns144) and so on. There is no correct answer to the 
question ‘what is a tree?’ unless one knows the context in which it is being 
asked. Just as “if you ask reality a wave question, you will get a wave 
answer; ask it a particle question, and you will get a particle answer”,145 if 
you ask a tree a biochemical question, you will get a biochemical answer; 
and if you ask it a habitat question, you will get a habitat answer. 
Any categorisation of the universe is thus at best contingently truthful. But 
this does not advocate shying away from categorisation itself (nor from 
rejecting certain categorisations). Categorisation is a useful, practical and 
natural way to respond to the world around us (viz gestaltism). Rather, it 
alerts us to the fact that many categorisations are both possible and 
meaningful; they are equiprimordial.146 One must therefore be wary at all 
times that a categorisation – as foreground or background, as whole or 
part, as particle or wave – is just that: a categorisation rather than the 
categorisation. In Bateson’s words, “the division of the perceived universe 
into parts and whole is convenient and may be necessary, but no necessity 
                                       
144 §4.2, especially the ‘Colossal’ nature of rights. 
145 Mathews (n10) 55, citing Fritjof Capra, The Turning Point (Fontana 1983) 77. 
146 Heidegger’s word. See Wrathall and Murphey (n103) 13. 
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determines how it shall be done”;147 and, according to Bohr’s 
Elefantordenen motto: ‘Contraria Sunt Complementa’.148 Trees are of both 
intrinsic and instrumental value, and Tommy is a member of Pan 
troglodytes, an individual living being, and a component in an 
ecosystem.149  
Aiming for immutable categorisations is therefore a hopeless task. There 
may be a comfort in everything being ‘in its right place’,150 but no such 
placement can be permanent. Instead of searching for the Ultimate 
Categorisation, it will prove more fruitful to accept that there are many 
valid perspectives available. In fact, more than one perspective is often 
needed to fully understand what something is. Consider the blind men 
touching the elephant, or how adopting an ecosystem perspective provides 
new (ecological) information on what life is like and how life originated: 
which came first – the ecosystem or the organism?151 
Multistability means that there are many perspectives that describe the 
same reality. In particular, the different integrons provide different but 
                                       
147 Bateson (n42) 47-49. 
148 The highest order of Denmark, <www.nbi.dk/hehi/logo> (accessed 3/12/2016). 
149 §7.2.1; §IIIn15. 
150 In the Radiohead song ‘Everything in Its Right Place’, Thom Yorke sings about 
there being ‘two colours in his head’ – the dichotomy of off/on, black/white is a 
comforting one. But the song “presents a musical scenario in which expectations 
of resolution are continually frustrated” (p57). It is a song which creates a 
“schizophrenic split within the subject” (p92). Rather than seeking comfort in an 
impossible preordained order, we may be better off accepting unpredictability, 
vulnerability and absence of control. Both quotes from Marianne Tatom Letts, 
Radiohead and the Resistant Concept Album (Indiana University Press 2010). 
151 Morange (n51) 108.  
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equally valid perspectives of the same natural world. The organism 
perspective permits understanding of vital interests and dignity, but it is 
not necessarily the case that such a perspective is well-suited in the 
creation of legal rights. Accepting multistability does not mean accepting 
that all perspectives are equally appropriate for a given situation, but 
rather that different perspectives may be more valuable depending on the 
context. The following section argues that because organisms are 
organisms-in-their-integrons, it is appropriate to adopt an ecosystem 
perspective in order to protect their vital interest in forming ecological 
communities. 
9.6 CORPORATE ECOSYSTEM RIGHTS 
As Kramer notes, law can create legal subjects out of our ‘ecological’ 
world: “the capacity of a being as an entitlement-holder will not hinge on 
the unproblematic unity of the being, but on the status bestowed by the 
relevant legal system”.152 International law has already created legal 
subjects out of humans, international organisations and peoples, and it can 
do so too with (other) integrons: if ecologists can meaningfully identify and 
intra-act with integrons, then so too can lawyers. Flexibility concerning the 
nature of legal subjects is necessary to model the complexities of both 
ecology and law.153 As Tallacchini observes:  
                                       
152 supra n2. See also Stone (n102) 494n125. 
153 Anna Grear, ‘Law’s Entities: Complexity, Plasticity and Justice’ (2013) 4 
Jurisprudence 76, 76-77. 
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The relationship between the world of natural objects and 
the world of legal objects is mediated… by perceptions and 
representations of reality. The way in which we build the 
entities of the world by drawing the boundaries of things, 
the choices with which we distinguish the objects around 
us, abscribing to them the character of wholeness or of 
parts… [L]egal notions themselves are charged with their 
own Gestalt, which conveys a particular partitioning of the 
world.154 
Pertinently, an organism ‘partitioning’ is necessary to grasp that organisms 
have interests and dignity, but an alternative ‘partitioning’ is needed to 
fully protect these interests and dignity via vital rights. This is because 
individualism alone cannot prevail within environmental protection: “the 
moral atomism that focuses on individual animals and their subjective 
experiences does not seem well adapted to coping with ecological 
systems”.155 An alternative perspective is required to complement the 
relationality of the natural world, and to respond to the realisation that not 
only organisms themselves, but also their interests and dignity are 
interrelated and continuous. Interests do not always work in isolation and 
opposition, but are frequently shared. This is apparent both within humans 
and the ecosphere in general. 
                                       
154 Mariachiara Tallacchini, ‘A legal framework from ecology’ (2000) 9 Biodiversity 
and Conservation 1085, 1092-93. 
155 Rodman (n42) 89. 
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People do have interests that make essential and not 
merely accidental or contingent reference to those of others, 
for example, when a mother wishes for her child’s recovery, 
the child’s flourishing is an essential part of her flourishing… 
we must see human beings and their interests as 
essentially related and interdependent.156 
[P]olicies serving the interests of the human species as a 
whole, and in the long run, will serve also the ‘interests’ of 
nature, and vice versa.157 
It makes sense to protect these essentially related and interdependent 
interests by protecting the relations themselves, as well as the integrons 
that emerge through them. This section provides four reasons as to why it 
is appropriate to vest rights in ecosystems (ie to create RoN) in order to 
protect the natural world through international law. There are both 
pragmatic and theoretical reasons for adopting such a perspective, but in 
short it is because doing so would improve the law’s alignment with 
ecological principles.158 
9.6.1 FOUR REASONS FOR ADOPTING ECOSYSTEM RIGHTS 
In order to protect the ecologically embedded nature of organisms-in-their-
integrons, it makes sense to switch perspective to one of the higher levels-
of-organisation in which this embeddedness takes place. Given that it is an 
                                       
156 Plumwood (n7) 20. 
157 Norton (n42) 240. 
158 See §7.1.2. 
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interest in forming ecological communities that has been identified, it may 
seem appropriate to use the ecological community159 as a suitable 
perspective for protecting that interest. However, as will be seen, there is 
in fact value in instead opting for the ecosystem.160  
9.6.1(A) TO PROTECT THE VITAL INTEREST IN FORMING ECOLOGICAL 
COMMUNITIES 
Plainly, for organisms’ vital interest in forming ecological communities to 
be protected, it is necessary for the communities themselves to be 
protected. Ensuring that ecological communities do not only exist, but are 
healthy, resilient, diverse and have integrity will ensure their continuation, 
and allow organisms to be able to form appropriate relations with(in) them 
and to fulfil their role within their ecological community. It will allow 
organisms (the possibility) to flourish, since part of this flourishing 
happens in community.161 However, in order to ensure the health and 
integrity of communities, it will sometimes be necessary to also be 
concerned with the health and integrity of ecosystems.162 
The key difference between a community and an ecosystem is that a 
community is a group of intra-acting species in a particular location, 
                                       
159 supra n87. 
160 The other integron options are for the main part not tempting: a population is 
clearly too narrow, since it concerns only intra-species relations, and the 
landscape and biome are too spatially and theoretically divorced from the 
organism. The biome, as the totality of life on the planet, does provide a potential 
alternative, as recognised in the Gaia Hypothesis.  
161 An important aspect of dignity §1.3.1n53. 
162 See §2.3 These are inevitably contested concepts: see Vito de Lucia 
‘Competing Narratives and Complex Genealogies: The Ecosystem Approach in 
International Environmental Law’ (2015) 27 JEL 91, 102-103. 
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whereas an ecosystem also includes the abiotic elements in that 
location.163 It is thus the community as the communion of organisms that 
is the locus of the relational aspects of organism dignity, just as a ‘people’ 
carries some of the relational aspects of human dignity.164 However, in 
order to protect a community, consideration must be given to abiotic 
factors too, just as protection of a ‘people’ also requires consideration of 
societal (ie ahuman) infrastructure such as language.165 It is the 
community/people where the dignity is realised, but protecting this dignity 
requires attention to be given to the ecosystems/society perspective.  
A community cannot exist without an ecosystem, nor vice-versa. But 
because an ecosystem is defined more broadly than a community, 
protecting the ecosystem necessarily entails protecting the community (an 
ecosystem is a ‘community-plus’). That is, everything that must be in place 
for a community to be considered healthy must also be in place for the 
corresponding ecosystem to be healthy. However, at times it will also be 
necessary to consider abiotic elements in order to ensure the health and 
integrity of a community. 
For example, the integrity of a riparian community is dependent on the 
state of the watercourse: a canalised river will not be able to support as 
                                       
163 The CBD (Article 2) defines an ecosystem as a “dynamic complex of plant, 
animal and micro-organism communities and their non-living environment 
interacting as a functional unit”.   
164 §1.4-1.5. 
165 See HRC, General Comment 23 [5.3]. And perhaps even broader: “a people 
can be thought of as a nation or a country, including a territory and its associated 
flora and fauna” James Summers, Peoples and International Law (2nd edn, Nijhoff 
2014) 359. 
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diverse and resilient a community as a meandering one.166 Or consider how 
contaminated soils inhibit soil microorganism functioning, resulting in “a 
decrease in the amount of microbial biomass and a change in community 
structure”.167 It is therefore necessary to consider the abiotic elements of 
an ecosystem, as well as the biotic ones, in order to protect organisms’ 
vital interest in forming ecological communities. 
Protecting the health and integrity of ecosystems will effectively protect 
organisms’ interest in forming ecological communities. Note that there is a 
considerable overlap here with the argument of Chapter Two that a human 
right to a healthy environment should be defined inter alia in terms of 
ecosystem health.168 As living organisms, humans too have an interest in 
forming ecological communities, and this interest can be protected by 
vesting rights in ecosystems to ensure their health and integrity. 
9.6.1(B) TO PROTECT OTHER VITAL INTERESTS 
As seen in Chapter Eight, nonhuman organisms have vital interests other 
than the one in forming ecological communities.169 At the very least, they 
have a vital interest in continued biological functioning, from which 
interests in essentials such as clean air and water can be derived. These 
organism interests can potentially be protected through the perspective of 
                                       
166 Stephen Addy et al, ‘River Restoration and Biodiversity: Nature-based solutions 
for restoring rivers in the UK and Republic of Ireland’ (IUCN-CREW 2016) 15. 
167 Ken Giller et al, ‘Toxicity of heavy metals to microorganisms and microbial 
processes in agricultural soils: a review’ (1998) 30 Soil Biology and Biochemistry 
1389, 1395. 
168 §2.3. 
169 §8.2.1. 
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ecosystem rights to clean air and water. Again, the ecosystem perspective 
provides a valuable way to protect the dignity of organisms, which is 
justifiable since “despite their exceptional moral and legal status, the fate 
of cetaceans […for example…] remains tied to the health of marine 
ecosystems”.170  
Through ensuring ecosystem health and integrity, other vital interests can 
also be secured. Such a cascading process is already discoverable in the 
‘respect, protect, fulfil’ typology within IHRL whereby states must ‘create 
an environment in which rights are enjoyed’.171 Although clearly a different 
meaning of the word ‘environment’ is intended here, the overarching point 
stands that healthy ecosystems create an environment in which organisms’ 
many vital interests can be enjoyed.  
Adopting an ecosystem perspective for RoN does not preclude vesting vital 
rights in some individual nonhumans who may merit additional protection 
(an ecosystem perspective does not entail ecofascism172). Organisms that 
are more discrete than continuous (eg pandas compared to slime moulds); 
or those with more developed psychological lives (who have a vital interest 
in psychological freedom173); or those expressing a greater level of self-
                                       
170 David Mence, ‘The cetacean right to life revisited’ (2015) 11 International 
Journal of Law in Context 17, 39. 
171 §2.5. 
172 See eg J Baird Callicott, ‘Holistic Environmental Ethics and the Problem of 
Ecofacism’ in Beyond the Land Ethic (SUNY 1999). Also see UDRME Articles 1(6) 
and 4(2) which allow for species-specific rights; Thomas Berry, ‘Rights of the Earth’ 
in Burdon (n79) 227, 229. 
173 §8.2.1.4. 
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awareness (as in the NhRP cases174) are the lead candidates for individual 
nonhuman vital rights. When it is relatively easy to identify isolatable 
organisms in these ways, it may be reasonable to then focus rights at this 
level too. At other times, when it is more difficult to pick the organism out 
from the ecosystem, rights will work best at the ecosystem level. The 
possibility of species- (or other taxon-)specific rights (such as IHRL or the 
Helsinki Declaration of Rights for Cetaceans) is specifically provided for in 
the Universal Declaration of Rights of Mother Earth (UDRME), stating that 
“[n]othing in this Declaration restricts the recognition of other inherent 
rights of all beings or specified beings”.175 
9.6.1(C) TO REFLECT HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY 
An ecosystem perspective is also pragmatic. It acknowledges humans have 
responsibility towards living organisms without attempting to vest rights in 
every single creature (a surely impossible task). Ecosystem rights create a 
more manageable structure: just as it is sometimes appropriate in ecology 
to consider the ecosystem perspective, so too for law.176 That every 
organism is a locus of valuational activity with dignity does not mean that 
humans must ensure every life is lived perfectly. Instead, humans must 
ensure that their activities take proper account of the vital interests of 
other lifeforms.  
                                       
174 §7.2.1. 
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176 See Levins and Lewontin (n129) 128-29. 
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As seen in Chapter Four, rights are always a relation between two 
actors.177 It may be valid to consider the nature and indeed the limitations 
of both these actors when designing the structure of rights – and in 
particular the claim-rights that specifically secure in vital rights178 given 
their auxiliary and derivative nature.179 In this case, with humans and/or 
human constructed institutions as the duty-bearers, it makes sense to 
design the rights such that these duty-bearers can actually comply with 
their duties.180 Pragmatically speaking, this may be facilitated by vesting 
rights in ecosystems. 
The pragmatism of an ecosystem perspective is also found in its mirroring 
of existing international environmental law. As seen in Chapter Three, the 
‘ecosystem approach’ is the primary framework for action under the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, as well as being utilised in other fora,181 
and the burgeoning concept of ‘ecocide’182 also adopts an ecosystem 
perspective. Vesting rights in ecosystems can segue with these approaches, 
while also increasing the urgency of protection afforded to the natural 
world through international law. The ecosystem approach has both 
                                       
177 §4.3. 
178 §4.6. 
179 §6.2. 
180 See also the discussion of fairness in §8.3.1 and how this may contribute 
towards grounding human duties. 
181 See de Lucia (n162). 
182 Polly Higgins, Eradicating Ecocide (Shepheard-Walwyn 2010) 63; 
<http://eradicatingecocide.com/> (accessed 18/4/2015) 
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anthropocentric and ecocentric interpretations,183 and De Lucia notes that 
the ecocentric accounts 
[R]eflect a modal shift in the understanding of reality, and 
of nature: away from the atomistic and towards the 
systemic and relational. Ecosystems are thus apprehended 
as wholes, and all participants—humans and non-humans 
alike—are connected in a relational field comprised of 
places, processes, individuals and ecological 
communities.184 
This interpretation of the ecosystem approach is clearly compatible with 
imagining vital rights subjects as organisms-in-their-integrons, and with 
aligning the law with ecological principles. Creating ecosystem rights would 
build on this existing account of the ecosystem approach, encouraging it to 
serve as “one of the picklocks for a radical reconstruction of a legal 
subjectivity no longer centred on abstract rational agency, but on a 
plurality of embodied, vulnerable agencies”.185 There will always be room 
for conflict between anthropocentric and ecocentric accounts, but an 
ecological re-imagining of the vital (including human) rights subject can 
help overcome this divide. 
                                       
183 de Lucia (n162) 103-106. 
184 ibid 105. 
185 ibid 105-106. 
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There will also always be conflict between the interests of the ecosystem 
and of individuals,186 presenting conundrums to environmental governance 
systems. Whether or not an invasive species should be culled; or whether 
or not humans should assist wounded prey animals are not straightforward 
issues. But rights neither create nor immediately solve these problems: 
natural systems always include events that work against the interests of 
certain individuals (death is inevitable). Working out the correct balance 
between the interests of an organism and the integrity of an ecosystem 
(and hence the interests of other organisms) is a balancing act which is 
likely to be context dependent. Part of this balancing requires 
acknowledging that just as we have greater responsibilities to our friends 
and family than distant strangers, we likely have more engaged 
responsibility to other humans than to beetles. This does not remove 
duties, but rather contextualises and interprets them. 
Vital rights cannot provide perfect or permanent solutions to the complex 
tension between organism dignity and ecosystem health,187 but they can 
provide a framework for doing so. A benefit of developing the theory of 
RoN is to detail the nature and the content of human duties, to be further 
fleshed out through interpretive processes.188 As with the margin of 
appreciation utilised by the ECtHR, RoN should set broad standards that 
                                       
186 See eg Simon Hailwood, ‘Bewildering Nussbaum: Capability Justice and 
Predation’ (2012) 20 The Journal of Political Philosophy 293. 
187 cf Schlosberg (n10) 145-46; Daniel Crescenzo, ‘Loose Integrity and Ecosystem 
Justice on Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach’ (2013) 10 Environmental Philosophy 
53, 56-59. 
188 See §2.3-2.5. 
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can be achieved in a variety of ways in different situations and different 
societies.189 
9.6.1(D) TO RESPECT ECOCENTRIC INTRINSIC VALUE CLAIMS 
Finally, not only can adopting an ecosystem perspective for rights 
potentially mirror the interests (and dignity) of individual organisms, it also 
corresponds with claims that the ecosystem itself is the bearer of intrinsic 
or systemic value.190 One could potentially construct an argument for the 
rights of ecosystems entirely at this level if a convincing case for such 
value could be made. 
Perhaps more usefully, the fact that an ecosystem exhibits some quasi-
autopoietic191 properties provides signals as to what ecosystem-level 
functions (or ‘interests’) should be focussed on in order to protect the 
ecological aspects of organisms’ dignity. The integrity of a homeorhetic192 
ecosystem can be maintained by protecting dynamic functions such as 
succession, soil formation, population regulation and nutrient cycles.  
                                       
189 See Evans v UK (2007) 46 EHRR 728 for an example of where “the 
irreconcilable rights of two individual were at stake, although with a significant 
public interest dimension.” David Harris et al, Law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (2nd edn, OUP 2009) 387, 9. See also SAS v France (2015) 60 
EHRR 11 [129]; UDRME Article 1(7). 
190 eg Holmes Rolston III, ‘Value in Nature and the Nature of Value’ in Attfield and 
Belsey (n42) 23; Mathews (n10) 119; Robert Elliot, ‘Instrumental Value in Nature 
as a Basis for the Intrinsic Value of Nature as a Whole’ (2005) 27 Environmental 
Ethics 43. 
191 Or ‘sympoietic’, see Beth Dempster, ‘Boundarylessness: Introducing a Systems 
Heuristic for Conceptualising Complexity’ in Charles Brown and Ted Toadvine (eds), 
Nature’s Edge (SUNY Press 2007) 93. 
192 §8.3.2. 
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9.6.2 COMPARISON WITH PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 
Regulating human interaction with the natural world sometimes requires 
the adoption of an ecosystem perspective. It is therefore prudent to vest 
vital rights in ecosystems, even though dignity arises at the organism level. 
Such an approach is valid because ‘ecosystems’ and ‘organisms’ are 
different perspectives or ‘partitionings’ of the same underlying reality. 
There is a valuable parallel here between rights of ecosystems and of 
peoples. Both are held by corporate entities whose precise composition is 
difficult to identify; neither have immediately apparent boundaries. Yet 
both exist as units that are not totally arbitrary despite these ultimately 
blurry edges. Both are examples of corporate rights being used as the best 
way to protect relational aspects of the dignity of their members. Just as 
the formation of social communities is essential to humans, so the 
formation of ecological communities is essential to all living things. 
Ecosystem rights would allow the law to protect the ecologically relational 
aspects of organisms’ dignity just as peoples’ rights allow the law to reflect 
the socially relational aspects of human dignity.193 
There is however an important distinction between peoples’ rights and 
ecosystem rights. Peoples’ rights function alongside individual human 
rights and therefore need only protect the social dimension of human 
dignity. On the other hand, ecosystem rights, if used as the perspective 
through which the majority of individual organisms’ interests are protected, 
must keep closer track of these individual interests. For example, they 
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must be able to ensure that organisms’ vital interests in continued 
biological functioning are not violated. This chapter ends by considering the 
actual content of RoN in order to see how these multiple goals might be 
achieved. 
9.7 MAKING SENSE OF RIGHTS OF NATURE 
So far this chapter has focussed on the justifications for RoN. It has not 
considered in detail any actual rights. It concludes with a consideration of 
what rights could be vested in ecosystems by considering those contained 
within the UDRME and how they align with the analysis of this chapter. It is 
worth restating that the rights contained within the UDRME are applicable 
to “Mother Earth and all beings of which she is composed”.194 However, a 
number of these can be seen as being more appropriate for organisms, 
and others as more suitable for ecosystems. Greater precision over who 
exactly are the subjects of RoN would facilitate their establishment and 
their interpretation.  
9.7.1 RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN THE UDRME 
The first right in the UDRME is the right to life and to exist.195 This right 
should be interpreted in line with IHRL to mean that no organism should be 
arbitrarily deprived of life196 by human agency.197 What is arbitrary will 
                                       
194 Article 2(1). Not all of the rights will be considered here. Those excluded are 
the right to be respected (Article 2(1)(b)); the right to not have genetic structure 
modified (Article 2(1)(i))); and to play a role in Mother Earth (Article2(2)).  
195 Article 2(1)(a). 
196 See ICCPR Article 6(1); HRC, General Comment  6 [3], HRI/GEN/1/ (Vol I). 
197 The duty-bearers for RoN will almost certainly be human (institutions). 
480 
 
likely be species specific: the deprivation of a tree’s life will require a 
different justification than for a whale or a human.198 When applied to 
ecosystems, the right to exist makes more sense than to life:199 an 
ecosystem itself is not in any obvious sense a living being,200 but the 
complete destruction of an entire ecosystem will surely violate the dignity 
of its organisms. Ecosystems themselves must be protected for organisms’ 
vital interests to be protected. The proposed crime of ‘ecocide’ also 
recognises the need for international law to better protect ecosystems, 
notably for the benefit of “any living species dwelling in a particular 
place”,201 and there is potential for synergies between the two approaches 
of RoN and ecocide.202 
The rights to water,203 clean air,204 integral health,205 and freedom from 
contamination206 in the UDRME are all examples of organism interests 
being containable within ecosystem rights. They recognise the need for 
RoN to protect the individual interests of organisms as well as their 
ecological interests, while adopting a suitable and practical method of 
                                       
198 Since trees are not whales are not humans. 
199 See ‘Harmony with nature’ A/71/266 (1 August 2016) [36], referring to the 
“fundamental legal rights of ecosystems and species to exist, thrive and 
regenerate”. 
200 Importantly, they are homeorhetic rather than homeostatic (§8.3.2). cf The 
Gaia Hypothesis and claims that ecosystems are autopoietic.  
201 Polly Higgins, Eradicating Ecocide (Shepheard-Walwyn 2010) 63. 
202 ibid 155-56, 168. 
203 Article 2(1)(e). 
204 Article 2(1)(f). 
205 Article 2(1)(g). 
206 Article 2(1)(h). 
481 
 
doing so: an ecosystem right to integral health may be the best way to 
ensure the health of its constituents. Such rights can be aligned with 
environmental human rights207 and can likely work in co-operation with 
them (interests are frequently shared rather than competitive). 
The right to integral health (or ones to integrity and to health) is in fact of 
utmost importance within RoN. This is because it would transform 
environmental law from reactive and protective measures to enhancement 
and improvement. “What is being regulated at present is how much 
destruction can occur. By contrast, an Earth Jurisprudence model asks: 
‘What would a healthy system look like?’”.208 Duties concerned with the 
creation and maintenance of healthy systems would give environmental 
law renewed vigour. 
The right to live free from torture209 appears to primarily require an 
organism perspective. When couched as an organism right, it is compatible 
with parallel ideas from human rights (and no doubt some nonhuman 
organisms merit such a right). However, it can be made relevant to the 
ecosystem level by understanding it broadly as freedom from 
exploitation;210 nature does not only exist as repository of natural 
resources for humans. Whilst humans necessarily must make use of the 
                                       
207 See Ksentini Report, Draft Principles Articles 5-8; ‘Harmony with nature’ (n199) 
[36]. 
208 ‘Harmony with nature’ (n199) [43]. 
209 Article 2(3). 
210 See §8.2.1.2. 
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natural world, it is not necessary to exploit it. Humanity should seek to 
work with, rather than against, natural processes.  
At the ecosystem level, the UDRME contains two rights of predominant 
interest: the “right to regenerate bio-capacity and to continue vital cycles 
and processes free from human disruptions”;211 and the right to “maintain 
identity and integrity as a distinct, self-regulating and interrelated 
being”.212 Both of these pick up on ideas and themes developed in Part III 
and are examples of rather complex Hohfeldian bundles concerned with 
processes beyond the level of the organism. They can be rationalised by 
understanding protecting vital cycles and maintaining integrity are 
necessary to secure functioning ecosystems, in which the vital interests of 
organisms have the best chance of being met. 
The RoN contained within the UDRME are compatible with the pathways for 
justification sketched in this chapter. They focus at both organism and 
ecosystem levels (although greater precision over the subjects of RoN is 
needed), and they protect the ‘intrinsic relations’ and vital interests of 
living systems. By using rights to directly protect the conditions and 
processes through which living systems achieve their autopoietic status, 
international law can enhance the protection afforded to the natural world.  
9.7.2 STRUCTURES FOR RIGHTS OF NATURE 
It is necessary to ascertain how this model of rights constructed in Part II 
maps onto RoN. This chapter has demonstrated a way in which the moral 
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component at the ‘core’ of a right can be found for RoN. The securing213 of 
the parallel moral core within IHRL consists primarily (but not exclusively) 
of state duties to respect, protect and fulfil the core rights. The same 
model is feasible for RoN.214 However, the need for human institutions to 
conceptualise the natural world as a global good is even more pressing 
here than it is for environmental human rights.215 Because of their holistic 
and relational outlook, RoN demand better international cooperation and 
more dispersed duties (including ‘up’ to international organisations and 
multinational corporations; ‘down’ to businesses and other national actors; 
and ‘diagonally’ between states and areas normally considered outside 
their jurisdiction216). This is recognised in the UDRME which seeks to place 
duties on “[h]uman beings, all States, and all public and private 
institutions”.217 
It has been shown that ecosystems represent a suitable level-of-
organisation in which to vest RoN. However, given the ultimately global 
interconnectedness of living systems, it may in fact be the case that a 
number of rights (such as to regenerate bio-capacity and continue vital 
cycles218) can also be vested in the entire biosphere. The duties securing 
                                       
213 §4.6. 
214 See also Stephen Turner, A Global Environmental Right (Routledge 2014) 70-
100. 
215 §2.4.1(a). 
216 John Knox, ‘Diagonal Environmental Rights’ in Mark Gibney and Sigrun Skogly 
(eds), Universal Human Rights and Extraterritorial Obligations (University of 
Pennsylvania Press 2010) 82. 
217 Article 3(2).  
218 UDRME Article 2(1)(c). 
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such rights would certainly necessitate greater co-operation between state 
and non-state duty-bearers.  
Related to, but distinguishable from, identifying the correct holders of RoN 
is their legal representation. In Part I it was demonstrated that suitable 
representation for peoples’ rights may not be straightforward, but is 
eminently possible. The same holds true regarding RoN. Clearly human 
agency will be required for legal representation of any natural entities 
vested with RoN. As seen in the introduction to Part III, the concept of 
legal representation is neither new nor controversial, but it does require 
careful identification of the most suitable guardians. 
There are two main alternatives here. The first is to allow any natural or 
legal person to make representations for RoN through vesting the relevant 
Hohfeldian power(s) in all. This is the approach taken in the UDRME219 and 
the Ecuadorian Constitution.220 A shortcoming of this approach is the latent 
potential for ‘hijacking’ of RoN for personal gain.221 Alternatively, a specific 
set of bodies could be enlisted which have the relevant powers. Most likely 
these would include relevant NGOs and/or members of the local 
community. For example, the Whanganui Agreement appoints two 
Guardians, one from the Government and one from the local population.222 
                                       
219 Article 3(2)(h). 
220 Article 71. 
221 Laurel Fish, ‘Homogenizing Community, Homogenizing Nature’ (2013) 12 
Stanford Undergraduate Research Journal 6, 8. 
222 See §7.3.4. 
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At stake here is the appropriate representation of the interests of the 
natural world and issues of common concern. The ability of NGOs to play 
this role can be seen through their key involvement in existing 
international environmental law where their involvement is often the 
driving force behind treaty regimes,223 and their existing position giving 
communities a voice in international law.224 However, this is not to say that 
only NGOs can perform such a task – both individuals and indeed states225 
could do so too. The involvement of a diverse range of actors with an 
expanding portfolio of roles within international law can contribute towards 
the creation of a law better able to deal with extraterritorial/transboundary 
issues of common concern.226  
One can imagine RoN functioning through an example. Consider the 
construction of a new airport on an estuary. The construction of this airport 
will clearly have impacts on both the local ecosystem and the global 
climate system. Already human rights and environmental law require that 
such a project must involve consultation with local human communities 
and consideration of their interests; the Aarhus Convention227 and the 
                                       
223 Farhana Yamin, ‘NGOs and International Environmental Law: A Critical 
Evaluation of their Roles and Responsibilities’ (2001) 10 RECIEL 149. 
224 Consider Ogoniland (§2.4.1(a)); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda) 
[8]; Stone (n102) 466. 
225 Consider Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan) (Separate Opinion of 
Judge Cançado Trindade) [53]-[60]. 
226 See also §2.5.3. 
227 Articles 6-8. 
486 
 
ECtHR’s judgment in Hatton228 make this clear. In addition, environmental 
impact assessments (EIAs) provide some protection to the estuary 
ecosystem itself, but this is merely procedural since construction can 
normally go ahead with purely token modifications even if the EIA shows 
up serious environmental damage.229 RoN on the other hand provide 
substantive protection to the natural world. Other environmental law such 
as laws protecting certain species or habitats could be relevant, but only if 
there are protected species or habitats in the area.  
RoN on the other hand would protect the vital natural processes found in 
the estuary which the airport must not interfere with. These would include 
nutrient cycles and geomorphology within the river and impacts on nearby 
breeding grounds and migration routes (from the ecosystem perspective); 
and potential negative effects on local cetacean populations (an organism 
perspective perhaps reliant on something akin to the Helsinki Declaration). 
These concerns would not only receive clear substantive recognition, but 
also a greater level of priority due to the rhetorical power of rights 
resulting in greater weight in balancing processes. 
The inalienability of rights would also mean that construction should only 
go ahead if the requirements of the relevant rights can be met. Rights do 
not always have the widest scope imaginable, but nor do they ever 
completely disappear. States (and other duty-bearers) would have 
flexibility in meeting their obligations, but would not be able to derogate 
                                       
228 See §2.2.1. 
229 Birnie et al, International Law & the Environment (OUP 2009) 165. 
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from them entirely. This would have the overall effect of ensuring that 
human activities seek to work with, rather than against, natural processes. 
Importantly too, by rights being vested in ecosystems, any reparations for 
damages incurred through violations of RoN would be owed to the 
ecosystems themselves, rather than any property owners. The difference 
between legal subjecthood and being treated as an inanimate object is 
here rather telling. 
The use of RoN would also allow guardians to speak on behalf of the 
natural world to ensure that activity does not threaten its vital interests. 
Arguments against environmental damage are often couched in long-
winded demonstrations of the damage it will have on humans.230 Although 
these arguments are valid, a more direct (and more honest) route is to 
acknowledge that it is not only humans (and their short-term interests) 
that merit legal protection and may require reparations. A great strength 
of RoN is their endorsement of the agency, the subjecthood, the value, and 
the dignity of the nonhuman world. This is carried by the definitive moral 
urgency that is contained within the semiotics of ‘rights’. RoN can help 
resituate humans as players in the natural world, rather than as 
commanders of it. This is best achieved by realising a shared ethical 
framework underlying both human rights and RoN. That is,  
[t]he proposed application of the term ‘right’ to animals and 
the environment is therefore of great epistemological 
                                       
230 See Wouter de Groot et al, ‘Fostering Committed Action for Nature’ (BIOMOT 
project, Radboud University 2016). 
488 
 
significance because it has been a term so tightly attached 
to and associated with the human: if and when applied to 
other species it promises to change the very nature of 
these beings and entities because it alters how they are 
described and so understood to be. It repositions the rest of 
nature in relation to us and in so doing it also changes 
us.231 
Finally, because of the potential transboundary impacts of the airport 
(through greenhouse gas emissions), an international, cosmopolitan, public 
good perspective addressing issues of common concern can also be 
adopted through RoN. RoN can empower both guardians for the Earth and 
non-nationals who are potential victims of climate change to challenge 
environmentally destructive activity, supporting less fragmented 
approaches towards preventing catastrophic environmental damage.  
9.5 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has shown that all living organisms have a vital interest in 
forming ecological communities as a result of their autopoietic nature. 
Organisms flourish in ecological community. This implies that all living 
organisms have dignity, since they have a vital interest additional to the 
one in continued biological functioning. As all living organisms have dignity, 
there is justification for vesting vital rights in nonhumans.  
                                       
231 Ngaire Naffine, ‘Legal personality and the natural world: on the persistence of 
the human measure of value’ (2012) 3 JHRE 68, 71. 
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These vital rights must protect the vital interests of living organisms. It is 
therefore necessary for nonhuman vital rights to protect inter alia 
organisms’ vital interest in forming ecological communities. The frustration 
of this interest underlies much ecological degradation (for example habitat 
loss and soil contamination) and so protecting it will prove a valuable way 
to protect the natural world through international law. 
An effective way to protect this interest is through vesting rights in 
ecosystems rather than organisms. This can be justified by both theoretical 
and practical reasons. Theoretically it is justifiable because the natural 
world can be viewed from many perspectives: it is multistable. The 
organism perspective and the ecosystem perspective are different views of 
the same reality: organisms and ecosystems co-constitute one another 
through their intra-actions. Protecting the ecosystem entails protecting the 
dignity of its organisms, since these ought to be imagined as organisms-in-
their-integrons. Ecosystem rights can protect the ecologically relational 
aspects of the dignity of organisms in a similar fashion to how peoples’ 
rights protect the socially relational aspects of the dignity of humans.232 
Practically, it makes sense to focus RoN at the ecosystem level because 
forming ecological communities is reliant on properties and processes that 
operate at scales other than the organism. The interest in forming 
communities can therefore be best assured (or at least disproportionate 
human interference with it best prevented233) by shifting perspective to the 
                                       
232 §1.4-1.5. 
233 §9.6.1(c). 
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ecosystem level and considering how human activity affects the health and 
integrity of the ecosystem. Doing so prevents RoN having to hold the 
perspective of every organism within their gaze at all times. It also builds 
on existing directions within international environmental law (in particular 
the ecosystem approach) that are focussing more and more on ecosystems 
and their processes. 
Establishing RoN would have definitive practical benefits because they 
would enhance international law’s ability to protect the natural world. In 
particular, RoN would ensure that all ecosystems were protected both 
substantively and procedurally; insist that reparations and remedies in the 
case of a breach were directed towards the ecosystem itself; allow 
environmentalist arguments to be made without necessarily referring to 
human interests; and augment environmental law through focussing on 
the enhancement of natural systems as well as limiting their destruction. 
RoN have other indirect benefits too. They enrich understanding of the 
vital rights subject (both human and otherwise) as living beings embedded 
in an ecological world. This further enrichment of the (non)human rights 
subject provides a pathway to improve law’s construction of the human 
and the nonhuman alike, and thus better protect real living beings rather 
than abstract legal personas.234 Just as peoples’ rights have played a role 
in imagining the human as socially embedded, so too can ecosystem rights 
allow the law to reflect the ecologically embedded nature of all living 
beings. 
                                       
234 §1.3. 
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Developing an understanding of dignity and the interrelated nature of vital 
interests also encourages closer collaboration between environmental and 
human rights law. Entwining human rights and environmental law more 
tightly in their justifications can potentially help align their practices too. 
Preventing human suffering and providing for human flourishing requires 
the existence of healthy ecosystems;235 and dissecting human dignity leads 
towards realisation that dignity is not an exclusively human trait. The 
divide between humanity and nature is softened when it is examined more 
closely; both humans and nonhumans stand to benefit from this softening. 
Human interest in healthy ecosystems arises in part because humans have 
an interest in forming ecological communities. The mental health benefits 
of contact with nature and the sense of connectedness and solace that 
people feel within the natural world236 can potentially be better understood 
and better secured237 through establishing RoN. These benefits arise 
because humans too are ecologically embedded. Individual human rights 
must of course remain, and other individual organisms can also stand to 
benefit through the creation of vital rights designed to protect their vital 
interests. 
What remains challenging, and cannot be fully explored in this thesis, is 
how the organism and the ecosystem perspective can best work side-by-
side in practice. Living organisms may be like eddies on a river or drops in 
                                       
235 §1.3; §2.3; §3.2.1. 
236 §3.2.1. 
237 §4.6. 
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a stream, “but the expression ‘drops in the stream of life’ may be 
misleading if it implies the individuality of the drops is lost in the stream. 
Here is a difficult ridge to walk: to the left we have the ocean of organic 
and mystic views, to the right the abyss of atomic individualism”.238 
Neither mystic views nor individualist abysses can provide appropriate 
environmental protection. Reconciling the individual and the whole is far 
from straightforward, but RoN can legally endorse that they are different 
pictures of the same reality, and provide key reference points to guide 
law’s functioning.
                                       
238 Naess (n33 1989) 165. 
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CONCLUSION 
10.1 OVERVIEW 
This thesis has described, analysed, critiqued and developed a number of 
different methods by which vital rights (ie the sort of rights found within 
international human rights law) can be used for to protect the natural 
world. This has been done through an analysis of human rights law theory 
and practice; through developing a model that describes the structure and 
function of vital rights; and through investigating approaches towards 
nonhuman rights and establishing a theory to underpin them.  
Environmental vital rights are diverse in terms of their subjects, content, 
feasibility, and current establishment. They also appear in different places 
on anthropocentric-ecocentric, human-nonhuman, and individual-corporate 
axes. The table overleaf summarises the rights considered in this thesis. 
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Rights Individual
-Group 
Human       
-Nonhuman 
Anthropocentric
-Ecocentric 
Current 
Establishment 
Greened 
existing human 
rights (eg right 
to health, right 
to life) 
Individual 
(although 
some 
corporate) 
 
Human Anthropocentric Well established at 
the regional level 
(especially Europe 
and America) 
Procedural 
environmental 
rights (eg 
Aarhus 
Convention) 
Individual 
(although 
could be 
corporate) 
Human Broadly 
anthropocentric 
Well established at 
the regional level 
(especially Europe)  
A human right 
to a healthy 
environment 
Individual 
and 
corporate 
Human Justification must 
be 
anthropocentric, 
but content should 
be broadly 
ecocentric 
Established at the 
regional level 
(especially 
America and 
Africa) 
Additional 
environmental 
human rights 
(to protection, 
conservation 
etc) 
Individual 
and 
corporate 
Human Justification must 
be 
anthropocentric, 
but tenor could be 
quite ecocentric 
Established in 
UNDRIP, some 
may be necessary 
to secure other 
rights. 
Individual 
nonhuman 
rights (eg 
freedom from 
torture, right to 
liberty) 
Individual Nonhuman Biocentric and/or 
ecocentric (could 
include a 
nonhuman right to 
a healthy 
environment) 
Growing discussion 
at the national 
level 
Rights of 
nature (eg 
ecosystem 
rights to 
regenerate bio-
capacity and to 
integrity) 
Corporate Human and 
nonhuman 
Ecocentric Some appearance 
at the national 
level, referred to 
by the UN 
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Out of the assemblage of environmental rights there are two standout 
candidates in terms of their potential effectiveness in protecting the natural 
world through international law. These are a human/peoples’ right to a 
healthy environment (with a broad definition of ‘healthy environment’) and 
rights of nature (RoN) vested in ecosystems. These are particularly well-
suited to enhancing environmental protection because of the holistic 
ecosystemic perspective they provide. Furthermore, if used in conjunction, 
they can head towards a suitable balance between anthropocentrism and 
ecocentrism. Combined, they have an ability to soften the divide between 
humanity and nature: this emerges partly because both are grounded in 
(inter alia) the vital interest of organisms in forming ecological 
communities.  
Another promising area for the deployment of nonhuman rights is 
individual rights of certain domesticated species. Although such rights can 
do less by way of environmental protection, they are still relevant to this 
thesis. Each of these three kinds of right will be reviewed in more detail. 
First though, it is worth summarising what this thesis has demonstrated 
about ‘vital rights’ themselves. 
10.2 VITAL RIGHTS: A SUMMARY 
This thesis has specified and analysed a particular kind of right: the sort of 
rights found in international human rights law (IHRL). Labelled ‘vital rights’, 
these are a subset of all rights, and include – but are not restricted to – 
IHRL. Vital rights are ‘Colossal’: like the Colossus of Rhodes, they stand 
astride two distinguishable but connected domains (law and morality), and 
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they dominate these domains because of their potency, urgency and 
function. 
Vital rights are vital in two senses: they are vested in living beings, and 
they protect essential interests. In short, vital rights are grounded in the 
essential interests of living beings (vital interests). The subject of vital 
rights is thus a real life embodied and embedded living being rather than 
an abstract legal persona: this is an important feature of vital rights. 
Although there must remain an element of technical legal personality to 
the vital rights subject (since they are legal rights), they must also 
continuously develop their ability to imagine their subjects as real living, 
‘fleshy’ beings.  
This thesis has analysed vital rights using Interest Theory and the 
Hohfeldian schemata of rights. This analysis has shown that vital rights are 
complex bundles of Hohfeldian positions containing a core bundle as well 
as claim-rights specifically designed to secure this core. The core bundle 
can typically be represented by a shorthand expression such as ‘the right 
to life’ that is grounded in vital interest(s) of the right-holder. These vital 
interests are fundamental enough to justify the creation of legal claim-
rights in a protective perimeter specifically designed to secure them. 
Within IHRL, these claim-rights are between individuals and their state, 
and can be analysed through the respect, protect, fulfil typology.  
The moral character of rights is thus predominantly found in their core, 
and their legal effect in their securement. Understanding vital rights as 
both moral and legal can also enhance understanding of their function. 
From a legal perspective, vital rights are grounded in interests; as moral 
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entitlements, they are justified by (eg) dignity. This duality means that 
dignity can be understood as being specified in a set of vital interests: this 
is compatible with dignity’s characterisations as pluralistic and inherent in 
living beings. Furthermore, the thesis has argued that to have dignity is to 
have a vital interest additional to the one in continued biological 
functioning. This is because more than mere survival is of value to 
something with dignity. 
Through this framework for vital rights, this thesis has argued that vital 
rights both could and should be vested in nonhumans. This is because 
nonhumans do have dignity: in particular, organisms have a vital interest 
in forming ecological communities.  
Although this thesis has considered dignity as the attribute of fundamental 
moral importance that vital rights protect, it is not contended that only 
dignity can provide the moral foundation for vital rights. Although a 
pluralistic conception of dignity provides it with plenty of room to cover a 
wide range of moral concerns, it might be possible to understand the 
essential moral demands of composite entities such as peoples and 
ecosystems through other conceptual handles.1 The thesis acknowledges 
that related concepts such as ‘intrinsic value’ or ‘integrity’ could also be 
used to justify vital rights. 
The thesis has not sought to explore all the many facets of vital rights, but 
rather to survey and analyse existing and potential approaches and 
                                       
1 David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice (OUP 2007) 145-46; Daniel 
Crescenzo, ‘Loose Integrity and Ecosystem Justice on Nussbaum’s Capabilities 
Approach’ (2013) 10 Environmental Philosophy 53, 56-59. 
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justifications for environmental human and nonhuman rights. In particular, 
further research is needed to explore the detailed technical ramifications of 
establishing new vital rights and how they could function within 
international law. For example, whether the model for IHRL (with states as 
the primary duty-bearers) can be seamlessly transposed, or whether more 
nuanced models (in particular with regards to duties and representation) 
are required to take into account the transboundary and public good 
nature of the natural world2 remains to be seen. The concepts of 
citizenship, jurisdiction and sovereignty may provide challenges here. 
A final point is to reflect on whether or not the focus of this thesis on rights 
was prudent. There are a number of difficulties in using rights in 
environmental protection, much of which is due to the history they come 
laden with. That is, rights are traditionally viewed as individualistic and 
adversarial: two properties which this thesis has shown to be anathema to 
suitable legal structures to protect the natural world. Rights are also often 
thought of as exercisable and combative: that is, right-holders themselves 
must be able to actively demand and deploy their rights against others. 
Again, this cannot be maintained for many of the rights suggested here. 
Indeed, a number of theories doubt the value of recourse to the notion of 
‘rights’ altogether within environmental discourse.3  
                                       
2 §2.4.1(a); §2.5.3; §9.7. 
3 Mark Sagoff, ‘On Preserving the Natural Environment’ (1974) 84 Yale LJ 205; 
Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (Random House 1975); PS Elder, ‘Legal Rights for 
Nature –The Wrong Answer to the Right(s) Question’(1984) 22 Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 285; Bill Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecology (Gibbs Smith 1985); 
Paul Taylor, Respect for Nature (Princeton University Press 1986); Cynthia 
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However, previously supposed properties of historical ‘rights’ have already 
been eroded by the development of contemporary IHRL (viz Baxi) and 
clearer understanding of the technical structure of rights (viz Hohfeld). 
Rights must no longer be considered as mere political trumps of land-
owning men; nor is it the case that duties or powers must come bundled 
with claim-rights. Both the ethos and the structure of rights have 
developed and must continue to develop as the content of what they 
protect evolves, and as understanding of their underlying subjects enriches. 
This thesis contributes towards this evolving understanding of what a ‘right’ 
is. The concept of ‘rights’ as a legal tool did emerge from Enlightenment 
Europe and were apotheosised by the American and French Revolutions. 
However, they are just that: a legal tool. And the use of this tool must 
change as how we wish to use it changes. The legal structures for 
environmental rights may require innovation, but such creativity is one of 
humanity’s greatest strengths.  
Even once it is accepted that rights in general are suitable for usage in 
environmental protection, the focus of this thesis on vital rights may be 
open to challenge. Other species of ‘rights’ that place greater emphasis on 
their legal rather than moral character may be able to provide more 
efficient environmental protection within a shorter time-frame. With the 
appropriate Hohfeldian filter in place, it can be argued that nonhumans 
already do have a number of legal rights through, for example, legislation 
                                                                                                              
Giagnocavo and Howard Goldstein, ‘Law Reform or World Re-form: The Problem of 
Environmental Rights’ (1990) 35 McGill Law Journal 345; Conor Gearty, ‘Do 
human rights help or hinder environmental protection?’ (2010) 1 JHRE 7, 7-10. 
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designed to protect animal welfare.4 The thesis could instead have 
explored these approaches. 
However, there is something important about the specific designation of a 
right that is found in vital rights.5 This deliberate use of ‘rights-language’ 
channels the particular potency of rights, and can provide environmental 
law with much needed urgency and emphasis. There is a significant 
difference between animal welfare laws and RoN, which is in part a 
consequence of the rhetorical potency of ‘rights’. This potency may be 
required if the oft-predicted and multiple global environmental 
catastrophes are to be avoided. Furthermore, consideration and 
establishment of nonhuman vital rights can develop insight into human’s 
undeniable nature as living beings. By understanding nonhuman rights as 
emerging from the same ground as human rights, the divide between 
humanity and nature can effectively be softened.  
10.3 KEY ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS  
Although there are a number of interrelated ways in which rights can be 
used to protect the natural world, there are three forms that show promise 
for legal development: a human right to a healthy environment; 
(ecosystemic) rights of nature; and animal rights. 
                                       
4 Mathew Kramer, ‘Do Animals and Dead People Have Legal Rights?’ (2001) 14 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 29; Tilikum et al v Sea World, 842 
F.Supp.2d 1259 (SD Cal 2012) 7 and Animal Welfare Board of India v A. Nagaraja 
& Ors Civil Appeal No. 5387 of 2014 [49], [51], [55], [60]. 
5 §4.2; §9.7.2. With respect to RoN, see Christopher Stone, ‘Should Trees Have 
Standing?’ (1972) 45 S Cal L Rev 450, 488-89; Christopher Miller, Environmental 
Rights (Routledge 1998) 176-87; Ngaire Naffine, ‘Legal personality and the natural 
world: on the persistence of the human measure of value’ (2012) 3 JHRE 68, 71. 
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10.3.1 A HUMAN RIGHT TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 
A human right to a healthy environment exists in numerous national 
constitution; has been created within the African and Inter-American 
regional human rights regimes; and has been referred to by the European 
Aarhus Convention. This right goes above and beyond the ‘greening’ of 
existing human rights since it provides a clear endorsement of the 
importance of environmental conditions to human dignity and permits for 
environmental issues to feature directly in standard setting and balancing 
processes within IHRL.  
Furthermore, by operating under a broad definition of ‘healthy 
environment’ – including both ecocentric and anthropocentric reference 
points such as clean, diverse, beautiful and functioning ecosystems – this 
right can truly offer increased substantive protection to both humans and 
nonhumans. In particular, it would place states under obligations to create 
and implement legal frameworks to protect biodiversity, and enhance 
IHRL’s ability to set (context-specific) standards for determining 
appropriate environmental conditions. Such a broad definition is not only 
possible, but has received support within national and international law. 
Furthermore, it would ensure that a human right to environment is not 
redundant by providing levels of environmental protection that ‘greening’ 
cannot.6 It would also contribute towards softening the divide between 
humanity and nature through its endorsement of the human need for 
healthy ecosystems. 
                                       
6 §3.3. 
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This thesis suggests that a human right to a healthy environment should 
be codified at the global level and should be vested in both individuals and 
groups. There are dimensions of environmental protection better 
understood as being of individual (or collective) concern (eg local pollution 
issues), but there are also environmental problems that necessitate a 
group response (eg global biodiversity loss). The groups to be protected by 
a human right to a healthy environment are envisaged here as broader 
than the definition of a ‘people’ normally seen within IHRL.7 In fact, a truly 
global understanding of groups is required to meet the global 
environmental problems facing the world today. That is, the nature of 
issues such as climate change potentially means that: 
The only viable perspective is a global one, focused not on 
the rights of individuals, or peoples, or states, but of 
humanity as whole. It would reconceptualize in the 
language of economic and social rights the idea of the 
environment as a common good or common concern of 
humanity.8 
Limitations remain to using human rights to effect environmental 
protection. The important criticism that drove the remainder of this thesis 
was the problem of anthropocentrism. This can be overcome to an extent 
by using ecocentric reference points for a ‘healthy environment’. However, 
human rights are by definition vested in humans and are thus unavoidably 
                                       
7 §1.4.2. 
8 Alan Boyle, ‘Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next?’ (2012) 23 EJIL 
613, 641. 
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anthropocentric. This anthropocentrism can be softened by understanding 
the human rights subject as not only embodied and socially embedded (as 
IHRL currently does), but as ecologically embedded too. Humans, as living 
organisms, have a vital interest in forming ecological communities. This 
interest contributes to grounding a human right to a healthy environment 
and demonstrates why the definition of a ‘healthy environment’ should 
include ecocentric reference points. 
However, the recognition that (human) flourishing happens in ecological as 
well as social communities points to a more radical, and potentially more 
successful, way to overcome this anthropocentrism. This is through the use 
of nonhuman rights. All organisms flourish in ecological communities and 
have an interest in healthy environments. The two approaches are 
interconnected and potentially highly compatible: both environmental 
human rights and RoN can be grounded in organisms’ vital interest in 
forming ecological communities. 
Another possibly undermining limitation of environmental human rights is 
related to scale. In terms of both time and space, environmental problems 
function in a way that extends IHRL to its limits. The conferral of standing 
upon future generations,9 and the achievement of closer alignment 
between extraterritorial applications of human rights and transboundary 
problems in international environmental law10 may potentially help solve 
these problems. 
                                       
9 §2.4.1(b). 
10 §2.5.3. 
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This thesis has demonstrated how best human rights can be used to 
protect the environment. By defining a human right to a healthy 
environment broadly, some of the key problems associated with it (such as 
redundancy) can be overcome, and a differentiation made between 
greened human rights and a human right to environment. The latter right 
can be a useful tool in protecting the natural world as long as it does not 
become the pinnacle for ecocentric environmental protection. The reason 
why it must not do so is because it is a priori incapable of acknowledging 
that moral duties are not only owed to humans. Since human rights are 
vested in humans, they can only protect the natural world for the sake of 
humans. No matter how ecocentrically defined, a human right to a healthy 
environment cannot capture that “[e]very form of life is unique, warranting 
respect regardless of its worth to man”.11 This is a significant limitation, 
since ecocentric formulations of morality are key to both environmental 
ethics and law.  
Future research can build on this thesis by exploring how a human right to 
a healthy environment could be established globally (eg through a 
standalone treaty, a protocol, or through General Comments); further 
elaborating the particular duties that would arise from the right; and 
investigating how an ecocentric definition of a healthy environment can 
align with other human rights. The concepts of ecohealth, biophilia, 
solastalgia and relational values may be helpful here,12 as might the 
                                       
11 WCN, Preamble. 
12 §3.2.1. 
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development and alignment of principles from both IHRL and 
environmental law regarding extraterritoriality and intertemporality.   
10.3.2 RIGHTS OF NATURE 
The other category of environmental rights suggested as a valuable tool for 
environmental protection by this thesis are rights of nature (RoN). These 
are less well-established, but the idea of nonhumans as rights-holders is 
gaining momentum within national law and recognition within international 
fora. Part II of this thesis demonstrated that it is technically possible to 
vest rights in nonhumans; Part III constructed an argument that vital 
rights should be vested in nonhumans.  
The thesis has used an Interest Theory approach to provide a stable 
foundation for RoN and to interlink them with IHRL. It has done this by 
showing that RoN, conceptualised as vital rights, can be conceived of as 
protecting nonhuman vital interests and dignity, just as IHRL protects 
human vital interests and dignity. 
The case made in this thesis for the creation of nonhuman vital rights is 
thus reliant on demonstrating the existence of nonhuman dignity. An 
argument for the existence of nonhuman dignity has been made in a non-
extensionist way. That is, rather than identifying attributes of certain other 
organisms that make them similar to humans, the thesis has analysed the 
very nature of vital interests and dignity. In particular, it has argued that 
dignity arises when something has a vital interest additional to the one in 
continued biological functioning. 
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The thesis has shown that many of the vital interests grounding IHRL are 
applicable beyond the human species. This is not because other organisms 
are somehow ‘nearly human’, but rather because the subject of vital rights 
(including the human rights subject) is a living being. As such, it is not 
surprising that other living beings also have vital interests: they are the 
essential interests of living beings after all. 
Living beings have essential interests because they are autopoietic. Being 
autopoietic means that organisms have internally-defined goals (self-
organisation and self-production), and they participate in activities in order 
to achieve these goals. As such, organisms have interests in the state of 
the world: things can go well or badly for them according to the fulfilment 
of their goals. Organisms are not neutral, but are loci of valuational activity 
with their own perspective on the world (their Umwelt). At the very least, 
organisms have a vital interest in continued biological functioning.  
Furthermore, the inherent relationality of autopoietic organisms means 
that they have an additional vital interest. Autopoietic organisms are 
inherently relational because in order to self-produce, they must intra-act 
through semi-permeable membranes with the world ‘outside’. The 
ecological ‘Self’ and ‘other’ are not independent, but co-constitutive. The 
ecological world is composed as much of relations as of matter, and the 
intrinsic relations and communities formed by organisms are essential to 
their flourishing. As a result, all organisms have a vital interest in forming 
ecological communities. This implies that organisms too have dignity: it is 
not just mere survival that matters to organisms, the kind of life matters 
too. 
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Because living organisms have dignity, they are viable candidates for the 
protection of vital rights. Nonhuman dignity is not the same as human 
dignity, and so nor should nonhuman rights be the same as human rights. 
Dignity is variable and pluralistic, and so vital rights should be variable in 
response: human rights are for humans, dolphin rights are for dolphins, 
forest rights are for forests. However, discerning parallels in the 
justifications for IHRL and RoN facilitates re-imagining of humans and the 
natural world as unified rather than distinct. This is potentially the greatest 
strength of RoN. 
The thesis has also argued that the dignity of organisms can be best 
addressed at the ecosystem level. That is, rather than seeking to bestow 
rights on “Mother Earth and all beings of which she is composed”13 as the 
UDRME does, this thesis has argued that it is more manageable and 
justifiable to vest RoN in ecosystems, even though they are ultimately 
justified by the dignity of organisms. This is a valid approach because 
‘organisms’ and ‘ecosystems’ are two perspectives of the same underlying 
reality. Organisms are ‘organisms-in-their-ecosystems, and ecosystems 
are ‘ecosystems-through-their-organisms’: the ecosystem and the 
organism are equiprimordial.  
The ecosystem perspective is appropriate for the vesting of RoN because it 
immediately captures and is concerned with the relationality of organisms. 
By protecting the ecosystem, organisms’ interest in forming ecological 
communities can be respected, protected and fulfilled. This is comparable 
                                       
13 Article 2(1). 
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to how peoples’ rights are used by IHRL to protect the social 
embeddedness of humans. 
There are, moreover, additional motives for protecting the dignity of 
organisms through ecosystem rights: both ecology and existing 
environmental law are often already focussed at this level-of-organisation; 
they provide a defensible simplification that overcomes the impossibility of 
accounting for the interests of every living being; and ecosystems are 
themselves potential bearers of dignity14 and/or intrinsic value.15 As well as 
vesting rights in ecosystems, it may also be appropriate to vest RoN in the 
whole biosphere (or Mother Earth). Although ecosystems can be identified 
as units (and legal subjects can be made of them), they will always intra-
act with one another. As a result, many environmental problems are truly 
global in scope (eg climate change), and solutions to such problems 
require a whole-Earth perspective. Vesting rights in the Earth would also 
help reconceptualise the natural world as a common good not only of 
humanity, but of all forms of life. Such an approach is certainly possible, 
and warrants further investigation: it is not clear that the same 
justifications and content for vital rights can simply be extrapolated to a 
different level-of-organisation. 
Focussing on ecological interconnectedness for justifying RoN is, however, 
not without its flaws. Examples can doubtless be given of the extraction of 
organisms from their natural environment that hardly seem to entail a 
                                       
14 §8.3.4. 
15 §9.6.1(d). 
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violation of dignity. It seems unlikely that RoN should protect against the 
keeping of houseplants, for instance.16 This may be a result of the difficulty 
in moving between the organism perspective and the ecosystem 
perspective, or it may demonstrate a need to develop understanding of the 
vitality and versatility of many nonhuman lifeforms. In either case, the 
balance between individual interests and ecosystem integrity is an issue 
that RoN will have to engage with more fully in order to further solidify 
their justification, their content, and their duties. 
Examples that may help understand how to balance these discrepancies 
are particularly abundant in agricultural systems. The differences between 
monoculture and permaculture, or between fertilisation by petrochemicals 
and by nutrient-recycling, indicate the importance of connection without 
demanding that rights be vested in every single organism. Food systems in 
general provide an excellent arena for developing many of the themes 
discussed in this thesis (factory farming and therapeutic horticulture being 
other examples). Further research in this area could identify agricultural 
practices that are and are not compliant with RoN, for example. 
As regards some of the technical aspects of RoN, it is clear that they 
require the creation of new legal subjects. This is technically unproblematic. 
Since legal personhood is a construct invented by humans, it can be 
defined however humans wish. The Hohfeldian analysis has demonstrated 
that legal subjects need not hold identical or symmetrical legal positions 
                                       
16 Although these are hardly isolated: the soil is full of life. See Rudolf Steiner, 
Agriculture Course: The Birth of the Biodynamic Method (George Adams tr, Rudolf 
Steiner Press 2004) 68-69. 
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(in particular, being a right-holder does not require being a duty-bearer). 
This appropriately non-identical extension of legal personhood has already 
been seen in the creation of IHRL and in the Reparations case. 
Furthermore, the apparent ‘fuzziness’ of the boundaries of ecosystems 
should not be seen as too damaging: both peoples and indeed individual 
humans show some element of fuzziness in their boundaries too, yet legal 
systems have plainly proved capable of vesting rights in them. 
Related to, but distinguishable from, the identification of the correct 
holders of RoN is their representation. As seen in established RoN laws, it 
is possible for appropriate representation for RoN to be found (NGOs are 
perhaps the best candidate). The detailed arrangements for this within 
international law requires further research. Recalling the divide seen in 
Chapter Three between legal viability and moral legitimacy, representation 
falls into the former category, whereas this thesis was primarily concerned 
with the moral legitimacy of RoN. 
Finally, although the content of ecosystem rights has been discussed in 
this thesis, greater detail is still needed. Identifying appropriate duty-
bearers for RoN, and the content of their duties, is an issue connected to 
this. Precedents from RoN in Bolivia, Ecuador and New Zealand, and from 
the mock tribunals set up by the Global Alliance for Rights of Nature,17 may 
help determine what works and what does not work from both legal and 
environmental perspectives. What seems promising is for the content of 
RoN to be focussed on the processes through which living organisms 
                                       
17 See <http://therightsofnature.org/lima-2014-tribunal/> (accessed 21/4/2015). 
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regenerate themselves (such as water and nutrient cycles), as well as on 
safeguarding ecosystems that are themselves resilient, focussing on non-
fragmentation, diversity, and undammed rivers. An overarching principle 
that can guide the content of RoN is for humans to work with rather than 
against natural processes.  
Broadly speaking, the RoN approach gives a voice to the nonhuman natural 
world which is difficult to achieve without the legal tool of a right. Vital 
rights have been used to elevate and protect the most important aspects 
of being a human, coded for through ‘human dignity’. They can also be 
used to protect nonhuman dignity. This thesis has contributed to RoN-
theory by demonstrating how RoN can be aligned with IHRL through an 
Interest Theory approach. This can play a valuable role in the creation of a 
new cosmology (or mythology) which resituates humans as a part of the 
natural world and can effectively guide human action in the 21st Century. 
It also allows human rights to be seen as an example of the species-
specific rights referred to in Articles 1(6) and 4(2) of the UDRME, further 
endorsing humans’ status as first living beings. A cosmology which 
endorses RoN will see humans as first violin, rather than the conductor, of 
Earth’s living orchestra. 
10.3.3 INDIVIDUAL NONHUMAN RIGHTS 
There is also a strong case (and evolving legal pathways) for individual 
rights of certain nonhuman organisms. This thesis has demonstrated that it 
is technically possible for nonhumans to be the holders of rights through a 
rigorous and clear Hohfeldian analysis of the nature of rights themselves. 
Individuals of domesticated species, and those which are more ‘individual’ 
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than they are ‘continuous’18 (including livestock, pets and animals used for 
research) are the forerunners here. The content of these rights can be 
aligned (though not equated) with the content of human rights.  
However, it is not readily apparent that such rights contribute towards 
environmental protection. They may improve the lives of caged 
chimpanzees and factory farmed pigs, but they are not directly concerned 
with the state of the natural world at large. On the other hand, if bestowed 
on wild animals (such as in the Helsinki Declaration), then their role in 
environmental protection is more visible. In particular, human and (eg) 
dolphin rights to a healthy environment could be seen to work in tandem. 
Individual nonhuman rights also contribute towards shifting attitudes 
towards the nonhuman world and demonstrate the softness of the divide 
between humanity and nature. Their effect can therefore be seen as 
indirect rather than direct.  
  *   
A potential problem with the nonhuman rights seen in this thesis must be 
noted. An asymmetrical development of nonhuman rights may be under 
development. Certain organisms (eg chimpanzees) and certain ecosystems 
(eg Te Urewera) could be bestowed with legal rights before others. There 
may be a prioritisation towards the more culturally and/or ecologically 
significant species and ecosystems in this regard. Such rights cannot then 
be said to be universal, an important feature of human rights. This trap 
can be dealt with by pointing out that dignity and the moral core is 
                                       
18 §9.6.1(b). 
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universal, even if the securing claim-rights are not. The differentiation 
arises in considering where it is that human responsibility lies.19 The legal 
architecture protecting nonhuman dignity is dependent on the relationship 
between the humans and the nonhumans in question. It is essential in this 
regard to remember that the creation of nonhuman rights is concerned 
with regulating human behaviour (humans are the only suitable Hohfeldian 
duty-bearers after all). Choosing the most suitable legal forms must have 
in mind the nature of human duties appropriate to secure rights as much 
as philosophical theories underpinning claims and liberties worthy of being 
rights. 
10.4 DIGNITY, HUMANITY, ANIMALITY 
The concept of dignity has been integral to the thesis. It is worth 
summarising what has been seen about it and making some final 
observations concerning it. Dignity may be a vague and abstract concept, 
but it is not entirely arbitrary and meaningless. This thesis has established 
a number of features of dignity. 
10.4.1 DIGNITY SIGNPOSTS WHAT MATTERS AND WHY IT MATTERS 
Dignity serves two functions within vital rights. Dignity is both a metric, 
shepherding the content of vital rights and assisting in their interpretation; 
and a justification for the existence of vital rights ‘to begin with’.20 Because 
dignity serves as both metric and justification, it signposts both what 
matters and why it matters. The contours of dignity follow the contours of 
                                       
19 §9.6.1(a). 
20 §1.5.1n191. 
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suffering and flourishing; but dignity also has the ability to invoke 
responses and call for action. Dignity demands that suffering be prevented 
and flourishing promoted.  
These two roles are inevitably intertwined: chimpanzees (eg) matter 
because there are things that matter to and about them. They must be 
treated with dignity because they have dignity; and they have dignity 
because it is possible to treat them in an undignified way. Dignity is 
multifaceted and multifunctional – it must be for it to be able to underpin 
the potent legal and moral norms contained within vital rights. 
10.4.2 DIGNITY ARISES WHEN MORE THAN SURVIVAL MATTERS 
The possibility (though undesirability) of undignified treatment also reveals 
an important feature of dignity. Because dignity is a metric as well as a 
justification, it is a richer and more variable concept than the similar 
concept of intrinsic value. In this thesis a distinction between the two has 
been drawn on account of the fact that dignity, unlike intrinsic value, is 
also concerned with the detailed nature of appropriate treatment, rather 
than just being an end-in-itself.21 Having dignity means that it is desirable 
to live a life in dignity, the details of which are determinable through 
dignity’s role as a metric. The possibility of living an undignified life means 
that dignity exists when there are things other than mere survival of value.  
As there are potentially numerous things other than mere survival that are 
of value to organisms, and because these are not necessarily universally 
                                       
21 §8.4.1-8.4.2. 
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applicable, dignity is pluralistic, flexible and variable.22 It is not just life 
that matters to something with dignity, but the kind of life. This thesis has 
further explained this distinction through the lens of vital interests. 
10.4.3 DIGNITY CAPTURES WHAT IS ESSENTIAL TO LIVING BEINGS 
Vital interests are the essential interests of living beings. Because vital 
rights protect both dignity (rhetorically) and interests (analytically), it is 
possible to overlap the two concepts. This thesis has argued that dignity is 
specified through vital interests because dignity captures what is essential 
to living beings.23 Furthermore, since dignity arises when more than mere 
survival is of value, dignity arises when something has a vital interest 
additional to the one in continued biological functioning.24 
The thesis has shown that organisms’ essential interests arise through 
their autopoietic nature.25 There is a reason why possessing dignity 
requires an interest additional to the one in biological functioning. This is 
because that interest can in some senses be considered to be the basic 
interest: it is not possible to have other vital interests without having one 
in continued biological functioning. The possession of further interests, 
though they are indicative of more complex forms of life, also represent 
restrictions and limitations on how an organism can survive and flourish. 
Organisms have these further interests because they are limited in how 
                                       
22 §6.4.2. 
23 §6.5. 
24 §8.4.2. 
25 §9.2. 
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they can effect their continued biological functioning: not all conditions are 
equal from an organism’s point of view, and it is the simpler organisms 
such as bacteria that are able to survive under a much greater variety of 
conditions and so have fewer vital interests. There is thus somewhat of a 
hierarchy between vital interests, which is connected to the varying 
complexity of life and the increased specialism and limitations that 
increased complexity brings. This thesis provides ground for further 
research into this area: linking concepts such as autopoiesis, autonomy, 
dignity, agency, legal subjectivity, capabilities, and vulnerability. 
It is also important to note that dignity cannot be entirely reduced to vital 
interests. Dignity carries something above and beyond what a simple set of 
interests can. This is because dignity also represents the fusion and the 
togetherness of these interests and the subject they inhere in. Through 
this overarching character of dignity, it is able to call out for action in a 
coherent and unified fashion and so function as a justification for vital 
rights. Dignity represents the fullness and vitality of life, something so 
complex that any attempt to analyse it will always provide only a limited 
perspective. 
10.4.3 DIGNITY INHERES IN EMBEDDED ORGANISMS 
Because dignity is tied to the very essential processes of life, and because 
dignity is not a status to be awarded,26 dignity is inherent in living 
organisms (a result of ‘a real, historical and biological birth’27). As such, 
                                       
26 §1.5.2. 
27 §6.4.1n62. 
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dignity arises through physical processes: it is not a supernatural 
phenomenon, nor is it some non-material ‘implant’, but instead it is bound 
up in and emerges through the embodied and embedded nature of living 
organisms.28 
The thesis has shown that much of the content of dignity is not exclusively 
human, nor is human dignity derived from a status of humans-as-opposed-
to-animals, but rather from humans’ status as living beings.29 This is 
important: dignity should not be used in a vain attempt to maintain an 
arbitrary division between the human and the nonhuman, but rather to 
celebrate the vulnerability and animality of humanity that we share with 
other forms of life. 
Humans have the privileged ability to reflect on our own existence. 
Through this capacity, we have unEarthed ourselves from our bodily world 
into a psychological, mythological and philosophical one. The development 
of most major world religions in the first millennium BCE “made it possible 
in principle for the self to become disembedded from society and society 
from the given world of nature”.30 However, humans cannot escape our 
worldly and bodily selves: attempting to deny these results in an 
impoverished conceptualisation of what it is to be human since they are 
crucial and axiomatic to who we are. Denial of our animality works to the 
detriment of humans and nonhumans alike. 
                                       
28 §6.4. 
29 §6.4.3; §8.2-8.3. 
30 The so-called ‘Axial Age’: Robert Bellah, Imagining Japan (University of 
California Press 2003) 6. 
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Perhaps most importantly, dignity is shared and arises through relation.31 
Although the loci of dignity may be individual organisms, these organisms 
are not exclusively individual after all. They exist through intrinsic relations 
and their flourishing happens in community.32 Dignity therefore is caught 
up in relations and processes which are not only physically ‘outside’, but 
even operate at levels-of-organisation other than the individual altogether 
(eg families or ecosystems). The importance of the social dimension of 
being human is gaining recognition through, inter alia, peoples’ rights. This 
thesis contends that there is a parallel to be found in the ecological 
dimension of dignity, one common to all forms of life, to be recognised and 
protected through, inter alia, ecosystem rights. 
10.5 CONCLUSION 
There is not one simple approach by which vital rights can be used to 
protect the natural world, but many related ones. The various approaches 
overlap with one another. For example, procedural and substantive 
environmental human rights work best in tandem; both humans and 
nonhumans have a demonstrable interest in living in a healthy 
environment; and RoN share content with environmental human rights. 
Perhaps most significantly, the interest in forming ecological communities 
can ground both a broadly defined human right to a healthy environment 
and rights of ecosystems. 
                                       
31 §1.4-1.5; §2.4.1; §3.4; §4.4; §5.5.2, §6.4; §7.3.3; §8.4; §9.2-9.4. 
32 §9.2-9.4. 
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These overlaps are a result of the shared nature of interests of living 
beings. That interests are shared in this way is a consequence of our 
thoroughly relational, interconnected and continuous world. Given Part II’s 
defence of the claim that rights protect interests, it follows that neither the 
subjects nor the content of environmental rights can be housed in 
watertight boxes. Importantly, this is true as much between humanity and 
nature as it is within the nonhuman realm. That is, human interest in the 
state of the natural world operates broadly in tandem with nonhuman 
interest in the state of the natural world. As (first) living beings, it is 
impossible to cut human interest apart from the interest of other living 
systems. An important consequence of this is that it is ultimately in the 
interest of humans that nonhumans be protected too. This is in line with 
Bryan Norton’s ‘Convergence Hypothesis’ which states that “policies 
serving the interests of the human species as a whole, and in the long run, 
will serve also the ‘interests’ of nature, and vice versa”.33 
There will of course be discrepancies between the immediate interests of 
humans, other organisms, and the ecosystem (conflict will be felt both 
within and between these three categories). But the role of vital rights is to 
demarcate the boundaries within which these discrepancies cannot be 
traded off. They are the moral bedrock, not the solution to all ethical and 
legal dilemmas. Already a degree of balancing is present within both 
environmental and human rights law, and the creation of more ecocentric 
rights would simply frame these balancing processes. That is, additional 
                                       
33 Bryan Norton, Toward Unity Among Environmentalists (OUP 1991) 240. 
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environmental rights would allow for concerns over the state of the natural 
world and over the moral demands of nonhuman organisms to feature in 
the same framework – and with the same language, rhetoric and legal 
form – as other important values which have already received the 
protection of vital rights. 
A plurality of environmental rights also allows for a plurality of pragmatic 
approaches. It allows flexibility in terms of which level to focus at 
(ecosystem or organism, human or nonhuman). This flexibility serves to 
strengthen the twinned systems of environmental and human rights law by 
providing mutually supporting (although at times contrasting) ways to 
understand complex problems. As seen in Chapter Nine, a multitude of 
perspectives is essential. 
In terms of establishment, a piecemeal introduction of environmental 
rights seems both likely and appropriate. Rights of individuals of 
domesticated species, rights of culturally or ecologically important 
ecosystems, and a human right to a healthy environment are the 
forerunners in this regard. 
The existence of nonhuman vital interests, or nonhuman intrinsic value, or 
even nonhuman dignity, does not mean that the creation of nonhuman 
rights is mandatory. Rather, it simply provides a possible justification for 
them. The decision to create RoN is ultimately a political one. This may 
well turn out to be a sensible decision, given its potential to protect all 
living beings (humans included). The point is to add ecological dimensions 
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to existing ethics, not to replace an anthropocentric ethic with a 
misanthropic one.34  
Vital rights, justified by dignity, can be used as tools to protect life on this 
planet. Much of human dignity is shared with and similar to that of others, 
both human and nonhuman. These overlaps are most apparent when 
considering the ecological aspects of dignity, but exist elsewhere too. 
Environmental rights can work best when their adversarial nature is turned 
down and their ability to protect corporate entities such as ecosystems 
used. To this end, ecocentric models for rights, with both humans and 
nonhumans as their subjects, presents the most promising way forward for 
using vital rights to protect the natural world through international law.
                                       
34 Patrick Curry, Ecological Ethics (2nd edn, Polity Press 2011) 57-59. 
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